Media Relations
Newsletter 09-11
December 2008
Chapter 2: Contemporary Public Affairs
Section II
Public Affairs Operations at the Division Level
LTC Randy Martin
In January of 2007, the 3rd Infantry Division (3ID) was leaning forward in its foxhole as a war-fighting command and public affairs (PA) practitioners. The division public affairs officer (PAO) accompanied a reconnaissance party from Fort Stewart, GA, to forward operating bases (FOBs) in Iraq. The 25th Infantry Division was scheduled to hand over reins for Multi-National Division-North in June. The 3ID, recognizing the significant role of information on the modern battlefield and in the counterinsurgency fight, took steps to include PA in the operational plan. PAOs were accustomed to taking a back seat and fighting for their positions at the decision table. So this sort of inclusion was a welcome change.
Then news came that the plan to replace the 25th had been scrapped. President Bush announced a "surge" of forces to Iraq on January 10, 2007. A new command was built just south of the national capital. The new organization would command forces and cut the flow of accelerants (i.e., the material that perpetuated instability and violence) to Baghdad. The 3ID would command the Multi-National Division-Center (MND-C).
In the succeeding months, the MND-C earned a reputation for aggressive, proactive PA. It was tough work, but public opinion in the U.S. shifted, and the "surge" was counted as a success, both on the ground as well as in the media.
The formula for MND-C's success had four components. First, the commanding general (CG) placed a very high priority on PA. Second, the division operated a world-class media operations center (MOC). Third, PAO Soldiers and civilians were well led and carefully managed. Finally, there was a strategy for reaching all audiences from the beginning of the deployment.
Commanding General Emphasis
At predeployment training, the CG once asked of his staff, "Who here is a PAO?" He surveyed the room and said, "Every hand should have gone up. Every one of you is a PAO." His point played out in time as nearly every officer seated in the room (more than 30) had conducted at least one major interview while deployed. In the 3ID, media presence was not considered a hindrance. Rather, an engagement with a reporter was an opportunity to tell stories, and telling stories just might help sustain public support at home. That was important.
In the fight against terror, the support of the American people is vital. The CG's charge to his assembled division PA staff in Iraq was to produce a PAO staff three times its normal size, have stories play in the United States 24 hours after a newsworthy event played out on the ground in Iraq, and tell stories that would appeal to most Americans.
He allocated resources to accomplish the PA mission. He knew the importance of having a MOC, and early on, he made the MOC's renovation his top funding priority. He designated a single-story office building just across the street from the division headquarters, and it was extensively remodeled for the task. He arranged for both military and civilian contractors to augment the PAO staff.
He invested his time. One hour each Sunday was dedicated to meet with the PAO and his staff. The meeting finalized the CG's schedule to engage media in the coming week. The CG also assessed the previous week's performance and validated the concept for the top MND-C stories. The notes of these meetings were then sent out across the division so that leaders would know where to focus media in the coming week.
The CG instilled a storyteller ethos across the force. His morning battle update briefings presupposed that significant activities from overnight already had a PA exploitation plan. His question was simply, "PAO, what are we doing to get that story out?" He expected his commanders and staff to have told the 3ID story to a designated public within 24 hours. Brigade commanders briefed their own "stories of the week" on Mondays. This practice placed a heavy responsibility on the entire staff.
The PAO had to be nested with the current operations in the division operations center. Daily PAO huddles were held at 1700 in order to synchronize with brigades. Subject matter experts had to be ready for the potential to give a nationally televised interview on short notice. Contributors of specialized imagery-the stuff that sealed the deal with national TV networks-were all drilled to deliver unclassified aerial platform video products to the PAO rapidly. If the CG's staff was struggling to accomplish the task, he offered to take a personal role in the effort.
The Media Operations Center
Based on the shared experiences of the commander and the PAO staff, the unit developed a concept for the MOC building. Engineers took a draft plan and went to work to redeem the dilapidated structure. The final design would service visiting media and afford a pleasant and professional work environment. Space inside was designated for a recording studio and conference room. Engineers installed a customer service counter for efficient distribution of press products such as information packets and identification badges. One room served as workspace to broadcasters who edited videos. The media relations officer and noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) were given a room in the building to provide "command and control." Finally, a room was outfitted with television monitors and computers for continuous media monitoring. The MOC also had indoor plumbing, a break area, and a small kitchen. The building was so well suited to the task that from time to time media would opt to sleep in the MOC rather than the tents used for transient billeting.
The tools for media relations were collected before deployment. Contingency mission planning for continental U.S. deployments and previous Operation Iraqi Freedom experience along with after-action reviews were instructive on best practices and supplies for MOC operations. The NCOIC and PAO developed a list of required material and assembled the MOC kit.
Chief among required equipment was the Digital Video Information Distribution System (DVIDS). DVIDS, in spite of not being a modification tables of organizations and equipment item, remains the best answer for disseminating video and other large files from the frontlines to home. The DVIDS is essentially a PAO pacing item at a time when PA has become operationally significant. A spare DVIDS system was held in reserve at division to be used as a float, which paid dividends again and again. All Soldiers were trained on DVIDS operations before deploying. Maintenance above the operator level required a technical team from outside the division or the system was shipped to the manufacturer.
Other tools, such as a professional backdrop and wide-screen television monitor; TVs; a multiplex box for audio; an AM/FM radio scanner; computers for unclassified and classified data; and a healthy unit basic load of video tapes, DVDs, batteries, and power converters were packaged for the contingency MOC. To validate that the MOC had all the tools that PAOs would need when deployed, the PAO established the division's MOC during all predeployment field training. PAO Soldiers practiced setting up their workspaces and conducted media events with role play and actual media in training exercises right up to deployment.
The MOC functioned on a 24-hour basis. Soldiers and contractors staffed workstations. An NCO continued coordination for embeds and helped expand the effort to tell stories during prime time in the U.S., long after the sun had set in Iraq. The audience was on east coast time in the U.S., and the MOC had to be aligned with that market.
Manning
The staff section was organized into three major sections: media relations/current operations, command information, and future operations (FUOPS)/plans. A field grade officer or the staff section master sergeant/NCOIC led each section. The deputy PAO was the media relations officer. She was also the contracting officer representative for a supporting contractor who helped with strategic communication. The division PAO plans officer served as the PAO chief of current operations. The PAO NCOIC was responsible for all command information. The attached mobile public affairs detachment (MPAD) commander was the FUOPS planner. All other Soldiers and staff members were aligned under these sections.
The division and its brigades were not fully staffed during the train up and deployment. Help was not immediately available on the ground either. All active component PA units were deployed or in line to deploy when President Bush announced the "surge." Because Army PA relies on reserve component forces, there would be a long lead-time for getting an MPAD to help the division. To correct the shortfall, the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) cross-leveled seven PA Soldiers from three MPADs and one PAD for 45 days. This situation was not sufficient but it was a start. MNC-I later attached half of the 302nd MPAD, a United States Army Reserve unit from Bell, CA. Divisions allocated Soldiers to PAO staff sections according to their skills and training them to compensate for any deficiencies in experience.
An NCO managed embedded media. A contracting agency rounded out the media relations staff with four to five contractors on the ground in Iraq. It also provided a "reach back" capability to the U.S., where five more contractors stationed in Washington, D.C., provided around-the-clock media monitoring. The contracting agency brought commercial experience to the PA staff. The contracting agency provided metrics for outreach both on the ground and in the U.S. and advised the PAO on new methods for communicating with the media. The contracting agency's list of media contacts and understanding of the power of Web logs or "blog" audiences paid dividends. The contracting agency also managed the division's Web page and assisted in advertising strategies to support the Web site. taskforcemarne.com
The division placed a 24-hour current operations staff on the division operations center floor. The PA current operations section collocated with the G-7 in order to share the Command Post of the Future (CPOF) computer for situational awareness. CPOF also provided a continuous common operating picture, situational awareness of events at the lowest level, and rapid identification of potential news stories. The current operations staff monitored the media, wrote fragmentary orders (FRAGOs), and authored "immediate" press releases.
In three of four brigades, MPAD Soldiers filled vacancies in the brigade PAO staff. At other times, PAO Soldiers were prepositioned to support major operations in a main effort unit. As a rule, PAO Soldiers were under the operational control of the supported unit. The staff issued a FRAGO so the PAO Soldiers understood their relationship with the supported command and its tasks and purposes.
FUOPS/plans consisted of one officer and one NCO. While current operations focused on 72-hour and less planning, with guidance provided in fragmentary orders, FUOPS focused on the 72-hour and greater plan. FUOPS worked on special projects and developed PA annexes to support major operations in conjunction with the G-5 staff.
The Plan
The information plan wove command information and media relations to tell the division's story to multiple audiences simultaneously. The plan was conceived before deployment but refined in theater to meet the CG's intent.
The division PAO built a four-page newsletter that was distributed six days a week. The Dog Face Daily (DFD) contained stories and pictures that came from brigade PA offices. The newsletter published both operational, as well as fewer "newsy" traditional command information stories. Distribution was via the classified and unclassified computer networks, on email, or posted to Web sites. The DFD was also posted to the DVIDS Web site and the task force Web site. Soldiers reported that they perpetuated distribution to their own personal contacts.
The division published From the Front, a quarterly photo magazine. A division staffer sorted material that came from the brigades. Each brigade had its own chapter. A digital version of the magazine was then forwarded to an Iraqi publication company. Delivery was made to all outlying bases by traditional logistics convoys. A twice-monthly newspaper, Marne Focus, was also published and distributed in a similar fashion. Once published, both were sent in their electronic form to 1,500 email recipients.
The division produced a weekly television newscast called Marne Forward. Marne Forward aired weekly in dining facilities throughout the MND-C, thanks to careful transfer of DVDs. A digital version of the newscast was sent to DVIDS and downloaded for play on Marne Television at Fort Stewart, GA, and, by special arrangement, the Pentagon Channel. All broadcast products were made available for public viewing on the Internet.
Media relations included live and taped interviews with stateside media, embedded reporters, and battlefield circulation personnel. Lining up media opportunities was everyone's business. The DVIDS staff marketed stories, the division staff cold-called media with story ideas, and the contracting agency helped break into new media markets. Individual officers and NCOs were even encouraged to call their hometown media in order to offer a local perspective of the surge. Late in the deployment, media relations even teamed with the garrison PA office to market potential interviews to local and national television.
The division conducted monthly "Baghdad Bureau Chiefs' Luncheons" (BBCL). These luncheons brought media to a central location where they could meet with the CG for a formal question and answer session on the record. The CG determined the theme for each session. Each session was scheduled to coincide with a major division operation. The BBCL allowed guest speakers, usually brigade commanders or deputy CGs, the opportunity to build relationships with media during the informal lunch session. One objective at each BBCL was to find potential embeds. The division was active at recruiting embedded media all the time. Western media were picked up inside the "Green Zone" and transported to FOBs by helicopter. Then the media representatives were linked with designated escorts. Planning and preparation for embeds was formalized with the publication of a daily FRAGO that gave a task and purpose for each embed. The CG and the deputies also escorted media as part of their battlefield circulation. Traveling with a member of the command group appealed to reporters because they received access, security, and were guaranteed to get an interview with an authority figure. When a civilian reporter from the national pool was not available, a PAO Soldier would travel along with him.
Conclusion
MND-C was aggressive and focused on storytelling. Storytelling was the business of command, and all resources were applied in order to do so. Success came from having CG emphasis, an effective MOC, PAO professionals well led and carefully managed, and a good strategy for reaching all audiences from the beginning.
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