Measuring Stability & Security in Iraq

March 2007
Report to Congress
In accordance with the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007
(Section 9010, Public Law 109-289)

¹ The information in this report has been made available with the assistance of many departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, the U.S. Embassy in Iraq, and the Government of Iraq. The report complements other reports and information about Iraq provided to Congress, and is not intended as a single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its Coalition partners, or Iraq.
² In early November 2006, Prime Minister Maliki scolded lawmakers in a closed session of the Council of Representatives and promised sweeping reforms of his cabinet. He also renounced militias on national television, saying, “There cannot be a government and militias together. One of the two should rule. I personally will not be in a government based on militias.”
³ Ibid.
⁴ National Intelligence Estimate: Prospects for Iraq’s Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead, January 2007, National Intelligence Council. www.dni.gov.
⁵ As of October 2006, of the 999 known MOI detention centers, 794 were reporting data on prisoners. On average, the reporting facilities were at 79% capacity. However, 51 of these jails were overcrowded, with the Attica jail in Qadisiyah being the most overcrowded, housing more than three detainees for every one bed it was designed to hold.
⁶ National Intelligence Estimate, January 2007.
⁷ Extracted from Davis, Jacquelyn K., Radical Islamist Ideologies and the Long War: Implications for U.S. Strategic Planning and U.S. Central Command’s Operations, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Washington, D.C. January 2007.
⁸ National Intelligence Estimate, January 2007.
⁹ Nationwide poll, December 2006: “Agree or disagree, violence is never justified even if the government does not meet your needs.” 81% agree and 11% disagree. Sample size: ~5,000. Margin of error: < 1.5%.
¹⁰ Nationwide poll, December 2006: “Agree or disagree, it is wrong to kill women and children even in jihad.” 94% agree and 3% disagree. Sample size: ~5,000. Margin of error: < 1.5%.
¹¹ Nationwide poll, December 2006: “Do you think the government of Iraq’s current policies to improve the security situation in Iraq are a step in the right or wrong direction?” Right direction: 44% Wrong direction: 42%. Sample size: ~5,000. Margin of error: <1.5%.
¹² Nationwide poll, December 2006: “Over the past three months would you say that conditions for peace and stability in Iraq have improved, worsened, or stayed the same?” Improved: 7% Worsened: 67% Stayed the same: 24%. Sample size: ~8,000. Margin of error: < 1.5%.
¹³ Nationwide poll, November-December 2006: “Agree or disagree, I personally can do nothing to stop the sectarian violence.” 65% agreed and 29% disagreed. Sample size: ~5,000. Margin of error: < 1.5%
¹⁴ Nationwide poll, January 2007: “On a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being high and 1 being low, how would you describe the tensions in your [country/neighborhood] today?” Country/neighborhood average: 7.99/3.61. See chart on page 21 for results. Sample size: ~12,000. Margin of error: < 1.5% nationwide, < 5% provincial.
¹⁵ Nationwide poll, December 2006: “Do you agree or disagree, militias should be dissolved.” 79% agree and 17% disagree. Sample size: ~12,000. Margin of error: < 1.5%.
¹⁶ Nationwide poll, December 2006: “On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being not very much and 10 being very much, how much do you blame militias for the violence in Iraq today?” 42% answered 10, 10% answered 9, and 8% answered 8. Sample size: ~12,000. Margin of error: < 1.5%.
¹⁷ Nationwide poll, October and December 2006: “In general, do you have confidence in the ability of the Iraqi government to protect you and your family from threat?” Yes, 36% and 48%, respectively. Sample size: ~8,000 (nationwide). Margin of error: < 1.5% (nationwide) and 2%-8% (provincial).
¹⁸ Nationwide poll, October and December 2006: “How much confidence do you have in the following to improve the situation: [Iraqi Army/Iraqi Police].” Percent answering a great deal or some for the Iraqi Army: Oct. 63% and Dec. 66%, for the Iraqi Police: Oct. 67% and Dec. 69%. Sample size: ~8,000. Margin of error: < 1.5%.
¹⁹ Some of these challenges are detailed in Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Report 06-032, “Iraq Security Forces: Review of Plans to Implement Logistics Capabilities,” October 28, 2006.
²⁰ This report and future reports will not discuss the Center for Dignitary Protection. MNSTC-I has completed its training goal and no longer has visibility on whether these personnel are serving. MNSTC-I continues to assist in training bodyguards for high-ranking GOI personnel.
²¹ This estimate is based on worldwide averages for police attrition with adjustment factors for conditions in Iraq. As described in the section on personnel accountability, no reliable data currently exist to validate present-for-duty strength.
²² This includes the approximately 137,000 authorization for the Objective Counter-Insurgency Force, approximately 12,000 authorization for the 10% manning increase for the Iraqi Army, and approximately 26,000 for the prime minister’s initiative to expand the military with new units.
²³ This is based on a total authorization support personnel of 14,673. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction report SIGIR-06-032, ISF: Review of Plans to Implement Logistics Capabilities notes that, “ . . . we calculated that between 37,800 and 44,500 personnel will be required for the total number of logistics units required by the Concept to support the Iraqi Army . . . . After reviewing a draft of this report, MNSTC-I officials provided information documenting that, as of September 30, 2006, a total of 42,900 ?support forces’ have been trained since 2004. This total includes not only logistics personnel but also military police and communications and administrative personnel.”