Media Relations
Newsletter 09-11
December 2008
Chapter 3: Getting Our Message Out
Section I
Breaking Through the National Media Filter: How to Succeed in Telling the Story through Hometown Outreach
MAJ Alayne Conway
The media continues to play a large role in shaping perceptions both in Iraq and at home in the United States. The footprint of the Western media based in Iraq has dramatically changed from the early days of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and the 3rd Infantry Division (3ID) witnessed this evolution. This chapter looks at the changes in the media structure and how the public affairs office from the 3ID adapted to these changes, found a way to break through the national media filter, and succeeded in telling the Soldier's story.
The Media Build-up in Iraq
During the early days of the war, the Pentagon arranged for more than 600 journalists to embed with military units across the battlefield. The intent was to give the media a firsthand look at the war and an opportunity to report back to the American public. Despite criticism that the program would jeopardize the objectivity of media reporting, it was a resounding success. Living rooms across America had front-row seats as they watched the battle for Baghdad unfold. The media were effective tools in telling Soldiers' stories during the early days of OIF.
Over time, media outlets established bureaus in and around the International Zone (IZ), commonly known as the Green Zone. The IZ has become the epicenter for both coalition forces and the Government of Iraq. Once in the IZ, media could obtain their credentials to cover military stories. In 2004, Western media were criticized for reporting from their hotels instead of from the field and encouraged to get out with the military units and get the real story.
The 3ID returned to Iraq in early 2005 and had the important mission of overseeing the transition from the interim government to a freely and fairly elected representative Iraqi government that had the support of the Iraqi people. During this time, journalists reported on good news associated with the Constitutional Referendum in October 2005 and then the elections in January 2006. It seemed that Iraqis were in control of their future, and the U.S. military was building capable and competent Iraqi security forces.
There was no shortage of embedded reporters (embeds) during the 3ID's second deployment. Brigades juggled anywhere between eight and ten media embeds on a weekly basis. Multiple correspondents staffed Baghdad media bureaus and were able to spend adequate time with military units. There was a constant flow of embeds from the United States and international media outlets.
Units reached out to Pan-Arabic media, whose numbers seemed to grow on a daily basis. Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B), led by the 3ID headquarters, managed a Baghdad media club, so there was no shortage of Iraqi journalists available for day trips and press events. To a certain extent, public affairs pursued hometown outreach, but it was usually second or third in the priority of effort. Much of the hometown outreach was geared to the home-station media. In the case of 3ID, outreach with Savannah, GA, media was a weekly occurrence but never matched the daily interactions with the Baghdad media bureaus.
Reporting the war changed after the Samarra mosque bombing in 2006. Attacks against coalition forces were on the rise, and positive news was often hard to get out. The military criticized the media for always reporting the negative story. The media often responded back with, "How can we report on the positive stories when the security situation is so bad?"
The "Surge" Brings Change to Media Reporting
President George W. Bush announced a new strategy for Iraq on January 10, 2007. The announcement of the "surge" brought some optimism for the way ahead and gave the military the necessary leverage to start turning the tide of negative coverage.
By the end of the month, the 3ID received the notice to deploy back to Iraq. The public affairs office deployed with a staff of seven Soldiers and a kit bag full of talking points and messages to tell the story of the "surge." The Iraq conflict became a dominant political story, and during the month of January 2007, coverage of the war consumed a full quarter of the print, television, and online news.
Despite the political debates surrounding reducing the U.S. involvement in the war, there was a lot of media interest in the deployment of the 3ID for its unprecedented third tour to Iraq. After two successful tours to Iraq, the division was called upon to secure the belts surrounding Baghdad. On April 4, 2007, 3ID stood up the Multi-National Division-Center (MND-C) headquarters. Reaching out to the Western audience would be a challenge for the new headquarters. Media were familiar with MND-B and already had relationships with 1st Cavalry Division and its brigades. The 3ID needed to reestablish relationships with the Baghdad media and make sure they knew there were Dog Face Soldiers' stories to be told.
This challenge was coupled with changes. The media landscape was quite different from the previous deployment. Gone were the days of 25 bureaus with multiple crews and correspondents that could embed for a long time. After journalists were seriously injured in the line of duty, media organizations placed stringent travel restrictions on their journalists. In January 2006, ABC News anchor Bob Woodruff and his cameraman were seriously injured when the military patrol they were traveling in was hit by a roadside bomb. Another tragic incident occurred in May 2006 when CBS News correspondent Kimberly Dozier was seriously injured during an Iraqi car bomb attack in Baghdad. Her cameraman and sound man were killed along with a U.S. Soldier and his Iraqi translator.
Media embeds and day visits were closely scrutinized, and some journalists were not allowed to travel in uparmored high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles. Some media could only travel in mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles, and other bureaus mandated that their journalists travel with a battalion commander or senior leader since they usually had a dedicated personal security detachment. Due to security concerns coupled with dwindling broadcast time dedicated to Iraq stories, U.S. based corporate offices for the Baghdad bureaus put a crunch on reporting.
The early days of the "surge" provided an opportunity to tell the story through the national media. Many of the operations were lethal, and MND-C Soldiers took the fight to the enemy using ground and air assets. Soldiers told their stories with press releases, photos, handheld video cameras, and weapons system videos.
The division headquarters had more flexibility to tell the story with Apache gun tape footage, fixed-wing bomb footage, and unmanned aerial system clips that were more appealing to the television networks. This video was also important in telling the American people how the U.S. military was taking the fight to the enemy. The volume of these video releases by the 3ID prompted CNN to package a story about the Department of Defense's liberal policies for releasing footage.
Despite the potential for good news coverage, Americans still received a grim portrait of the war in Iraq during the first ten months of the year. Almost half of the reporting consisted of accounts of daily violence. There were spikes of coverage throughout the year; the most notable was the coverage of GEN David Petraeus' progress report on Iraq in September 2007. Both the military and media agree that the overall trend of Iraq coverage has been on a steady decline since January 2007.
For the first nine months of MND-C's deployment, priority of effort went toward national media outreach. This outreach was a combination of monthly media lunches in the IZ, daily reach-outs to the Baghdad-based media to market breaking news stories, and battlefield circulation. MG Rick Lynch gave an open invitation to the Baghdad media to travel with him during his visits across the MND-C area. He encouraged the public affairs office to schedule media for these visits throughout the week and determined that the ideal balance was scheduling print journalists the majority of the time and a television crew at least one day per week. These visits built the relationship between MND-C and the media, provided coverage of brigades' events, and paved the way for future embeds.
In addition to battlefield circulations, MND-C scheduled monthly media lunches. The concept of the Baghdad Bureau Chiefs' Lunch (BBCL) carried over from 1st Cavalry Division and proved to be an excellent way of introducing a new military operation to the media. BBCLs were not usually instant news makers but did build rapport with the journalists and assisted MND-C in lining up embeds and day trips for brigades.
Although the media operations center (MOC) operated 24-hours each day, the stateside media cycle kept Soldiers busy into the early morning hours. Stories were marketed to the Baghdad-based media and select Pentagon correspondents. The public affairs office used the Digital Video and Imagery Distribution System regional representatives based in Atlanta to assist brigade PAOs with setting up interviews with national, regional, and local media outlets. The MOC also maintained contacts with the Pentagon Press Corps, and through continuous engagements, the division built mutually beneficial relationships with Fox News Channel and CNN.
There were additional spikes in national media coverage for MND-C during the remainder of the year. As the "surge" began to reduce the violence, journalists produced more feature-style stories. The Baghdad media helped the division carry Soldiers' stories to ever-larger audiences. The 3ID's 90th birthday garnered some national and local area coverage in November 2007. Both Thanksgiving and Christmas provided opportunities to tell Soldiers' stories and connect with the home front.
Need for Change
During the early days of 2008, the division commander was eager to find a way to break through the national media filter and share the hard work of Soldiers with the American public. He tasked the public affairs office with conducting an aggressive hometown outreach program. The approach was three-pronged and implemented at all levels of the command.
One of the programs was called Operation Thank You. This program allowed unit leadership to reach out to their local hometowns and give an update on current operations. All staff sergeants majors; command sergeants majors; battalion, brigade, and division primary/special staff; and battalion, brigade, and higher commanders completed a hometown interview over a 90-day period. The MND-C public affairs office also drafted a hometown thank-you letter that Soldiers were encouraged to send to their hometown newspapers.
In addition to staff interviews and command team interviews, the division also encouraged Soldiers to conduct interviews with their hometown media. Brigades rotated Soldiers through engagements with the home station media to include weekly radio and television interviews. Soldiers from the special troops battalion assigned to the 3ID filled out hometown news releases and the public affairs office released them to hometown media outlets through the Hometown News Service in San Antonio, TX.
At the division-level, the CG directed Fort Stewart, GA, to stand up a hometown outreach cell. This group was responsible for setting up 15 interviews per week for the Top 5 leaders of the division. This group included the CG, division command sergeant major, deputy commanders for support and maneuver, and the chief of staff. Each member of the command group was required to conduct television and print interviews every week. Their schedules were deconflicted by the MOC, whose staff prepared packets with biographies and outlet backgrounds and monitored the interviews.
This component of the program was conducted over an 11-week period with positive results. After conducting more than 140 interviews, the Top 5 had reached out to 32 states. Radio interviews proved to be the most fruitful for getting the message out with a 100 percent air rate. Television and print interviews were not as successful but were still effective with a 50-55 percent air and run rate. Overall, MND-C achieved the desired outcome of reaching out to the American people through the hometown markets and telling the MND-C Soldier's story.
The division still conducted national-level media outreach but on a more selective basis. Breaking news stories were still marketed to the Pentagon-based and Baghdad media. These stories were marketed because of the type of story or the strength of the elements. If there was quality weapons systems' video, the capture of large caches or caches with Iranian munitions, or a need to counter a potential negative story, the MOC developed the package and pushed the story out to the national media. As for battlefield circulations, the public affairs office focused more on getting the right reporter out to the right unit to tell the right story.
The latest initiative has involved reaching out to the national talk show radio hosts in an effort to keep up the drumbeat on the success of the surge and MND-C's transition to capacity-building operations. This has been very successful, and in the first week alone, it was estimated that MND-C sent its message to an estimated 15 million listeners.
Breaking the national media filter has gotten much harder since the early days of the war. It continues to be a challenge for military units as they compete for coverage with the ongoing 2008 presidential campaign. Iraq continues to be a topic of interest but on most days accounts for less than 10 percent of the daily news. Public affairs staffs must get creative and find ways to tell stories associated with the hard work of Soldiers. The Baghdad media are still viable and PAOs should engage them, but they should be not the sole means of getting the story out. Every Soldier has a hometown, and units will find the most success in marketing their stories to those outlets. Many of these news organizations are eager to use the hometown connection to localize the context of Iraq news and, ultimately, tell the Soldier's story.
Endnotes
- Why News of Iraq Didn't Surge." Retrieved March 26, 2008, from Pew Research Center Web site http://pewresearch.org/pubs/775/iraq-news.
- "The Portrait from Iraq-How the Press Has Covered Events on the Ground." Retrieved April 15, 2008, from http://www.journalism.org/print/8996.
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