COMBAT
SERVICE SUPPORT BOS
(Trends
are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not
in
any priority order.)
Positive
Performance
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
Techniques for Responsive Logistical Support
OBSERVATION
(CSS): Units are developing techniques for providing responsive support to
the brigade combat team.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Units have been able to provide responsive support to the brigade by adjusting
LOGPAC pushes, surging Class IX, and rescheduling water/fuel/ice delivery times.
2.
Units are placing liaison officers (LNOs) at critical node centers, such as
the brigade tactical operations center (TOC) and main and corps support battalion
(MSB/CSB) TOCs to facilitate the planning process and ensure a smooth and timely
passage of critical information on the battlefield. This is being done because
FM communications in the division support area (DSA) remains somewhat of a
problem for MSBs/CSBs to gather information to develop a clear picture of the
battlefield and gain situational awareness. By placing an LNO forward with
the forward support battalion or regimental support squadron (FSB/RSS), the
MSB/CSB in the rear is kept abreast of changes in tactical and environmental
situations and can pass information to the TOC in a timely manner. As a result,
the battalion commander in the DSA can make adjustments and decisions based
on the current situation. 3.
Military police (MPs) and tactical covering forces (TCFs) are being used more
in the BSA/RSA to provide rear area security and coverage in addition to the
BSA/RSA quick reaction force (QRF). The use of MPs and TCFs in the BSA/RSA
is mission dependent, but whenever possible, an MP platoon or scout platoon
has been attached to the FSB/RSS to provide security. 4.
Units are aware of the requirements for risk assessments and are performing
risk assessments on a daily basis. Normally, O/Cs see an incremental improvement
in the quality of the assessment produced during the rotation. The biggest
areas that improve are enforcement of a bottoms-up risk assessment and identifying/addressing
all aspects of tactical and environmental risks.
SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES:
1.
Units should continue providing responsive support to the brigade by adjusting
LOGPAC pushes, surging Class IX, and rescheduling water/fuel/ice delivery times.
2.
Units should continue placing LNOs at critical node centers to facilitate the
planning process and ensure a smooth and timely passage of critical information
on the battlefield. 3.
Continue using MPs and TCFs in the BSA/RSA to provide rear area security and
coverage. 4.
Units should maintain their awareness of the requirements for risk assessments
and continue to perform risk assessments on a daily basis. (TA.7
Combat Service Support BOS)
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
Company Maintenance Team
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Attaching a habitual company maintenance team to the airborne/air assault/antitank
company provides forward repair and recovery capability.
DISCUSSION:
Battalion
maintenance sections that attach a two-man maintenance contact team (on a cargo
HMMWV with tools and some parts) to D Company can ensure "repair and recovery
are completed as far forward as possible and at the lowest capable echelon."
(FM
7-20,
The
Infantry Battalion,
pg. 8-15). This habitual company maintenance team is always immediately available
to the company to verify and assess all faults found on its vehicles. Many
of these vehicles are repaired and returned as mission capable well within
the standard two-hour timeline for on-site repairs. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES:
Employ
the concept of using a dedicated, habitual slice company maintenance team attached
to AT D Company during tactical operations. The purpose of this team must be
"to provide a quick-fix capability for those items that can be repaired in
less than 2 hours and recovery capability for those items requiring more extensive
repairs." (FM
71-123, Tactics
and Techniques for Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Armored Brigade, Battalion Task
Force, and Company Team,
pg.
8-33).
(TA.7.3.2
Fix/Maintain Equipment)
TREND
3
SUBJECT:
Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services (PMCS)
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Operator PMCS of weapon systems is normally conducted daily in the
light task force/battalion.
DISCUSSION:
The
operators of the battalion/task force's weapon systems conduct PMCS a minimum
of once daily. O/Cs observed that few maintenance faults occurred due to a
lack of proper PMCS. This is a strong example of "preventive" maintenance.
SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES:
Leaders
throughout the task force need to reinforce to their soldiers the tangible
benefits of conducting a proper PMCS in accordance with their operator TMs
at least once daily.
(TA.7.3.2.1
Perform Preventive Maintenance)
TREND
4
SUBJECT:
Medical Team Clinical Application and Protocol
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Company/team medical personnel demonstrate outstanding clinical skills
and apply treatment to standard.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Field medical cards (DD Form 1380) are usually initiated properly. 2.
Triage and site management improves with each mission.
SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES: Sustain
EMT-level medical training and incorporate assigned physician assistants (PAs)
when applicable.
(TA.7.4.4.1
Provide Medical Treatment)
TREND
5
SUBJECT:
Air Evacuation of Casualties
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Medical platoon leaders effectively coordinate and execute air CASEVAC
to battalion casualty collection points/aid stations (CCPs/BASs) when available.
DISCUSSION:
Coordination
with higher medical treatment facility and combat health support (CHS) officer
for aeromedical evacuation support is good. Flexibility and anticipatory judgment
facilitate responsive air casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) to Level 2 treatment
facilities.
SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES: Sustain
unit ASOP/TACSOP and validate during all training events. Medical platoon leaders
must consistently participate in brigade CSS/CHS rehearsals for detailed coordination.
(TA.7.4.4.2
Evacuate Casualties)
Needs
Emphasis
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
Logistical Operations
OBSERVATION
Brigade Staff): Brigades have difficulty conducting logistical operations over
long distances.
DISCUSSION:
Brigade
staffs do not train over the long distances, becoming accustomed to shorter
lines of communication. They routinely fail to conduct a time-distance analysis
or allocate enough time to execute logistical operations. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Brigade
combat teams (BCTs) should include TOCEX, orders drills, and FTXs at Home Station
to establish a structure within the brigade that replicates doctrinal distances
for the conduct of logistical operations. (TA.7
Combat Service Support BOS)
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
Maintenance Management
OBSERVATION
(CSS): Brigades/regiments and forward support battalions/regimental support
squadrons (FSBs/RSSs) do not adequately conduct maintenance management or synchronize
the supply and maintenance disk drops.
DISCUSSION:
The
daily brigade/regimental maintenance meeting rarely achieves the desired endstate
of providing a clear picture on: 1.
Current and projected combat power. 2.
The delivery of critical Class IX parts. 3.
The resolution of such logistics issues as enforcement of disk drops and meeting
attendance. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The maintenance meetings conducted by a brigade/regiment must follow a set
agenda that:
a. Addresses key logistics issues (aside from maintenance).
b. Provides visibility on current/projected combat power.
c. Enforces strict disk drop procedures.
d. Identifies critical Class IX requirements.
2.
The use of a "red ball" system to deliver critical Class IX repairs to both
the BSA/RSA and UMCPs needs to be identified and executed to generate combat
power before the next battle. 3.
Units need to develop a system that will confirm/deny shipment of and receipt
of critical Class IX parts. When air assets are used to execute a "red ball,"
the support unit must ensure that the aviation support element has knowledge
of the high priority Class IX plan and has worked out all coordination issues
prior to executing the mission. 4.
Brigades/regiments need to establish a disk drop plan with disk drop times
and procedures that they are willing to enforce (example: drop supply disk
before maintenance disk). Subordinate units must rehearse the disk drop plan,
and the brigade/regimental XO or commander must ensure/enforce compliance.
The plan must be centered around the brigade's/regiment's maintenance effort
(the maintenance meeting). (TA.7.3.2
Fix/Maintain Equipment)
TREND
3
SUBJECT:
Form 5988E Flow
OBSERVATION
(Armor): Forms 5988E are not reaching the Unit Level Logistics System (ULLS)
boxes in a timely manner and are not filled out to standard.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Company/teams do not enforce an SOP for completion of preventive maintenance
checks and services (PMCS) and turn-in of Forms 5899E. 2.
Task force maintenance meetings are too often omitted, which further prevents
the unit from "seeing themselves."
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Ensure a solid system exists for the flow of Forms 5988E. 2.
Develop a tracking system that allows the battalion maintenance officer (BMO)
to shift priorities. 3.
The BMO should brief the maintenance estimate during mission analysis and at
OPORDs. (TA.7.3.2.1
Perform Preventive Maintenance)
TREND
4
SUBJECT:
Unit Ministry Team (UMT)
OBSERVATION
(Brigade Staff): UMTs are not equipped to be combat multipliers for the brigade.
DISCUSSION:
1.
UMTs seldom have radios to coordinate and execute brigade/regiment religious
support coverage. Without appropriate communication equipment, the brigade/regiment
UMTs cannot have the situational awareness or track the battle to provide ministry
on the battlefield. Radios are not on the MTOE of most brigade/regiments. Man-pack
radios are not sufficient due to the distances involved. UMTs need a vehicle-mounted
radio with power amplifier. 2.
UMTs are seldom used in a liaison role with civilians on the battlefield (COB)
such as host nation authorities, private volunteer organizations, non-governmental
organizations and indigenous clergy. 3.
UMTs do not provide religious support to civil affairs (CA) assets.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The brigade/regiment commander must understand, emphasize, and equip the brigade/regiment
UMTs so they can be combat multipliers for the brigade/regiment. The commander
sets the tone in the command when he recognizes and uses the capabilities of
the UMTs to enhance combat readiness and effectiveness. 2.
The brigade/regiment UMTs must have radios to coordinate and execute the brigade's/regiment's
religious support coverage and communicate with brigade/regiment UMTs, per
FM
16-1, Religious
Support.
Commanders could help their UMT by leading the effort for a MTOE change so
that UMTs can have the ability to execute the commander's religious support
program. These radios are already on the TOE. However, the MTOE is where UMTs
live and do ministry for soldiers. 3.
UMTs should be used to support the CA teams through the command. Using the
UMT in these kinds of operations can enhance the combat effectiveness of the
unit by possibly lowering the threat level and using nonlethal means to address
the issues. This gives the commander the option of re-allocating his combat
power based upon a lower threat level. Chaplains and assistants are the executive
agents of the commander's religious support plan. This includes advising the
command on indigenous issues in the AOR in conjunction with CA. A commander's
CA team may not be on the ground when the unit encounters COBs, but his UMT
will be there. (TA.7.4.3.4
Perform Chaplaincy Activities)
TREND
5
SUBJECT:
Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) Operations
OBSERVATION
(Armor): CASEVAC operations are not synchronized.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Task force CASEVAC plans are too often developed by the medical platoon leader
without detailed knowledge of either the task force scheme of maneuver or the
S4's support plan. 2.
Poor linkage with the forward support medical company (FSMC) denies the medical
platoon leader understanding of the brigade's CASEVAC plan.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Involve the medical platoon leader in task force wargaming. 2.
Ensure that communications exist to the FSMC commander. 3.
The medical platoon leader must know the brigade's CASEVAC plan prior to the
task force wargame. 4.
Distribute the CASEVAC plan with the rest of the CSS plan. (TA.7.4.4.2
Evacuate Casualties)
TREND
6
SUBJECT:
Casualty Reporting
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Casualty types/categories, method of transportation, and estimated
time of arrival are often not reported before evacuation to the battalion aid
station (BAS).
DISCUSSION:
1.
Inadequate reporting often results in the BAS displacing to a subsequent location
without realizing casualties are en route. This markedly increases task force
died-of-wounds (DOW) rates due to excessive evacuation time. 2.
Casualties often arrive without DA Forms 1155 and 1156, which hinders unit
patient tracking and replacement capabilities.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Casualty reporting must be incorporated into the unit tactical SOP (TACSOP)
and exercised during platoon and company lane training. 2.
Uniformity of MILES casualty cards, DA Forms 1155 and 1156, must be standardized
throughout each task force, such as having name data completed and placing
cards in the first aid dressing pouch. 3.
Line company medics and designated non-standard ambulance crews must report
pertinent casualty information to the BAS prior to evacuation.
(TA.7.4.4.2
Evacuate Casualties)
TREND
7
SUBJECT:
Gunnery Skills
OBSERVATION
(Aviation): Attack helicopter battalion and cavalry squadron gunnery skills
continue to erode.
DISCUSSION:
Skill
erosion is evident during force-on-force (MILES/AGES) and live fire operations.
Recent crews employing the Hellfire point target weapon system have tallied
probability of hit statistics of less than 60. This appears to be caused by
a lack of Home Station gunnery training. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Attack
and cavalry units must make gunnery training a priority. These units must standardize
their gunnery evaluations per FM
1-140, Helicopter
Gunnery.
Tables V through VIII must receive objective evaluation. (TA.7.4.5
Train Tactical Units and Personnel)
TREND
8
SUBJECT:
Soldier Skills
OBSERVATION
(LTP): Individual soldier skills at the lowest level need improvement.
DISCUSSION:
Individual
soldier skills often become the difference between success and failure on the
battlefield. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Commanders at all levels should be willing to give up maneuver time, if needed,
to improve the single soldier or crew at bottom level. Although maneuver training
is essential, each soldier must be able to do his job to provide the needed
killing power. 2.
Stick lanes are a good place to train individual skills. NCOs should study
FM
25-100, Training
the Force,
and
FM
25-101, Battle
Focused Training,
and
should understand this line of training better than anyone else in the force.
(TA.7.4.5
Train Tactical Units and Personnel)
TREND
9
SUBJECT:
Class IV and V Operations
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Most engineer battalions are seldom able to execute an integrated Class
IV/V plan.
DISCUSSION:
The
engineer battalion tactical SOP (TACSOP) typically outlines the doctrinal
combined
arms responsibilities for packaging and moving Class IV/V barrier materials
and for operating Class IV/V supply points, but these responsibilities are
rarely addressed specifically in brigade and task force orders. As a result,
most engineer battalions end up as the sole executors of the planning, preparation,
and execution phases of Class IV/V logistical operations. This lack of participation
by other members of the brigade combat team in the execution of Class IV/V
operations detracts from the engineer battalion's primary missions of countermobility
and survivability during the brigade's defense.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Engineer planners at all levels should campaign for the active support of other
members of the combined arms team in support of Class IV/V operations, and
the specifics of this support should be addressed in the maneuver order. 2.
Class IV/V operations and responsibilities should be addressed in the scheme
of maneuver, sub-unit mission, and service support subparagraphs, not relegated
to the engineer annex. 3.
In addition to the engineer battalion TACSOP, the task force and brigade combat
team TACSOPs should also specify responsibilities for Class IV/V operations.
(TA.7.5.2
Supply the Force)
TREND
10
SUBJECT:
Forecasting CSS Requirements
OBSERVATION
(Armor): CSS requirements are not being developed or briefed to standard.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Units are not forecasting resupply requirements during wargaming. 2.
S4s are not identifying triggers for movement of elements or mobile prepositioning.
3.
Planning for tactical resupply is not completed; all requirements while in
contact become emergency requirements.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Integrate S4s with the rest of the staff. 2.
The S4 must examine all classes of supply/logistical function for each phase
of the operation during wargaming for both task force and company/team level.
(TA.7.5.2
Supply the Force)
TREND
11
SUBJECT:
Ammunition Tracking, Management, and Distribution
OBSERVATION
(FS): The tactical operations center (TOC) staff does not accurately track
ammunition to facilitate current and future operations.
DISCUSSION:
The
TOC is responsible for planning, coordinating and executing the FA portion
of the fire support plan for the supported maneuver unit. As such, the S3 is
responsible for supervising ammunition management for the battalion and overseeing
the activities of the battalion fire direction officer and ammunition officer.
Improper ammunition tracking undermines ammunition management, causing unforeseen
ammunition shortages, missed resupply triggers, improper ammunition configuration,
and untimely resupply.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Develop and enforce an ammunition management SOP. 2.
Assign responsibilities and reporting procedures. Key considerations are:
a. Manage special munitions/square weights/powder lots.
b. Standardize ammunition report required (SOP).
c. Start with a true base count.
d. Force FDCs to maintain records of fire.
e. Track special ammunition by round.
f. Batteries track by round - report by red/amber/green status.
g. Forecast battalion ammunition needs.
h. Develop and implement an ammunition distribution plan.
i. Maintain quality control.
j. Fix responsibility for reporting and tracking ammunition.
(TA.7.5.2
Supply the Force)
TREND
12
SUBJECT:
Ammunition Planning and Management
OBSERVATION
(FS): Ammunition planning, management, and triggers continue to be a systemic
weakness for firing batteries.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Firing batteries struggle with the process of identifying ammunition requirements
based on battery essential field artillery tasks (EFATs) and the battalion
scheme of maneuver. Without a clear picture of requirements, commanders are
unable to fully develop their ammunition plan during their mission analysis
and orders development. 2.
Commanders, unsure of where they will move and occupy, cannot determine which
charges and munitions they will need, and poorly addressed EFATs leave commanders
without the specifics needed for planning. For example, during the planning
process in a recent rotation, the type of propellant to use to employ the FASCAM
minefield was not properly wargamed. As a result, a battery used red bag to
shoot the FASCAM when they were short that propellant. The commander did not
participate in the planning process and did not provide the battalion the necessary
battlefield calculus to execute EFATs for the fight. Because the commander
could not and did not identify his ammunition requirements, he could not inform
the battalion that they were short on required munitions. 3.
Commanders have difficulty tracking and managing the ammunition used and remaining
on their guns, FAASVs, and PLS. Once firing begins, platoons quickly lose track
of ammunition quantities on hand, and the POCS are often at a loss tracking
ammunition expenditures. Without a firm grasp of ammunition expenditures, the
batteries cannot trigger ammunition resupply at appropriate times.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Ammunition
management begins with the receipt of the battalion field artillery support
plan (FASP). Based on the briefed scheme of fires and EFATs, the commander
must begin identifying his ammunition requirements. STEP
1. Analyze the scheme of fires.
By
looking at the missions that the battalion expects him to shoot, the commander
can determine a quick figure on the type and number of rounds he will probably
need. An example of this process follows. Assume the following are missions
that the battalion plans to shoot: | AE
7118 | NK
414973 | Battery
6 | DPICM: | 36
DPICM |
| AE
7120 | NK
385952 | Battery
12 | DPICM: | 72
DPICM |
| AE
7125 | NK
417928 | Battery
1 | SMC: | 6
SMC (Build only) |
| AE
7130 | NK
367954 | Battery
12 | DPICM: | 72
DPICM |
| AE
7133 | NK
387962 | Battery
6 | DPICM: | 36
DPICM |
| AE
7137 | NK
390942 | Battery
6 | DPICM: | 36
DPICM |
| AE
7147 | NK
371918 | Battery
12 | HEA | 72
HEA |
By
quickly adding up the mission totals based on the scheme of fires, the commander
finds that he will need 252 DPICM, 6 SMC, and 72 HEA. Experience shows that
most battalions require twice the planned ammunition for each target. Target
location error, requests for additional fires, and missed triggers often result
in repeat missions. One
technique is to determine the numbers required by the scheme of fires and then
double them.
Thus,
the battery commander could interpolate a requirement for 504 DPICM, 12 SMC,
and 144 HEA. This gives him a minimum number for planning. It can also focus
him in planning for contingencies. The majority of the munitions are DPICM.
This can key him to go heavy on DPICM for additional targets of opportunity.
EFATs will also influence his planning numbers for anticipated requirements.
EFATs, such as smoke, Copperhead, and FASCAM, will generate additional ammunition
requirements. A thorough examination of what thebattalion intends his battery
to shoot will generate a fairly accurate ammunition planning number.
STEP
2. Identify the charges needed to shoot the required missions.
With
a detailed execution matrix, the commander can easily identify where he will
be when shooting each mission. The battery fire direction officers (FDOs) should
determine which charges they need. The commander can then determine the powder
requirements and take into account any supply or ammunition restrictions that
will influence the powders available. With these two steps accomplished, the
battery commander will have a sound analysis of his ammunition requirements
for the upcoming fight. He must then examine what ammunition he has available
and identify any shortfalls or requirements. The earlier he identifies his
requirements to battalion, the more likely the ammunition will be there for
the fight. STEP
3. Develop a standardized turret and FAASV load.
A
standardized load ensures that each platoon is ready to fire the anticipated
missions. However, platoon-specific EFATs, such as Copperhead raids can affect
platoon ammunition loads. The commander should determine how the battery will
shoot. Based on his mission analysis, the commander will decide if the guns
will shoot off their turrets, FAASVs, or off of the ground. Based on a high
ground threat, the commander may have his FAASVs in overwatch away from the
guns. This will require a turret load tailored to shooting the missions without
FAASV resupply. A low ground threat may have the guns mated with their FAASVs.
Here a turret load may focus on requirements during emergency missions or during
EFATs planned for later in the fight. The bottom line on developing a turret
load is that it should allow the gun to accomplish specific EFATs without need
of resupply or when FAASVs or PLS are not available. Once the commander has
identified what munitions to carry on the gun and FAASV, he can address the
PLS load. His requirements may mean sending the current PLS back to battalion
to get a different configuration or to pick up additional projectiles and powders.
STEP
4. Develop the triggers needed to stay in the fight.
The
commander should base the triggers on EFATs and anticipated ammunition expenditures.
Develop specific triggers by numbers and type of rounds. Percentages are confusing
and lead to misunderstandings. For triggers to be effective, the entire chain
of command must understand them. For example, if the trigger to resupply the
gun from the FAASV is the use of 10 DPICM, the chief of section (COS) and the
ammunition team chief (ATC) must both know that the trigger is 10 expended
DPICM. During the fight, the COS can call the FAASV forward without waiting
for the command once he reaches his trigger. Likewise, develop specific triggers
for the FAASVs to resupply at the PLS. Ensure inclusion of these triggers in
the battery OPORD. STEP
5. Track ammunition during the fight.
There
is no one person who tracks all the ammunition. Leaders throughout the platoons
and battery must be aware of what ammunition is on hand and what has been expended.
This allows for quick response when meeting triggers and little confusion during
resupply. COS and ATC track what they have and report to the POCs. POCs track
ammunition expenditures and keep the platoon leaders and platoon sergeants
informed. Platoon sergeants monitor the guns and FAASVs to ensure proper response
to ammunition triggers. The battery commander tracks the overall status to
determine when he needs additional ammunition from battalion. The end result
will be a battery that does not fail during its essential field artillery tasks
due to a lack of proper ammunition. (TA.7.5.2
Supply the Force)
TREND
13
SUBJECT:
Resupply of Class V for Mortar Platoons
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Resupply of Class V for mortar platoons is inconsistent throughout
the campaigns.
DISCUSSION:
1.
During force-on-force missions, mortar platoon sergeants (PSGs) are unable
to integrate CSS into their rehearsals or fully develop paragraph 4 of the
OPORD. 2.
PSGs complete the necessary coordination through the supply system, but requests
are cut due to a lack of support vehicles. 3.
Mortar platoons are directly impacted on their ability to prepare and execute.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Mortar platoons must develop a working relationship with their support element
prior to deployment. Establish and standardize SOPs and develop push packages
of Class V. 2.
During fire support planning, consider ammunition requirements. It is essential
that the mortar platoon leaders or platoon sergeants (PSGs) be present to advise
on what types of ammunition will be required. For example, if the mission is
defense (day or night), sufficient HE and WP rounds must be on site. This situation
causes the mortar platoon leader and the PSG to maintain contact with the supporting
element and advise on any ammunition constraints. The PSG must facilitate this
process over the A/L net. 3.
Rehearse battlefield resupply of Class V at platoon level. Good techniques
are:
a. Use triggers to help determine when and where Class V resupply
will occur.
b. Push forward the necessary resupply trucks to be under
the control of the PSG prior to crossing the line of departure (LD).
(TA.7.5.2
Supply the Force)
TREND
14
SUBJECT:
Tracking Supplies in the Field Trains Command Post (FTCP)
OBSERVATION
(Mech): The FTCP does not track on-hand and requested supplies down to the
company level.
DISCUSSION:
When
on-hand and requested supplies are not tracked, mission critical supplies are
not requested, and supplies cannot be delivered during LOGPACs to the appropriate
place on the battlefield.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
The
FTCP must track on-hand and requisitioned supplies at the company level to
ensure the proper quantities of supplies are being requisitioned, and to ensure
that when these supplies are received, they can be distributed to the end user
in a timely manner. (TA.7.5.2
Supply the Force)
TREND
15
SUBJECT:
Supply Management: Logistics Packages (LOGPACs)
OBSERVATION
(Mech): LOGPAC times established in unit SOPs and OPORDs are rarely met.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Units are not meeting their established logistics release point (LRP) times.
LRPs are established late, and first sergeants (1SGs) return their LOGPACs
to the LRP site long after the published return time. 2.
The excessive time consumed during company and specialty platoon resupply has
a major impact on task force logistical sustainment operations. The impact
of LOGPACs returning late is most visible when support platoons are unable
to meet scheduled bulk resupply of Classes I, III, and V in the brigade support
area (BSA). This results in the HHC commander and support platoon leader being
unable to establish a timeline that includes pre-combat checks/pre-combat inspections
(PCC/PCIs) and an adequate rest plan for their soldiers.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Units must establish a realistic and attainable LOGPAC turn-around time. This
will facilitate the planning and proper execution of resupply operations in
the BSA. 2.
Ensure that subordinate units in the task force treat LOGPACs as a critical
event and have enough command involvement to guarantee the timely return of
the LOGPACs to the LRP. (TA.7.5.2
Supply the Force)
TREND
16
SUBJECT:
Class VIII Resupply System
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Brigade Class VIII resupply systems are inadequate.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Planned push-package systems via LOGPAC are not utilized. 2.
There is seldom a plan for periodic resupply. 3.
Ambulance back-haul is seldom used.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The brigade/division medical supply office (forward) must establish clear guidance
and set policy for medical resupply. 2.
The LOGPAC system, when used, must be tracked by the higher headquarter's medical
treatment facility. 3.
Medical resupply packages must be clearly marked. 4.
Class VIII coordination/requests can be conducted directly by the medical platoon
leader and ambulance platoon leader during mission planning and CSS/CHS rehearsals.
(TA.7.5.2
Supply the Force)
TREND
17
SUBJECT:
Civilians on the Battlefield
OBSERVATION
(Brigade Staff): Soldiers are too often unclear on the use of force against
civilians who commit crimes in their presence.
DISCUSSION:
Most
brigade combat teams conduct training focused on the law of war and rules of
engagement (ROE) concerning civilians on the battlefield (COB) prior to their
rotation, and have ROE soldier's cards for this mission. In most cases, however,
when the regiment's troops are confronted by assaults by COBs on other COBs,
the troopers do nothing to control the situation until after a COB is injured.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Sustain the use of mission-specific ROE cards. 2.
Allocate time on the training schedule for the judge advocate (JA) or commanders
to conduct additional vignette training on the ROEs for COB. (TA.7.7.2
Conduct Law and Order Operations)
TREND
18
SUBJECT:
Civil Military Operations (CMO)
OBSERVATION
(Brigade Staff): Civil military operations (CMO) lack command focus and emphasis.
DISCUSSION:
CMO
teams lack critical assets for accomplishment of their mission. Because brigade
combat teams often either ignore requests for assets or are not prepared to
task and execute critical assets, the CMO teams were often unable to accomplish
their mission. For example, one judge advocate (JA) requested assistance from
a battalion-level quick reaction force (QRF) to respond as security to remove
COBs from a key assembly area. The battalion did not respond, and the brigade
would not support the JA or task another unit to fulfill the mission. As a
result, the COBs brought PPG (Pahrumpian Peoples Guard) militia to the brigade
support area (BSA) the next morning. Ten soldiers, seven civilians, two media
representatives, and four PPG were killed or wounded in a firefight that ensued.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Give
overall responsibility for the CMOs to a senior staff officer, such as the
brigade combat team XO or S3, to ensure that the brigade combat team and subordinate
commands support personnel and equipment taskings for CMO. (TA.7.7.2
Conduct Law and Order Operations)
TREND
19
SUBJECT:
Riot Control Equipment
OBSERVATION
(Brigade Staff): Elements responding to civilian demonstrations are not properly
equipped with riot control equipment.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Protective gear, such as face shields and riot control shields, are frequently
not available during civilian demonstrations. 2.
There is seldom a uniformity among the elements responding to the incidents
with respect to individual protective equipment.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Organizations deploying to an area where contact with civilians is a security
consideration should plan to outfit their soldiers with the appropriate civil
disturbance equipment. This also allows the unit to employ a graduated response,
in terms of levels of force, against a civilian demonstration. 2.
Having proper riot control equipment is important for two reasons:
a. It provides minimum protection for soldiers when put in
a confrontational situation with civilians.
b. It helps to measure the level of force appropriate to the
situation. When soldiers automatically deploy with rifles, the use of deadly
force is harder to control.
(TA.7.7.2
Conduct Law and Order Operations)
TA.6
Mobility/Survivability and NBC BOS Narrative
TA.4
Command and Control BOS Narrative
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