NTC TRENDS AND TTPs, 3rd and 4th Quarters FY99

COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS (cont)

TREND 56
SUBJECT: Risk Assessment

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Leaders do not demonstrate proficiency in applying the risk assessment process to their missions.

DISCUSSION:

1. Some leaders see the Force XXI Small Unit Risk Management Handbook for the first time at the NTC. Most have not had formal instruction in the recent past on how the process works, and even fewer have received adequate instruction on how the process is integrated with mission analysis, planning, preparation, and execution.

2. Most platoons do well identifying such hazards as speed, night driving over hilly terrain, and heat and cold weather injuries. However, controls for reducing the factors surrounding fratricide are rarely considered. While some units have SOPs for anti-fratricide, many soldiers are unaware of the content of such SOPs. Consequently, anti-fratricide and operational risks do not receive adequate consideration.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The most successful units follow their SOPs when conducting risk assessment, soliciting input from various leaders in the unit for a broader view of the mission at hand. Those demonstrating difficulty with the risk assessment process normally do not incorporate the system in their training at Home Station.

2. The extent of leader involvement in subordinate unit planning (guidance, backbrief, feedback) is a proportional indicator of success in this area.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 57
SUBJECT: Aviation Asset Management

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): A majority of the tasks assigned to the aviation task force in the OPORDs are beyond their capabilities given the assets available.

DISCUSSION:

1. The aviation task force frequently has numerous maintenance problems that are not taken into account when plans are developed.

2. Named areas of interest (NAIs) are often too large, too numerous, and deep into enemy zones/sectors.

3. The length of coverage, given the available assets, is too long.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The aviation LNO must communicate the current and projected aviation strength and fighter management cycles during course of action (COA) development. The LNO should then advise the staff on what the aviation task force can realistically provide to ensure the R&S, C2, and CSS plans do not fall short of their missions.

2. Aviation assets tracking boards should be posted and updated in the A2C2 cell or in a location available to the S3/battle captain.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 58
SUBJECT: Integrating Signal Systems

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Units do not fully integrate all signal systems into the fight.

DISCUSSION: A lack of integration of signal assets is caused by the S6's lack of asset visibility, poor operator proficiency level, and the staff not fully understanding the capabilities and limitations of organic signal assets and external support.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Develop a signal asset tracking system to include other available systems from CS and CSS units.

2. Develop a comprehensive training program that seeks to educate users at all echelons (commanders to equipment operators).

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 59
SUBJECT: Decision Support Matrix (DSM)

OBSERVATION (Armor): The DSM is seldom developed or used as a decision tool for the unit commander.

DISCUSSION:

1. Units often develop a single course of action (COA).

2. Units are not building a flexible plan and using the DSM to execute.

3. When used, the DSM is often a post-rehearsal product, which is too late in the process.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Develop a flexible plan based on decision points.

2. Develop a DSM format suited to the unit and train it at Home Station.

3. Use the DSM during rehearsal.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders )

TREND 60
SUBJECT: Roles of the Aviation Liaison Officer (LNO)

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): The aviation LNO roles and description of duties are often insufficient or are not defined.

DISCUSSION: Staffs usually use the aviation LNO to assume the role of the S3-air in addition to his already time-intensive duties as a planner and coordinator. As a result, the aviation LNO is not present for the MDMP process, and aviation operations are not synchronized into the fight properly.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Per the U.S. Army Aviation Center LNO handbook, FM 1-100, Army Aviation Operations, and FM 71-3, The Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade, the role of the LNO is to represent the aviation unit commander at a designated headquarters for the duration of an operation. The LNO must be involved in the command estimate process to ensure the planned employment is within the aviation capabilities with the assets available and is doctrinally correct.

2. Appoint and train an S3-air in accordance with MTOE authorizations.

3. Allow the aviation LNO to become involved in the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) from start to finish. Once a plan for Army aviation is decided upon, allow the LNO to keep the aviation commander informed of the brigade combat team's plans and refinements up to mission execution.

4. Appoint an S3-air to supervise the execution of the A2C2 plan and manage the brigade airspace. One LNO cannot do both these jobs effectively.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 61
SUBJECT: Forward Support Battalion (FSB) Integration with Tenant Units

OBSERVATION (CSS): FSB staffs are not incorporating tenant units into their operations.

DISCUSSION: Support units do not effectively incorporate tenant units into their everyday scope of operations and planning.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Tenant units occupy a sizable amount of terrain on the BSA/RSA perimeter and play a critical role in reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) planning and execution for battalions and squadrons.

2. Tenant units can provide the expertise needed to develop and publish effective fire support, air defense artillery, and engineer support annexes for the BSA/RSA during the orders process.

3. The FSB/RSA should involve tenant units in Home Station training and develop a solid working relationship and understanding of planning requirements with these units. They can also help facilitate the development of a pre-formatted support annex that would simplify and speed up the orders publication process.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or orders)

TREND 62
SUBJECT: Direct Fire Planning

OBSERVATION (Mech): Direct fire plans are often not developed for the entire maneuver area.

DISCUSSION: Units often plan direct fires on the objective (offensive missions), but do not develop a direct fire plan throughout the maneuver space. By not developing a direct fire plan for the approach, "double taps" result, or enemy vehicles are bypassed altogether because no one was focused on likely locations. Units normally do well controlling fires upon reaching the objective, but waste time trying to control fires if contact is made prior to the objective.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Direct fire plans should be developed for all phases of an operation, not just the objective. The direct fire plan, if based on the IPB, will focus scanning and sectors of fire at all times.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 63
SUBJECT: Platoon SOPs

OBSERVATION (Mech): Platoon SOPs are frequently not complete.

DISCUSSION:

1. Mortar platoons do not manage time well, specifically at the squad level. Troop-leading procedures are conducted sporadically, rehearsals are incomplete, and priorities of work are different for all squads in the platoons.

2. Platoon SOPs do not define the standard for each task or how and when they will be conducted.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Develop a complete SOP. The SOP is the unit's guide for how it conducts business. From the SOP, units identify or establish the standard for how they will plan, prepare, and execute their mission.

a. A complete SOP enables the platoon leadership to be less directive, thus allowing more time to conduct pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections (PCCs/PCIs) and accomplish tasks.

b. A complete SOP identifies the task and standard for each type of mission and specifies the order in which those tasks need to be conducted.

2. Use FMs and TMs to develop the initial SOP, and then further refine it for specific use at platoon level, revising and prioritizing TTPs as appropriate.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 64
SUBJECT: Integrating the Scout Platoon Sergeant and NCOs into the Orders Process

OBSERVATION (Mech): Scout platoon leaders often do not tap the expertise of the platoon sergeant and senior scouts during the orders process.

DISCUSSION: Although the scout platoon sergeant is the most experienced scout within the platoon, the platoon leader seldom utilizes him and the other scout NCOs during the planning process.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Utilize the experience of the platoon sergeant and NCOs to enhance the platoon's success during operations. Give them the job of selecting routes, preparing paragraphs 4 and 5 of the OPORD, constructing a quality terrain board, and risk management.

2. Include tasks to be performed by the NCOs in the platoon SOP to streamline the orders process and to train new subordinate leaders on the specific responsibilities they have during the orders process.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 65
SUBJECT: Scout Platoon OPORD SOP

OBSERVATION (Mech): Scout platoons rarely have an established SOP for formatting and issuing their OPORDs.

DISCUSSION: Most NCOs used small notebooks to copy information. With the amount of information covered during the OPORD briefings, subordinate leaders are not able to write down all the important information.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. All leaders should use a platoon OPORD SOP.

a. The OPORD SOP ensures that important information is not lost, makes the OPORD processes faster, and produces a more accurate OPORD with greater detail.

b. Using a platoon OPORD format will focus the platoon leader during the creation of the OPORD and will ensure that all information is covered. The platoon's success will be greatly enhanced during missions when the platoon leader has all the information given from the TF.

2. Modify the platoon's SOP to include procedures for formatting and issuing OPORDs. Each leader should use 8 ½" x 11" or 5" x 8" versions of the OPORD format. The format selected should be the standard for each platoon leader to use when writing and issuing his OPORD.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 66
SUBJECT: Direct Fire Planning

OBSERVATION (Mech): During the planning process, units are not planning the detail required to effectively engage the enemy with direct fires.

DISCUSSION: The lack of direct fire planning results in the unit using multiple rounds from different vehicles to kill the same target. A lack of orientation results in subordinate units being unable to mass fires due to masking by friendly units or no established sectors of fire. This lack of mass allows the OPFOR to accomplish their mission and hampers the BLUFOR's ability to influence the battle.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The direct fire system is the number one killer on the NTC battlefield. Each unit must execute detailed planning as outlined in FM 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force. Develop a checklist from this manual and add it to the unit SOP for use during planning.

2. Use engagement criteria, target criteria, target priority, destruction criteria, trigger lines, and target reference points to help focus all the direct fire systems in the task force, thereby achieving mass.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 67
SUBJECT: Task Force Fragmentary Orders (FRAGOs)

OBSERVATION (LTP): Task forces are issuing incomplete FRAGOs.

DISCUSSION:

1. Incomplete FRAGOs often result in either destroying the task force (TF) or causing the subordinate commander to execute an operation that was not intended. A common term for such orders is the "Go and Do" order.

2. An example:

a. A TF commander directs a company/team to go around the south side of Hill 876 and attack the flank of the AGMB that is moving from 114 Wadi to the Iron Triangle. So, the company commander proceeds in column. The TF commander fails to mention that three AT-5s are covering the flank and does not tell the company what the rest of the TF is doing. What supporting fires can he expect? The TF also does not tell the company commander what he is expected to achieve (e.g. destroy AGMB? fix AGMB? cause AGMB to halt its movement east and orient south?). However, he was told to execute expeditiously.

b. Based on what he knows of the situation, the company commander moves in column, traveling. The lead platoon rounds Hill 876 into an AT-5 ambush. Since the company commander is displaying the appropriate sense of urgency conveyed by the TF commander, the second platoon in column screams around the corner into the same ambush. If they are lucky, the third platoon sees that eight vehicles have just been destroyed, and he assumes a hasty defense to develop the situation.

c. Meanwhile, a company is combat ineffective, and is not attacking the flank of the AGMB.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The quality of FRAGOs is invariably an issue during force-on-force AARs, and O/Cs see the same phenomenon in LTP. Below is a diagram the O/C teams use to discuss FRAGOs. Of particular interest is the requirement for the subordinate commander to give a quick confirmation briefing to ensure in the heat of battle he understands what he is doing (Task) and why he is doing it (Purpose). Page H-29 of FM 101-5 shows the doctrinal format for a FRAGO, which is consistent with the technique advocated by the O/C teams at the NTC.

Slide showing doctrinal format for a FRAGO

Figure 1

2. Between the TF commander, XO, and S3, someone needs to see the developing situation in sufficient time to allow for a brief, but thoughtful plan. If the TF leadership will use the technique depicted in the diagram above, the quality of FRAGOs will improve as will the quality of execution of combat operations. It is also wise to emphasize task, purpose, and endstate for each subordinate unit. Thus, in addition to paragraphs 1, 2, and 3a of the FRAGO, also issue an abbreviated execution matrix.

(TA.4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 68
SUBJECT: Battery-Level Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (FS): FA batteries do not conduct effective rehearsals.

DISCUSSION: Battery commanders adequately identified their essential field artillery tasks (EFATs), but often do not relate specific rehearsals to the completion of essential tasks.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Battery commanders need to place emphasis on conducting rehearsals as part of Home Station training. SOPs must have a detailed plan for rehearsals at the battery level.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 69
SUBJECT: ADA Platoon Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (Mech): Air defense artillery (ADA) platoons rarely rehearse.

DISCUSSION: Platoon rehearsals often amount to a conversation between the platoon leader and platoon sergeant.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Rehearsals are a critical part of troop-leading procedures. Platoon leaders should validate plans, intent, and concept of operation during their rehearsals. Procedures in FM 44-64, SHORAD Battalion and Battery Operations, can be used to improve rehearsals.

(TA.4.4.1.1Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 70
SUBJECT: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Operations Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): NBC reconnaissance, decontamination, and smoke support are not adequately rehearsed during the preparation phase of the mission.

DISCUSSION:

1. NBC and smoke operations are not given adequate attention during brigade combined arms and CSS rehearsals.

2. Coordination is not conducted between task force and brigade chemical staffs to ensure everyone knows the plan and is ready to execute their portion of it. As a result, there is no common picture of how the brigade will conduct NBC operations.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The brigade should adequately address NBC and smoke operations in its combined arms and CSS rehearsals.

2. Chemical staffs should conduct FM rehearsals prior to mission execution to ensure everyone knows the plan and is prepared to execute their tasks. Chemical staffs can conduct FM rehearsals on the chemical company frequency. Participants should include the BCT and task force chemical officers (CMLOs), chemical company commander, decontamination and smoke platoon leaders, and the NBC reconnaissance element leader.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 71
SUBJECT: CSS Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (Armor): CSS rehearsals are rarely conducted to standard.

DISCUSSION:

1. Plans are not well distributed.

2. Paragraph IV is rarely briefed in detail at the task force OPORD.

3. Information is not disseminated to those who need to know.

4. The rehearsal becomes a briefing.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Develop ways to distribute the CSS plan through WARNOs, LRPs, and CTCP OPORDs.

2. The S4 must share information with the CTCP as soon as he gets it, and the S1 must act.

3. Use the task force combined arms rehearsal site whenever possible to lower rehearsal overhead.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 72
SUBJECT: Engineer Unit Dissemination of Graphic Control Measures

OBSERVATION (Engineers): Graphic control measures are not being disseminated in a usable form to the lowest level.

DISCUSSION:

1. Most engineer units lack an effective functional means of transmitting and utilizing graphics. The difficulty with most current methods observed is that units do not take into account the needs of the user at the lowest level. The squad leader and platoon leader is often handed a brigade TOC-sized overlay, far too large and unwieldy to be managed in a track commander's hatch or the passenger seat of a HMMWV. This could be reduced by some fairly simple measures at the company TOC level.

2. Many soldiers do not know the meanings of the symbols on their overlays or how to properly use them.

3. Many units do not accurately copy graphics, often resulting in units driving into known obstacles and minefields.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Units should use the same scale maps at all levels for the dissemination of graphics.

2. Establish a workable map size for the lowest-level user to handle in his work area; 24" x 18" has been shown to be a good size. Make map boards from plexiglass or other suitable transparent material, and establish standardized reference points ("bolt holes" or "tic marks") so the maps may be placed on these map boards in the same place, every time.

3. The engineer battalion TOC should evaluate the terrain of the operational area and pre-register all likely map subsections.

4. Prepare overlays from the higher headquarters' graphics to cover each map subsection. Sections should overlap, so that a leader need not refer to two separate overlays more than necessary.

5. Conduct training on graphical control measures until all involved leaders and soldiers are fully prepared to use them.

6. Take great care in the reproduction of graphics.

a. Train one or more soldiers to be experts at this task. Help them understand the importance of their work, and ensure they have the tools necessary to do a good job.

b. Many units neglect to plan for or provide sufficient office supplies to their subordinate units. Every platoon should have a field supply of acetate and alcohol pens available, including unit templates and rulers, to ensure accuracy in copying graphics.

7. Unit troop-leading procedures (TLPs) should include a pre-combat inspection (PCI) by the unit commander to ensure subordinates' graphics are correct. Graphics can be the difference between life and death or success and failure on the modern battlefield.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 73
SUBJECT: Company and Battalion Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (Aviation): Company and battalion rehearsals are inadequate.

DISCUSSION:

1. Companies too often do not conduct rehearsals, and when they do, the rehearsal does not focus on the direct fire plan or critical actions at the objective.

2. Commanders do not conduct rehearsals with a clear endstate or ensure that all crews understand the direct fire plan.

3. Commanders do not discuss contingencies or clearly articulate how the direct plan will be adjusted as the situation changes.

4. Battalion commanders and S3s do not conduct adequate rehearsals to ensure that the attack company's direct fire plans are synchronized and that they support the commander's intent.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Commanders at all levels must set the standard for rehearsals. Commanders must have a clear vision of the endstate for the rehearsal, and must rehearse until all members of the team understand the plan. A standardized terrain model kit is a useful tool and cuts down on set-up time.

2. Commanders must allocate adequate time for rehearsals and closely guard this time to ensure that rehearsals are not bypassed.

3. Companies and battalions should routinely conduct rehearsals at Home Station. It is critical for subordinates to see the rehearsal standard and to work TTPs which best facilitate the team's understanding of the mission. Once the unit has established and validated their TTPs, they must be incorporated into the unit SOP.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 74
SUBJECT: Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (FS): Units do not allocate sufficient time, resources, or credence to the concept of the rehearsal.

DISCUSSION: None.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Units should routinely train and practice a variety of rehearsal types and techniques. When time is at a premium, the staff should conduct a reduced rehearsal, focusing only on critical events, using the backward planning cycle. The unit SOP should identify appropriate rehearsal types and techniques, and standards for their execution.

2. Appendix D of FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, outlines the following types of rehearsals:

a. Confirmation brief.

b. Backbrief.

c. Combined arms rehearsal.

d. Support rehearsal.

e. Battledrill or SOP rehearsal.

3. To determine which rehearsal technique to use, consider the following:

a. Time - Amount required from planning to execution.

b. Multi-echelon - Number of echelons that can participate in the rehearsal.

c. OPSEC - Ease of the enemy to gather intelligence from the rehearsal.

d. Terrain - Terrain management considerations.

4. The ROCK DRILL.

a. When time permits, one of the best rehearsal formats is the rock or terrain model method. The strength in the rock drill is the ability to portray the battle space in all three dimensions. This method also allows key leaders and staff to walk through their significant piece of terrain and discuss their actions in order to support the battalion's plan. Units can also make use of their decision support template (DST) and/or synchronization matrix during the rock drill to keep it organized and to verify their plan.

b. Units should incorporate rock drills as part of the battalion SOP. The SOP should address preparation requirements and the structure of the event. The operations sergeant and the S2 should put together and maintain a standard rock drill/rehearsal kit to assist in quick terrain model set-up.

EXAMPLE:

- Layout/terrain model. Fix responsibility for the layout of the terrain model (normally the S2 section). The terrain model should depict or contain the following items:

- Boundaries.
- Phase lines.
- BP/attack positions.
- Routes/MSRs.
- Objectives.
- FSCMs.
- Task force graphics, if available.
- Major terrain.
- All position areas.
- Targets.
- Obstacles.
- Air Routes.
- Radar Zones.

- Procedures. Initially, the battalion S3 explains the rock drill site outlining the prominent terrain and graphics. He also states the mission of the higher and adjacent units.

- The S2 follows and discusses the following:

- Mobility corridors/avenue of approach down to company level.
- Weather and its effect on the operation.
- Most likely and most dangerous COA.
- Enemy artillery locations.
- Enemy phases of fire (time and location).
- Critical enemy decision points.
- Enemy recon assets and mission.
- Enemy TA capabilities/location.
- Enemy chemical strikes, FASCAM, and air assault locations.

- The S3 then briefs the maneuver plan (artillery and task forces).

- Each commander then positions himself on his initial position. Each phase of the operation is then rehearsed in the following order with the S3, commander, and staff identifying appropriate event driven triggers.

- S2 - enemy action/reaction.
- S3 - maneuver action/reaction.
- S3 - TOC location/all event driven triggers for the TOC.

- The S2 will then ask leading questions to ensure everyone understands the plan, portraying the uncooperative enemy.

- Each firing battery commander briefs:

- Battery location.
- Azimuth of fire.
- Projected combat power.
- Critical FS tasks at that phase of the operation.
- Number of targets in file.
- Alternate location/trigger for movement.
- Time to move from primary to alternate.
- Ammo status.
- Status of position improvement.
- CASEVAC plan.

- S2 or counterfire officer will brief:

- Radar's mission.
- Radar's positioning.
- Radar's movement triggers.
- Active zones per position.
- Cueing that corresponds to planned zones.
- Adjacent unit security.
- GS fires and GS AN/TPQ-37 radar support.

- Combat trains commander:

- Location/trigger for movement.
- BAS, AXP, FAS, and MAS locations.
- Mass casualty mutual support plan.
- Location of recovery.
- Critical tasks.
- UMCP location and equipment in it.
- Amount of Class V on hand in combat trains.
- CSS triggers.

- Field trains commander:

- Location.
- Ammo in field trains.
- Ration cycle.
- LRP time/location.
- Distance from BSA to combat trains.
- Rear area combat operations (targets planned in support of BSA defense).
- CSS triggers.

- Battalion FDO:

- Scheme of fires.
- Target assignment/volume, desired effects.
- MET schedule/MET status.
- Fire order standards.
- Method of commo voice/digital.
- Primary and secondary observers.

- Chemical:

- MOPP status.
- Decon sites and link-up points.
- Location of decon assets and water.
- Dirty routes.

- BSO:

- Retrans location and movement scheme/triggers.
- Changeover time/procedure.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 75
SUBJECT: Combined Arms Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Combined arms rehearsals do not result in a fully synchronized plan that all subordinate units and leaders clearly understand.

DISCUSSION:

1. Rehearsals are not conducted on adequate terrain models that allow participants to visualize the terrain and the relation of friendly and enemy forces to each other.

2. Units do not conduct an interactive rehearsal that includes advancement of the force with the initiative. Advancement of the force with the initiative (the enemy for a friendly force defense and friendly forces for an attack against the enemy) requires using the wargame technique of action/reaction/counteraction in order to ensure all subordinates understand how the operation is synchronized. This interactive approach to the rehearsal involves the subordinate commanders to a high degree and causes them to rehearse their plan against an uncooperative enemy represented by other players on the terrain model.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units must practice and refine rehearsal procedures. Whenever possible, conduct terrain model rehearsals involving interactive friendly and enemy players discussing actions/reactions/counteractions.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 76
SUBJECT: Integration of the Adjutant into Brigade Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Adjutants are seldom participants in brigade combat team wargames or rehearsals.

DISCUSSION:

1. Adjutants are normally an afterthought in the wargaming process.

2. Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) and support are rarely discussed during brigade combat team rehearsals, the combined arms rehearsal, or the CSS rehearsal. When units do discuss the evacuation plan, there is insufficient detail to facilitate medical coverage of the brigade combat team's sector of operations.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Adjutants must be integrated into brigade wargames and rehearsals.

2. Brigade combat teams should refine their rehearsal processes and force units to brief the casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) plan.

3. The rehearsal should require a representative from all units, especially those company-sized units that are dependent upon area support, to attend the CSS rehearsal.

(TA.4.4.1.1Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 77
SUBJECT: Fire Support Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Many brigade fire support rehearsals are nothing more than a backbrief to the fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) or a continuation of the wargame.

DISCUSSION:

1. Although brigades normally try to conduct two fire support rehearsals (a terrain board rehearsal and an FM rehearsal) with the task force fire support officers (FSOs) and the FA battalion, they are seldom accomplished with any success.

2. Units seldom have a rehearsal format in their SOP, do not follow established SOPs, lack essential personnel, or do not receive the necessary bottom-up refinement of the plan required to do a detailed rehearsal.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The brigade fire support rehearsal is most effective when it occurs prior to the brigade combined arms rehearsal because it ensures that fires can, in fact, accomplish what will be rehearsed with brigade.

2. The FA battalion and subordinate fire support elements (FSEs) must complete their rehearsals before the brigade's fire support rehearsal. The rehearsal itself needs to run like all good rehearsals, with an enemy or friendly action described and then all players (S2, observers, ALOs, FSOs, FDOs, etc.) executing their portion of the plan, complete with the call for fire and other radio traffic.

3. Use a scheme of fires worksheet as an excellent tool to organize and conduct the rehearsal.

4. Rehearse retakes, adjusting fires, and executing branches and sequels, and other potentially desynchronizing events to provide the flexibility necessary to fight the enemy and not the plan.

5. Units need to develop a format for rehearsal, publish it in their SOPs, and ensure all personnel come to the rehearsal prepared to rehearse.

6. Use a fire support backbrief immediately following the issuance of the brigade OPORD. This can ensure that task force FSOs and the FA battalion clearly understand the brigade fire support plan and the scheme of fires to prevent subordinate plans that do not support that of the brigade.

7. Integrate fires into the brigade combined arms rehearsals by ensuring targets are placed on the terrain model or rehearsal map. When possible, the executors of fires (Strikers, FISTs, FA battalion S3, FDO, etc.) should participate. Clearly discuss task and purpose for each target, the trigger, the required effects, and the volume and duration of fires.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 78
SUBJECT: Time Management

OBSERVATION (Armor): Task forces are not setting or adhering to an established timeline.

DISCUSSION:

1. Units are not following the 1/3 - 2/3 rule in the planning timeline.

2. Staffs are not trained to meet specific requirements in the time allotted.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The task force S3 or XO must establish a realistic timeline and enforce it.

2. Make maximum use of parallel planning.

3. Train the timeline prior to arrival at NTC. Some units can meet 6-hour window - others need 8 to 10 hours.

4. Exercise the orders process at Home Station under the same conditions as NTC.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 79
SUBJECT: Electronic Warfare (EW) Team Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): A lack of rehearsals conducted at company and platoon levels has hindered EW operations.

DISCUSSION:

1. Poor time management and failure to follow the 1/3 - 2/3 rule often results in rehearsals being omitted at company and platoon levels.

2. A lack of proper troop-leading procedures has added to the absence of rehearsals being conducted at all levels.

3. The lack of rehearsals restricts the teams' understanding of their mission, the flow of the battle, and contingency missions that would arise as a result of the enemy conducting a different course of action (COA) than the one anticipated.

4. There has been a lack of emphasis and flexibility based on time management regarding conducting rehearsals. As a result, units often fight the plan and not the enemy.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Rehearsals must be conducted at every level to ensure every soldier understands the mission and the scheme of maneuver.

2. Time available will dictate whether the rehearsal will be a terrain board, map, or FM rehearsal. This will allow any issues that arise with the mission to be de-conflicted.

3. Platoon and team leaders must attend or participate in company and platoon rehearsals if their element is to understand the scheme of maneuver.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 80
SUBJECT: Brigade Fire Support Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (FS): Brigade fire support rehearsals are often inadequate.

DISCUSSION: The brigade normally tries to conduct two fire support rehearsals with the task force (TF) fire support officers (FSOs) and the FA battalion (a terrain board rehearsal and an FM rehearsal). However, many of these rehearsals are nothing more than a backbrief to the fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) or a continuation of the wargaming. Reasons for this problem continue to be:

1. Units do not have a rehearsal format in their SOP or do not follow established SOPs.

2. Units lack essential personnel.

3. Units do not receive the necessary bottom-up refinement of the plan required to do a detailed rehearsal.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

a. The field artillery (FA) battalion and subordinate fire support elements (FSEs) must complete their rehearsals before the brigade's fire support rehearsal.

b. The brigade fire support rehearsal needs to run like all good rehearsals, with enemy or friendly actions described and then all players executing their portion of the plan, complete with the call for fire and other radio traffic.

c. Rehearsal players should include the S2, observers, air liaison officers (ALOs), fire support officers (FSOs), and fire direction officers (FDOs).

d. The scheme of fires worksheet provides an excellent tool to organize and conduct the rehearsal. Rehearsing reattacks, adjusting fires, and executing branches and sequels, and other potentially desynchronizing events provides the flexibility necessary to fight the enemy and not the plan.

e. Units need to develop a format for rehearsal, publish it in their SOPs, and ensure all personnel come to the rehearsal prepared to rehearse.

2. A second technique is to use a fire support backbrief immediately following the issuance of the brigade operations order (OPORD). This can ensure that TF FSOs and the FA battalion clearly understand the brigade fire support plan and the scheme of fires, and prevent subordinate plans that do not support brigades.

3. Integrate fires into the brigade combined arms rehearsals by ensuring targets are placed on the terrain model or rehearsal map. When possible, the executors of fires (strikers, fire support teams [FISTs], FA battalion S3, and FDO) should participate. Clearly discuss task and purpose for each target, the trigger, the required effects, and the volume and duration of fires.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 81
SUBJECT: Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (Mech): Rehearsals seldom reflect reality.

DISCUSSION: Rehearsals at the NTC seldom account for attrition. Normally, the entire company makes it through the breach with no casualties, and they reach the objective with 100 percent of the OPFOR destroyed. The OPFOR in most rehearsals is also a cooperative enemy, doing exactly what we want them to do. Seldom do rehearsals cover contingencies or losses.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The first run-through of the rehearsal should cover the plan from beginning to end with everyone being successful. This ensures that each tank commander understands his role throughout the mission.

2. After the first rehearsal, conduct a rehearsal that incorporates a different enemy COA and casualties, thus also exercising contingency and evacuation plans. This forces redundancy in planning and ensures the company is prepared to continue the mission in the event that losses occur.

3. Include some major scenarios and standard battle drills in the rehearsal. This will enable the unit to cross the line of departure (LD) better prepared for enemy contact.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 82
SUBJECT: Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (Mech): The rehearsal is rarely realized as a combat multiplier at the company/team level.

DISCUSSION:

1. The rehearsal is often omitted because of lack of time.

2. The rehearsal often consists of a re-briefing of the company/team plan that was briefed in the operations order.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Institute principles of rehearsals as discussed in FM 71-1, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, Chapter 2, pages 2-38 to 2-41, and CALL Newsletter No. 98-5, Rehearsals, Mar 98, into the company team TACSOP and troop-leading procedures. FM 71-1, Chapter 2, states: "Rehearsals are practice sessions conducted to prepare units for an upcoming operation or event. They are essential in ensuring thorough preparation, coordination, and understanding of the commander's intent. Company team commanders should never underestimate the value of rehearsals."

2. Protect the time scheduled for the rehearsal within the troop-leading procedures, and reschedule other events if at all possible.

3. Platoon leaders brief their plans to the commander during the rehearsal. This will ensure the company's scheme of maneuver will support the commander's intent and, ultimately, the company/team's task and purpose assigned by the task force commander.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 83
SUBJECT: Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (Mech): Rehearsals, when they are conducted, frequently do not allow platoons to fully "see the enemy, see the terrain, and ourselves."

DISCUSSION: None.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Rehearsals are essential to success in high tempo combat operations. Implement the use of a terrain model, sketch map or map rehearsal. The rehearsals allow all involved to visualize the battle and their commander's intent. When possible, the platoon leader should conduct the rehearsals overlooking the actual terrain of the area of operations. These techniques are very effective for confirmation briefs and backbriefs.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 84
SUBJECT: Task Force Time Management

OBSERVATION (Mech): Because of inadequate time management at task force level, scout platoons are often not able to accomplish important tasks prior to crossing the LD.

DISCUSSION: The task force often gives the scout platoon insufficient time to prepare for a mission. The scout platoon often neglects or omits rehearsals, pre-combat inspections (PCIs), and boresiting because they run out of time.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Conduct abbreviated preparation training at Home Station.

2. The task force staff must be made aware of the minimum time required for the scout platoon to prepare for a mission. With sufficient time to prepare, the scout platoon will increase the probability of success in answering the task force commander's PIRs.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 85
SUBJECT: Assignment of Tactical Tasks to Achieve the Purpose

OBSERVATION (Mech): Units are assigning unclear or multiple tasks down to subordinate units.

DISCUSSION:

1. Without a clear task and purpose, units are confused as to what the higher commander wants.

2. Units are not nesting the task/purpose of subordinate units with the task force main effort.

3. Graphic control measures are not always depicted throughout the depth of the task force and brigade combat team (BCT) battle space.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Adhere to the basic five-paragraph OPORD format as described in FM 71-123, Tactics and Techniques for Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Armored Brigade, Battalion Task Force, and Company Team.

2. Assign a task and purpose for all subordinate units, ensuring they are nested with the task force main effort. Assign purpose first (the desired endstate), then assign the appropriate task.

3. Ensure that the tactical task is specific enough for the subordinate leader to understand exactly what his unit is to do.

4. Each subordinate unit should have a unique task and purpose within the context of the scheme of maneuver.

5. The main effort has the same purpose as the task force.

6. Graphics at the task force level must provide enough control measures to assist in focusing subordinate elements, while maintaining enough flexibility in the plan to allow for changes on the move. Use checkpoints and/or terrain index reference system (TIRS) throughout the area of operations/interest.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 86
SUBJECT: Task Force Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (Mech): The task force combined arms rehearsal (CAR) is often no more than a briefing given by the commander or S3.

DISCUSSION: The task force CAR rarely results in unit synchronization.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The task force rehearsal is essential to ensure that subordinate unit plans are synchronized and will achieve the higher commander's intent. Develop a script as outlined in CALL Newsletter No. 98-5, Rehearsals, Mar 98. The script will help the task force and subordinate units to prepare for and execute the rehearsal.

2. Once the script is developed, incorporate it into the tactical SOP.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 87
SUBJECT: Rehearsing Forward Passage of Lines

OBSERVATION (Mech): Coordination for forward passage of lines is inadequate.

DISCUSSION: Inadequate coordination results in a lack of essential information at the time of the rehearsal. Rehearsals, when conducted, do not include the passage of lines/battle handover.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The task force should conduct parallel planning and coordination to ensure that all information is disseminated down to the lowest level in a timely manner. To assist the planning effort, recommend a liaison officer (LNO) be sent from the passing unit to the unit that will be passed through.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 88
SUBJECT: Task Force Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (Mech): Rehearsals are not adequate at the task force level.

DISCUSSION: Rehearsals are often used to make up for a lack of wargaming. This results in a loss of focus, an inability to verify the existing plan, and multiple changes. Many of the BOS representatives rebrief their plans at the rehearsal, rather than being briefed by a subordinate unit.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Let the executor brief the individual who developed the plan. The new version of FM 101-5 (May 97) presents clear guidance.

2. Refer to CALL Newsletter No. 98-5, Rehearsals, Mar 98.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 89
SUBJECT: Fire Support Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (LTP): Artillery fire support rehearsals are often not conducted to standard.

DISCUSSION: Fire support rehearsals often achieve less than expected outcomes of what rehearsals are designed to do.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. At a minimum, rehearsals should address the following:

a. Commander's Intent.

b. Integrate Intelligence.

c. Scheme of Maneuver and Fires.

d. Movement Planning and Positioning.

e. Observation, Target, Trigger, Firing unit.

f. Target Verification.

2. When rehearsals address the issues listed above, the unit is better prepared to execute the plan. When conducted correctly, the rehearsal will:

a. Identify synchronization problems supporting the maneuver plan.

b. Exercise communication nets.

c. Identify target-triggering responsibilities.

d. Validate the observer and attack system plan.

e. Result in an improved responsiveness and lethality of artillery fires during execution.

3. State in unit SOPs the purpose and intent of unit rehearsals:

a. Determine essential participants.

b. Assign roles and responsibilities for the conduct of rehearsals.

c. Establish high standards and enforce the standards.

4. Other techniques:

a. Rehearse everything, not just the fire support plan.

b. Specify the time and method of rehearsal.

c. Have a predetermined list of items to cover.

d. Establish key participants to be present.

e. Schedule sleep plans around rehearsal time so that key participants are present.

f. Conduct the rehearsal under the XO's or S3's direction.

g. State the goal/objective of rehearsals and refinements.

h. Practice the plan - the rehearsal is not a wargame.

i. During the rehearsal, address specific actions to accomplish tasks.

j. At a minimum, conduct a target list/data base verification.

k. Include specific munitions needed.

l. Howitzer sections verify ammunition and ability to fire data.

m. Correct problems on the spot.

n. Have a plan and place for degraded operations in the event time is limited.

o. Integrate the movement plan.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 90
SUBJECT: Role of the Engineer Battalion HHC Commander in the Brigade Rear Area

OBSERVATION (Engr): Engineer battalion HHC commanders tend to neglect their role as the brigade rear area engineer.

DISCUSSION: Too many engineer battalion HHC commanders locate away from the forward support battalion (FSB) tactical operations center (TOC) and the brigade S4 cell and are not filling their role as the FSB engineer.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The HHC commander must assume the role of FSB engineer, much in the same way that a line company commander does with a TF. The commander, as the rear area engineer, should:

a. Plan, coordinate, and execute the mobility/survivability BOS in the brigade rear area. This includes assisting the FSB staff with terrain analysis, creating obstacle plans for the BSA, planning survivability work for critical CSS assets, and ensuring CSS elements understand obstacle lane/bypass marking.

b. Participate in the FSB orders process and publish an engineer annex to FSB OPORDs, to include a survivability matrix.

2. The key to success is to establish a close training relationship between the HHC commander and the FSB staff prior to deployment.

(TA.4.4.3 Provide Command Presence)

TREND 91
SUBJECT: Pre-Combat Checks/Pre-Combat Inspections (PCCs/PCIs)

OBSERVATION (Brigade staff): Signal company PCCs/PCIs were not always conducted to standard.

DISCUSSION:

1. Companies usually do not deploy to NTC with standardized PCC/PCI checklists and do not develop any throughout the rotation.

2. Soldiers usually conduct PCCs, but variations among teams and incomplete PCIs have been observed throughout each rotation. Load plans have been inconsistent and are not always used.

3. Weapons' maintenance, weapons' bore sighting (MILES), and COMSEC inventories have been observed as not always being to standard throughout each rotation and are key factors in determining the survivability of remotely deployed elements.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Signal companies must develop standard PCC/PCI checklists. These checklists could include a signal specific checklist and a tactical checklist. Recommend that leaders at all levels conduct aggressive PCIs to ensure every soldier and all equipment is "fit to fight" prior to every mission.

2. Accurate load plans should be developed and used prior to any mission including all vehicle movements.

3. Signal companies must continue to train operators to maintain all equipment to standard.

4. Operators and leaders need to continually use their PCC/PCI checklists on a daily basis. As combat missions continue for many days and operators get fatigued, even the brightest minds must use written checklists and leaders must continually inspect.

(TA.4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

TREND 92
SUBJECT: Pre-Combat Checks and Pre-Combat Inspections (PCCs/PCIs)

OBSERVATION (Mech): PCCs/PCIs are not completed to standard during the preparation phase.

DISCUSSION:

1. Commanders do not incorporate PCCs/PCIs in their timelines.

2. There is a lack of initiative by junior leaders. First-line supervisors are not inspecting their soldiers without being told specifically to do so.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Time must be incorporated in the company timeline for conducting PCCs/PCIs. This is the commander's time to ensure that his unit is prepared for combat. In the event that this does not occur, junior leaders must ensure that their soldiers are prepared for combat. Discovering shortcomings after contact is made is usually too late to correct them.

(TA.4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

TREND 93
SUBJECT: Pre-Combat Checks/Pre-Combat Inspections (PCC/PCI) in the Tactical Operations Center (TOC)

OBSERVATION (Mech): PCC/PCIs are often not conducted to standard in the TOC.

DISCUSSION: TOC personnel and assets are not often supervised or inspected to ensure that quality products are being sent to subordinate units and that TOC personnel understand the upcoming fight.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Develop priorities of work for TOC personnel in conjunction with a timeline to ensure personnel and equipment are prepared.

2. Section NCOICs should report to the OPS NCO or battle captain that inspections are complete.

(TA.4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

TREND 94
SUBJECT: Engineer Unit Preparation for Combat

OBSERVATION (Mech): Engineer units frequently do not complete essential preparation-for-combat tasks.

DISCUSSION:

1. Critical preparation-for-combat tasks are often not identified.

2. Critical indicators are not well defined for subordinate units.

3. There is rarely a timeline established or enforced for completion of preparation tasks.

4. Shortcomings are not being identified or are being identified too late to overcome them.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Units must establish a standard set of preparation for combat indicators or criteria. The indicators might not cover all aspects of preparation but are used to determine the preparation status of subordinates.

2. The critical preparation tasks must be clearly defined by the commander to include a timeline for completion. The TOC must track these indicators to assist the commander and identify shortcomings in time to be corrected.

3. The preparation for combat indicators can drive those items inspected during the commander's pre-combat inspection (PCI) of the unit. Some potential preparation for combat indicators are:

HAS THE SUBORDINATE UNIT:

- Boresighted/ test fired weapons systems (small arms, crew served, Volcano, RCU, MICLIC)?

- Distributed and posted graphics?

- Issued the OPORD and conducted backbriefs?

- Conducted rehearsals (mounted and combined arms where applicable)?

- Completed Class III/IV/V upload?

- Conducted PCC/ PCIs?

- Conducted risk assessment and implemented controls?

(TA.4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

TREND 95
SUBJECT: Synchronization of Fires and Maneuver

OBSERVATION (Armor): Fire support is rarely integrated into the task force wargame.

DISCUSSION:

1. Task forces are not developing a scheme of fires with adequate triggers.

2. Observation plans are not synchronized with the scheme of maneuver.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The task force S3/XO and fire support officer (FSO) must ensure integration of fires.

2. Jointly develop adequate triggers based on time and space, relation to terrain and enemy, and the task force scheme of maneuver.

3. Develop both the scheme of fires and the observation plan.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 96
SUBJECT: Integration of Aviation and Ground Maneuver Operations

OBSERVATION (Aviation): Aviation and ground maneuver elements do not have an integrated planning process.

DISCUSSION: Air/ground integration problems begin during the planning process and continue through preparation and execution phases. Planning in a vacuum produces a disjointed maneuver plan with uncommon maneuver graphics/control measures, poor communications plans, improperly assigned priority of fires (POFs), and attack-by-fire positions that do not support the ground scheme of maneuver.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Commanders must identify decision points, task, and purpose of aviation assets. Based upon the commander's guidance and the wargaming results, the S2 refines the collection plan to support the commitment of aviation assets.

2. A competent air liaison officer (LNO), who has the authority to speak for the aviation commander, must participate in the brigade combat team battle staff's Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). The LNO should assist the ground maneuver element in the planning of all base orders and, on a case-by-case basis, specific follow-on missions.

3. Aviation company/troop commanders must monitor the ground maneuver units' command net to synchronize ground/air combat power and to reduce the risk of fratricide.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 97
SUBJECT: Synchronization of Fires and Maneuver: Scheme of Fires

OBSERVATION (Mech): Task forces and squadrons frequently have difficulty arranging activities supporting essential fire support tasks (EFSTs) in time and space during the wargaming process.

DISCUSSION: None.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The S3 and fire support officer (FSO) must ensure the complete integration of fire support into the wargaming process of the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).

2. The FSO must advise the task force commander and S3 when they ask fire support to execute unrealistic tasks.

3. The endstate must produce an executable scheme of fires, an observation plan, and refinement submitted to brigade.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 98
SUBJECT: Adjacent Unit Coordination

OBSERVATION (Mech): Coordination during brigade combat service support (CSS)/combat health support (CHS) planning processes and rehearsals is poor.

DISCUSSION:

1. Coordination with adjacent task force(s) during forward passage of lines, rear passage of lines, chemical casualty decontamination, and breach operations is inadequate.

2. Graphic control measures that template proposed battalion aid station (BAS) locations, ambulance exchange points (AXPs), and personnel decontamination stations (PDS) are not consistently published, resulting in desynchronized casualty evacuation (CASEVAC).

3. Hasty coordination between task force medical platoon leaders during execution is often attempted, but usually ineffective.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Confirm and record FM radio frequencies and call signs of all brigade combat team (BCT) CHS nodes prior to deployment (during the RSO&I phase) when possible.

2. Adjacent unit BAS is often the most proximate medical treatment facility (MTF) during CASEVAC operations and can adequately support Level 1 treatment requirements. Establish specific planning requirements and control measures during brigade CSS planning processes and rehearsals. Clearly define the plan, actions during key events, and triggers for movement.

3. Centralize CHS node reporting and tracking. Verify FM communications checks and issue FRAGOs as necessary prior to LD and as METT-T dictates.

4. Incorporate forward passage of lines and rear passage of lines, chemical casualty decontamination and breach operations into Home Station multi-echelon training events. Refer to FM 8-10-4 and FM 6-27: "The passage of lines may offer the medical platoon leader the opportunity to interface with his counterpart in the unit being passed. This is an excellent opportunity to share information concerning enemy force, casualty assessment, evacuation routes, requisite site selections, and possible logistical assistance."

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 99
SUBJECT: Synchronizing Tactical Operations

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Staffs are seldom able to achieve the level of detail required to fully synchronize a plan and apply all the combat multipliers to the battle.

DISCUSSION:

1. Staffs do not integrate combat multipliers during the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) due to lack of detail, partially developed courses of action (COAs), and lack of enemy visualization. Staffs are not using the action/reaction/counteraction method.

2. Battlefield Operating System (BOS) representatives do not come to the wargame fully prepared to integrate the effects of their assets in terms of task, purpose, specific location, times, triggers, events, and effects. As a result, combat multipliers are either not integrated or not sufficiently synchronized to have a significant effect.

3. COAs are not refined following the commander's guidance to the point that each staff officer clearly understands the overall plan. COA statements and sketches are rarely developed to enhance understanding.

4. Staffs are challenged with visualizing how the enemy will fight in terms of task and purpose for each enemy element and how the enemy uses the terrain. This leads to difficulty conducting action/reaction/counteraction discussions to further clarify opportunities to integrate the BOS.

5. The lack of detail and visualization in the wargame ultimately leads to decision support matrices that do not significantly assist the commander in making timely decisions.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Staffs must follow the requirements for a complete COA statement and sketch as outlined in FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations. Staffs must be prepared for the wargame and be aware of the enemy's capabilities and COAs. Each staff officer must talk in terms of specific details (task, purpose, time, location, triggers, events, and effects).

2. Implement the action/reaction/counteraction drill versus a "fill-in-the-synch-matrix- block" drill to ensure the staff is visualizing the battle.

3. Develop a decision support matrix (DSM) that clearly identifies the decision, enemy and friendly conditions that relate to the decision, the observer, and the named area of interest (NAI) that answers the priority intelligence requirement (PIR) relating to the decision.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 100
SUBJECT: Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Synchronization of Tactical Operations

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): TOCs do not achieve full potential for synchronizing tactical operations.

DISCUSSION:

1. TOCs seldom achieve full potential for predictive analysis, battle tracking, and targeting due to compartmentalization, lack of information sharing, and ineffective battle captains. As a result CAS, FA, engineers, aviation, and ADA are often not fully synchronized.

2. TOC staffs do not conduct battle update briefs as often as is needed during fast-paced operations to ensure all staff elements are informed of the latest guidance and direction from the commander and XO.

3. FRAGOs are rarely issued to clarify the current situation and proved clear tasks/purposes for future operations.

4. Battle captains are not key players during battles, often relegated to only updating combat power charts only. As a result, XOs frequently handle radio traffic and fight the current fight rather than maintaining a broad perspective of the battle.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The XO or battle captain must conduct battle update briefs on a more frequent basis and develop FRAGOs that clarify the situation and tasks/purposes for subordinate units.

2. Battle captains must be empowered to handle current radio traffic to allow the XO time to look forward and develop FRAGOs.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 101
SUBJECT: Synchronizing CSS with Maneuver

OBSERVATION (CSS): CSS is not adequately integrated into the brigade maneuver plan.

DISCUSSION:

1. CSS operators in the FSB/RSS, MSB/CSB and the brigade/regimental staff never fully integrate the concept of support with the maneuver plan or timeline.

2. In the case of combat health support (CHS), units normally complete casualty estimates. However, the triggers to move ambulance exchange points (AXPs) and Level 2 care are seldom identified, and the movement of such entities on the battlefield is neither effectively rehearsed nor synchronized with the maneuver plan.

3. The brigade S4s and FSB/RSS support operations officers are rarely fully involved in the brigade's/regiment's planning and course of action (COA) development process. The FSB/RSS support operations section continues to remain in the background and provides little input or planning in integrating CSS support with the rest of the BOS functions.

4. CSS rehearsals conducted by the brigade/regiment are not fully attended by the brigade/ regimental staff, the FSB/RSS, and the maneuver trains. Pertinent information provided in both the combined arms and CSS rehearsals is not always relayed to the FSB/RSS S3 for inclusion in a FRAGO (i.e., FASCAM locations enemy/friendly, templated chemical strikes, and enemy DIRT insertions).

5. Most OPORDs that are published by the FSB/RSS contain an incomplete concept of support paragraphs and supporting matrices.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. CSS support must be integrated with the BOS. The only way to accomplish this is to have the support operations officer fully involved in the brigade's/regiment's orders process, working in conjunction with the brigade/regimental S1 and S4.

2. The concept of support must be integrated with the maneuver scheme, which links LOGPAC resupply times, AXP/MAS/FAS locations, and ADVON/FLE movements to major muscle movements in the brigade/regiment.

3. Critical information concerning tactical hazards and risk must be passed to the S3 for inclusion in any updates to the published order to prevent fratricide and needless loss of life, limb, or critical assets/commodities.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 102
SUBJECT: Synchronization of Indirect Fires with the Maneuver Plan

OBSERVATION (Mech): The indirect fire plan is seldom synchronized with the maneuver plan.

DISCUSSION:

1. Indirect fires are seldom briefed in the company operations order.

2. Indirect fires are seldom synchronized during the company rehearsal.

3. The company/team FIST is often not present during the company rehearsal, and, if he is, it is usually late, as an afterthought.

4. As a result, company/teams do not realize the terminal effects of indirect fires on the enemy in conjunction with the maneuver plan during the campaign.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Even when the company is not augmented with a FIST, the platoons must receive a briefing on the scheme of fires and purpose of fires, because they are using a task force (TF) observer plan. With this information the platoon leaders would be able to utilize a target list or have knowledge of established targets during the mission.

2. The commander and FIST, when attached, need to work together during the planning process to ensure the indirect and direct fire plan will support the company's scheme of maneuver. This parallel planning ensures that the commander and FIST understand the TF indirect fire plan, and that the fires paragraph will be briefed during the company operations order. Information can then be disseminated throughout the company.

3. Recommend company/teams incorporate information listed in the following FMs into the company tactical SOP (TACSOP):

a. FM 71-1, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, Chapter 6, Section 1.

b. FM 6-20-20, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Battalion, Task Force, and Below, Chapter 2, Sections 2-6 and 2-7.

c. FM 6-71, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 103
SUBJECT: Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Displacement

OBSERVATION (Mech): Planning for TOC displacement is often inadequate.

DISCUSSION:

1. The TOC often delays displacement until just before the task force crosses the LD. This results in a loss of situational awareness at a critical point in time. It then becomes very difficult to regain this situational awareness or provide a clear picture to the commander.

2. Jump-TOCs (J-TOCs) have been ineffective primarily due to:

- a lack of planned triggers to execute the jumps,

- inadequate reconnaissance, and

- no effective communications plan.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The TOC must have a plan to battle track and provide the commander with critical information and recommendations throughout all phases of the fight. Using time/distance analysis based on critical events such as LD, first contact, actions on the objective, and forward passage of lines, the TOC should be able to plan their jumps to minimize the times when the TOC will be less effective.

2. Continue to refine and train the proper use of a J-TOC. If employed properly, the J-TOC can assist in ensuring the TOC maintains situational awareness.

3. Use LNOs at adjacent unit TOCs to improve the situational awareness of adjacent units and enemy activity.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 104
SUBJECT: Brigade Signal Officer (BSO) Adjacent Unit Coordination

OBSERVATION (Mech): BSOs are unable to coordinate with higher, lower, and adjacent units.

DISCUSSION: The BSO seldom integrates his plan into brigade and adjacent unit communications plans and has no knowledge of other communications plans. Without knowledge of other communications plans, cross-talk between units and significant events in the battlefield (i.e., passage of lines) could result in soldiers dying and the mission failing.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Coordinate with other units so that the task force can develop a communications plan that utilizes other unit assets and positioning efforts, and collocates retransmission assets for additional security. Knowing the brigade plan will further enhance and could influence the task force plan by understanding where the MSE assets are as well as key command and control nodes.

2. Foster a working relationship with other BSOs through the use of weekly meetings during garrison periods and daily meetings during field rotations, especially status updates of maintenance and overall equipment readiness. Prior to a battle, the task force should have a net call with all BSOs in the brigade combat team to obtain a final "dump" of communications planning.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 105
SUBJECT: Tactical Operations Center (TOC)/Jump-TOC (JTOC) Displacement Operations

OBSERVATION (Mech): Most units have difficulty integrating TOC and J-TOC operations into their scheme of maneuver.

DISCUSSION:

1. Units find that movement of the TOC is undesirable due to concern that communications will be lost or situational awareness would be reduced.

2. Typically units that execute TOC/J-TOC operations find that eventually both nodes move during contact, violating a major TTP in maintaining command and control.

3. Triggers are either not established or are not adhered to during execution.

4. TOC personnel are not fully briefed in the execution of the plan and do not have situational awareness of the battlefield once the operation commences.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Greater emphasis needs to be placed on the development and execution of displacement operations for the TOC and J-TOC. Confidence and trust in the execution of such operations can only be developed through careful integration of the plan into wargaming, rehearsals, and synchronization matrices.

2. Clear understanding of what each C2 node is responsible for as well as the personnel needed to man those nodes should be established and rehearsed prior to execution.

a. Develop tactical SOPs (TACSOPs) that clearly define the responsibilities of each node.

b. Rehearse the movement plan of the C2 nodes and develop triggers that will smoothly integrate the nodes into the overall command and control scheme of maneuver.

3. Develop battle drills within the execution matrix of TOC jumps (such as map board mirroring, internal triggers, and TOC configuration at execution phases).

4. Conduct Home Station training on C2 jumping, and foster the trust and confidence in what such operations can do for the overall command and control as well as situational awareness on the battlefield and the extension of communications in the battlefield.

5. Reference: CALL Newsletter No. 95-7, Tactical Operations Center.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 106
SUBJECT: Massing Combat Power

OBSERVATION (LTP): Brigade combat teams (BCTs) and task forces (TFs) are not massing overwhelming combat power.

DISCUSSION:

1. Units are not massing combat power during force-on-force battles at the BCT and TF level. BCT plans, by their very design, cause units to piecemeal their combat power into the fight. TFs further compound the situation by piecemeal commitment of company/teams into the close fight. In the defense there is no plan for the BCT to mass maneuver forces by repositioning. Each TF is on its own. For example, units often defend the Central Corridor with one TF arrayed behind the other. The OPFOR destroys the first TF with no interference from the second TF, and then destroys the second TF after the first is combat ineffective. The BCT also monopolizes artillery fires to conduct counter-battery fire, deep attacks, and fires against targets of opportunity. As a result, no artillery is available for the close fight--the decisive fight--and the unit rarely attacks the enemy with artillery while engaging with direct fires.

2. Units often include BCT-directed obstacles to support the deep fight and leave the TFs short of engineer effort in the main battle area. Furthermore, they expend their artillery and CAS with no aid from direct fire weapons and well before commitment of the MRR main body. The OPFOR need deal only with CAS and artillery. They often breach obstacles unsupported by direct fires. Once the OPFOR defeats those forces or avoids them, they then fight BLUFOR maneuver forces that have no assistance from artillery or CAS and have a much-diminished obstacle plan. In similar fashion, the BCT monopolizes attack aviation instead of allocating these forces to the TF.

3. In offensive operations, the BCT commits forces to the attack in a piecemeal manner. This phenomenon is particularly prevalent when the BCT has a light battalion. The infantry conduct a night attack to seize key terrain. They are unsupported by CAS, attack aviation, and mechanized forces. OPFOR concentrates on defeating the light infantry during the night; he is particularly effective at using artillery to kill BLUFOR infantry. By morning the light infantry is combat ineffective. The BCT then commits one mechanized TF to the attack. They are defeated with no help from the armor TF.

4. Units commit the armor TF last. They allow OPFOR to defeat the attack in detail, sequentially. In contrast, the OPFOR almost always makes the BLUFOR fight in at least two directions, and invariably, the BLUFOR is faced with multiple forms of contact (NBC, direct fires, indirect fires, and obstacles). On the other hand, OPFOR usually faces only one form of contact at a time and less often fights from multiple directions. Even when the BLUFOR attacks the enemy along more than one approach (Valley of Death and Central Corridor for example), the attacks are not synchronized; and OPFOR can defeat one attack before he has to focus fires on the other.

5. When the above is the BCT approach, the TFs are handicapped. However, at TF level, combat multipliers are not requested, and TFs focus almost exclusively on maneuver forces. Then they commit the maneuver forces to battle one company/team at a time. Rarely does more than one company/team mass fires on the enemy in force-on-force battles.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive time and place. " To mass is to hit the enemy with a closed fist, not poke at him with fingers of an open hand. Thus, mass seeks to smash the enemy, not sting him." -- FM 100-5, Operations, p. 2-4.

2. The BCT should plan to mass maneuver forces against parts of the enemy. They should try to determine what is the critical phase of the battle and then mass overwhelming combat power against the enemy at that time. They should plan to employ artillery, obstacles, CAS, attack aviation, and direct fires against the enemy in a synchronized fight. The BCT should make the resources available to the commander who can actually see the fight.

3. The TF should employ more than one company at a time against the enemy.

"There is a tendency in each separate unitto be a one-handed puncher, by that a rifleman wants to shoot, the tanker to charge, the artilleryman to fire . . . that is not the way to win battles. If the band played a piece first with the piccolo, then with the brass horn, then with the clarinet, and then with the trumpet, there would be a hell of al lot of noise but no music . . . to get harmony in battle, each weapon must support the other. Team play wins. You musicians of Mars must come into the concert at the proper place and at the proper time."

--GEN Patton

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 107
SUBJECT: Heavy-Light Integration

OBSERVATION (LTP): Brigade combat teams (BCTs) are having difficulty integrating the light battalion's planning cycle into their timeline.

DISCUSSION:

1. The light battalion frequently does not get the BCT's intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) products early enough to support their Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).

2. Brigade commanders are declaring themselves air assault task force commanders (AATFC) in according with doctrine. However, in reality, the light battalion's staff is doing the preponderance of the movement planning. This includes planning SEAD and CASEVAC, and producing the air movement table. All of this is time-consuming considering the light battalion may be simultaneously developing a truck movement plan, an R&S plan, and a ground maneuver plan.

3. Another issue is the employment of the light battalion in the BCT scheme of maneuver. The BCT seldom maximizes the capabilities of the light battalion. Most light battalions have been employed close to the line of departure (LD) or to an intermediate objective. There is an apparent lack of understanding regarding the use of light infantry to minimize risk. The BCT does not fully realize how a light infantry battalion can enhance their R&S capability.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. New doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures (DTTP) should be developed on liaison packages for BCT operations to answer questions such as, What does a BCT need as part of their staff to help with special MDMP requirements? Just like a division main CP has a SOCCE to help with the integration and tracking of special operations, a standardized liaison package for the BCT should be developed when they have attached a light force. This package consists of at least a captain and an SSG or SFC to assist in the MDMP and to help with movement planning for the light force.

2. The light battalion commander must make solid recommendations to the BCT on how his battalion should be employed. The light battalion commander needs to come face-to-face with the BCT commander at receipt of mission to understand his intent and to discuss a course of action.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 108
SUBJECT: Light-Heavy Operations

OBSERVATION (LTP): The light task force (TF) continues to have difficulty with planning for and employing OPCON'd heavy company teams.

DISCUSSION:

1. As part of mission analysis, the heavy company teams' capabilities and limitations are not being discussed in detail.

2. During course of action (COA) development, the resulting graphics have insufficient control measures to effectively integrate the heavy company team into the fight.

3. During wargaming, the TF staff usually does not sufficiently synchronize the heavy force. This is largely due to a lack of a heavy force participation in the wargame.

4. The TF commander usually does not understand how to properly set the conditions (smoke, breaching, suppression, and so forth) and maneuver the heavy force.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Include more tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) on light-heavy operations into the trend reversal classes and provide improved coaching of these considerations during MDMP.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 109
SUBJECT: Electronic Warfare (EW) Matrices

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Electronic warfare (EW) matrices are inadequate.

DISCUSSION:

1. The EW matrix is not tied to the brigade's decision points and critical enemy events. This results in a hit-and-miss collection and jamming success rate.

2. EW assets are not fully synchronized with the brigade combat team (BCT) plan.

3. Military intelligence (MI) companies routinely attend the wargame, but develop the EW matrix before the wargame begins. Synchronization of IEW assets in the wargame is critical in synthesizing the IEW effort to support the scheme of maneuver and the scheme of fires.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Develop a sound EW matrix with preplanned jump locations that are tied directly to clearly defined triggers during the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). The matrix must show the brigade's decision points and what actions each asset should take during the time leading up to and at the specified time/event.

2. Synchronize the EW matrix with the scheme of fires and correlate it directly with the high-payoff target list (HPTL).

(TA.4.5 Employ Tactical C2W)

TREND 110
SUBJECT: Electronic Attack (Jamming) Operations

OBSERVATION (Brigade Staff): Direction finding for electronic attack operations are at times nonexistent or nonsupportive.

DISCUSSION: TLQ-17s have not been a player in providing nonlethal SEAD in support of air insertions or attacks. When aggressively employed, direction finding significantly enhances the effectiveness of the TLQ-17s.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Include direction finding as part of the jamming effectiveness reporting tasking for the electronic attack plan. Start with sound electronic warfare (EW) baseline construction, an EW matrix, and asset placement at the planning stage. Make direction finding a continual process.

(TA.4.5 Employ Tactical C2W)

TA.4 Command and Control BOS Narrative, Part 1

Acknowledgements

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