TA.4
COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS
Strengths
4.1 Acquire and Communicate Information and Maintain Status
* Signal operations: Brigade and battalion signal officers, communications sections, and the divisional signal units display strong motivation and sustainment of individual and collective task proficiency, despite the rapid pace and demands of the task force. Employment, installation, operation and maintenance of C3 assets are normally strengths. Collectively, brigade/battalion signal officers, as well as the divisional signal slice (company) understand their mission and coordinate closely to ensure unity of signal effort.
* Brigade: Good communications provides flexibility in air assault operations: Units with good communications have shown great flexibility during the air assault, in particular, the use of alternate LZs. Extremely important is the command and control aircraft with the commander and key staff personnel in an airborne tactical command post during the insertion. The C2 aircraft, as an airborne tactical CP, provides a communications link between the PZ and the LZ, and provides the commander with timely critical information needed to make decisions. TECHNIQUES: 1) The early insertion of a ground C2 element also gives the commander a location to command and control the fight once units are on the ground. 2) Execution checklists, with built-in flexibility and decision points, provide the commander a tool to react quickly to changing situations. These execution checklists are developed as part of detailed planning and wargaming.
4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status
* Bn/TF: Maintain good communication: Many units have made great progress in the use of O/I, A/L, and HF for extended communications.
* Bn/TF: Staff integration/crosstalk: Battle staffs are better integrated, and they exchange information among each other more regularly. The most effective staffs were those where the XO or S3 were highly proactive. They pushed staff integration and enforced the use of SOPs and other tools to ensure integration and information flow. PROCEDURES: 1) The use of Message Form 4004 and DA Form 1594 to pass information has facilitated information flow. 2) Develop TOC battle drills and include them in the unit TSOP. TECHNIQUE: Use a standard format for all shift change briefings; have all BOS personnel present and brief their respective area.
* Brigade: Time management: Commanders and staffs usually manage their time well. They prepare detailed warning orders and push parallel planning at all levels. The brigade S3 develops and enforces a time schedule based upon the 1/3-2/3 rule to plan and prepare for upcoming missions. Brigades also manage their time well during the compressed planning process, when time is at a premium.
* Brigade: AMC/AMB are keys to good air assault planning: The air mission coordination (AMC) and air mission brief (AMB) continue to be the keys to good air assault planning. Timely and accurate information on the number of aircraft and crews available help the commander and S3 fine tune the ground tactical plan. Flexibility of execution is a critical part of the planning process. TECHNIQUES: 1) The staff must develop and rehearse branches and sequels determined from a detailed war game of all aspects of the air assault (e.g., ground tactical plan, landing plan, etc.). This detailed wargame helps the commander and staff prepare for inevitable change. 2) To supplement the air movement table, some units use "Tadpole diagrams" to layout the air movement table visually. They incorporate the bump plan and lay out each lift, serial, and chalk by type of aircraft and type load. This enhances the unit's ability to conduct detailed rehearsals, and eases the briefing of subordinates.
4.2.2 Project Future Requirements
* Tactical Air Control Party (TACP)/Fire Support Officer (FSO) involvement: The communication between these elements in the establishment of a properly coordinated fire support plan remains key.
4.2/4.3 Assess Situation/Determine Actions
* Brigade: Tactical decision making process: Commanders and staff have a firm understanding of the steps involved in the tactical decision making process. They incorporate these steps, along with standardized products, into SOPs. When time is limited, commanders are doing a good job compressing the process. TECHNIQUE: The use of multiple warning orders is allowing a certain degree of parallel planning at lower echelons.
4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces
* Bn/TF: Briefbacks: Units consistently conduct briefbacks and confirmation briefs. TECHNIQUE: Use a standard format to make the briefs more time efficient and effective. PROCEDURE: Include the standard format in the TSOP. Include briefbacks on the unit timelines; require key leaders be present; use the XO and/or the S3 to keep briefbacks and rehearsals on track and to enforce key leader attendance, particularly the staff.
* Brigade: Rehearsals and backbriefs: Commanders are incorporating rehearsals and backbriefs into the planning and preparation phases. These provide an excellent tool to ensure subordinate commanders fully understand the brigade's key moving pieces on the battlefield, and what actions must occur in response to enemy initiatives. TECHNIQUE: Synchronization matrixes, execution matrixes,and checklists prove useful aides to guide rehearsals, ensuring that BOS and subordinate units understand what key actions must be accomplished as the battle unfolds.
4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations
* Bn/TF: Staff synchronization: Staffs are improving their ability to crosstalk.
* Bn/TF: Fratricide avoidance: Units continue to improve in the area of fratricide avoidance through the use of anti-fratricide matrices and the positive control of indirect fires.
* Bn/TF: Clearance of fires: Units are improving their ability to clear fires by implementing battle drills within their command posts.
Needs Emphasis
4.1 Acquire and Communicate Information and Maintain Status
* Late arrival of C3 assets: Brigade C3 vehicles and divisional C3 assets in support of the brigade and its battalions are needed early on the battlefield. However, the combat operation expands more quickly than the communications assets will support. Unit C3 vehicles, FM retrans and MSE signal assets are normally planned for arrival within the first 18 to 24 hours. Actual arrival tends to be 32 to 72 hours after the initial introduction of forces (depending on priority and location of the equipment in the airflow). RESULT: often signal integrity is lost, further depriving the commander of a robust, redundant, and survivable communications system. TECHNIQUES: 1) Cross load extended range antennas onto initial C3 vehicles. 2) Advise the commander on where to integrate C3 assets into the airflow to match command and control requirements with force projection requirements.
* Pre-operational checks and COMEXs: In most cases, staff sections and subordinate command pre- combat checks consist of reviewing packing lists or a cursory inspection of major components, and not a full range of operational and function checks of user owned and operated communications equipment. For example, all brigade task force MSRTs, SINCGARS FM, Improve HF Radios (IHFR), and single channel (SC) TACSAT are not operationally tested prior to each mission. COMEXs did not include FM and HF net control stations (NCSs) opening and controlling their nets or critical net members within subordinate commands entering the nets, ie., the scout CPs with IHFR to battalion and brigade S2s. Rehearsals do not include a complete review of signal operations concepts, plans and orders. PROCEDURES: 1) Review and revise TSOP as necessary to include those pre-operational and pre- combat checks and services necessary for user/operators to accomplish prior to mission execution. 2) Pre-combat checks include: inventories; function checks; SOP review. 3) COMEXs include: critical net stations entering required nets under the control of associated NCS with specified tasks or objectives. TECHNIQUE: Review timelined events with the brigade staff to synchronize signal operations and identify critical events prior to the conduct of all phases of an operation.
* User/owner operator skills: Generally commanders and staff personnel lack basic user/operator skills necessary to operate their own organic communications equipment. Normally signal personnel install, operate, and maintain SINCGARS combat net radios (CNR), Single Channel TACSAT radios, and Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) such as MSRTs, DNVTs, and facsimile devices. TECHNIQUES: 1) Home station user/operator communication equipment training programs will improve and sustain skills. 2) Use brigade TOC battle drills to improve, streamline, and sustain the collective task of C3 integration into the information management process.
* TACP communications: There have been some communications problems within the TACP elements and between TACP elements and the air support operations center (ASOC). The internal difficulties are normally because of the lack of an effective communications plan. Failure to communicate with the ASOC normally results from TACP elements not fully and effectively using all communication equipment options. PROCEDURE: TACPs must pre-coordinate and implement an effective internal communications plan.
4.1.1.1 Receive and Transmit Mission
* Bn/TF: Reporting: Companies tend to send lengthy reports to the battalion which lack clarity and accuracy. RESULT: the reports confuses the staff when they are trying to paint an accurate picture for the battalion commander. PROCEDURE: Have units use the SALUTE report format to shorten and clarify reporting. TECHNIQUE: Battle captains should insist on complete and accurate reports from the companies. The shift NCO and RTOs should help with this by doing a quality control check.
4.1.1.2 Receive and Transmit Enemy Information
* Brigade: Vision of the enemy: Rarely are the enemy actions and the impact of terrain fully analyzed by the entire staff. Instead, the brigade S2 is held accountable for presenting the situational template, without the benefit of the total staff's expertise and analysis. Wargaming enemy actions and considering the impact of terrain clearly deserve full staff consideration.
4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status
* Brigade: Battle tracking: TOC personnel frequently fail to keep maps, unit locations, combat power, and other critical information required by the commander, up to date. The problem becomes greater when the tactical CP is in control of the battle. Unit information is passed, but not in a timely manner. Status charts are not kept up to date and information is not posted when a shift change occurs. Commanders cannot, on a moments notice, get a clear snapshot of the current battle because of poor battle tracking by all sections. PROCEDURE: In the TSOP, 1) establish the required level of detailed information needed and specific times this information is transmitted, collated, and posted. 2) Determine who will track and post the information as part of their specified duties. TECHNIQUES: 1) Identify early the critical information (CCIR) the commander and staff must have to make decisions. 2) The battle captain must know all information requirements; report times; and the impact of information on subordinate units.
* Bn/TF: MSRT coverage: MSRT coverage still causes units problems because of C2 site location selection.
* Bn/TF: Use of the tactical fax: Units have problems with the tactical fax particularly when there are untrained personnel in the TOC, coupled with the aversion to use the generator.
* Bn/TF: COMEX: Units rarely conduct COMEXs. When planned, COMEXs must have commander's emphasis to ensure they are conducted, and that everyone understands the communications plan, with codewords, etc. PROCEDURE: Develop an SOP for VINSON, SOI, and ANCD compromises. TECHNIQUES: 1) Use an execution checklist during the COMEX to facilitate understanding. Issue the checklist as early as possible before the exercise. 2) Try conducting the COMEX in conjunction with a task force rehearsal for a mission.
4.2.2 Project Future Requirement
* Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT) coordination: Numerous JAAT missions have been unsuccessful because of the lack of coordination at the brigade task force level. Rarely is deliberate planning conducted to link Army aviation and Air Force CAS aircraft. Hasty JAAT operations occur regularly only because ALOs and aviation LOs take the initiative to exchange information.
* Brigade: COA development and wargaming: Brigades lack the detailed analysis and total staff integration to develop a synchronization plan. Not all of the staff participate in the COA development and wargaming process. Wargaming key events of the different COAs or the chosen COA rarely occurs. Wargaming often turns into a pro forma planning step, rather than a thought provoking interactive session which identifies blemishes and flaws in a basic concept. TECHNIQUES: 1) Incorporate all slice elements in COA development and wargaming. 2) Conduct detailed planning exercises to identify staff planning responsibilities and hone the skills of the staff members. This will help refine the planning procedures used in a field environment. 3) Keep a record of key decisions made during the wargaming sessions. 4) Encourage thought and dialog, but establish and enforce a time standard. Do not let wargaming turn into a "good idea" session. 5) Focus wargaming on critical events, actions, reactions and counter-reactions. 6) As additional information, such as subordinate concepts, become available reassemble the staff and wargame key brigade decision points and "moving pieces" to ensure they are fully synchronized.
* Bn/TF: Warning orders: Warning orders do not follow established format; issued IAW SOP; general and specific instructions are rarely based on the mission analysis.
* Bn/TF: Commander's guidance: While commander's guidance has improved, staffs do not translate that guidance into clear and concise orders.
* Signal operations/communications planning: Communications staff estimates, course of action development and comparisons, the synchronization process, priority of communication effort, net matrices, overlays and system diagrams are not well developed. RESULT: communications planning and execution become fragmented and incomplete. TECHNIQUE: The brigade signal officer should use FM 24-16, Communications-Electronics Operations, Orders, Records and Reports as the basis for developing planning tools.
4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces
* Bn/TF: TOC Operations; TOC SOP: TOC personnel are generally not trained in TOC management and internal organization; displacement; set-up procedures; security operations; maintenance. Most battle staffs do not clearly understand individual duties and responsibilities, particularly between NCOs and officers. The physical layout of the TOC is not rehearsed and no SOP exists. In some cases, the rotation is the first time the battle staff has set up the TOC with the entire slice. Units are unclear on assumption of C2 between the tactical CP and TOC, and SOPs do not address the how, why and when of TOC operations. RESULT: ineffective TOC operations and loss of adequate C2 during critical periods. PROCEDURES: 1) Standardize all maps and overlays for primary and special staff sections. 2) Develop tactical CP and TOC pre-combat inspection checklists. Include load plans and vehicle manning. 3) Define the role of the HHC chain of command in TOC and tactical CP management, particularly with security, maintenance and movement. 4) TOC SOP should be part of TSOP. TECHNIQUES: 1) Set up the TOC and tactical CP monthly at home station and work all the systems in the TOC. 2) Practice different configurations for different situations and conditions to determine what works best in any given circumstance. 3) Develop a shift change checklist and practice shift change briefings with the entire battle staff.
* Bn/TF: Resupply plan: 1) Unit logistical planners fail to coordinate or publish resupply plans. 2) Unit commanders have no feel for the type or amount of supplies they can expect to receive. 3) Logistical personnel fail to track the flow of supplies to the battalion and subordinate units. TECHNIQUE: Have logistical planners coordinate with the support operations officer of the forward support battalion to create and publish a resupply plan that is supportable, usable, and meets minimum requirements.
* Bn/TF: Incorrect graphic control measures: Battalions are not using graphic control measures correctly to control maneuver units. Graphic control measures are either not used properly or not used at all.
* Bn/TF: No quality control on graphics: Battalions frequently have no quality control on graphic control measures. RESULT: confusion about exact location. For example, the boundary between companies being mismarked can inadvertently create gaps on the ground between elements which the enemy can then exploit. TECHNIQUE: The battalion should have one person check the graphics prior to sending them to the companies and other elements to ensure they are accurate.
* Bn/TF: Wargaming and synchronization: 1) Task force XOs and S3s tend to focus on the maneuver fight without considering enemy reactions. 2) CS and CSS are typically addressed at the end of the process and are never truly integrated or synchronized.
* Bn/TF: Orders development: This process is most deeply affected by improper application of the military decision making process. 1) the process is fragmented and key steps are missed. 2) Staffs do not conduct thorough estimates; COA development; COA analysis. RESULT: synchronization drills and rehearsals evolve into COA development and wargaming sessions and the plan is never fully completed. PROCEDURES: 1) Develop and incorporate into the unit TSOP formats and products for warning; fragmentary; operations orders. 2) Use doctrinal terminology and graphics that are correct in usage and are correctly placed on overlays. TECHNIQUES: 1) Develop alternate methods for reproducing orders in the field, such as carbon paper, RTOs, and mimeograph machines. 2) Prior to any order being published, the XO or S3 must check the order for completeness and accuracy.
4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders
* Bn/TF: Orders production and issuance: Orders production and issuance is not effective. This is caused by poor planning and ineffective use of computers and copiers. Inaccurate copying of operations overlays, often caused by distortion from electronic reproduction means leads to inaccuracies on the ground during preparation and execution. TF XOs and S3s do not habitually check the complete order prior to issuance to ensure staff integration and synchronization, ie. conformity of base order, annexes, and overlays. See Orders development above.
* Bn/TF: Orders confuse subordinates: Most orders, when issued, confuse subordinate leaders. This is caused by incorrect doctrinal terms and graphics and/or or unclear tasks and purposes to subordinate leaders.
4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations
* Bn/TF: Time Management: Units develop time schedules upon receipt of missions, but: 1) rarely include critical events 2) are not updating the schedules as changes occur 3) Task force XOs and S3s do not enforce the time schedule 4) Task force XOs and S3s rarely maintain focus on time management. 5) During mission planning, battle staffs give little consideration to time/distance factors and their relationship to movement, preparation and mission execution. TECHNIQUES: 1) The battalion XO must establish and enforce the battalion time schedule. 2) Leaders at all levels must be informed of the time schedule. 3) Adjust the time schedule as required, but ensure essential tasks are completed as scheduled. 4) Use time schedules routinely at home station to support all training events.
* Bn/TF: Staff synchronization: Units do not have an SOP to guide them through the military decision making process. 1) Key steps in the process are bypassed.and neglected because of an overall lack of knowledge of the process and of the required staff products. 2) The XO and S3 rarely enforce the process and tend to "take over" the entire process, while only requiring battle staff members to provide input rather than participate. RESULT: once staffs identify problems caused by a fragmented decision making process, a great deal of time is lost attempting to go back and fix previous steps. PROCEDURES: 1) Develop a staff/TOC SOP which clearly defines the military decision making process (MDMP), and the duties and responsibilities of all staff members associated with it. 2) TOC SOP should include duties and responsibilities checklists for all battle staff members. Standardize the checklists and include them in a staff officer "smart book", which would include key planning tools and doctrinal excerpts. 3) Include the TOC SOP in the unit TSOP. 4) Send NCOs to the NCO Battle Staff Course and then take them to the LTP prior to the JRTC rotation. TECHNIQUES: 1) Develop and rehearse TOC and CTCP battle drills for recurring actions. 2) Train staff synchronization at home station by turning all home station training events into tactical missions. Require the staff to develop a concept using the MDMP, then produce an order and brief it. 3) Conduct multi-echelon training by deploying the tactical CP or TOC and CTCP to train concurrently on staff/TOC SOPs, while platoons and companies deploy to conduct internal training.
* Bn/TF: Minefield tracking: Minefield tracking is still ineffective. 1) Units do not track both friendly and enemy minefields on overlays and SIGACTS boards. 2) They do not have established techniques and procedures to disseminate this information to subordinate elements.
* Bn/TF: Battle tracking: Units still have difficulty in maintaining a clear picture of unit locations and status. 1) Units do not consistently track unit locations down to platoon and slice element levels. 2) Units develop complex task organizations which are difficult to track. 3) Units do not understand command and support relationships within their task organization. 4) Units do not have visibility on CS and CSS assets. 6) The TOC and CTCP rarely communicate with and provide one another essential information to allow one another to effectively battle track. RESULT: units rarely have an accurate picture of the task force's current combat power.
* User comprehension of C3 architecture: Commanders, staffs and battle captains do not understand the communications architecture available to them or its capabilities. RESULT: many times information is lost or delayed from reaching its destination because a battle captain does not know what communications assets are available to "get the message through."
TA.7
Combat Service Support BOS Narrative|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
