TA.7
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BOS
Strengths
CSS
* Technical/MOS skills of CSS personnel: CSS soldiers continue to demonstrate high levels of MOS and technical proficiency.
* Maintenance (Aviation): AVUM companies and crew chief efforts continue to be commendable. Rarely are aircraft not fully mission capable at execution time. AVUMs' downed aircraft recovery efforts also continue to improve. Quick reaction with the right personnel, equipment, and security force are key to recovery operations and become significant combat multipliers.
* Casualty processing (fire support): Unit casualty evacuation and processing has improved tremendously in the last few months. The effective use of combat lifesavers and medics at small unit level and expeditious evacuation of casualties has greatly reduced the number of soldiers dying of wounds.
* Transporting, collecting, and treating casualties (task force maneuver): Squads, platoons and companies are doing well at planning casualty collection and treatment. Individual soldiers know where the collection points are and routinely understand the correct method to transport casualties without causing more severe injuries. Initial triage and treatment by medics and combat lifesavers are strengths. Platoon sergeants and first sergeants are doing a good job at managing the casualty evacuation system.
* Treat and evacuate casualties (chemical platoon): Good CASEVAC plans are being developed and briefed down to the individual soldier level. TECHNIQUE: Platoons are arriving with at least one combat lifesaver per squad, and at least one vehicle is dedicated for evacuation. NOTE: A PFC took charge when his platoon suffered heavy casualties and evacuated all casualties in a timely manner.
7.5.1.2 Move/Evacuate Cargo, Equipment, and Personnel
* Convoy task organization: Units are task organizing convoys for combat. They are including military police and engineers as integral parts of convoy operations.
* Battalion trains use of Army aviation: Units are using Army aviation assets, when available, very well. Sling loading operations are a strength for the unit trains. Soldiers are well trained and aerial resupply is integrated into CSS planning.
* Soldier's load: Leaders are making great progress at reducing the soldier's load. The most important contribution to a reduced load is soldier confidence in the task force logistics system. When soldiers believe that the task force will deliver their ruck sacks and comfort items at a promised time, then soldiers will carry only essential equipment on their backs.
Public Affairs
7.4.3.5.3 Provide Public Information
* Speaking to the media: Commanders overall are willing to speak with the media and allow access to subordinate units. Commanders articulate a positive command message, even when dealing with sensitive or controversial subjects, ie., fratricide, casualties, accidents, host nation concerns, etc.
Civil Affairs
7.8 Conduct Civil Affair in Area
* Civil Affairs skills: Civil affairs direct support teams (DSTs) are consistently strong at basic civil affairs skills. They deploy with a good understanding of the mission and how to apply CA to help accomplish the mission.
* TOC operations/TOC SOP: DSTs understand and have a good grasp of TOC operations and consistently have a very strong TSOP. They assure the CA situation board is complete and up-to-date.
* Soldier skills: The CA soldier is well trained, motivated and ready to fight. They are proficient at most soldier skills, particularly map reading.
Needs Emphasis
CSS
* Sustainment operations (mech/armor): Heavy teams either do not have or do not effectively use their written logistical SOP. Typically, the heavy team does not deploy with a working logistical tracking, reporting, or requesting system. The link from the heavy team to the brigade ALOC typically lacks the appropriate prior coordination and planning to be effective. Because of the austere nature of a light infantry brigade task force and the unique needs of the heavy team, it is critical for heavy team CSS personnel to be totally integrated into the brigade ALOC planning process.
* Combat readiness analysis: Units fail to consistently submit daily DA Form 2406 to the brigade S4. RESULT: the S4 and the support operations officer cannot analyze the task force's combat readiness.
PROCEDURE: Strictly enforce reporting procedures in TSOPs. TECHNIQUE: Conduct LOGEXs at home station to train and reinforce reporting requirements.
* CSS integration: Brigade staffs are not integrating the brigade S1, S4, and FSB support operations into the staff planning process. RESULT: the logistics plan is not tied into the tactical plan. The S1, S4 and FSB staff have difficulty tracking the battle. This prevents them from anticipating requirements, or from providing proactive logistical support. It also hinders functioning as a brigade alternate TOC.
* Mortar maintenance: Many 60mm and 81mm mortars are not maintained to TM-10 and -20 standards. A large percentage of mortar sections show up without DA Form 2804-4 and all required section equipment. Also, many 60mm mortars fail to fire in the drop mode, forcing the gunner to fire them using the trigger.
7.4.4.1 Provide Medical Treatment
* Provide radiological services: Most medical companies are unable to provide X-ray capability. Equipment is not maintained or inspected as part of pre-combat checks. Most units experience a film/developer incompatibility. X-ray specialists are not proficient with their equipment. TECHNIQUE: Establish and employ the field X-ray during all FTXs and in support of sick call at the TMC on a monthly basis.
* Casualty evacuation (ADA): A high number of air defense soldier deaths are attributable to "die of wounds" resulting from a failure of timely evacuation of the wounded. Routinely air defense leaders and soldiers are unfamiliar with their supported unit's casualty evacuation plan; never rehearse it; never develop contingency plans. TECHNIQUES: Refer to CALL newsletters 89-5, "Commander's Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) System" and 91-5, "Battlefield Logistics."
* Casualty evacuation execution: CASEVAC continues to be a significant shortcoming. 1) Units do not have established procedures for evacuating casualties through the system from the point of injury to the division rear and out. 2) Staffs are not familiar enough with doctrine and unit SOP to develop an effective plan. 3) Control of aeromedical evacuation assets continues to be an unresolved issue.
7.5.1.2 Move/Evacuate Cargo, Equipment and Personnel
* Health service support in a chemical environment: Units are unprepared to decontaminate and treat chemical casualties. Soldiers and medical officers are unfamiliar with current chemical casualty care protocols. Chemical treatment sets are not properly stocked. Medical supplies and equipment are not safeguarded prior to anticipated chemical attack. TECHNIQUES: 1) Review FM 8-10-7 and "Medical management of Chemical Casualties" Handbook (Aug 93). 2) Develop an STX based on ARTEP task 8-2-0314. 3) Update unit treatment protocols.
* Aerial resupply planning: Brigade S4s typically do not adequately coordinate, synchronize or control available aviation assets earmarked for use in aerial resupply. BSA tenants also fail to efficiently manage aviation assets. RESULT: flight and crew days are not maximized; air missions are not adequately planned and briefed; loads are not properly rigged; A2C2 procedures are not fully implemented. TECHNIQUES: 1) Establish a single point of contact in the brigade command post/brigade support area to plan and coordinate aviation requirements. 2) Station an aviation LNO in the rear command post who articulates brigade lift requirements to the aviation task force commander. 3) Conduct abbreviated air mission coordination meetings with user units and the aviation LNO.
* Class V resupply-STINGER: Continued emphasis must be placed on the actual resupply process between the FSB/ATP and the deployed STINGER and Avengers sections to ensure the rounds reach the ADA fire units. ADA units routinely do not tie into and use existing LOGPACs going from the FSB to the task forces. RESULT: ADA leadership, using organic lift, go back to the FSB to conduct missile resupply. Battery personnel must do a better job requesting, receiving and issuing small arms, anti-tank (e.g., AT4, LAWS, etc.), and claymore mines. RESULT: ADA personnel will not have to conduct combat operations with ammunition quantities well below even basic load quantities. TECHNIQUE: Locate the first sergeant at the FSB/ATP to serve as the air defense liaison.
7.7.2 Conduct Law and Order Operations
* Checkpoint operations: OOTW operations often require infantry units to operate checkpoints or roadblocks. Generally, soldiers manning checkpoints do not thoroughly understand the Rules of Engagement (ROE) or their purpose. 1) Soldiers do not understand the use of deadly force; who they should or should not search; have no specific list of contraband items; have no clear instructions for dealing with refugees. 2) Units do not have a plan for what to do with detained personnel. 3) Units rarely have a plan for what they want the checkpoint to look like, ie., barricades, vehicle search area, male and female search areas, holding areas, etc.,. RESULT: checkpoint often does not accomplish what the commander intended. Contraband items often get through; friendly locals/host nation officials are often needlessly detained. These actions anger the local populace and make them lose confidence in US forces. TECHNIQUES: 1) Establish the physical layout of the checkpoint to best accomplish the required tasks. 2) Rehearsals for checkpoint operations should include likely scenarios that the soldiers will face (friendly locals with contraband; terrorists; refugees; host nation officials; snipers, etc). NOTE: see FM 7-10, appendix A; FM 7-20, appendix C; FM 7-98, pages 4-18 through 4-20; FM 17-98, appendix E for more checkpoint techniques and procedures.
Public Affairs
7.4.3.5 Provide Public Affairs Services
* Staff planning: Brigade and battalion staffs are not included in the planning, preparation and execution of media events.
* Public affairs assets and asset location: Task force commanders do not deploy with public affairs assets or designate public affairs/media liaisons at brigade, battalion and company levels. Public affairs assets available are not appropriately located to support and conduct public affairs during operations. TECHNIQUES: 1) Appoint media liaisons at all levels of command to interact with the news media and serve as a media escort. 2) Locate the task force public affairs officer or NCO and other public affairs assets in the ALOC, which contains the logistical assets to support the media's needs during media events.
* Public affairs SOPs: Units do not have SOPs for conduct of public affairs operations during deployments.
* Scheduled versus unscheduled media visits: Units refuse to speak to the media during unscheduled visits. TECHNIQUE: If time is available and the visit will not interfere with the mission, then units should not automatically refuse to speak to the media if the visit is unscheduled. Contact a public affairs liaison and advise of the presence of media; use the liaison as a go-between and see if time can be reasonably set aside for a visit.
* Credentialed versus uncredentialed media: Units often refuse to speak with uncredentialed media. Great numbers of media personnel from around the world deploy to areas of operation. Many hundreds of media from the host nation may also be present. Only "willing" media are credentialed. Credentialing is not a requirement to speak with US forces. Units may speak to uncredentialed media if time is available and will not interfere with the mission. TECHNIQUE: If you recognize the news reporter, allow him/her a few minutes of your time. If you do not recognize them, politely refer them back to the division or JTF public affairs officer for credentialing.
* Delay at the wire: During scheduled media visits, units spend a lot of time delaying media at the wire or perimeter before allowing access to the unit. TECHNIQUE: Do not delay the media at the wire during scheduled visits. Allow credentialed media accompanied by a military or DOD escorts immediate access. Time is money to the command and the media. Helping the media get their story quickly pays big dividends for your unit.
* Speaking with one voice: During media visits, leaders and soldiers give conflicting information about their unit's activities or about subjects the news media is covering. TECHNIQUE: Get public affairs guidance and important information down to the lowest level. It is important all members of your unit speak with one voice. RESULT: gets an accurate story out and gives you and the unit credibility with the media.
* Treatment of the press: Units handle or treat media according to their origin and affiliate. TECHNIQUE: Treat all media the same, regardless of affiliation or nationality. Telling your story truthfully and accurately to all affiliations and nationalities, while maintaining OPSEC, is important.
* Avoidance of the press: Units avoid the press for fear of making mistakes or not being comfortable with granting an interview. TECHNIQUE: Do not avoid the press. If you do not tell your unit's story, the media will tell it for you. If time or mission do not permit an interview, explain your situation to the reporter. Tell him/her you are busy now, but that you would like to reschedule.
* Home station training: Units do not plan or prepare for public affairs deployment operations at home station.
Civil Affairs
7.8 Conduct Civil Affairs in Area
* Command and Control: Civil affairs direct support teams experienced uncertainty in the area of command relationships. Direct support teams were often unclear on the difference between being under OPCON or attached to subordinate units. The distinction was often not spelled out in operation or fragmentary orders. There also was confusion about whether the G5 is a reporting channel or a level of command that the DST supports. PROCEDURE: The G5 is a reporting channel, not a command channel. The G5 does not exercise command authority over the S5 or DSTs.
* Intelligence preparation of the operational area: The civil affairs intelligence process at the DST level is not well understood because of immature doctrine. FM 34-36, chapter 10, provides helpful guidance for civil affairs OPB/IPOA. At the DST level, the IPOA cycle is driven by the use of area assessment checklists for information input from the following areas: 1) operational area evaluation 2) government functions 3) geographic analysis 4) demographic analysis 5) economic functions 6) public facilities functions 7) special functions analysis 8) database integration PROCEDURES: 1) Use FM 41-10, appendix B, area study and assessment formats for a start point in DSTs developing their own specific checklists. 2) Use the checklists to provide information to update the CMO estimate, which becomes the S5s staff estimate. 3) Area assessment checklists will help generate demographic, civil supply support and dislocated civilian overlays. 4) Additional reporting requirements should be spelled out by the S2 in the reconnaissance and surveillance collection plan.
* CA/CMO/Annex/Appendices to operations orders: The CA annex/appendix to opords produced by DSTs needs continued emphasis. The necessary staff coordination and tasks to subordinate units is often not accomplished. A recurring problem is the failure to include a dislocated civilian (DC) plan as an appendix to the CA annex to the opord. RESULT: the supported unit is forced to handle dislocated civilians in an unorganized reactive manner.
* Pre-deployment cultural briefs: Civil affairs DSTs often neglect to provide the supported unit with area/cultural briefs prior to insertion into the area of operations. DSTs usually overly rely on cultural "do's and don'ts" and ROE cards that are distributed at the intermediate staging base. TECHNIQUE: Have the S5 produce a videotape, in conjunction with the SJA, for required viewing by all soldiers. Distributed copies down to company level. If video support is not available, the civil affairs elements can put together an area handbook for task force distribution prior to conducting combat operations.
TA.6
Mobility, Countermobility & Survivability BOS & NBC & PSYOPS Narrative
TA.4
Command and Control BOS Narrative
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