TA.6
MOBILITY, COUNTERMOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY BOS
&
NUCLEAR/BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL (NBC) & PSYOPS
& NUCLEAR/BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL (NBC) & PSYOPS
Strengths
6. Mobility and Survivability BOS
* Training proficiency: Engineers continue to perform individual tasks to standard. Both sappers and heavy equipment operators are proficient at Skill Level 1 tasks.
Needs Emphasis
6. Mobility and Survivability BOS
* Battle tracking/reporting: Engineer leaders usually do not have an established system to track engineer operations. Reporting is untimely and either incomplete or inaccurate. Problems with reporting procedures are compounded by the lack of communications hardware between the brigade engineer and the task force engineers. TECHNIQUE: Engineer leaders must improve their knowledge and use of the communications assets normally found within task forces.
* Combined arms breaching operations: 1) Commanders and staffs do not apply all five breaching tenets to breaching operations. 2) Engineers rarely receive any enemy OBSINTEL of enemy obstacles they must breach. 3) Task forces neither mass nor synchronize their breach/assault efforts at the objective. 4) Task forces do not conduct effective reverse sequence planning. 5) The combined arms team does not conduct full force rehearsals. TECHNIQUES: 1) Implement the five breaching tenets for all breaching operations: intelligence; breaching fundamentals; breaching organization; mass; synchronization. 2) Develop and implement a combined arms breach training program in accordance with FM 90-13-1, chapter 7, "Combined Arms Breaching Operations."
6.1.2.3 Facilitate Movement on Routes
* Mobility/combined arms route clearance operations: 1) Commanders and staffs do not appreciate the significance of the enemy mine threat. 2) Soldiers lack mine awareness. 3) Engineers are not proficient at detecting buried mines. 4) battalion task forces do not conduct route clearance as a combined arms operation, to include the deployment and use of M9 mine rollers, as a part of the combined arms approach to route clearance. 5) Brigade and battalion task forces do not apply the five breaching tenets to route clearance operations. 6) Engineer leaders do not have systems to track enemy obstacle intelligence (OBSINTEL). TECHNIQUES: 1) All soldiers need mine awareness training. 2) Task forces need to conduct route clearance as a combined arms operation. 3) Modify the standard SALUTE report to include more detailed information on enemy obstacles. PROCEDURE: Develop and implement an enemy obstacle marking SOP.
* Combined arms obstacle integration: 1) Commanders and staffs do not understand the echelons of obstacle planning and execution. Usually obstacle plans neither attack the enemy's ability to maneuver, nor multiply the effects and capabilities of firepower. 2) Engineers continue to emplace point obstacles which the enemy easily bypasses. 3) Staffs do not understand mine supply operations. 4) Staffs do not provide enough specific guidance to engineer platoon leaders about the location of obstacles as planned by battalion. RESULT of (3) & (4): critical resources are seldom delivered on time at the right location. 5) Task forces continue to plan situational obstacles as time driven execution instead of event driven. TECHNIQUES: 1) Engineers must conduct leader training with the combined arms team on obstacle integration. Focus on echelons of obstacle planning and execution IAW FM 90-7, chapter 3 and chapter 6, "Combined Arms Obstacle Integration. 2) Task forces must conduct situational obstacle planning and execution IAW FM 90-7, chapter 8, "Combined Arms Obstacle Integration". 3) Engineers must emplace linear obstacles, where appropriate, rather than just point obstacles.
6.3.2 Employ Operations Security
* Improving BSA defense: Most FSBs do not plan or execute BSA defense operations efficiently. TECHNIQUES: 1) Planning the defense begins with the arrival at the new site. 2) FSBs, along with tenant units should conduct security sweeps and establish hasty security to receive the main body. 3) Begin to establish the BSA commander's defense plan IAW the priorities of work. 4) Continue to improve and upgrade the defense based on METT-T. 5) All units and soldiers within the BSA must become familiar with the FSBs TSOP. 6) Make maximum use of all available weapon systems to enhance the defense of the "normal" BSA tenants. For example, integrate tanks and IFVs into the plan. If a tank is waiting for mobility parts, but the gun system functions, that tank can be factored into a static defense plan. NOTE: Review JRTC's "Defense of the BSA" video tape.
* Passive air defense: Passive air defense measures enhance unit survivability, however, they are frequently ignored. 1) Units use camouflage nets, but usually fail to cover vehicle windshields, mirrors and headlamps. 2) Position improvements routinely do not include such measures as obscuring vehicle tracks, adjusting camouflage nets, and camouflaging bermed soil. 3) Convoys do not employ air guards, and vehicles routinely bunch up. Vehicles do not herringbone during stops. RESULT: lucrative air attack targets. FSBs, a highly attractive target, are the worst violators in failing to employ passive air defense measures. RESULT: FSBs are frequently targeted and sustain punishing airstrikes.
Nuclear, Chemical and Biological
Needs Emphasis
* Planning and coordinating chemical unit operations (brigade/battalion): Virtually no planning or coordination is being done between brigade and subordinate battalion staffs for the integration of chemical assets in support of the task force scheme of maneuver. No plans, use of graphics, trigger mechanisms, etc., are discussed or coordinated. Relationships such as OPCON or attached are seldom understood. Chemical unit leaders are often left out of the tactical decision making process, thus, they are unable to provide recommendations during COA development. RESULT: poor plans/annexes are developed. Many times the chemical unit executes missions without a clear task and purpose. TECHNIQUES: 1) Chemical units must train at home station with the task force and its subordinate elements. 2) Chemical platoon leaders should attend brigade training meetings just like the slice engineers and ADA units. 3) Division chemical officers need to take a more active role in chemical unit training, while aggressively training brigade chemical officers on how best to use attached assets. 4) Brigade and battalion XOs and S3s need to ensure that chemical assets are integrated early in the decision making process.
* NBC information and communication (brigade/battalion task force): While NBC information such as chemical downwind messages or threat intentions are reaching brigade, once there, the information flow stops. Battalions rarely see routine traffic such as chemical downwind messages. During one rotation, several units were unaware that the task force had raised its MOPP status..RESULT: those units were unprepared when a nerve agent attack occurred. Chemical staffs are not proactive in ensuring this kind of information is disseminated to all subordinate units. Chemical staffs seem to rely on the S2's Intelligence Summaries to do the job, unaware that subordinate chemical staffs and units seldom see these products. TECHNIQUES: 1) Chemical sections at all levels need to ensure that other staff members, from XO to RTO, are sensitive to what information the chemical officer should review before the information is filed away. 2) The chemical officer should go through the staff log and talk with his higher counterpart on a regular basis. 3) Battalion and company sections should not assume that "no news is good news."
* Plan for CDE (brigade/battalion task force): Brigade task forces rarely have a clear picture of the readiness status of their NBC and Chemical Defense Equipment (CDE). Other than the organic unit's initial report at home station, task force TSOPs usually do not have a report mechanism to enable brigade and battalion staffs to maintain a status of critical NBC equipment. PROCEDURES: 1) Establish a standard report which can be updated daily between chemical staffs at all levels. 2) CDE can also be included on daily LOGSTAT reports. TECHNIQUE: Use critical chemical defense equipment such as M8A1 alarms, CAMS, protective clothing, chemical decontamination equipment, etc. in home station field training. The equipment familiarity gained and the consistent exercise of the reporting system will result in better mission execution and more accurate status reporting.
* Conduct troop leading procedures: Most chemical related missions, such as smoke or decontamination, are performed under hasty conditions. This is the result of the ineffective planning and coordination by the supported units. Those supported units, however, usually have ample time to put together an effective plan and disseminate it to soldiers. Platoon and squad leaders are not using this time effectively. Insufficient training and inadequate SOPs require leaders to spend time training tasks their soldiers should already know, ie. actions on contact, ambushes, etc.) Junior NCOs are unfamiliar with the steps required to take a mission concept and then develop an executable plan. PROCEDURE: Chemical company commanders need to ensure their soldiers have a good TSOP, which includes all possible platoon battle drills. TECHNIQUES: 1) At home station, have platoon and squad leaders devise hasty planning techniques for smoke and decontamination missions. When time is limited, for example, prior to mission execution, the platoon leader should brief the entire platoon instead of the squad leaders in order to save time. 2) Teach troop leading procedures down to the junior NCO level. 3) Platoon sergeants should ensure that squad leaders conduct effective pre-combat inspections.
* Staff coordination (brigade/battalion task force): Other than with the S2 and S3 sections, the chemical staff rarely coordinates with other staff sections, ie. S1, S4, S5, CA/PSYOP, engineer, ADA, etc., on NBC functions and operations.
6.3.2 Employ Operations Security
* Secure and defend unit position (Chemical platoon): Units continue to have problems with this task.
Psychological Operations (PSYOP)
Strengths
6.3.1.1.5 Protect Forces and Friendly Populace from PSYOP Attack
* Doctrine and asset employment: Brigade PSYOP elements are well versed in PSYOP doctrine and the employment of their assets. The increased deployment tempo for PSYOP elements has increased of the criticality of PSYOP as both a force multiplier and a force protection asset. BPSEs assigned to brigades normally arrive with significant information on the operational area and the belligerent forces operating in the brigade area. Brigade task forces are receptive to the initial use of PSYOP.
* PSYOP integration: Units recognize the need for early integration of PSYOP assets to effectively employ them throughout the battlefield. Staffs that recognize PSYOP is most effective when employed early rather than as a "reaction force" to deal with situations as they arise will have greater PSYOP success. TECHNIQUES: 1) Early employment begins with pre-deployment training and preparation, and continues through deployment. 2) Units that conduct pre-deployment combined training and coordination are best able to effectively influence the civilian battlefield. NOTE: Supported commanders need to be aware of the limitations of reserve component PSYOP elements, ie. they may not be able to attend all scheduled pre-training. However, any events where they are included will pay dividends during mission execution.
* Deploying unit preparation: BPSEs provide the commander with the ability to fight on two battlefields -- conventional and non-combatant. The information database supporting the preparation of deploying soldiers and the intelligence preparation of the battlefield can result in limiting cross cultural incidents and increasing the unit's ability to successfully operate within the host country's boundaries.
Needs Emphasis
6.3.1.1.5 Protect Forces and Friendly Populace from PSYOP attack
* Integrate PSYOP into supported unit operations: In those brigades where PSYOP is not integrated, the BPSE is often on the periphery of brigade operations trying to execute its mission with no understanding of what the maneuver unit wants or needs to accomplish with PSYOP. TECHNIQUE: When PSYOP elements train with the supported brigade, have them participate in mission analysis; writing a precise PSYOP annex to an OPLAN; informing the battle staff on PSYOP capabilities.
* Conduct C3 of PSYOP assets: Command, control and communications by the BPSE of its PSYOP assets is a recurring weakness caused by poor communications. The primary weakness is not passing clear, concise information and guidance up and down the chain. PROCEDURES: 1) Specify in the PSYOP opord annex the PACE formula: primary, alternative, contingency, emergency means of communication. 2) Designate reporting formats; specific reporting times. 3) Analyze the supporting units TSOP with annexes to ensure compatibility with their procedures, and to smooth the PSYOP integration process.
TA.3
Air Defense Artillery BOS Narrative
TA.7
Combat Service Support BOS Narrative
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