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Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq

March 2007
Report to Congress
In accordance with the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007
(Section 9010, Public Law 109-289)

2. Iraqi Security Forces Training and Performance

By the end of 2006, the United States and its Coalition partners met their force generation targets, while continuing their efforts to expand the size and capability of the ISF to meet emergent requirements. As of February 19, 2007, approximately 328,700 forces (not including replenishments) have been trained. The actual number of present-forduty soldiers is about one-half to two-thirds of the total due to scheduled leave, absence without leave, and attrition. The police have also experienced significant attrition of personnel who have been through Coalition training, but provincial and local governments have hired additional police outside the train-and-equip program. Both the MOD and the MOI have assumed control of most force generation tasks and have developed a plan to continue routine replenishment of the force. The table on this page depicts the number of ISF trained by Coalition forces since 2003.

2.1. Assessed Capabilities

As of February 19, 2007, there were 112 Iraqi Army combat battalions. One hundred three are conducting operations at varying levels of capability; an additional nine battalions are being generated. There are two Special Operations Battalions, both conducting operations. Of the 17 planned Strategic Infrastructure Battalions (SIBs), 14 are assessed as conducting operations at various levels. Of the 103 Iraqi Army combat battalions conducting operations, 93 have the lead in counter-insurgency operations in their areas of responsibility. Additionally, 27 National Police battalions are operational, with 6 in the lead. All but one of the National Police brigades are currently conducting security operations in Baghdad. A brigade-sized operational reserve consisting of a mechanized battalion from the Army, a National Police battalion, and a Special Forces company has been established

Current Number of Trained* Iraqi Security Forces

Logistics and Sustainment of Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior Forces

The most significant shortcoming in both MOD and MOI forces' capabilities is in planning and executing logistics and sustainment requirements. Factors underlying this deficiency include inadequate levels of sustainment stocks and limited capacity of the MOD and the MOI to execute the planning/ acquisition/sustainment cycle.19 DoD is addressing the challenges to reduce Iraqi reliance on U.S. support. For example, the 13th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) is partnered with Iraqi logistics units to assist in the development of Iraqi Army divisional support capabilities. Embedded civilian advisors are assisting senior MOD and MOI officials in developing their capacity to organize, train, equip, sustain, and upgrade their forces.

MOD Forces' Assessed Capabilities
MOI National Police Forces' Assessed Capabilities

Current Manning Initiatives

The generation of the Objective Counter-Insurgency and Civil Security Forces is complete. The GOI, with Coalition support, is now executing several manning initiatives to replenish the force to allow units to be temporarily relieved to refit and retrain, and to increase present-for-duty levels in combat units. These initiatives will add more than 60,000 personnel to the ISF during 2007. MNF-I estimates that the MOI will require 32,000 new police annually to replenish the ranks. Training bases are established and fully functioning to achieve these replenishment goals.

  • Replenishment of 30,000. MNSTC-I is funding the training and equipping of 30,000 soldiers to replace personnel losses and to increase the manning of combat units to 110% to improve present-for-duty strength.
  • Prime Minister's Army Expansion Initiative. In consultation with the U.S. Government, the GOI decided to increase the size of the Army by approximately 24,000 soldiers. The additional forces will increase the MOD's ability to command and control its forces, enhance its operational and tactical flexibility, and allow battle-weary units to be pulled off-line to retrain and refit. This GOI initiative also came with fiscal resources from the MOD budget.
  • Replenishment of National Police Brigades. The Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team (CPATT) is working to replenish all National Police units with personnel and key pacing items of equipment in support of the Baghdad Security Plan and Phase II training at Numaniyah.
  • Expansion of National Police to 10 Brigades. The CPATT is supporting the prime minister's initiative to build a multicomponent (Iraqi Army and National Police) division-sized force to protect the Samarra Shrine reconstruction project. The team is generating a 10th National Police Brigade in support of this effort.
  • Establishment of Three Emergency Response Unit Battalions in Anbar. The CPATT, in cooperation with the MOI and provincial authorities, is assisting with the training and equipping of three battalions of auxiliary policemen, to assist the Iraqi Police Service primarily in the greater Ramadi area. This is a very positive initiative to take advantage of increased Sunni participation in the police forces of Anbar Province.

Complexity of Personnel Management in Maturing Ministries

The security ministries continue to struggle with immature personnel management practices. Personnel strength reporting by Iraqi military and police units is assessed as weak. The primary shortfalls in the personnel management system are as follows.

  • Lack of Confidence in Retirement and Death Benefit Payments. The GOI is formulating a Retirement/Pensions Law. Until this legislation is in place and effective, the security ministries will continue to pay pensions and martyr pay. The current system is based on an upfront lump sum payment and a pension of 80% of the total basic pay and allowances. This provided adequate financial support to families. These benefits have received significant attention from the MOI, and potential changes that would have undermined these initiatives have been strongly resisted. This effectively means that the MOI's employment rolls are enlarged; this is currently seen as being the most effective means of "looking after their own."
  • Wounded Remaining on the Rolls. The MOI and the MOD are in the process of developing an effective system to care for severely wounded soldiers and policemen. Like those killed in action, many wounded remain on the rolls in order to receive medical care and financial compensation. The MOD recently created medical "follow-up" units across the country. These units are holding companies to which severely wounded soldiers are assigned. This allows soldiers who are physically incapable of conducting their duties to be dropped from their unit rolls while still retaining pay and benefits. A similar plan will be implemented in the MOI.
  • Corruption. Corruption remains a factor at both the unit and ministerial level. In the personnel system, the Ministers of Defense and Interior are aware of "ghost" soldiers and policemen who exist only on the rolls. By maintaining these soldiers and policeman on their roles, units are able to receive additional resources based on per capita planning factors. Additionally, corrupt leaders often collect pay and other compensation designated for these soldiers and policemen. The ministries have made significant strides in reducing corruption within the personnel and pay systems and are well along in the automation of these systems to reduce corruption further and to tackle the absenteeism resulting from soldiers leaving their units to deliver their pay in cash to their families in their home districts.

2.2. Ministry of Interior

MOI forces consist of the Iraqi Police Service, the National Police, the Directorate of Border Enforcement, and other, smaller forces.20 MNSTC-I has completed its initial training and equipping goal for the Objective Civil Security Force (OCSF) of 188,300 MOI security forces and is in the process of expanding the MOI forces to 194,800. Although the MOI is implementing an automated personnel management system, there are currently no reliable data to indicate how many of the OCSF are still serving with the MOI. Additionally, the MOI has hired a significant number of police beyond those trained by MNSTC-I. MNSTC-I estimates attrition for the MOI as approximately 20% per year, with the Iraqi Police Service and the National Police attrition remaining higher than the Directorate of Border Enforcement and other personnel due to the variance of risks in the duties.21

2.2.1. Ministry of Interior Capacity Development

Embedded transition teams continue to report modest improvements in the MOI's ability to perform key ministry functions, such as developing and implementing plans and policies, intelligence, personnel management, logistics, communications, and budgeting. MNSTC-I assesses MOI as being partly effective. As was described in the November 2006 report, the CPATT's MOI Transition Team works with the MOI on developing and assessing these capabilities. The MOI Transition Team is composed of slightly more than 100 advisors.

Life Support, Logistics, and Accountability

Ammunition. On January 15, 2007, the responsibility for ammunition procurement, storage, and distribution for MOI forces was transferred from Coalition forces to MOI headquarters. The first of three ammunition deliveries to the MOI headquarters has occurred. Storage space, material handling equipment, and request quantities continue to be challenges. Future ammunition purchases through Foreign Military Sales will potentially resolve quantity issues.

Warehousing. Three warehouses at the Baghdad Police College (BPC) transferred to the MOI Director of Logistics on January 13, 2007. One warehouse has the capability to be used as an armory, providing the MOI headquarters with additional storage space for weapons and ammunition. The Director of Logistics has a staff prepared to assume responsibility for warehouse operations.

Vehicles. The MOI is initiating actions for oversight and policy for maintenance and vehicles (acquisition and distribution). To offset MOI headquarters' limited control over the provinces, the MOI plans to centralize the purchase of both vehicles and parts. Provincial independence; lack of trained mechanics, manuals, special tools, repair parts, and adequate maintenance facilities; and the current security situation have hampered this effort. The GOI is purchasing limited numbers of small non-American-manufactured vehicles with its own budget.

Fuel. Shortfalls of adequate fuel continue to hinder mission performance. To correct this, the MOI established a Fuel Management Office under the Director of Vehicles. This office continues to refine fuel allocation, request, and distribution issues.

Life Support. Life support contracts for eight Iraqi Police Academies transitioned to the MOI on December 31, 2006. This brings the total number of contracts transitioned to the GOI in 2006 to 18, valued at US$195 million. Efforts are under way to establish an MOI reporting mechanism to assess the quality of life support services at the academies following transition from the Coalition forces.

Personnel Management. The MOI does not yet have accurate personnel accountability and reporting procedures, and it is unknown how many of the more than 306,000 employees on the ministry's payroll are present for duty on a given day. MNSTC-I estimates that, on an average day, less than 70% of MOI personnel are present for duty. This is a combination of authorized absences (leave, school, sickness) and unauthorized absences. The problem of personnel accountability is being addressed through the purchase of an automated human resources and payroll system. The equipment and software for this system were installed in January 2007, and training has begun. Full deployment of the system is expected to take 18 months. Once complete, the personnel management system will be integrated fully with employee biometrics, improving the accuracy of employment rosters and facilitating employee criminal background screening.

Equipment Accountability. Due to decentralized control and funding of elements that comprise the MOI, there is no standardized unit equipment accountability procedure. The responsibility for proper equipment accountability is delegated to the subordinate organizations, with most elements maintaining equipment accountability through the use of hand receipts and manual ledgers.

Financial Accountability. Certain functional areas of the MOI operate under an assortment of financial authorities intended for a command- and-control structure that no longer exists. In this uncertain regulatory environment, proper financial reporting is inconsistent and results in difficulty for the MOI to budget centrally and execute funds effectively and transparently. Nevertheless, budget execution under Minister of Interior Jawad al-Bolani is improving and the Foreign Military Sales program will mitigate some of the risk of mismanagement in this area.

Command and Control. The MOI Transition Team is focusing on developing the minister's ability to delineate authority, responsibility, and accountability clearly throughout the MOI. The chain of command is relatively clear and effective for National Police and Border Forces. However, command and control for the provincial police is unclear. The decentralized nature of the Iraqi Police Service often results in conflicting guidance and directives coming simultaneously from the central ministry and the provincial government.

Internal Audit Functions

The Audit Department within the MOI falls under the Inspector General's (IG) office. Per Coalition Provisional Authority Order 57, the Audit Department is responsible for audits of the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of the ministry's operations and facilities. Currently, audit functions conducted for the Iraqi Police Service and the National Police are done via a separate audit element that reports directly to the Minister of Interior. The Office of the Director General for Audits provides a person to fill the audit function with that element.

During the fourth quarter of 2006, the MOI IG focused on improving MOI's internal capacity to identify, deter, and prevent corruption. Recent funding approval by the Ministry of Finance for increased force structure enabled the IG to embark on planning efforts to increase the number of employees by 1,000 individuals during 2007. These resources will significantly improve the IG's ability to evaluate and report independently on the performance of MOI programs and operations throughout Iraq. For the first time, the IG has developed an Annual Inspection Plan aimed at formalizing the use of IG special inspection committees to conduct inspections of pre-selected MOI organizations throughout Iraq based on approved inspection checklists. Additionally, the IG formalized a professional development program for serving IG employees and expanded the core Program of Instruction for basic training of IGs. During this period, the IG increased its number of trained investigators from 81 to 125, to include employees serving in outlying provinces.

From January 1, 2006, through December 31, 2006, MOI Internal Affairs opened 3,403 corruption-related investigations. Of these, 775 (22%) resulted in disciplinary punishment, 312 (9%) were forwarded to the Commission of Public Integrity or to a court for subsequent adjudication, 49 (1.5%) were closed because of insufficient evidence, and 106 (3%) were handled as internal MOI discipline. The other 2,161 (63%) remain open pending judicial review, ministerial review, or the completion of further investigation by Internal Affairs.

The Internal Affairs Directorate conducted 249 human rights-related investigations. Of these, 76 (30%) resulted in disciplinary punishment and 10 (4%) were closed because of insufficient evidence. The other 163 (65%) remain open pending judicial review, ministerial review, or further investigation. In 2006, Internal Affairs initiated a specialized training curriculum tailored to the needs of the Internal Affairs investigators. Through December 31, 2006, 915 of 1,250 full-time employees (73%) had received specialized training. Training will continue until all Internal Affairs Officers have graduated from this training course. Additionally, the Automated Fingerprint Identification Project identified 3,371 cases of employees making a false application for employment to the MOI or having a criminal history. This resulted in 1,383 dismissals during 2006.

2006 MOI Internal Affairs Investigations by Outcome

Sectarian Issues at the Ministry of Interior

The Iraqi Police Service is generally representative of the demographic makeup of its neighborhoods, although there are some neighborhoods in Baghdad and other cities where the percentage of Shi'a in the Iraqi Police Service is disproportionately high. Initial estimates, compiled during implementation of the National Police Transformation and Retraining program in late 2006, show that the National Police are disproportionately Shi'a. The U.S. Government is committed to helping the GOI create an MOI that reflects the diversity of the Iraqi people. The goal is to create ethnically integrated units at the national level, while still allowing local police to reflect the ethnic composition of the communities in which they serve. MNSTC-I continues to advocate recruiting initiatives targeting Sunnis to improve diversity and to provide a force that will impart even-handed law enforcement.

Foreign/Political/Militia Influence

Corruption, illegal activity, and sectarian influence constrain progress in developing MOI forces. Although the primary concern of the GOI remains the Sunni insurgency, tolerance of and influence exerted by Shi'a militia members within the MOI are troubling. Militia influence affects every component of the MOI, particularly in Baghdad and several other key cities. Recruits take an oath of office denouncing militia influence and pledging allegiance to Iraq's constitution. Whenever actionable evidence is found, it is acted on by the MOI Internal Affairs Directorate and the minister.

2.2.2. Iraqi Police Service

The Iraqi Police Service is composed of patrol, traffic, station, and highway police, as well as specialists, such as forensic specialists, assigned throughout Iraq's 18 provinces. Its mission is to enforce the law, safeguard the public, and provide internal security at the local level. The Iraqi Police Service constitutes the majority of MOI forces.

Iraqi Police Service Training and Personnel

CPATT has met the nationwide OCSF goal of training 135,000 Iraqi Police Service personnel. However, distribution of that 135,000 has not been according to original program goals, leaving some provinces with more than their programmed allocation and some with less. Basic training continues in those provinces still working to meet their individual requirements. CPATT is working with the MOI to build institutional capacity and to identify annual requirements for force sustainment, reconciling anticipated annual requirements with institutional capacity.

To meet local needs and dynamic requirements, the MOI authorized provincial governors to hire additional Iraqi Police Service officers, but the MOI and the governors are responsible for the additional officers' equipment and training. Every province, except Anbar, has more personnel than agreed. However, many of these additional police are put on the job with minimal or no training. As the Coalition transfers the institutional training base to MOI control, training of these "extra" local police will continue.

As of December 31, 2006, the majority of Iraqi Police academies had transitioned to Iraqi control. The two exceptions are the BPC and the Jordan International Police Training Center. For all academies, the administration and instruction functions transferred with relative ease. Operational control of the BPC was turned over to the MOI in 2006. Life support for the BPC will transition to the MOI this quarter. Because sufficient training capacity exists inside Iraq, the Jordan International Police Training Center is scheduled to cease basic-level training by March 2007, although the Department of State is looking at options to keep it open, to train limited numbers of Iraqi police officers in leadership and specialized courses, after DoD funding for the facility ends.

Iraqi Police Service Equipment

For Baghdad and nine other key cities, 100% of authorized vehicles and weapons have been delivered to the police. Overall, the Iraqi Police Service has received approximately 83% of authorized critical equipment and is expected to receive 100% by the summer of 2007.

Due to the immaturity of the MOI's equipment accountability system, there are no reliable figures on how much of this equipment remains in service, nor is it known how much equipment the MOI has purchased for additional Iraqi Police Service staff and for staff authorized by provincial governors. The most accurate reports on equipment quantities and serviceability are provided by MNC-I through the Police Transition Teams (PTTs). MNSTC-I continues to work with the Iraqi Police Service to implement standardized reporting and tracking processes and mechanisms. In conjunction with MNSTC-I, the MOI is developing a comprehensive procurement plan to ensure that MNSTC-I funds and MOI equipping funds are spent coherently.

Iraqi Police Service Operations and Mentoring

There are 203 field-deployed PTTs (10 Provincial, 44 District, and 149 Station) assisting the development of the Iraqi Police Service. Each team has approximately 11-15 members; 3 or 4 members of each team are International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs) hired as contractors by the Department of State, and the rest are typically military personnel, most of whom are Military Police. IPLOs provide civilian law enforcement expertise in technical aspects of criminal investigation and police station management. To conduct their missions, PTTs travel to stations to coach the Iraqi police and to conduct joint patrols with them. These joint PTT/Iraqi Police Service patrols promote active community policing and work to improve the reputation of the police among the Iraqi people.

Each month, MNC-I uses PTTs to assess the operational readiness of a portion of the police forces using the Transition Readiness Assessment process. This process evaluates the ability of the police to perform core functions required for effective law enforcement and community policing. Key assessment criteria include manning, leadership, training level, equipment, facilities status, force protection measures, and station ability to conduct independent operations. Cost and risk preclude deploying enough PTTs to cover all of Iraq's police stations; at any time, only 5 of Iraq's 18 provinces have sufficient PTTs to conduct the full range of activities described above. Continued PTT presence and participation at Iraqi Police Service stations are needed to improve police readiness and to sustain progress in reforming community policing.

Iraqi Police Service Recruiting and Vetting

The Iraqi Police Service screened more than 280,000 MOI employees, checking fingerprints against Ba'ath Party and Saddam-era criminal records. Of these, 8,000 were reported as possible derogatory matches, 1,228 employees were dismissed, and 2,143 were identified in late December 2006 and are pending dismissal. More than 58,000 police candidates have been screened for literacy, 73% of whom passed and were allowed to enter basic training.

Iraqi Police Service Quicklook Inspection Program

A Coalition-initiated, MOI-led Iraqi Police Reform Program called Quicklook was launched in December 2006 to review all aspects of performance and effectiveness of Iraqi police stations, beginning in Baghdad. This program consists of stations visits by the MOI team, composed of representatives of Police Affairs, Internal Affairs, Human Resource, Training, and Administrative directorates, and complemented by the local PTT, which provides both inspection preparation and on-site security. The team gauges the reliability of police forces as well as the more traditional readiness metrics involving manning, equipping, and facilities. As of February 1, 2007, the team had inspected nine stations. The Baghdad portion of the program will take 3-4 months and will lead to a joint report with recommendations for addressing identified shortfalls and deficiencies. Once completed in Baghdad, this program will be expanded to all of Iraq's police stations. MNSTC-I assesses that the MOI team is doing a good job holding the station and station commanders to the inspection standards.

Iraqi Police Service Leadership Training

The Iraqi Police Service has three 2-week leadership courses to improve the quality of its leaders. The First Line Supervisor Course is designed for company-grade officers; the Intermediate-Level Course is designed for field-grade officers; and the Senior-Level Course is designed for general officers. Courses cover topics ranging from management to ethics to field training. To date, 691 officers have completed the First Line Supervisor Course; 690 officers have completed the Intermediate-Level Course; and 606 officers have completed the Senior-Level Course.

The MOI's Intermediate Staff Officers Course, started in September 2006, teaches senior lieutenants and junior captains staff operational functions. To date, 14 officers have completed this course. The Advanced Staff Officers Course, which began in November 2006, teaches senior captains and majors field-grade staff functions. The Senior Staff Officers Course and the Executive Officers Course-designed for colonels and generals-are scheduled to begin in early 2007.

2.2.3. National Police

The National Police is a bridging force between the local police and the Iraqi Army, allowing the Minister of Interior to project police capabilities across provinces. The National Police is also charged with maintaining law and order while an effective community police force is developed. Until October 2006, the National Police was trained and served primarily in a paramilitary role and had received little traditional police training. MNSTC-I is implementing a National Police Transformation and Retraining Program to reorient it toward police functions.

National Police Training and Personnel

As of February 19, 2007, 24,400 National Police have completed entry-level training, meeting the OCSF goal of 24,400. The prime minister has announced a plan to expand the National Police by three battalions. This will bring the authorized strength of the National Police to 26,900.

National Police Equipment

The National Police was issued all of its key authorized equipment by the end of December 2006. MNSTC-I tracks the end-items issued to the National Police and relies on National Police Transition Teams (NPTTs) to report periodically on the status of that equipment. The MOI is responsible for equipping National Police hired in excess of the agreed authorization, although CPATT provides additional uniforms and key equipment to National Police units as they rotate through the Phase II program at Numaniyah.

During this reporting period, Iraqi and Coalition forces leadership emphasized National Police property and personnel accountability via the Quicklook program. The MOI Administration and Vehicles Directorates are making measurable improvements in property accountability policies and processes. The Administration Directorate developed and staffed an electronic data repository to track and account for items issued. This database will continue to be backed up by hard copies of supply transactions until more robust and stable electronic media, such as the e-ministry program, are available. The Vehicles Directorate is initiating an electronic database to track vehicles. Both directorates are writing policies and documenting accountability processes to enable future compliance audits of their activities.

National Police Operations

Currently, all but one of the National Police brigades not enrolled in the National Police Transformation and Retraining program are conducting counter-insurgency operations to support the Baghdad Security Plan. Two National Police battalions were assigned security lead for their areas of responsibility within Baghdad. One battalion has been designated as part of the prime minister's operational reserve, and an additional (10th) National Police brigade has been requested by the prime minister to provide security to the Samarra Shrine reconstruction project. Thirty-nine NPTTs now support the development of National Police units by mentoring, training, and facilitating communication with Coalition forces. NPTTs assess the readiness and operational capability of the National Police, similar to the tasks performed by Military Transition Teams with Iraqi Army units.

National Police Recruiting and Vetting

The MOI is responsible for recruiting and vetting the National Police force, assisted by Coalition forces advisors. Extensive re-vetting of serving National Police is part of the Phase II program at Numaniyah. This incorporates identification checks, fingerprints, a literacy test, and criminal intelligence background checks. New recruits will be vetted in the manner described above and approved prior to undergoing any training. A vetting committee, consisting of senior National Police leaders and MOI officials, has been set up at Camp Solidarity.

2.2.4. Directorate of Border Enforcement and Directorate of Ports of Entry

The Directorate of Border Enforcement (DBE) and the Directorate of Ports of Entry (POE) are charged collectively with controlling and protecting Iraq's borders. The DBE is organized into 5 regions, 12 brigades, and 38 battalions, and includes forces that man 420 border posts and forts, of which the Coalition has funded 258. There are 17 land border Ports of Entry, 4 sea Ports of Entry, and 4 air Ports of Entry.

DBE Training and Personnel

MNSTC-I has trained 28,400 DBE and POE personnel, meeting the OCSF goal. As elsewhere in the MOI, Border Forces payroll exceeds its authorized initial training objective. Overstrength regional and brigade-level headquarters continue to divert personnel away from border forts and POEs. The DBE has begun cross-leveling of excess personnel, and current staffing levels at POEs are sufficient. Promotion opportunities across DBE and POE units are improving, and there have been fewer pay problems. There are still discrepancies between MOI payroll numbers and actual assigned strength. The Iraqi leadership is addressing these issues through official investigations.

DBE and POE Operations

The DBE is supported by 28 Coalition Border Transition Teams (BTTs). The 11-man BTTs mentor and support the development of the border units. Additionally, four 3-man Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Border Support Teams mentor and monitor Border Enforcement personnel at critical POEs. The BTTs and the Border Support Teams are essential to the development of the DBE and POEs. The CPATT, in coordination with DHS and the Department of State, is developing a program to enhance transition teams at all DBE headquarters, academies, BTTs, and POEs, with contracted civilian subject matter experts.

The DBE is in the lead on Iraq's borders, backed up by Iraqi Army units in accordance with an MOI/MOD Memorandum of Understanding that was signed in January 2007. All Coalition-planned border forts are completed. Refurbishing headquarters buildings and assignment of trained border police are complete. Seventy-nine percent of the authorized critical equipment for DBE and 61% for land POEs have been issued. Remaining issuance of equipment, logistics facilities, and other infrastructure will continue throughout 2007. The MOI has reduced the numbers of legal POEs in an effort to concentrate on the readiness for those border crossings that remain open, and, since the last report, DBE and POE units have improved in Transition Readiness Assessment progression.

2.2.5. Facilities Protection Service

The Facilities Protection Service (FPS) is a decentralized group of security guards who protect GOI buildings and act as personal security details to protect government ministry officials. Each ministry controls its own force of FPS personnel. Although they share the same name, FPS personnel are not a coherent force. More than 150,000 personnel work for 27 ministries and 8 independent directorates, with half of the FPS personnel working in Baghdad. The MOI's FPS continues to have better regulation, training, and discipline than do FPS staff of other ministries, and a higher proportion of them-possibly half-have completed the FPS basic training course.

There continues to be evidence that FPS personnel are unreliable and, in some cases, responsible for violent crimes and other illegal activity. On December 27, 2006, the prime minister signed a consolidation directive that provided instructions placing all FPS personnel under the Minister of Interior and ordered the transfer of money for salaries to the MOI budget. The directive maintained the separation of the Ministry of Oil, the Ministry of Electricity, and the Higher Juridical Council forces. The MOI has a plan to assess the current state of these forces and implement the consolidation, including standardizing training, equipment, uniforms, and procedures.

2.3. Ministry of Defense

The Iraqi MOD forces consist of the Joint Headquarters (JHQ), the IGFC, the Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF), the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy (including Marines). The Iraqi military has an authorized strength of approximately 175,000 personnel,22 and is centered on an Army with nine infantry divisions, one mechanized infantry division, and associated combat support/combat support units. Two additional infantry divisions are in development as part of Prime Minister Maliki's Expansion Plan. The Iraqi Air Force consists of six squadrons; the Navy has two squadrons and a Marine battalion. The Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command Headquarters reached initial operating capability in July 2006 and will eventually command and control all Iraqi institutional training facilities. The Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command, under the direct command of the JHQ, consists of the Tactical Training Command and the National Defense University. The Tactical Training Command will begin to assume control of the institutional tactical training facilities-six Regional Training Centers and three Iraqi Training Battalions-in 2007. The National Defense University has reached initial operating capability and has started to operate institutions of professional development (e.g., Iraqi Staff Colleges, the National Defense College, and the Strategic Studies Institute).

As reported in November 2006, the JHQ assumed control of the IGFC, which, in turn, assumed operational control of five divisions from Coalition forces. Since November 2006, the IGFC has assumed operational control of three more divisions. By June 2007, it is expected that the IGFC will gain operational control of all divisions. Embedded Coalition advisors continue to assist in the development of JHQ and IGFC command-and-control capabilities.

The total number of trained-and-equipped MOD military personnel is about 136,400 (not including replacements), of which about 132,800 are in the Iraqi Army.23 For fielded units, about 65% of authorized personnel are present for duty at any time; this percentage varies widely among units. The greatest contributor to the difference between authorized strength and present-for-duty strength is a leave policy that places about one-quarter of all soldiers on leave at any time so that they can take their pay home to their families. This is driven by the lack of a nationwide banking system. In addition, since the first Iraqi Army combat units entered into service in November 2003, more than 20,000 personnel have been killed or severely wounded or have otherwise left the Army. The MOD is planning on replacing and expanding the overall force structure with a 30,000-person Replenishment Initiative, organized and implemented by the Iraqi JHQ. This initiative will add approximately 10,000 soldiers every two months over six months and will result in all combat units manned at 110%. The MOD has completed recruiting for this initiative, and the first training sessions began on October 1, 2006. About 44% of the 30,000-soldier expansion is complete.

2.3.1. Ministry of Defense Capacity Development

Embedded transition teams continue to provide monthly Transition Readiness Assessments. The assessments measure personnel manning, command and control, training, sustainment, logistics, equipping, and leadership of their partnered Iraqi units. These categories are assessed using both quantitative and qualitative metrics. Overall, the MOD is assessed as being partly effective at managing these functions.

The Minister of Defense has had some success in stabilizing the MOD, which suffered through a string of assassinations, widespread intimidation and death threats against employees, and a major corruption scandal in the year following its establishment in March 2004. The current minister recognizes the importance of forging a close partnership with the Coalition and is emphasizing joint initiatives, such as force replenishment, generation, and deployability. MOD's capacity to determine priorities and translate them into procurement requirements is improving.

Combat Operations (Company level and above)

However, competence levels in certain parts of the MOD remain low. The MOD suffers from a lack of strategic policy development and implementation and an inefficient procurement and budgeting process. A culture of distrust coupled with incompetence in certain key areas has made committing and obligating funds very difficult. The Coalition's MOD Transition Team is providing mentoring support to all senior MOD officials in developing their capacity to manage key ministerial functions, such as personnel management, budgeting, logistics, intelligence and security, acquisitions and contracting, plans and policies, communications, and inspections and investigations. The current MOD team consists of approximately 50 advisors as well as 6 U.S. military personnel advising MOD civilians and 12 civilian advisors from other Coalition countries. There are no U.S. Government civilian advisors at the MOD, which is problematic in that MOD civilians are not provided direct mentorship by their U.S. counterparts. A similarly scaled effort occurs at the JHQ, with U.S. military personnel comprising about half of the advisors and the rest roughly split between U.S. civilian contractors and military personnel from other Coalition countries.

Force Generation

Force generation of Iraqi Army units is increasingly focused on combat enablers and logistics. Three Iraqi Training Battalions are formed and fully operational. These battalions allow the Iraqis to train soldiers, independent of Coalition support, in sufficient quantities for force generation and replacement needs. New recruits attend a 13-week program of basic instruction. Upon graduation, soldiers receive additional training specific to their military occupation. Depending on their military skill, the length of training ranges from three to seven weeks. Other training institutions, such as the Military Intelligence School, the Signal School, the Bomb Disposal School, the Combat Arms School, the Engineer School, and the Military Police School, contribute to the growing professionalism of the Iraqi Army by teaching diverse specialties necessary to execute counter-insurgency operations.

Logistics and Sustainment

MOD logistics and sustainment is still a relatively immature system that requires significant Coalition assistance, especially in warehouse/depot operations and transportation. Development and implementation of MOD strategic logistics policy is particularly immature. The Iraqi Army has been slow to support sustainment, and there is limited indigenous capability and capacity to replace battle-damaged equipment. MNSTC-I has oversight of approximately 60 transition teams (of the 400 total teams for the MOD and the MOI) assigned to assist in logistics and sustainment issues. Throughout 2007, the focus will be on developing the areas of fuel, maintenance, budget, sustainment, ammunition, medical equipment and supply accountability, and national warehouse. Coalition forces continue to provide Combat Service Support by backstopping life support and fuel during times of emergency. In April 2006, the MOD assumed management of life support and its contracts, but Coalition forces are still assisting in extremis. Overall, support to the Iraqi Army provided by Coalition forces has decreased dramatically.

Approximately 90% of the planned Headquarters and Service Companies have been formed and are at some level of operational capability. MNSTC-I has distributed all key equipment to the Headquarters and Service Companies. Although the Headquarters and Service Companies are gaining some capability, Coalition forces and MNC-I logistics units will continue partnering and mentoring them as they assume their roles and in case of emergency or failure within the new Iraqi logistics system.

Planning and Coordination

The MOD and the JHQ are developing processes to reduce the reliance on MNF-I to direct, support, and sustain MOD forces. The transition of Iraqi Army divisions and the IGFC to MOD control marks the first time since the removal of the former regime that any Iraqi Army combat forces are under complete Iraqi command and control.

The transition also means that the MOD, through the JHQ, has assumed responsibility for support and sustainment planning for these divisions as well as for forces transferring to JHQ command and control in the future. The JHQ planning and coordination processes are immature and are currently hampered by bureaucracy, lack of trust and understanding, lack of experience with strategic planning, and dependence on Coalition support and funding.

Equipment Status

The focus of the Iraqi Army's train-and-equip effort shifted during this reporting period toward building combat support and combat service support forces.

The Iraqi armed forces were issued 100% of individual authorized items by the end of 2006. However, there is a problem with cross-leveling between and within units that leads to shortages in some subordinate units. Equipment accountability is improving; however, it is still at a level below that desired by the Coalition or by the GOI. MNSTC-I and the GOI are now issuing other missioncritical items to the Iraqi armed forces, such as up-armored HMMWVs, wheeled APCs, heavy machine guns, and fuel trucks. MNSTC-I is currently working with the MOD to transfer maintenance capabilities to the Iraqi Army. The MOD will fund a contract through a Foreign Military Sales sustainment case planned to start on April 1, 2007. This contract will be monitored by a joint Iraqi/Coalition forces board that will determine when the transition requirements have been met. The MOD agreed, in principle, to fund the National Maintenance Contract from spring 2007 through March 2008 using a Foreign Military Sales case. Total cost of the maintenance support contracts to be assumed by the MOD is estimated to be US$160 million.


The institutional training base accounts for basic and military occupational specialty training for soldier, squad leader, and platoon sergeant courses for non-commissioned officers, and initial-entry cadet and staff officer training for the officer corps. As these personnel move to their units, embedded transition teams and partner units directed by MNC-I oversee and mentor collective training in counter-insurgency-oriented missionessential tasks. A unit's ability to demonstrate proficiency in these mission-essential tasks contributes to its overall Transition Readiness Assessment, which is validated prior to the unit assuming lead in its area of responsibility. The high operational tempo faced by many units makes it difficult to sustain this initial training proficiency. This is particularly true in the area of logistics specialty training. Approximately 2,500 additional personnel are needed to allow both daily operations and focused training at the smallunit level.


Across the Iraqi Army, Iraqi divisions facing sustained combat operations within their normal operational area report absentwithout- leave rates to be between 5% and 8%. Passage of the Military Court Procedures Law on January 24, 2007, will provide Iraqi commanders with a tool to deal fairly and effectively with absenteeism and desertion.


As a result of the inability of the Iraqi Army to deploy units to Baghdad in August 2006, the Minister of Defense formed a committee to determine how to improve the deployability of the Iraqi Army. The recommendation of the committee was to identify a battalion from each Iraqi Army Division to serve as the rapid deployment force for that division, and provide incentive pay for soldiers who volunteer to serve in this elite battalion. To increase the predictability of deployments for soldiers, the committee also recommended a four-phase, 150-day deployment cycle that all units complete prior to movement from their home base. In February, five of the seven battalions recently ordered to Baghdad were successfully deployed, with the rest expected within the month.

Sectarian Issues in Recruitment

The Coalition and the GOI are committed to creating an Iraqi military that reflects the ethnic and religious fabric of Iraq, with diverse units loyal to the nation, not to sectarian interests. Although competence and merit are deciding factors when selecting recruits and leaders, ISF units mirror the demographic make-up of Iraq generally. The evennumbered divisions were assembled from former Iraqi National Guard battalions and tend to resemble the demographics of communities from which they were recruited. The odd-numbered divisions were nationally recruited and represent the national fabric. The Minister of Defense, through an Officer Selection Committee, has used normal transitions to diversify the senior leadership in the Iraqi Army. There are, however, indications that political forces in Iraq have influenced senior military appointments on the basis of sectarian affiliation. MNF-I and U.S. Embassy Baghdad are working closely with the GOI to discourage sectarian influences in the senior ranks and to encourage a balanced representation in leadership. The GOI is considering other methods to balance representation across the entire Army, Navy, and Air Force.

2.3.2. Army

The Iraqi Army is central to MOD counterinsurgency operations and strategy. The Army component of the Objective Counter- Insurgency Force consists of 131,300 soldiers and officers in 36 brigades and 112 battalions. The Prime Minister's Expansion Plan increases the Army by 2 division HQs, 6 brigade HQs, and 24 battalions. Nine Motorized Transportation Regiments (MTRs), 4 logistics battalions, 2 support battalions, 5 Regional Support Units, and 80 Garrison Support Units provide logistics and support for divisions, with Taji National Depot providing depot-level maintenance and re-supply. Headquarters and Service Companies provide logistical and maintenance support for each battalion, brigade, and division. The Army also supports a Special Operations Forces Brigade and 3 Strategic Infrastructure Brigade headquarters commanding 17 SIBs. Efforts to improve the capability of these units are led by Military Transition Teams, with U.S. and other Coalition officers and soldiers embedded in each battalion, brigade, and division headquarters; at IGFC headquarters; and at JHQ.

By the end of 2006, the last two MTRs were generated and released to MNC-I. Although lack of trained maintenance personnel and equipment has delayed full capability, the MTRs provide mobility and sustainment for Iraqi forces.

2.3.3. Iraqi National Counter-Terror Capability

Implementation of the national counterterrorism capability concept, approved by the prime minister on October 10, 2006, is on schedule for Initial Operational Capability in March 2007 and Full Operational Capability in December 2007. In March 2007, Iraqi personnel will occupy positions within each Counter-Terrorism headquarters and will begin operations and training.

Full Operational Capability consists of three complementary components:

  • Development of a national Bureau of Counter-Terrorism, separate from the ministries, that serves as the principal advisor to the prime minister on counterterrorism matters
  • Establishment of a coherent, nonsectarian, counter-terrorism "tiering" strategy that determines the level of the terrorist threat, assigns appropriate responsibility for action, and defines approval authority for execution; this strategy was established as part of the overall counter-terrorism concept
  • Establishment of a separate major command, equivalent to the ground, air, and naval forces commands, that provides support to the Bureau of Counter-Terrorism in intelligence and targeting areas

2.3.4. Special Operations Forces

The ISOF Brigade is the operational component of the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Command and is composed of approximately 1,500 soldiers organized into a counterterrorism battalion, a commando battalion, a support battalion, and a special reconnaissance unit. A key component in developing an Iraqi counter-terrorism capability is the expansion of the ISOF Brigade. This expansion will include an additional commando battalion with forward-based commando companies in Basrah, Mosul, and Al Asad.

2.3.5. Navy

The Iraqi Navy has approximately 1,100 trained-and-equipped sailors and marines organized into an operational headquarters, two afloat squadrons, and five Marine companies that are stationed for point defense of the offshore oil platforms together with Coalition forces. It will grow to 2,500 personnel as the acquisition program progresses. The expansion will include the procurement of 21 naval vessels, 2 offshore support vessels, and a number of small vessels. A contract for the purchase of the offshore vessels and several of the small vessels is complete, with an anticipated in-service date of February to December 2008. A contract for the four patrol ships has also been completed, with in-service dates starting in April 2007. Notably, all contracts were completed using Iraqi processes and money.

The Iraqi Navy faces significant challenges in meeting the individual and collective training needs for its ambitious acquisition program, including the leadership development of midgrade officers and technical skills of sailors. Training efforts include mentorship conducted by the Naval Transition Team and active skills training conducted by Coalition Navy, Marine, and Coast Guard forces. Infrastructure development will remain the main effort throughout 2007. Naval planning is maturing and coherent across acquisition, training, and infrastructure lines of development out to 2010.

2.3.6. Air Force

The Iraqi Air Force is organized and equipped for counter-insurgency operations. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft are currently located at Kirkuk Air Base (3rd Squadron with four SAMA CH-2000s) and Basrah Air Base (70th Squadron with four SAMA CH-2000s and two Sea Bird Seeker SB7L-360s). Each unit performs daily operational missions that collect intelligence for Iraqi and Coalition forces. The intelligence gathered during daily flights has provided timely evidence of perimeter security breaches and infiltration by insurgent forces. As described in the previous report, Iraq's capabilities to conduct airborne ISR are being developed with procurements of interim and advanced aircraft platforms.

The fielding of rotary-wing aircraft continues. The first 10 of 28 Mi-17 helicopters that MOD procured were delivered to the Iraqi Air Force. The MOD is also modifying 16 UH-1s donated by Jordan to UH-IIs; delivery is expected to be completed by April. The squadron receiving these UH-IIs will primarily conduct casualty evacuation and is expected to reach initial operational capability by the third quarter of FY07.

The 23rd Squadron at New Al Muthanna Air Base has three C-130E aircraft. Consistent with the Coalition Air Force Transition Team's force generation plan, the Iraqi Air Force intends to request an additional three Excess Defense Article C-130s from the U.S. Government to bring the squadron size to six.

There are currently more than 900 personnel in the Iraqi Air Force. Development plans call for a concentrated recruitment effort over the next 12 months, with an interim goal of 3,285 airmen by the end of 2007. Iraqi Air Force technicians have been performing routine maintenance, and Iraqi crews have been manning most missions without Coalition forces.

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