MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY
BOS &
NUCLEAR/BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL
(NBC)
(Trends
are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not
in
any priority order.)
Needs
Emphasis
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
Engineer Understanding of Enemy Mobility and Survivability (M/S) Missions and
Capabilities
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Engineers frequently do not have a full understanding of the equipment,
organization, and capabilities of enemy engineers.
DISCUSSION:
This
lack of understanding leads to only a superficial briefing in enemy engineer
efforts and rarely includes their most likely location, timing, and method
of employment. As a result, the commander is not prepared when the enemy uses
M/S assets against him because plans to counter these actions are not resourced
or synchronized into the friendly maneuver plan.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Engineers must conduct engineer battlefield analysis (EBA) per the guidance
of Appendix A, FM
5-71-2, Armored
Task Force Engineer Combat Operations.
2.
Know enemy capabilities, organizations, and employment as addressed in FM
100-61, Armor-
and Mechanized-Based Opposing Force Operational Art.
These capabilities must be wargamed against the terrain and mission at hand
to refine them from a doctrinal standpoint to a most likely method of employment.
(TA.6
Mobility and Survivability BOS)
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
Military Police (MP) Integration into Maneuver and Mobility Support (MMS) Operations
OBSERVATION
(Brigade Staff): MP platoon support is not adequately integrated into combat
operations to assist with mobility.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Brigades do not consistently integrate MP support for their breaching, forward
passage of lines (FPOL), and other MMS operations. 2.
Circulation control planning for FASCAM and chemical strikes along routes and
at breach lanes do not consistently include provisions for holding areas, marking
alternate routes, or methods for controlling follow-on and support forces around
or through these areas.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
MPs are capable of supporting a breaching operation and assisting maneuver
and follow-on and support forces by establishing control measures on the ground
to facilitate movement. MP support for such operations should be included into
the brigade tactical SOP (TACSOP). Using the MP platoon to facilitate movement
at critical maneuver periods would render a significant payoff in mobility
for the brigade. The TACSOP should include contingency planning for moving
forces forward and rearward and for reacting to the effects of the battlefield.
2.
Use MPs in FPOL operations to free combat arms units to perform offensive or
security functions forward. 3.
MPs can conduct route signing and escort/guide functions to facilitate movement
of priority efforts.
(TA.6.1
Provide Mobility)
TREND
3
SUBJECT:
Brigade Level Breach Planning
OBSERVATION
(Engineer): During offensive operations, the maneuver brigade staff often does
not include the breach as a significant phase of the operation.
DISCUSSION:
Breach
plans do not address the brigade's responsibilities for a task force breach
or specify how the brigade intends to synchronize the breaching tenets of suppress,
obscure, secure, and reduce (SOSR). As a result, the brigade is unable to set
the conditions prior to committing to the breach and is rapidly destroyed by
the defending enemy.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Breach
planning at the brigade level should focus on five areas: 1.
Engineer integration in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).
2.
Breach organization and mass 3.
Reverse planning process. 4.
Actions at the breach. 5.
Brigade responsibilities at the breach. (TA.6.1.1.1
Breach Obstacles)
TREND
4
SUBJECT:
Marking Breach Lanes and Bypass Lanes
OBSERVATION
(Engineer): Lane marking procedures used by units are often inadequate.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Recent rotations have indicated a need to reevaluate doctrinal lane and bypass
marking procedures, to include entrance, exit, final approach, far recognition
markers, and marking materials. 2.
Many units use VS-17 panels, which is a doctrinally approved method of marking.
However, recent trends indicate problems with identifying the VS-17 panels
at the breach site. This is because the VS-17 panel is also commonly used as
a CASEVAC and fratricide marking system on combat vehicles. With so many VS-17
panels in the area, soldiers often experience difficulty identifying the marking
system, resulting in the unit missing the lane entrance. 3.
Many units using VS-17 panels do not include directional arrows indicating
the entrance or bypass lane boundaries. 4.
Variations in marking standards between units often results in confusion due
to varied task organizations, especially during heavy/light operations. 5.
The spacing of the funnel markers is often so great that a vehicle approaching
from an angle will drive in between funnel markers and into the obstacle.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Refer to FM
90-13-1, Combined
Arms Breaching Operations.
Marking a breach lane or bypass is a critical sub-component of obstacle reduction.
Effective and timely marking of a breached lane allows the tactical commander
to project his forces through the obstacle quickly and safely, with his combat
power intact. 2.
Units should consider the guidelines listed in FM 90-13-1, Table 3-2, page
3-16, "Guidelines for Lane-Marking Devices," which discuss visibility requirements.
a. Marking devices need to be visible under a variety of conditions,
including night operations, inclement weather, obscurants, and when buttoned
up in tracked vehicles. Using the VS-17 panel to mark everything is not productive
and should be managed rigorously by all leaders.
b. Units should develop nonstandard marking devices that are
easily distinguishable from VS-17 panels. When marking a lane through a complex
obstacle, units should have a well-defined marking system to eliminate confusion
when approaching and passing through the obstacle.
3.
The Army should consider re-addressing the need for a standardized marking
system that is available through the logistics system, highly visible at great
distances, easily transportable, and distributed Army-wide for use by the entire
combined arms team. (TA.6.1.1.1
Breach Obstacles)
TREND
5
SUBJECT:
Combined Arms Breaching Operations
OBSERVATION
(Armor): Combined arms breaching operations are not coordinated or synchronized.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Units are not incorporating breach tenets into the planning process. 2.
Units are not:
a. Developing OBSTINTEL collection plan.
b. Synchronizing "breach fundamentals."
c. Using reverse breach planning to develop task organization.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Develop an aggressive reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan to collect
OBSTINTEL. 2.
Develop a flexible plan to react to results of OBSTINTEL. 3.
Conduct mounted rehearsals. 4.
Include details of actions at the breach in the OPORD. 5.
Employ reverse breach planning to drive task organization of reduction assets
and composition of breach, support, and assault forces. (TA.6.1.1.1
Breach Obstacles)
TREND
6
SUBJECT:
Situational Obstacles
OBSERVATION
(Engineer): Brigade situational obstacle planning is inadequate.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Engineers often conduct the planning for situational obstacles in a vacuum.
As a result, units normally lack the synchronization necessary to influence
the enemy's scheme of maneuver. 2.
Units do not know the location of planned targets. 3.
Dissemination of SCATMINE warnings is incomplete. 4.
Situations for fratricide incidents increase.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Engineers should influence situational obstacle planning during the brigade
mission analysis briefing. 2.
The assistant brigade engineer (ABE) should examine potential target areas
of interest (TAI), examine obstacle requirements, and establish situational
priorities. 3.
The ABE should recommend situational obstacle targets that the staff can integrate
with direct or indirect fires throughout the width and depth of the battlefield
for each enemy or friendly course of action (COA). (TA.6.2.1
Secure/Select Location of Obstacles)
TREND
7
SUBJECT:
Employment of Situational Obstacles
OBSERVATION
(Armor): Employment of situation obstacles is often ineffective.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Situational obstacles are not arrayed against multiple enemy courses of action
(COAs), and execution is not tied to decision points. 2.
Criteria for execution are not defined. 3.
Triggers are not tied to the reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan. 4.
Obstacle intent is not identified (target, trigger, desired obstacle effect).
5.
Obstacles are normally executed based on time, not on an event identified in
the decision support matrix (DSM) or template (DST).
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Use the seven steps of defense for each situational obstacle, even in offense.
2.
Perform time/distance analysis between named area of interest (NAI) and target
area of interest (TAI). 3.
Integrate fires. 4.
Control execution with DSM/DST for triggers. 5.
Assign intent during COA development to determine feasibility and triggers.
(TA.6.2.1
Secure/Select Location of Obstacles)
TREND
8
SUBJECT:
Task Force Engineer Situational Obstacle Planning
OBSERVATION
(Engineer): Engineer companies have difficulty planning and executing situational
obstacles.
DISCUSSION:
1.
If situational obstacles are planned, it is primarily done at the engineer
battalion level based on the brigade plan. This typically results in critical
countermobility assets, such as the ground Volcano, being taken away from the
engineer company and frequently consolidated into an ad
hoc
platoon
under the control of varyious leaders (from the S3 to an excess lieutenant)
in the engineer battalion. 2.
Situational obstacles are not integrated into the task force (TF) plan or battle
space and are less responsive to the needs of the TF commander. 3.
The obstacles are frequently not tied to TF triggers and often are employed
at a time and place inside the TF sector that does not support the scheme of
maneuver. This situation frequently leads to an increase of minefield fratricides,
and to greater restriction of the commander, rather than providing him freedom
of maneuver. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Situational obstacles, such as ground Volcano or MOPMS, should be planned at
TF level. 2.
If the assistant brigade engineer (ABE) identifies critical situational obstacles
in the brigade scheme of maneuver, the obstacles should be listed in tasks
to subordinate units. This allows the TF engineer to plan command and control,
movement, force protection, and integration into the TF plan. 3.
Frequently the engineer company assault and obstacle (A&O) platoon leader should
command and control the situational obstacles assets. He is familiar with the
TF plan and is able to position himself to best accomplish the mission. The
unit can then attack enemy maneuver using a target (specific organization,
not just "enemy"), location, and effect while maintaining its freedom to maneuver.
This is synchronized by a set of triggers based on friendly and enemy actions.
The final result is a situational obstacle plan that accomplishes mission essential
tasks and remains responsive to the TF commander. (TA.6.2.1
Secure/Select Location of Obstacles)
TREND
9
SUBJECT:
Integration of Obstacles with Fires
OBSERVATION
(Armor): Obstacle groups are seldom integrated with fires to achieve a desired
obstacle effect on enemy maneuver.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Obstacle groups lack intent (target, location, obstacle effect). 2.
Obstacle group design is insufficient to achieve desired effect. 3.
Fires are not integrated to achieve desired obstacle effect. 4.
Obstacles are not sighted by maneuver company/team commanders. 5.
Lanes are not planned. 6.
Brigade-directed obstacles are not refined at task force level. 7.
Obstacle plans and graphics are not disseminated, often leading to fratricide.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Engineers should not execute without company/team participation, to include
siting. 2.
Task force commander must give clear guidance. 3.
Employ doctrinal densities to create obstacle groups. 4.
Refine brigade-directed obstacles; use a liaison with general support (GS)
assets working in sector. 5.
Tactical operations center (TOC) must track obstacles and disseminate obstacle
graphics. (TA.6.2.2
Emplace Obstacles)
TREND
10
SUBJECT:
Situational Obstacles
OBSERVATION
(LTP): Situational obstacle planning at the brigade and task force level is
inadequate.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Most brigades and battalion task forces have difficulty planning and synchronizing
the execution of scatterable munitions as situational obstacles to support
their scheme of maneuver and attack the enemy's maneuver. This is primarily
due to the lack of a detailed observer-trigger plan. 2.
Often, brigades employ scatterable munitions using friendly or time-based triggers
rather than using enemy-based triggers. As a result, the brigade is often unable
to effectively influence the enemy's maneuver and is ultimately ineffective
in influencing the enemy's course of action (COA). TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The assistant brigade engineer (ABE) and brigade staff should focus on integrating
situational obstacle planning during COA development to improve synchronization
with the brigade's scheme of maneuver. This technique will also improve integration
of situational obstacles with fires needed to effectively influence the enemy's
maneuver. 2.
The brigade staff, not just the engineer, should help in the development of
situational obstacle triggers and the observer plan linked to decision points
in the decision support template (DST). 3.
To improve situational obstacle planning at both the brigade and task force
level, recommend that the ABE or assistant task force engineer be included
as an integral part of the targeting process and participate in the targeting
meeting.
(TA.6.2.2
Emplace Obstacles)
TREND
11
SUBJECT:
Employment of Modular Pack Mine System (MOPMS)
OBSERVATION
(Engineer): Performance of basic employment techniques using the Modular Pack
Mine System (MOPMS) is inadequate.
DISCUSSION:
Units
arriving at the NTC typically request that O/Cs conduct classes on the MOPMS.
Units are not conducting this training at Home Station.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The MOPMS is a lethal weapon system when used correctly, but requires constant
training to maintain this highly perishable skill. Units should train soldiers
at Home Station in the proper use of the RCU, MOPMS, and alternate means of
firing to specified standards. 2.
Units should ensure that soldiers are using actual MOPMS trainers to provide
realistic responses for the soldier. 3.
Engineer company commanders should ensure that MOPMS are included in the maneuver
unit's routine training plan. (TA.6.2.2.1
Emplace Mines)
TREND
12
SUBJECT:
Survivability: Vehicle Fighting Positions
OBSERVATION
(Engineer): Units do not construct vehicle fighting positions to standard.
DISCUSSION:
Most
combat support equipment (CSE) platoons and combat heavy (CH) platoons continually
struggle with the execution of vehicle survivability positions, particularly
M1, M2, FISTV, and Q-36 radar positions. Standards are not clearly understood
by engineer equipment operators or their maneuver counterparts. As a result,
vehicle positions are generally too narrow, too shallow, too short, or not
adequately camouflaged by removing spoil.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Equipment operators and maneuver unit leaders and soldiers should receive periodic
Home Station training on the proper construction of vehicle fighting positions.
This means adequate "stick time" for operators to ensure they are proficient
and combined arms training to ensure the equipment operator, vehicle driver,
and vehicle commander can readily identify a position constructed to standard.
2.
Units should paint depth markers on digging vehicles and publish standards
using these markers in tactical SOPs (TACSOPs) and locally-produced "smart
cards." (TA.6.3
Enhance Survivability)
TREND
13
SUBJECT:
Survivability: Close Combat Operations
OBSERVATION
(Engineer): Rotational units are consistently unprepared to engage and destroy
the enemy.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Units are not adequately trained on close combat operations. Rehearsals, if
conducted, seldom address how the enemy can influence maneuver and how the
unit should react to those actions. 2.
React-to-contact drills are usually inadequate in combat engineer units and
are often regarded as unimportant by small unit leaders. 3.
Breach rehearsals generally do not include a rehearsal of local suppression
by the engineers and attached maneuver elements. Breach rehearsals usually
involve just the engineers, rather than conducting a combined arms rehearsal.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Engineers need to receive instruction in the battle focused training methodology
at all levels of schoolhouse training, as appropriate for the given audience.
2.
Unit Home Station training should focus on combat tasks, to include standard
small unit combat tasks such as react-to-contact. 3.
Training on engineer-specific tasks should take place in a combined arms environment
whenever possible. 4.
Units that choose to incorporate battle drills into their tactical SOP (TACSOP)
should consider including react-to-contact drills. (TA.6.3
Enhance Survivability)
TREND
14
SUBJECT:
Defense of the Combat Trains
OBSERVATION
(FS): The combat trains (CAT) does not demonstrate the skills necessary to
establish a perimeter defense.
DISCUSSION:
1.
There is a lack of knowledge on proper construction techniques and emplacement
of fighting positions, especially positions with overhead cover. 2.
Hasty fighting positions are not constructed in sufficient numbers and are
constructed too short and shallow to provide adequate protection. 3.
The CAT defense diagram does not evolve into a graphic representation of the
battery defense.
a. Sectors of fire are not properly marked or interlocked
at section level.
b. Listening/observation posts (LPs/OPs) are not established.
c. Terrain reference points (TRP) for both ground and air
defense are not always established.
d. Special teams are not rehearsed regularly to ensure a capable
response.
4.
There is a need for continued focus and training on NBC defense measures to
increase force protection capabilities. The lack of knowledge in NBC skill
Levels 1 and 2 tasks result in over 50 percent casualties at the CAT during
chemical attacks. The casualties were the direct result of:
a. Lack of M8 alarms.
b. NAAK kits not distributed.
c. Inability to conduct both the MK256 Kit and unmasking procedures
to standard
d. Poor MOPP discipline.
e. Improper pre-combat checks/pre-combat inspections (PCCs/PCIs)
of NBC equipment.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The commander and 1SG must inspect and correct deficiencies within the unit's
perimeter and enforce the standard. 2.
FM
7-8, Infantry
Rifle Platoon and Squad,
and GTA 7-6-1 are good sources for identifying techniques and standards for
construction and employment of fighting positions. 3.
FM 6-50, Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Cannon Battery,
covers proper range card techniques and standards. 4.
All required NBC defense skills are listed in the Skill Level 1, Common Task
Manual, and should be integrated into "Monthly Drills" to ensure each soldier's
proficiency. 5.
Establish a standard perimeter defense layout, orientation and placement of
fighting positions, individual fighting position standards, section chief responsibilities,
and a PCC/PCI checklist in a tactical SOP (TACSOP). (TA.6.3
Enhance Survivability)
TREND
15
SUBJECT:
Unit Ministry Team (UMT) Survivability
OBSERVATION
(Brigade Staff): UMT battlefield survivability skills are not adequate.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Chaplain assistants do a great job of protecting their chaplains; however,
they are not active in the planning and preparation phases of the battle and
do not prepare the entire UMT for battlefield survival while conducting battlefield
ministry. 2.
Chaplain assistants are not given enough opportunity to design and brief a
concept of support, or brief the commander in the chaplain's absence. These
opportunities would enhance their abilities and increase the effectiveness
of the UMT.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The unit must strive to have chaplain assistants receive training as a 71M.
2.
Chaplains and senior NCO chaplain assistants need to plan to use chaplain assistants
in a greater role on the battlefield. Training should focus on their combatant
duties, to include time management, weapons bore-sighting, commo checks, pre-combat
checks/pre-combat inspections (PCC/PCIs), load plans, and the use of the unit
and UMT tactical SOP (TACSOP). (TA.6.3
Enhance Survivability)
TREND
16
SUBJECT:
Company Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Staff
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Many companies do not have a trained NBC staff.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Most companies do not have MOS-trained NBC NCOs, and the battalions seldom
train and integrate alternate NBC NCOs into task force missions. 2.
The SANATOR is usually maintained by soldiers at the support platoon and remains
in the BSA during the entire rotation. 3.
The operational decontamination plan at task force level is seldom rehearsed
or resourced. As a result, none of the logistic assets that are required to
execute the plan are aware of the requirement. The chemical officers (CMLOs)
plot a few decontamination points on the map, but neither the SANATOR operator
nor the 5,000-gallon truck driver know these points. 4.
The CMLO does not speak to his company NBC NCOs during planning. As a result,
chemical defense equipment (CDE) is not tracked and NBC operations integration
is never achieved. 5.
Units have no system in place that ensures the battalion NBC staff and the
company NBC NCOs exchange experiences and/or information regularly. As a result,
the company and battalion do not work in unison to create an effective NBC
staff. There is no effective cross-talk between battalion and company NBC personnel.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Create a working NBC staff in accordance with page 5-3 of FM
3-101, Chemical
Staff Considerations.
2.
NBC staffs at battalion and company level must:
a Identify the NBC threats and determine if current chemical
force is sufficient.
b. Monitor the status of NBC defense equipment in the battalion.
c. Monitor the status of NBC preparedness in the force.
d. Develop training plans to correct NBC defense training
deficiencies.
e. Develop chemical support plans to support current operations.
f. Develop NBC defense plans to protect the force.
g. Monitor the NBC situation.
h. Monitor the status of chemical units.
3.
A working NBC staff must:
a. Recommend changes to the plan based on the NBC situation
and coordinate with higher headquarters for support as necessary.
b. Continuously update the commander on all NBC operations
and remain technically and tactically proficient in all NBC issues as they
relate to the unit's mission.
c. Create a program that ensures the battalion NBC staff discusses
NBC issues regularly with their company counterparts via low density NBC MOS
training.
d. Set clear standards for assessing and evaluating training
based on published field manuals.
(TA.6.3.1
Provide Battlefield Hazard Protection)
TREND
17
SUBJECT:
Rear Area Security
OBSERVATION
(Brigade Staff): Security planning for brigade rear area operations is not
adequate.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Planning for rear area operations at the brigade level does not adequately
address the full range of threats to the rear area. While MPs are normally
designated as a response force for Level 1 and 2 threats, this is the extent
of any meaningful planning for dealing with these threats. 2.
Rear area named areas of interest (NAIs) in the brigade sector are not identified.
3.
Assessment of threats to particular assets on a per mission basis is not accomplished.
4.
The command is not focused on MP efforts in the rear area. 5.
Protection for rear area units was focused close in, rather than identifying
infiltration routes for threat forces and interdicting them before they could
employ their weapons against these units.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Rear area operations planning needs to be incorporated into the staff planning
process. Synchronize these efforts by involving staff members in the planning
process, to include the Provost Marshal or MP platoon leader, and by conducting
course of action (COA) development and wargaming for the rear area. 2.
Accepting risk in the rear in order to mass firepower forward does not mean
ignoring the requirement to plan rear operations. Contingencies must be established
to deal with rear area incursions by threat forces.
(TA.6.3.1
Provide Battlefield Hazard Protection)
TREND
18
SUBJECT:
Soldier Contamination Prevention Measures
OBSERVATION
(Brigade Staff): Soldiers are not proficient in nuclear, biological, and chemical
(NBC) common tasks.
DISCUSSION:
Soldiers
are not adequately trained in NBC common tasks prior to deployment to the NTC.
This includes wear of MOPP gear, reaction to chemical attack, use of M8 and
M9 paper, use of the NBC Warning and Reporting System (NBCWRS), treating chemical
casualties, and conducting immediate decon.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Soldiers
must be able to conduct NBC common tasks to survive a chemical attack and carry
on with their mission. Units should train their soldiers to conduct NBC common
tasks proficiently prior to the rotation. (TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
19
SUBJECT:
Base Defense of the Brigade Support Area (BSA)
OBSERVATION
(CSS): Units do not effectively integrate subordinate units into the base defense
of the BSA.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Sector sketches are often not turned into the battalion in a timely manner,
which affects the timely integration of defensive fires. 2.
The reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan often does not state a task
and purpose for units manning listening posts/observation posts (LPs/OPs) or
perimeter positions. 3.
R&S plans are not continuously updated to reflect confirmation or denial of
a named area of interest (NAI). 4.
Times of expected enemy activity are not published as part of the R&S plan
based on templating of enemy activity.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
The FSB/RSS should focus Home Station training on force protection issues involving
base defense integration, sector sketches, range cards, and R&S planning and
execution requirements. 2.
Units should use a standard R&S pre-formatted template to lay out the BSA/RSA
and R&S plan to subordinate units. 3.
Identify an overall OIC or NCOIC to be in charge of the quick reaction force
(QRF) rather than using the battalion/squadron S3 in this capacity. 4.
Enforce the time standard depicted in the battalion/squadron SOP.
(TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
20
SUBJECT:
Chemical Defense Equipment (CDE)
OBSERVATION
(Brigade Staff): Units too often deploy to the NTC without the necessary CDE
to protect the force in an NBC environment.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Many units are unaware that they are critically short items of CDE until after
they arrive at the NTC. 2.
Some chemical personnel do not know what CDE their units are authorized in
MTOE or CTA items. 3.
Units cannot possibly know their CDE status and order equipment until they
have established what they are authorized.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
All units assigned and attached to the brigade should check their MTOE and
CTA to learn what they are authorized in CDE. Conduct thorough CDE inventories
several months prior to deployment to NTC. 2.
The brigade should invest dollars in critically short items. If the unit does
not have funds available to fill all shortages, request additional funds from
higher headquarters, or cross-level with units that are not deploying to NTC.
3.
Division chemical sections should provide assistance to deploying brigades
to ensure units have the CDE necessary for NBC operations during the rotation.
(TA.6.3.1.1.4
Employ Protective Equipment)
TREND
21
SUBJECT:
Force Protection
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Platoons routinely do not employ chemical alarms in their assembly
areas (AAs).
DISCUSSION:
None.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
The
scout platoon needs to identify an "NBC track" and enforce the emplacement
of the M8A1 alarm. (TA.6.3.1.1.4
Employ Protective Equipment)
TREND
22
SUBJECT:
Task Force Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Operations
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Task forces are not able to conduct NBC operations to standard.
DISCUSSION:
A
majority of task forces have an NBC TACSOP that outlines procedures for integrating
NBC operations into all phases and procedures for reacting to NBC threats.
However, it is evident based on unit performance that the TACSOPs were not
being used.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Create and implement
an
NBC TACSOP in accordance with FM
3-3, Chemical/
Biological Contamination Avoidance;
FM 3-4, NBC
Protection;
FM 3-5,
NBC
Decontamination;
FM 3-100,
NBC Defense, Chemical Warfare, Smoke and Flame Operations;
and
FM
3-101, Chemical
Staffs and Units.
2.
Integrate the approved NBC TACSOP into all Home Station training events to
ensure units are familiar with the procedures and are able to understand the
role of the smoke platoon, decontamination platoon, and chemical reconnaissance
section. 3.
Units must be able to react to an NBC threat following their NBC TACSOP without
losing personnel, equipment, or the main objective. (TA.6.3.1.2
Remove Battlefield Hazards)
TREND
23
SUBJECT:
Decontamination Planning and Support
OBSERVATION
(Brigade Staff): Units do not adequately plan and prepare for decontamination
operations.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Brigade staffs do not plan and coordinate support requirements for decontamination
operations. 2.
Brigade orders do not task units to provide support, and little coordination
is done to ensure support is effectively executed.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Brigades should conduct decontamination training that integrates all support
requirements during their train-up prior to deployment. Thorough decontamination
support requirements include water, engineer, traffic control, security, PDS,
CASEVAC, augmentees, and ADA coverage. 2.
Units should be tasked in the brigade OPORD to provide all the support necessary
to conduct successful decontamination operations. After the order is published,
the brigade staff should continue to conduct coordination to ensure that units
understand their tasks and are prepared to execute the mission. (TA.6.3.1.2.1
Decontaminate Personnel and Systems)
TREND
24
SUBJECT:
Chemical Casualty Decontamination Planning and Support
OBSERVATION
(Mech): Brigades and task forces do not adequately plan for patient decontamination
sites (PDS).
DISCUSSION:
1.
Often, task forces rely solely on the brigade concept of support for all aspects
of chemical decontamination, despite organic capabilities. 2.
Chemical strikes are often predicted accurately and templated accordingly;
however, graphic control measures, proposed sites, or pre-positioned assets
are not established within the brigade combat team (BCT) or task force. 3.
Triggers to establish the sites are not defined. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Establish and publish graphic control measures and triggers for PDS in the
task force OPORD. 2.
Divide chemical patient decontamination and treatment sets, kits, and outfits
(SKOs) between battalion aid station/advanced trauma life support (BAS/ATLS)
teams to allow greater flexibility and continuity of support. 3.
Commitment of water assets to chemical decontamination sites is imperative
for responsive PDS setup. 4.
SOPs must include augmentees with responsive transportation to active PDS.
Sole reliance on brigade support for chemical decontamination is impractical
due to time-distance factors. 5.
Update/validate TACSOPs with inclusive Home Station training.
(TA.6.3.1.2.1
Decontaminate Personnel and Systems)
TREND
25
SUBJECT:
Security Operations
OBSERVATION
(Brigade Staff): Performance of local security practices is not consistent.
DISCUSSION:
Gunners
are often not in the turrets of their vehicle. At times, squads and teams execute
a 100 percent sleep plan when conducting security operations. TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
Gunners
must be in the turrets when conducting missions. Security duties must be integrated
into sleep plans. Soldiers and leaders must understand that security is the
first priority of work. (TA.6.3.2
Employ Operations Security)
TREND
26
SUBJECT:
Integration of Mechanical Smoke
OBSERVATION
(Brigade Staff): Brigades do not adequately employ mechanical smoke.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Brigade staffs do not adequately plan the use of mechanical smoke to support
the brigade combat team (BCT) fight. 2.
Smoke assets are often task organized under maneuver task forces with no clear
task and purpose. Task force staffs are left to conduct their own smoke plans.
3.
There is no mechanism in place to ensure that task force smoke supports the
brigade commander's intent. As a result, rotational brigades do not have generated
smoke on the battlefield when and where the BCT commander wants it.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Give more attention to smoke planning during the Military Decision-Making Process
(MDMP). 2.
Produce a smoke overlay for each brigade course of action (COA) and ensure
smoke support meets the BCT commander's intent. 3.
Provide a task and purpose for smoke in the brigade OPORD. (TA.6.3.2.2.3
Employ Smoke/Obscurants)
TREND
27
SUBJECT:
Smoke Integration
OBSERVATION
(Armor): Smoke assets are not adequately integrated into the scheme of fires.
DISCUSSION:
1.
Units have a good understanding of capabilities of smoke assets such as artillery,
generated, and pots, but exhibit a poor effort in identifying potential uses
for smoke assets, fully developing a smoke plan, and smoke triggers. 2.
Commanders give good guidance for potential missions, but none specifically
directed at smoke assets.
TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES:
1.
Consider using smoke in some form during all phases of operations. 2.
Integrate the smoke platoon leader and platoon sergeant into the planning process
early. 3.
Develop a concept sketch and assign a task and purpose. 4.
Integrate and synchronize the plan during the wargame, OPORD brief, and rehearsal.
(TA.6.3.2.2.3
Employ Smoke/Obscurants)
TA.3
Air Defense BOS Narrative
TA.7
Combat Service Support BOS Narrative
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