TA.2
FIRE SUPPORT BOS
Strengths
* Technical fire direction: Field artillery battery fire direction centers (FDC) have made great strides improving technical fire direction knowledge. Junior enlisted soldiers demonstrate a greater understanding of computing accurate, timely firing data. Additionally, FDCs use backup firing capabilities to provide continuous responsive fires.
* Digital communications: Units demonstrate great skill establishing and maintaining digital tactical and technical communications. SINCGARS proficiency, coupled with routine home station LTACFIRE training, produce effective results. TECHNIQUE: Continue to reinforce home station training involving digital communications between the Fire Finder radar (Q36), FA battalion FDC (LTACFIRE), brigade FSO (LTACFIRE), DIVARTY (LTACFIRE), battalion FSO (FED/FIST DMD), and firing battery (BCS).
* Commanders and FSO integration: Commanders and fire support officers from brigade through company understand the importance of integrating fires to support the scheme of maneuver. Commanders and their fire supporters do an excellent job of determining: 1) how fires will be used to support the scheme of maneuver 2) when fires are critical 3) where fires must be placed to support maneuver plans 4) restrictions for fires to ensure they do not interfere with the scheme of maneuver. The habitual relationship of fire supporters to their maneuver units is working. FSCOORDS and FSOs have assumed the responsibility for integrating all aspects of mortars into the indirect fire system. Mortars are normally provided survey by the FA battalion. Ballistic MET is normally provided to mortars. Battalion and company FSOs have assumed the responsibility for providing mortars with guidance on positioning, commander's attack guidance, and the ammunition needed to support combat operations. Mortars have become the weapon of choice to provide immediately responsive fires for maneuver forces. TECHNIQUE: Mortars are integrated with field artillery and other fires support assets to echelon fires during objective preparation, to allow maneuver forces to close with and destroy the enemy.
Needs Emphasis
* Targeting process: The brigade level targeting process often lacks focus and fails to orient collection and supporting fires. Targeting meetings are conducted, but routinely fail to focus combat power to find, fix and finish critical high pay-off targets. Most units do not use the results of targeting meeting to refocus their collection plans or task specific units to confirm or deny named areas of interest. There is often little follow up on taskings that are given to subordinate units as part of the targeting process. The "decide" element is being done adequately. However, the execution of detect, deliver and assess needs great improvement. TECHNIQUE: The targeting process must become a routine action managed by the brigade XO or S3. The process must use the commander's intent to focus assets on finding, fixing and finishing the enemy. "Decide, Detect, Deliver, Assess" is a continuous process that must be understood and integrated by all brigade task force BOS members.
* Automated fire planning: Brigade and battalion fire support elements are not using LTACFIRE, Digital Message Devices (DMD), or Forward Entry Devices (FEDs) to update target lists and compute fire plans. RESULT: 1) errors in target grids 2) lengthy radio transmissions 3) lack of automated tactical fire direction 4) delayed input at the battalion FDC. Automated fire planning is rarely being used, even in the defense where soldiers' load is rarely a problem. TECHNIQUES: 1) Establish SOPs and routine training programs to improve/sustain automated fire planning performance 2) Include all digital players, using and operational scenario over realistic distances.
* Clearance of fires: Timely clearance of fires (counterfire and targets of opportunity) remains one of the greatest challenges of forces training at the JRTC. Mission processing is generally good. However, the inability of most units to battle track their subordinate elements causes great delays in clearing fires. Clearance times are averaging five minutes when the goal is under two minutes. Drills and pre- clearance techniques are being used but continued emphasis is needed. Maneuver commanders must carefully balance timely clearance with the fratricide caused by faulty planning and procedures. TECHNIQUES: 1) Brigade and battalion task forces must develop and implement TOC drills, pre- clearance matrices, and effective communications to improve fires clearance times. 2) TOC drills must be simple and well rehearsed. The focus of the drill is the effectiveness of friendly battle tracking. 2) Pre-clearance matrices are effective when updated and employed across the brigade task force. 3) Immediate communications during the clearance process is vital.
* Slow indirect fires: Most fire support teams are not well trained in the adjustment of indirect fires onto rapidly moving mounted and dismounted enemy forces. FIST teams, FCT teams and scouts must be able to call for fires quickly, while in contact. Decentralized, "fast" fire missions are rarely seen, particularly during the offense. TECHNIQUES: 1) One round adjustments, bold shifts and use of priority targets are weaknesses which can be overcome by aggressive force-on-force home station training. 2) Observers must train to adjust fire onto moving enemy elements from the prone position. Once the first round is on the ground, the observer must make a bold, accurate shift and fire for effect. 3) Priority targets and selected use of quick fire channels can assist the observer in firing missions "fast." 4) A force-on-force exercise prior to the rotation is extremely helpful for fire support personnel.. TSFO and static observation posts do not challenge observers like a fast moving OPFOR.
* JAAT proficiency: JAAT planning and coordination are normally not conducted by units as a part of the staff planning process. JAAT coordination normally consists of only the exchange of frequencies to be used to coordinate the employment of attack aviation and close air support aircraft. Indirect fires are normally not planned to support employment of attack aviation and close air support. TECHNIQUE: During home station training, integrate attack aviation, close air support and idirect fires into the planning, coordination and rehearsal process. Follow FM 6-20-50, appendix C for JAAT planning, coordination, and execution. PROCEDURE: Develop SOPs for JAAT employment and integrate the procedures into the unit TSOP.



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