COMMAND
AND CONTROL BOS
(Trends
are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not
in
any priority order.)
Positive
Performance
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
Scout Platoon Leader Situational Awareness
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Scout platoon leaders maintain good situational awareness and are proactive
in requesting to move reconnaissance forces further forward on the battlefield
to support the task force's scheme of maneuver.
DISCUSSION:
Scout
platoon leaders monitor the task force command net and remain situationally
aware of the operation. Because of this awareness, the platoon leader is able
to continuously update the task force TOC on the location and disposition of
his forces and can nominate new observation posts (OPs) or missions to support
the maneuver forces. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES:
1.
Task force commanders have new PIRs that must be answered as the battle progresses.
The scout platoon leader's ability to maintain situational awareness and nominate
new locations and missions has proven to be very successful for many task forces.
2.
During an operation, the task force TOC often loses visibility of the scout
platoon. As such, the scout platoon leader must be situationally aware of the
task force's scheme of maneuver and the scout platoon's location in relation
to the maneuver forces. With knowledge of the task force plan and commander's
intent, the platoon leader can nominate new positions for his forces to answer
the commander's new PIRs.
(TA.4.1
Acquire and Communicate Information and Maintain Status)
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
Line of Sight (LOS) Planning
OBSERVATION
(Brigade Staff): Valuable knowledge has been gained on LOS planning and installation
of radio transmission links.
DISCUSSION:
Signal
companies have learned how valuable signal site reconnaissance is to planning
LOS links. Often, after profiling several links, discrepancies are found and
corrected between the digital SCC profile and the terrain as seen by the soldiers
on-site. For example, in several cases, the SCC profile indicated a radio link
would have clear LOS, but actually the antenna ended up pointing directly into
a mountain. Other times the digital profile indicated the link would not work,
but when tested the link worked.
SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES:
1.
Signal companies should continue to conduct training on planning LOS links
and continue to train leaders and soldiers on conducting detailed signal site
reconnaissance. 2.
Teach the S3 section to use the SCC only as a tool and to increase confidence
in key leaders conducting signal site recon. 3.
Train planners on verifying digital profiles with manual LOS analysis.
(TA.4.1.2
Manage Means of Communicating Information)
TREND
3
SUBJECT:
TOC Configurations
OBSERVATION
(Mech): TOCs have had various configurations, based on METT-T, which provide
the best environment for battle tracking and TOC operations.
DISCUSSION:
None.
SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUE:
Continue
to train and sustain the TOC configuration operation.
(TA.4.1.2
Manage Means of Communicating Information)
TREND
4
SUBJECT:
Mission Analysis
OBSERVATION
(Mech): The mission analysis processes are usually conducted to standard, primarily
due to organization and a focused agenda.
DISCUSSION:
None.
SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES:
1.
Adhere to the mission analysis agenda outlined in FM
71-2, The
Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force.
Do not cut corners during this step of the Military Decision-Making Process
(MDMP). 2.
Each BOS representative must be prepared to brief specified and implied tasks,
critical tasks, limitations and constraints, assumptions, risks, and assets
available. They should then list their requests for information (RFIs). 3.
Once the commander has heard all of the BOS briefs, he should give guidance
and focus each of them on his intent for their particular BOS (it is helpful
to the commander if the BOS representative provides suggested uses of their
BOS to achieve the commander's intent). 4.
The commander should state his decisive point and provide guidance for course
of action (COA) development. 5.
Products that should be derived from the mission analysis brief are:
a. Restated mission.
b. Timeline.
c. Enemy COA brief.
d. Focus for the reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan.
6.
Use of NCOs and junior enlisted personnel to assist in the process, particularly
the set-up, will allow staff officers to focus on the "analysis" and save time.
(TA.4.2.1.1
Analyze Mission)
TREND
5
SUBJECT:
Soldier Morale
OBSERVATION
(Brigade Staff): Soldier morale in signal companies is high.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Leaders and soldiers are always receptive and willing to learn. Every signal
company has a positive attitude and is very capable of installing, operating,
and maintaining Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE). 2.
The capabilities and leadership of the units is excellent.
SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES:
1.
Each company should maintain the standards set throughout their rotations.
2.
Company leadership should continue to ensure soldiers are taken care of and
are able to train hard. Keep up the quality training and dedication to excellence
and high morale will continue.
(TA.4.4
Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
TREND
6
SUBJECT:
Troop-Leading Procedures (TLP)
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Medical platoon leaders often demonstrate flexibility and proactive
support in response to condensed timelines and multiple changes in task force
orders.
DISCUSSION:
Medical
platoon leaders often develop and sustain an effective hasty orders/wargaming
process and modified rehearsal technique, which is clearly understood by subordinates.
PCCs and PCIs are usually conducted to standard. Medical platoons maintain
a high degree of motivation throughout each rotation. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUE:
Sustain
effective TLP and incorporate formal process into unit TACSOPs and training
events. Publish timelines and critical tasks. Delegate responsibility to subordinate
leaders.
(TA.4.4
Direct and Lead Subordinates)
TREND
7
SUBJECT:
Scout Platoon Pre-Combat Checks (PCCs)
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Platoon section sergeants and squad leaders are conducting quality
PCCs prior to receiving the platoon leader's OPORD.
DISCUSSION:
Scout
platoon NCOs normally receive a quality WARNO from the platoon leader, allowing
section sergeants to conduct PCCs of their sections prior to the platoon leader
issuing his OPORD. SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUE:
The
task force TOC/staff should continue to give WARNOs with sufficient detail
to allow the scout platoon leader to issue a quality WARNO to his platoon.
This allows the scout platoon section sergeants to conduct PCCs prior to receiving
their OPORD and also allows the task force to expedite the deployment of reconnaissance.
(TA.4.4.4
Maintain Unit Discipline)
TREND
8
SUBJECT:
Aviation Integration into the Scheme of Maneuver
OBSERVATION
(Brigade Staff): Units can produce an airspace plan that supports the maneuver
plan by following the targeting cell meeting with an Army airspace command
and control (A2C2) cell meeting.
DISCUSSION:
None.
SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUES:
An
A2C2 meeting should be conducted immediately after every wargame phase. It
should be attended by the FSO, S3, ALO, ADANCO, S2, and the aviation LNO. Ensure
the plan is briefed during the combined arms rehearsal to facilitate synchronization
and dissemination to the lowest levels possible. (TA.4.4.5
Synchronize Tactical Operations)
TREND
9
SUBJECT:
BOS Representation in the Planning Process
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Key planners from each BOS are usually present during the planning
process.
DISCUSSION:
None.
SUSTAINMENT
TECHNIQUE:
Continue
to ensure a representative from each BOS is present and prepared to provide
the commander with their capabilities and restrictions for the upcoming mission.
(TA.4.4.5
Synchronize Tactical Operations)
Needs
Emphasis
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
Civilians on the Battlefield (COB) Reporting
OBSERVATION
(Brigade Staff): COB reports to the tactical operations center (TOC) are sporadic.
DISCUSSION:
Information
does not flow well from the units in the field through battle captains to the
special staff, including the judge advocate (JA). Incomplete reports often
come to the brigade battle captains and are never passed to the special staff
for action. (As an example, during one rotation, the JAs often did not receive
the corps' FRAGO for an upcoming mission until the morning of the meeting,
or not at all. Had it not been for O/C intervention, the JAs and special staff
would not have had any advance warning.) As a direct result, the brigade combat
teams are often not prepared for the mission, necessitating an order for a
reinspection.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Create a standard fratricide and COB reporting format in the tactical SOP (TACSOP)
so all necessary information for a response can be relayed to the special staff
in one message. 2.
Add a standard distribution for COB/significant legal issue reports. (TA.4.1.1.4
Receive and Transmit Friendly Troop Information)
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
Fratricide Reports
OBSERVATION
(Brigade Staff): Fratricide reports to the tactical operations center were
sporadic.
DISCUSSION:
In
many cases, fratricides were not reported to the TOC through the subordinate
units. When they were reported, they lacked the necessary detail and normally
took over 24 hours to reach the TOC and the judge advocate (JA).
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Make fratricides a commander's critical information requirement (CCIR) to the
brigade combat team commander and record and forward the report to the JA for
action. 2.
Add a fratricide report to the tactical SOP (TACSOP) referenced under the current
chapter on fratricides. (TA.4.1.1.4
Receive and Transmit Friendly Troop Information)
TREND
3
SUBJECT:
Combat Service Support (CSS) Reporting
OBSERVATION
(Brigade Staff): Current levels of reporting within the brigade combat teams
do not provide the S4 with adequate visibility of on-hand supplies within the
unit.
DISCUSSION:
The
lack of adequate information to properly track and control critical CSS assets
on the battlefield results in inadequate asset visibility, delays in resupply,
and many avoidable emergency resupply requests. In one rotation, 35 percent
of all LOGREPs turned in during the rotation were emergency requests for resupply.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Units should review their SOPs to ensure that required reports are appropriate
and contain all of the information necessary to track the CSS effort without
undue repetition or burden on subordinate units. 2.
Units should use CPXs and other simulations as a vehicle to focus on accurate
and timely reporting by subordinate units. (TA.4.1.1.4
Receive and Transmit Friendly Troop Information)
TREND
4
SUBJECT:
Communications Network Planning
OBSERVATION
(Brigade Staff): Communications network planning is not always synchronized
with the brigade's maneuver plan.
DISCUSSION:
1.
The Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) network plan is not always synchronized
with the brigade's maneuver plan. 2.
FRAGOs and OPORDs often lack sufficient technical and tactical details, resulting
in decreased situational awareness and leaders having insufficient time to
conduct troop-leading procedures. Dissemination of this information does not
always get down to the remote team level, resulting in destruction or ineffective
employment of key remote systems.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Synchronize the MSE planning cycle with the brigade's timeline. Conduct concurrent
planning with brigade. 2.
Develop methods to continue to train the signal battalion LNO and provide him
tools to ensure MSE assets are included in the MDMP. 3.
Develop a system to quickly disseminate information, including FRAGOs, OPORDs,
and graphics, down to the soldier level. Utilize the most efficient method
(TACLAN, TACFAX, etc.) to get information from brigade down to the signal company
and platoon level. 4.
The orders development process used at NTC by each company should be continually
trained at Home Station in order to increase proficiency.
(TA.4.1.2
Manage Means of Communicating Information)
TREND
5
SUBJECT:
Signal Soldier Maintenance of Communications Equipment
OBSERVATION
(Brigade Staff): Customer support by signal soldiers to ensure the communications
architecture is installed, operated, and maintained, is not to standards.
DISCUSSION:
During
several rotations, the brigades/regiments have experienced difficulty with
MSRTs, DNVTs, DSVTs, Blackjack fax machines, EPLRS SA hosts, CSS automation
systems, and other communications equipment. While this equipment is owned
and operated by the user, it is the signal soldier that must be the subject
matter expert (SME) on communications equipment. Units do not have enough knowledge
of their organic communications equipment, and signal soldiers are not always
proactive in ensuring the entire communications architecture is operational.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Signal soldiers must have the knowledge to troubleshoot and maintain the communications
architecture, per FM
11-43, Signal
Leader's Guide.
Continue to train signal soldiers to become experts on all communications and
automation equipment. 2.
The signal soldier must also be able to train the users to become self-reliant.
Place emphasis on signal soldiers providing proactive signal support to help
users figure out how to install, maintain, operate, and troubleshoot their
equipment. 3.
Ensure the SYSCON and node management teams are actively checking all systems
in the communications architecture.
(TA.4.1.2
Manage Means of Communicating Informaiton)
TREND
6
SUBJECT:
Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) Communications Networks
OBSERVATION
(Brigade Staff): Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) communications networks
are seldom planned or designed to support a dynamically phased operation on
the modern battlefield.
DISCUSSION:
During
several battles, signal companies have maintained relatively static networks
that do not react to changes in different phases of each battle and do not
react to battlefield conditions that trigger network reconfiguration.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Node centers and radio access units (RAUs) must be prepared for rapid movement
and react to each phase of the battle. During the defense, MSE planners must
plan additional locations for forward-deployed elements for survivability purposes
and several locations should be identified for short-notice jumps. Close coordination
with the brigade S6 section and battle tracking is required to ensure MSE assets
react to offense and defense operations. 2.
Conduct realistic training by planning and executing dynamic networks that
support each phase of the mission and cover the width and depth of the battlefield.
a. Train on developing triggers that support the expansion
of the network during offensive operations.
b. Plan and execute defensive operations that utilize alternate
locations and react to battlefield triggers.
c. Train on battle-tracking down to team level to ensure all
signal teams have situational awareness and know how and when to reconfigure
the network.
(TA.4.1.2.
Manage Means of Communicating Information)
TREND
7
SUBJECT:
Signal Plans
OBSERVATION
(Brigade Staff): Signal plans lack sufficient detail.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Signal annexes produced lack sufficient detail to provide adequate support.
Although annexes provided locations of retransmission and radio access unit
(RAU) teams, the annexes did not explain:
a. Possible problem areas/dead space.
b. Triggers to use the retransmission frequency or hopset.
c. Locations of other signal assets in the units zone (node
centers and MSE relay teams).
d. Movement plans of signal units/teams.
e. Frequency jump plan for single channel operations.
f. Detailed pre-battle communications exercise instructions.
g. Priority of maintenance for signal systems.
2.
S6s do not plan for overwhelming success or catastrophic failure (contingency
communications), which leads to a signal plan that provides insufficient redundancy.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The S6 must coordinate constantly with all staff members and utilize all available
tools (terrain teams, MSE commander, or BATCON/SYSCON) to ensure sufficient
detail is provided and complete signal support is rendered to the unit. 2.
Planning must be completed early and with consideration for overwhelming success
and catastrophic failure.
(TA.4.1.2
Manage Means of Communicating Information)
TREND
8
SUBJECT:
Contingency Planning for Command and Control (C2) Systems
OBSERVATION
(Armor): Planning for C2 systems support is inadequate.
DISCUSSION:
1.
The C2 plan is seldom wargamed during the planning process, resulting in only
one-dimensional planning for C2 assets. 2.
Redundant C2 is not incorporated into the plan. 3.
Units do not react to failures in the retransmission system, and, as a result,
scouts cannot communicate. 4.
If the tactical operations center (TOC) is destroyed, the combat trains command
post (CTCP) is not in a position to take over the fight.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES: Incorporate
"PACE" into each phase of the operation. EXAMPLE
(scout mission):
- P Primary means of C2 (retransmission)
- A Alternate means (relay/scout retransmission)
- C Contingency C2 (move to last point of C2)
- E Emergency (runner/send someone back; switch to another net)
(TA.4.1.2
Manage Means of Communicating Information)
TREND
9
SUBJECT:
Communications Plan Coordination with Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Personnel
OBSERVATION
(Mech): TOC personnel often do not understand or adhere to the communications
plan.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Battle staffs and TOC soldiers are often not trained on what the communications
plan is and how movement of the TOC, following the initial communications plan,
and tracking the battle can enhance the overall "visibility" of the battle.
2.
Occasionally, frequencies or net identification are altered or communications
assets, such as retransmission sites, are moved by other than communications
personnel during critical times on the battlefield. 3.
Movement of the TOC is not fully synchronized with the original communications
plan, and neither the signal officer (SIGO) nor the NCOIC enforce the plan
during the execution phase of the mission.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Train the TOC to understand the importance of integrating and adhering to a
communications plan. 2.
The SIGO should reinforce the communications plan with the battle captain and
operations sergeant. 3.
The communications NCOIC should continually monitor and position himself at
the TOC to supervise the integration of the TOC with the plan while the unit
is in contact.
(TA.4.1.2
Manage Means of Communicating Information)
TREND
10
SUBJECT:
Situational Awareness and Force Protection
OBSERVATION
(Brigade Staff): Radio and relay teams and node centers do not have adequate
situational awareness or force protection.
DISCUSSION:
Inadequate
force protection and situational awareness contributed to the destruction of
communications equipment, including remote radio access unit (RAU) teams, relay
teams, and numerous casualties at node centers, during enemy engagements. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Platoon leadership must refine tactical troop-leading procedures to ensure
situational awareness is driven down to individual level. 2.
Companies should develop a process for disseminating critical situational awareness
information to platoons and teams. 3.
Situational awareness information should be included on every team's tactical
pre-combat inspection (PCI). (TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
11
SUBJECT:
Airspace Control Measures Management
OBSERVATION
(Brigade Staff): Tactical Operations Centers (TOCs) do not consolidate airspace
measures on map boards.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Units do not fully integrate the Army airspace command and control (A2C2) plan
in the TOC or during combined arms rehearsals. 2.
Air corridors are rarely depicted on the operations overlay. 3.
Units do not use a single map or overlay to manage brigade airspace. The ALO,
ADAO, and AVN LNO use separate maps for their respective control measures.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Ensure
all airspace control measures are posted on one map board. Ensure the A2C2
cell and/or map board is located near the ADA and fire support maps. All airspace
users can then visualize airspace conflicts and resolve them. Indirect fire
asset locations must be updated on this map. (TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
12
SUBJECT:
Battle Tracking in Rear Command Post (CP) Operations
OBSERVATION
(Brigade Staff): Rear CPs are consistently unable to track current operations.
DISCUSSION:
Rear
CPs are not physically configured for battle tracking. Situation maps are not
maintained and tracking charts are ineffective. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Units
should review their SOPs and reconfigure the rear CP to allow for battle tracking.
SITMAPs and wing boards with effective tracking charts are needed. S1/S4 personnel
must be organized for 24-hour operations. (TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
13
SUBJECT:
Situational Awareness - Signal
OBSERVATION
(Brigade Staff): Situational awareness in signal units is inadequate.
DISCUSSION:
1.
S6s seldom achieve or gain the information needed to provide situational awareness,
a complete picture of signal assets, and how the unit as a whole is supported
through communications. 2.
Subordinate unit signal officers (SIGOs) do not provide asset visibility or
coordinate their communications effort with the brigade/regimental SIGO. This
leads to an unsynchronized signal plan that causes units to suffer communications
outages during critical times during the battle.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES: Develop
a system that produces cross-talk among SIGOs, such as a signal huddle, or
conference calls at predetermined times of the day, and integrate the S6 into
the brigade/regimental combined arms rehearsal.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
14
SUBJECT:
Operational Graphics
OBSERVATION
(Brigade Staff): Operational graphics are too often not adequately disseminated.
DISCUSSION:
1.
A lack of operational graphics for the military intelligence (MI) company results
in a lack of situational awareness. The analysis and control element (ACE)
and the platoon operations center (POC) are degraded in their ability to synchronize
the intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) effort with the brigade combat
team's scheme of maneuver. 2.
The lack of graphics often leads to a fratricide and a few other close calls
due to a lack of situational awareness. 3.
The lack of graphics prevents the EW systems from conducting any analysis of
the traffic being intercepted prior to sending it to the POC.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Although it is unreasonable to expect each team to have a complete copy of
operational graphics, all teams need the basic unit graphics as well as visibility
of obstacles in zone. This will allow the ACE/POC and EW teams to follow the
battle and anticipate and make the changes necessary to continue to synchronize
the EW plan with the brigade combat team plan. 2.
Having operational graphics:
a. Allows the ACE/POC and EW teams to anticipate the movement
of EW assets on the battlefield during critical moments of the fight.
b. Helps prevent fratricide by making teams aware of unit
boundaries and with whom they must coordinate for terrain.
c. Allows teams to operate independently in the event that
the higher HQ is rendered combat ineffective or communications are lost.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
15
SUBJECT:
Aviation Battle Tracking in the Tactical Operations Center (TOC)
OBSERVATION
(Brigade Staff): TOCs do not track aviation elements throughout the battle.
DISCUSSION:
1.
TOCs rarely know in a timely manner when and where aircraft are located on
the battlefield and usually rely on the aviation LNO to conduct aviation battle
tracking. 2.
Current operation staff members are very reluctant to command and control aviation
assets. The command and control functions for the aviation task force are conducted
on the brigade combat team's O&I and command nets, no different from any other
task force under brigade control. This causes a breakdown in the synchronization
of the aviation effort, lack of proper airspace management, and the loss of
aviation combat power.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Increase aviation reporting during the battle and use checkpoints, routes,
ACPs, and phase lines to help quickly identify aircraft locations. 2.
Ensure that the aviation task force continuously updates the TOC on its troop
locations. The TOC does not need to track every aircraft at every moment; however,
if needed, the TOC must be able to call the aviation task force and receive
that information in a timely manner. 3.
Some specific missions, such as air Volcano and unrehearsed missions, may need
to be controlled at the brigade combat team TOC.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
16
SUBJECT:
Situational Awareness
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Tank crews are often so fixated on looking for large columns of armored
vehicles that they overlook the presence of single vehicles close in.
DISCUSSION:
The
idea of being the killer tank, coupled with the knowledge of reconstitution
on the MILES battlefield, often causes crews to give up local security for
the chance of engaging multiple targets at a range that is often beyond the
maximum effective range for the weapon system. The big killers (OPFOR) on the
battlefield are increasingly SOKOL, mines, AT-5s from dismounts, and single
vehicles maneuvering on the unit's flank to within 500 meters. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The track commander must be aware of his environment at all times. 2.
Assign areas for scanning within the unit. The best way to detect enemy forces
around the unit is to position two men up out of the hatches with responsibility
for scanning. 3.
Watch for the signature of an AT weapon from the adjacent hillside rather than
for several tanks beyond direct fire range. The enemy should never be able
to drive a BRDM directly down the middle of a firing line without being observed.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
17
SUBJECT:
Task Force Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Information Management
OBSERVATION
(Mech): There is often no standardized report format in the TOC.
DISCUSSION:
Most
TOCs have multiple charts for tracking statuses. TOC shift personnel are usually
content to get the information and fill out the charts without regard for how
the information might impact on the upcoming mission. With no standardized
report format, information and reports are often copied on the nearest piece
of paper and not filed for future reference. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Charts are ideal as long as the soldiers filling them out understand the reason
why tracking those items is important and when the information given requires
further action. Develop an SOP which illustrates "if this - then this." For
example, IF
a
company reports a two under Class III/V after LOGPAC, THEN
both
the S4 and the task force XO are to be notified immediately. 2.
The timeliness of information flow can mean the difference between life and
death. Soldiers may die if the battle captain is not quickly informed that
the engineers have received the grids to an air Volcano minefield that has
been employed along his counterattack route. Use a five-ply standardized report
format, fill it out correctly and completely, and distribute it simultaneously
to the battle captain, S2 section, FSE, and engineers. The shift NCOIC should
maintain the fifth copy. This system allows each of the BOS representatives
to receive the same information quickly and reminds the individual taking the
report of items required in the report.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
18
SUBJECT:
Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Battle Tracking
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Battle tracking in the TOC is often insufficient.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Battle tracking prior to crossing the line of departure (LD) is often not done
to standard, particularly in the defense. 2.
BOS representatives do not adequately cross-talk or track the commander's critical
information requirements (CCIR) and priority intelligence requirements (PIR).
3.
Graphics are not maintained with the task force and adjacent unit locations.
4.
Combat functions representation at the "map board" is initially inadequate
but improves with follow-on missions. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Battle tracking is a continuous process, and emphasis must be placed on timely
and accurate reporting. The operations sergeant and the battle captain must
enforce TOC SOPs. They must ensure the tools (charts, log, report formats,
map with graphics, push pins, and so forth) are available and that shift personnel
use them. 2.
Formal changeover briefs and periodic briefs to key leaders will usually keep
soldiers on their toes. The information that is either captured or missed could
dramatically affect the commander's ability to make informed decisions. 3.
The XO or battle captain in charge at the TOC should be able to focus on the
"big picture" to make decisions and make recommendations to the commander.
Enabling the TOC OIC to do this requires the BOS representatives to continuously
feed information to a centralized map board and provide the overall picture.
4.
A Red/Hot TOC configuration plays an important role in the effectiveness of
this process.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
19
SUBJECT:
Staff Integration During Execution
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Integration of staff cells is inadequate during mission execution.
DISCUSSION:
Reports
received were not shared with all combat functions representatives. This resulted
in a lack of situational awareness and predictive analysis. The integration
greatly improves with follow-on missions. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Continue to improve BOS integration by assigning specific personnel to man
radios, take reports, and provide information to the leaders at the map/tracking
board. 2.
Use a five-ply report format to ensure all the BOS representatives receive
the same information in a timely manner.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
20
SUBJECT:
Field Trains Command Post (FTCP) Battle Tracking
OBSERVATION
(Mech): During tactical operations, the FTCPs rarely maintain clear situational
awareness of the battlefield.
DISCUSSION:
Maneuver
graphics are normally posted to the map in the CP; however, they are not updated,
and there is no centralized tracking and reporting process to ensure a positive
handover in the event of having to assume the role as the main or CTCP. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
HHC commanders should establish an FTCP SOP that clearly explains each soldier's
responsibilities while on shift in the FTCP. 2.
Establish a shift changeover and commander update brief format. 3.
Ensure the FTCP has the proper tracking charts and FTCP organization, which
will allow the FTCP to function as the main CP when needed.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
21
SUBJECT:
Medical Platoon Situational Awareness and Battle Tracking
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Although they improve with each mission during the rotation, medical
platoon leaders initially demonstrate inadequate situational awareness and
battle tracking.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Platoon leaders monitors only battalion A&L FM radio frequency. The battalion
command net is not consistently monitored by the medical platoon. As a result,
medical platoon leaders are often unaware of company/team engagements or casualty
densities as they occur. 2.
Company 1SGs and medical crews do not cross-talk. 3.
Front-line ambulance (FLA)/tracked ambulance crews seldom track the battle
or use overlays that template graphic control measures, clean/dirty routes,
and friendly/enemy obstacles. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Battalion command and A&L radio frequencies must be consistently monitored
by medical platoon personnel for adequate situational awareness. Establish
a redundant FM reporting system with each casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) node
which emphasizes cross-talk with company 1SGs. 2.
Friendly and enemy graphics must be posted and updated as METT-T dictates.
3.
Develop a battle-tracking system that incorporates current company battle positions
and CCPs, BAS location, contingency positions/routes, and ambulance exchange
point (AXP) locations.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
22
SUBJECT:
Company/Team Situational Awareness
OBSERVATION
(LTP): Company/team commanders lack situational awareness.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Company commanders demonstrate the following weaknesses in their ability to
maintain situational awareness:
a. Effective tactical SOP.
b. Battle drills.
c. Reaction to direct fire.
d. Reaction to indirect fire.
e. Rehearsals.
f. Synchronization of combat multipliers.
g. Effective use of their command and control (C2) personnel.
2.
The most significant concern expressed and acknowledged by all commanders is
time management. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Units
must conduct Home Station training to improve these skills. Many units returning
to Home Station from the LTP return to high OPTEMPO and real world missions,
which forces training to be deferred until 120 days prior to their rotation.
The unit cannot train sufficiently in 120 days to gain the skills and coherence
needed.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
23
SUBJECT:
Situational Awareness
OBSERVATION
(LTP): Most units are unable to maintain situational awareness.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Situational awareness seems to be a lost art at the NTC. Companies, and in
some cases entire battalions, are often lost to a single weapon system, such
as AT-4s or AT-5s. Commanders often lose half of their combat power before
closing with the main force they are trying to engage. 2.
Training is not done well at crew level. Lack of training time is often stated
as the reason. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Train
at Home Station.
Tactical and doctrinal manuals plainly state and show drawings of where each
crewmember's area of responsibility is to be focused. We must get back to the
focus of training at all times for combat. For example, at all times crewmembers
should be up at their position with binoculars scanning their areas. Training
should include all field problems as well as gunnery. Situational awareness
training must be done at Home Station; it cannot be trained after the unit
deploys to their NTC rotation. 2.
Commanders should exercise combat patience if at all possible while moving
their forces. Too many times units become so involved with getting to the objective,
they lose focus on their situational awareness.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
TREND
24
SUBJECT:
Risk Management
OBSERVATION
(LTP): Battalions seldom conduct effective risk management planning.
DISCUSSION:
1.
There is no process to look at risk during all steps of the Military Decision-Making
Process (MDMP). 2.
Battalion commanders and staffs do not have a firm understanding of all inherent
risks -safety and fratricide - at time of mission execution. 3.
The battle staff and commanders do not continually assess risk during execution.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Emphasize
risk management during the MDMP per the guidance of the Force XXI Risk Management
Handbook.
(TA.4.2
Assess Situation)
TREND
25
SUBJECT:
Integration of the Battalion Maintenance Officer (BMO) in the Planning Process
OBSERVATION
(Mech): The BMO or his representative have little or no participation in the
task force planning process.
DISCUSSION:
1.
There is seldom a maintenance representative present for the task force mission
analysis process and briefing. As a result, no clear and concise picture of
the task force maintenance posture and no explanation of how it may affect
the upcoming mission were provided. 2.
The S4/S1 were unprepared to brief for the BMO. The result was an incomplete
understanding of the maintenance status of key systems and assets in the task
force (i.e., current and projected M1A1 and M2 slant by company and platoon
and the status of operational mine plows) prior to course of action (COA) development.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
If
the BMO cannot attend mission analysis, the S4 and/or S1 must be able to provide
an accurate current and projected maintenance status of the task force and
an articulation of its impact on the course of upcoming operations to the commander
and staff.
(TA.4.2.1.1
Analyze Mission)
TREND
26
SUBJECT:
Decision Point Development
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Task force commanders often do not clearly identify and develop decision
points for the operation.
DISCUSSION:
A
lack of commander's decision points makes it difficult for the staff to focus
their efforts to ensure the plan supports this critical event/location. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
The
commander must establish decision point(s) early in the planning process (mission
analysis) to focus the staff and supporting BOS elements in order to achieve
success.
(TA.4.2.3
Decide on Need for Action or Change)
TREND
27
SUBJECT:
Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Officer Integration Into the Military Decision-Making
Process (MDMP)
OBSERVATION
(Brigade Staff): ADA officers struggle to integrate with brigade combat team
(BCT)/task force (TF) staffs during the planning process.
DISCUSSION:
ADA
officers do not use doctrinal techniques and procedures, integrate the air
defense plan into the supported unit's scheme of maneuver, or properly position
ADA assets. As a result, there is high attrition from enemy air. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
ADA officers must be actively involved in the MDMP. 2.
Employment principles of ADA and the concurrent six employment guidelines (balanced
fires, weighted coverage, mutual support, overlapping fires, early engagement,
defense in depth) must be highlighted for the supported unit. 3.
ADA officers must supplement the S2s in collecting and evaluating air threat
capabilities. (TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
28
SUBJECT:
Integrating the Air Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) into
the Planning Process
OBSERVATION
(Mech): The Air IPB is not integrated into the planning process.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Air defense platoon leaders do not cross-talk air threats with the S2 during
the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). 2.
The S2 and ADA officers do not brief the air threat during mission analysis
and the OPORD brief. 3.
On occasion, intelligence information from the ADA officer is completely different
from that of the S2. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
ADA officers should coordinate with the S2s on who briefs the air threat. 2.
The air IPB should be refined as information is collected on the enemy. 3.
ADA officers should develop an adequate ADA concept of operation that supports
the task force scheme of maneuver. (TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
29
SUBJECT:
Establishing Air Defense Priorities
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Task force commanders put minimal emphasis on air defense priority
planning.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Priorities are rarely established and when they are, they are too broad. 2.
S3s and air defenders have been determining task force priorities instead of
task force commanders. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Task
force commanders must establish air defense priorities (e.g., Bravo Company
or breach force, assault force). This allows the ADA officer to identify essential
air defense tasks and the type of coverage needed. (TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
30
SUBJECT:
Integration of the Judge Advocate into the Military Decision-Making Process
(MDMP)
OBSERVATION
(Brigade Staff): Judge advocates (JAs) are rarely integrated into any phase
of the MDMP.
DISCUSSION:
1.
JAs do not participate in the mission planning process. This lack of integration
hampers their situational awareness of the battlefield and contributes to problems
with information flow that is needed to accomplish the various missions required
of the brigade combat teams. 2.
When JAs are involved in the planning, they are able to increase battle staff
awareness of legal and CMO issues.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Include the JA and legal clerks in Home Station CPX, STX, and FTX planning
and training. 2.
Ensure that the JA understands MDMP and reviews the commander's guidance before
it is issued, and include the JA in initial phases of the MDMP. The JA should
review OPLANs, OPORDs, and FRAGOs at the lowest level possible. 3.
The JA should coordinate and be included with the regimental battle staff.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
31
SUBJECT:
Integration of the Chaplain Assistant into Battle Planning
OBSERVATION
(Brigade Staff): Regimental chaplain assistants are sometimes not allowed to
participate during battle planning in the tactical operations center (TOC).
DISCUSSION:
While
attempting to monitor the battle, chaplain assistants are sometimes asked to
leave the TOC during battle planning.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
During operations, the chaplain assistant performs many staff functions in
accordance with FM
16-1, Religious
Support.
At the chaplain's direction, the chaplain assistant attends briefings; monitors
the tactical situation at the TOC; helps prepare religious support estimate,
plan, and annex; and coordinates religious activities. 2.
Unit Ministry Team (UMT) NCOs at senior levels plan, brief, and perform operational
training with other staff NCOs, coordinate enlisted taskings, and recommend
the assignment of replacement enlisted personnel to the G1/S1. 3.
Commanders and staff members must be aware of the roles of chaplain assistants
in the Army and support his or her mission in order for the assistants to be
able to assist the chaplains in religious support missions. To accomplish the
mission, the chaplain assistant accompanies the chaplain in the area of operations.
Let them do their job. (TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
32
SUBJECT:
Integration of the Military Police (MP) Platoon into the Military Decision-Making
Process (MDMP)
OBSERVATION
(Brigade Staff): The MP platoon is not effectively integrated as a member of
the brigade battle staff.
DISCUSSION:
1.
There is minimal consideration for MP operations during the MDMP. Consequently,
MP employment was principally planned and/or directed by the S3 or XO following
the issue of the brigade OPORD. 2.
During the MDMP, the platoon leader, or designated MP representative, often
inserts himself into the planning process in order to provide expert input
on MP employment. Typical focus included using MPs to assist in circulation
control in the offense and rear area security in the defense. However, these
operations are seldom included in the brigade OPORD, and there are few specific
tasks given to the MPs. 3.
Security missions are assigned during the execution phase of an operation as
an afterthought, with little analysis of the threat, criticality of assets
in the rear area, and probability of attack from enemy ground forces or other
elements. Many times the required critical assets are already operating in
front of infantry and armor task forces.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Combined arms operations occur when the proper systems for planning, preparing,
and executing are employed correctly. The brigade combat team needs to ensure
supporting units are included in the planning process to exploit the capabilities
of all of its assets. 2.
The brigade XO needs to ensure that the MPs are an integral member of the staff.
The platoon leader, or his designated representative, can provide guidance
on enemy prisoner of war (EPW) operations, civilians on the battlefield (COBs),
protection of critical assets, rear area counter-reconnaissaance, and maneuver/mobility
support operations.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
33
SUBJECT:
S6 Integration into the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)
OBSERVATION
(Brigade Staff): The S6 is inadequately integrated into the MDMP.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Inadequate integration of the S6 leads to underdeveloped, unsynchronized, and
misunderstood signal plans that do not fully support the brigade/regiment throughout
the width and depth of the battlefield. 2.
Other staff members who rely on communications to execute their plans too often
do not successfully coordinate signal requirements.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
The
S6 and other members of the staff (XO, S1, S2, S3, S4, and FSO) must gain a
complete understanding of signal matters as it relates to each staff function.
This new understanding will lead to ensuring the S6 is completely involved
in all phases of the MDMP. Ultimately, this will result in a coordinated and
synchronized signal plan.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
34
SUBJECT:
Integration of the Signal Officer (SIGO) into the Military Decision-Making
Process (MDMP)
OBSERVATION
(Armor): The SIGO is seldom integrated into the planning process.
DISCUSSION:
1.
As a result of a lack of integration, signal support is not synchronized across
the width and depth of area of operations. 2.
There is no synchronization of C2 node locations and movement to support the
scheme of maneuver. 3.
There is no synchronization of retransmission systems. 4.
There is no synchronization of Force XXI and MSE systems.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Get the SIGO to the table. 2.
Discuss each phase by BOS to integrate the signal plan. 3.
If time does not permit detailed discussion, revisit the C2 plan. 4.
Ensure adjacent unit coordination with other units and higher headquarters
to provide redundancy.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
35
SUBJECT:
Mortar Platoon Integration into the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)
OBSERVATION
(FS): Mortar platoon operations are seldom integrated during the task force
planning process.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Because task forces do not integrate mortar platoon leadership into the MDMP,
mortar platoons seldom understand their task, purpose, and endstate during
mission execution. 2.
Task force fire support officers (FSOs) do not apply or understand battle calculus
as it relates to mortars. 3.
Task force FSOs do not assign motor priority of fires to elements during fights.
4.
Task force staffs do not identify movement criteria/triggers, go-to locations,
IPRT times, ammunition ranges or resupply triggers, or DNE levels (ammunition
management). 5.
Task force staffs do not clearly assign locations for the mortar platoon inside
the task force formation. 6.
Task force staffs who assign mortar platoons OPCON to companies for movement
do not ensure the company leadership understands the company responsibility
to get mortar platoons to the right location at the right time. 7.
Task force mortars are not properly integrated into task force fire support
rehearsals.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Involve the mortar platoon leadership in the task force MDMP. When the leadership
is involved in the planning process, they gain a better understanding of their
task, purpose, and endstate for their platoon. They are better able to conduct
their own troop-leading procedures (TLP) and focus on the proper pre-combat
checks/pre-combat inspections (PCC/PCIs) to accomplish their mission. 2.
When task force mortars are OPCON to a company for movement, they should be
involved with that company's leadership and TLP. Understanding when and where
mortar fires are needed and from whom they can expect to receive CFFs will
lead to better execution of suppressive/effective mortar fire missions. 3.
Ammunition management must be conducted at task force level during all stages
of the MDMP to ensure mortar platoons are able to deliver the right fires at
the right time at the right location.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
36
SUBJECT:
Task Force Planning
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Task force planning is inadequate during all phases of the operation.
DISCUSSION:
1.
During the planning process, task forces are not developing the detail necessary
to effectively accomplish their mission. Units frequently do not complete the
final phase of the plan to ensure they achieve the commander's desired end
state. 2.
Missions, such as forward passage of lines and breaching, are seldom planned
with the required detail to synchronize all the BOS. Lack of detail results
in confusion and the need for more refinement later in the process, which takes
planning time away from subordinate units as they wait for information. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Units must execute detailed planning as outlined in FM
71-2, The
Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force.
The
staff needs to answer all questions prior to issuance of the OPORD. 2.
Refer to FM
17-95, Cavalry
Operations,
as
a source for detailed planning of passage of lines and battle handover. 3.
Develop a checklist from these manuals and add it to the unit SOP for use during
planning.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
TREND
37
SUBJECT:
Task Force Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)
OBSERVATION
(Mech): The MDMP at task force level is not being conducted to standard.
DISCUSSION:
1.
The staff has difficulty establishing and adhering to a timeline and agenda
to accomplish this process. 2.
The staff often tries to combine course of action (COA) development and wargaming,
resulting in a lack of focus and a plan that is not synchronized. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Refer to FM
71-2
for
the steps and procedures for accomplishing this process. 2.
The task force XO or S3 must establish a timeline, not only for the task force
in order to allow subordinates to plan and establish priorities of work, but
to ensure the complete
process
is
accomplished in the time allotted. 3.
Refer to 
