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Military

Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq


June 2007
Report to Congress
In accordance with the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007
(Section 9010, Public Law 109-289)


Section 2-Iraqi Security Forces Training and Performance

2.2 Ministry of Interior Forces

The MoI forces consist of the Iraqi Police Service, the National Police, the Directorate of Border Enforcement, and other, smaller forces.13 There is currently no reliable data on how many of the OCSF are still serving with the MoI. The estimates range from 40% to 70% of the total trained by the Coalition. The previous attrition estimate of 20% per year is being reviewed and preliminary indications from MoI personnel documents indicate that the figure may be too high. Additionally, the MoI has hired a significant number of police beyond those trained by MNSTC-I. MNSTC-I continues to work with the MoI to track these personnel and their training and equipping requirements.


Iraqi Army and National Police with Lead Responsibility for Counter-Insurgency Operations in Their Areas

Ministry of Interior Transition Issues

As of December 31, 2006, administrative responsibility for the majority of Iraqi Police academies has transitioned to Iraqi control. The two exceptions are the Baghdad Police College (BPC) and the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC). The administrative and instructive functions for all academies were successfully transferred; operational control of the BPC was turned over to the MoI in 2006. Having achieved its goal of training and equipping 135,000 police, the MoI is now responsible for running the majority of its training academies and for generating replenishments for the police force. Basic recruit training ceased at JIPTC at the end of February 2007 once the OCSF goals were met. To date, more than 3,000 cadets have graduated from Iraqi-run police training programs. The only current training at JIPTC is limited to Iraqi Corrections Service Officer candidates in support of Task Force 134's Rule of Law responsibilities. However, the capacity still exists at JIPTC to support any expanded police training requirements.

Ministry Capacity Development

Coalition advisors continue to report marginal improvement in the MoI's ability to perform key ministry functions such as developing and implementing plans and policies, intelligence, personnel management, logistics, communications, and budgeting. For example, the MoI does not yet have accurate personnel accountability and reporting procedures, and it is unknown how many of the more than 320,000 employees on the ministry's payroll are present for duty on a given day. MNSTC-I and the ministry are continuing efforts to develop systems to address some of these shortcomings. For example:

  • Deployment of an automated human resources and payroll system is in Phase I of a three-phased fielding plan and is projected to be fully fielded and operational by June 2008.
  • The MoI Director General of Administration and Logistics has established an automated equipment accountability system that the Iraqis continue to populate with both Coalition- and Iraqi- produced data drawn from historical documentation and hand-receipts.
  • MoI is currently in the process of developing its CY 2008 budget with the intent of using a requirementsbased budget process, and full implementation of the Iraqi Financial Management Information System (IFMIS) is projected for the end of 2008. With these initiatives, budget execution should improve.

Corruption, illegal activity and sectarian/ militia influence constrain faster progress in developing MoI forces and gaining Iraqi populace support. Although the primary concern of the GoI remains the ongoing insurgency, multiple allegations of tolerance of and influence exerted by Shi'a militia members within the MoI is troubling. Militia influence impacts every component of the MoI, particularly in Baghdad and several other key cities. The MoI also continues to struggle with internal corruption, and the ministry made continued efforts this quarter to address this problem. Key to these efforts is effective investigations when allegations appear to have some credibility. For example:

  • From January 1, 2007, through March 31, 2007, MoI Internal Affairs opened 1,954 new corruption-related investigations. The investigations resulted in the firing of 854 employees, the forced retirement of 13, referral to the Commission of Public Integrity of 16 for further investigation, and internal disciplinary action against 255. The other 816 cases remain open. The Internal Affairs Directorate conducted 41 human rights-related investigations. Of these, two resulted in disciplinary punishment and 39 remain open.
  • The Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) project identified 1,200 cases making false applications for the reporting period of January 1, 2007 through March 31, 2007. Of these 1,200 cases, the Minister dismissed 92 employees who committed the most serious violations. The Minister also dismissed 824 cases from the December 2006 list. As of March 31, 2007, 916 employees have been dismissed since the beginning of the year.

Embedded Advisory Support

As described in the March 2007 report, the Coalition Police Assistance Training Team's (CPATT's) MoI Transition Team (MoI-TT) works with the MoI on developing and assessing capabilities. The MoI-TT is comprised of slightly more than 100 advisors. In addition, 222 field-deployed Police Transition Teams (PTTs) assist in the development of the Iraqi Police Service. Ten of these provide advice at the provincial police headquarters level, 65 at the district level and 148 at the police station level. Each team has approximately 12 to 15 members; two to four members of each team are civilian International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs) hired as contractors by the Department of State, and the rest are typically military personnel, many of whom are Military Police. IPLOs provide civilian law enforcement expertise in technical aspects of criminal investigation and police station management.

PTTs travel to stations to mentor the Iraqi police and conduct joint patrols with them. These joint patrols promote active community policing to improve the reputation of-and confidence in-the police by the Iraqi people. Although each provincial police headquarters has a dedicated Transition Team (TT), it is not feasible to have TTs assigned to all of the more than 1,100 police stations in Iraq due to funding constraints on hiring civilian police advisors and limitations on the number of available Military Police. Thirty-nine National Police Transition Teams (NPTTs) now support the development of National Police units by mentoring, training, and facilitating communication with Coalition forces. NPTTs assess the readiness and operational capability of the National Police, similar to the tasks performed by Military Transition Teams with Iraqi Army units.

A Coalition-initiated, MoI-led Iraqi Police Reform Program called "Quicklook" was instituted in December 2006 to review all aspects of performance and effectiveness of Iraqi police stations, beginning in Baghdad. As of 30 April 2007, the team had successfully inspected 44 of 47 stations. The Baghdad portion of the program will take three to four months and result in a MoI generated report and a plan to address deficiencies. Once completed in Baghdad, this program will be expanded to other Iraqi police stations. MNSTC-I assesses that thus far the MoI team is holding the stations and their commanders to the inspection standards.

Logistics and Sustainment

The MoI's logistics and sustainment capacity requires continued development. The FY 2007 DoD Supplemental funding request focuses on key shortfalls, particularly in equipment maintenance. Specifically:

  • The MoI is developing policies, plans and processes for acquisition, distribution, and maintenance of vehicles. The MoI has begun to centrally purchase vehicles and repair parts using selfgenerated and FMS contracts.
  • Ammunition purchases through Iraqifunded FMS cases have resolved procurement sourcing issues, but shortfalls of adequate fuel continue to hinder mission performance.
  • All life-support contracts have been transferred to the MoI except for life support at Baghdad Police College, which is slated to transfer at the end of June 2007. Small-scale lifesupport contracts have been reestablished at the Basrah and Al Kut Joint Training Academies to support the National Police Replenishment Plan. To support the new Anbar Police Academy, CPATT has established a full life-support contract which runs through November 2007.
  • MNSTC-I has established seven health clinics throughout Baghdad to support the National Police. Border police health logistics requirements will be addressed through a memorandum of agreement between MoI and the Ministry of Health that is intended to provide healthcare for police across Iraq.

Force Generation

CPATT is working to replenish all National Police units with personnel and key equipment items in support of FAQ. In addition, MNSTC-I is supporting the Prime Minister's initiative to build a multi-component (Iraqi Army and National Police) division sized brigade force to protect the Samarra Shrine reconstruction project. CPATT is also helping to establish eight Provincial Police Force (PPF) units in Anbar Province and four PPF units in Diyala Province.

Iraqi Police Service

The Iraqi Police Service (IPS) constitutes the majority of MoI forces assigned throughout Iraq's 18 provinces and is comprised of patrol and station police and specialists in such disciplines as forensics. The IPS's mission is to enforce the law, safeguard the public, and provide local security. For Baghdad and the nine key cities,14 100% of authorized vehicles and weapons have been delivered to the police. Overall, the Iraqi Police Service has received approximately 89% of authorized critical equipment and is expected to receive 100% by the end of 2007. It is thought that, due to combat loss and attrition, a significant portion of the equipment may no longer be in MoI inventories and serviceable.

Militia infiltration of local police remains a significant problem. Prime Minister Maliki has expressed a commitment to retraining and reforming police units that are shown to be serving sectarian or parochial interests. Some security forces also remain prone to intimidation by, or collusion with, criminal gangs. Even when police are not affiliated with a militia or organized crime, there is often mutual distrust between the police and the judiciary, each viewing the other as corrupt.

National Police

The National Police (NP) is a bridging force between the local police and the Iraqi Army, allowing the Minister of Interior to project police capabilities across the provinces. The NP is also charged with maintaining law and order and augments local policing efforts in internal security and policing operations. Until October 2006, the NP were trained and served primarily in a paramilitary role and had received little traditional police training. MNSTC-I partnered with the MoI to conduct a four-phase NP Transformation Program (also known as the "re-blueing" program) to reorient the program towards police functions. Phase I is complete and consisted of NP "Quicklook" inspections to improve overall readiness. Phase II is ongoing and involves standardized collective training, which includes added emphasis on human rights, rule of law and police ethics. Phase III will begin 90 days after the North Atlantic Council endorses an Italian-led training plan that will be based on the tactics, techniques and procedures of Italy's Carabinieri. Phase IV involves forward positioning to train on contingencies such as security for pilgrimages, natural disasters and national emergencies.


MOI National Police Forces' Assessed Capabilities

Directorate of Border Enforcement and Directorate of Ports of Entry

The Directorate of Border Enforcement (DBE) and the Directorate of Ports of Entry (PoE) collectively control and protect Iraq's borders. The DBE is organized into 5 regions, with 12 brigades totaling 42 battalions; 38 of the battalions are supported by a Coalition equipping program. These forces staff 420 border and annex forts, of which the USG has funded 258. The PoE operates 13 of 17 land ports of entry into Iraq.

The other four land POEs were closed as part of the increased security measures implemented in February 2007. MNSTC-I has trained over 29,660 DBE and PoE personnel, meeting the OCSF goal of 28,400. As described in previous reports, all Coalition planned border forts are complete and have been handed over to the GoI. In addition, the DBE Director General is building smaller border fort annexes to close the gaps in areas with a high threat of intrusion. As of this reporting period, the Iraqi government has funded construction for a total of 16 border fort annexes and plans to build 291 more, which will bring the total number of forts and annexes to 711. Once complete, these should provide adequate facilities to support the forces providing Iraqi border security. Currently, 28 Coalition Border Transition Teams (BTTs) support border and port operations.

Facilities Protection Service

The Facilities Protection Service (FPS) was originally established in 2003 by Coalition Provisional Authority Order 27 to protect infrastructure and facilities controlled by the various government ministries. CPA Order 27 is intended to standardize the powers and authorities that ministry guard forces could exercise. While the Ministry of Interior directed the FPS to establish unified standards for FPS personnel and all ministries, the FPS remained a loose confederation of mainly contract security guards that protect facilities and ministry officials at the 27 ministries. Many ministries have resisted central control and authority over their guard forces, particularly as political parties gained control over the ministries and have used the FPS as an employment opportunity for militia and sectarian interests. To assert MoI authority over the FPS, the Iraqi government decided last year to consolidate all FPS personnel under the MoI into a single force of approximately 98,000 personnel. Although the MoI has begun to take over training and vetting of FPS personnel, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) has not yet centralized funding with the MoI. (Without a new law or a clear directive from the Prime Minister, most ministries remain resistant to this initiative.) Because the FPS is not part of the Coalition's programmed train and equip requirements, metrics such as numbers of personnel or equipping status are not included in the overall data.

National Information and Investigation Agency

The National Information and Investigation Agency (NIIA) is the strategic criminal intelligence arm of the MOI. With almost 2,700 personnel currently assigned, and an endstrength target of 6,000 in 2008, the agency has the potential of becoming a significant force in the GoI's fight against terrorism and the insurgency. The organization consists of a National Headquarters and 15 provincial NIIA Bureaus. Anbar's bureau is the only provincial bureau that is not yet at initial operating capability. The Kurdish region has its own MoI and criminal intelligence supported structure. Eventually, the NIIA leadership intends to position NIIA officers in all IPS stations throughout Iraq. Currently NIIA intelligence officers are embedded with the National Police Division headquarters and work alongside police in performing their criminal investigative duties. Over time, a network of officers in the field will be able to pass data directly to the National Headquarters through their respective provincial bureaus. NIIA capabilities are currently assessed as minimal in most areas such as investigations, analysis, and surveillance. The NIIA has been issued 95% of its weapons and body armor and 20% of its vehicles. The current security environment restricts the movement of criminal investigators (predominately Shi'a) in the MoI from traveling to crime scenes around Baghdad and other key cities to conduct investigations. Lack of trust between agencies impedes the exchange of criminal intelligence and collaborative intelligence products. Furthermore, the NIIA has only limited secure IT communications capabilities, inhibiting nationwide networking.



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