Military

The following recommendations are submitted for immediate consideration, and are in addition to the previously submitted recommendations detailed above.

There were some issues that surfaced during the days that followed the initial notification process to the families.  As background, the notification process was carefully studied on an earlier occasion with the unit adjutants of 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group.  During that conference, it was decided that the military was responsible to notify the individuals that the member had listed as the primary and secondary Next of Kin (NOK) as well as the emergency contact listed on the PEN form.  The initial notification on all cases was to be the person identified as the emergency contact followed by the primary and then the secondary NOK.  In some occasions during the notification process by the teams it was determined that the person being notified wished to inform the rest of their families.  Those wishes were of course honoured.  However, when this course was followed, some family members were upset that they were not also notified by the military. 

There was at least one instance in which a member's parents were not included on the PEN as other people had been listed under "Emergency Notification" and "Primary" and "Secondary" NOK.  The Rear Party was not at liberty to guess the member's wishes or relationships.  They acted on the information available which is strictly based on the PEN form that the member completes prior to deployment.  There is no other document available that provides further information on their family members (e.g. address and phone number of both parents). 

Given the changing nature of the modern family structure in which separated parents are not uncommon it is suggested that the PEN form be revised to allow for additional NOK entries for notification.

The Board was in a fact-finding/analysis mode for over two months, during which time the membership became concerned with specific security of information issues.  In particular, there seemed to be a lack of consideration given to OPSEC.  As an example,                                                                                                      was included on a CF member's personal web site.  One site named snipers and their home units.  Another offered information on in- theatre procedures, CF Immediate Operational Requirements (IORs), delivery timelines, deployment numbers, procurement problems for deploying units, costs, and even deployment strategies.

Much of this information is not classified in a military sense, but when summarized by an authoritative source and published on the Internet, formerly innocuous information can become an operational liability.  With the threat of terrorist activities today and for the foreseeable future, a tighter rein on OPSEC matters is required within the CF. 

Members of the CF who assemble or operate a personal website on the Internet must be educated as to the OPSEC issues associated with discussing military related matters in such a public forum.

It is the opinion of the Board that the existing mission planning procedures at the F-16 unit (170^th Fighter Squadron) and the AWACS squadron (960^th Airborne Air Control Squadron) need to be reviewed.   More specifically:

• If not already in place, a system needs to be developed whereby all aircrew flying combat missions in OEF are briefed on the valid ACO and on all the subsequent changes that could potentially apply to their missions.  Associated with that process, a "Read File" applicable to ACOs, ATOs and SPINS, with clearly defined reading requirements (every mission, every day, or every edition) and customers (all aircrew, all controllers, tasked individuals or any combination thereof), needs to be reviewed for improvement at the unit level to ensure better information dissemination.
• If not already in existence, a control and standardization method needs to be developed to ensure that all aircrew fly with accurate airspace coordination information.  More specifically, the information that aircrew will have with them while flying, as well as the format in which the information is presented (maps, diagrams, briefing cards) needs to be clearly defined. 
• On the same topic, aircrew need to be better informed on the                      or any other ATO-visualization software, and need to be reminded of its limitations. 
• Finally, aircrew need to be reminded by the chain of command (CAOC on down to the unit level) that a thorough knowledge of the elements of the ATO and ACO applicable to their mission is ultimately their responsibility.  This can only be guaranteed through careful mission preparation and study.

The reviewed testimonies have confirmed a certain lack of knowledge by the aircrews of the functions of the CAOC, its capabilities and its limitations.  It is the opinion of the Board that air-fighting units at all levels would be better served if an initial familiarization briefing of the CAOC was mandatory for all aircrew arriving in theatre.   This briefing could take place at the CAOC (ideally) or could be given by CAOC representatives at the various deployed locations in the theatre.

It is the opinion of the Canadian Board that the CAOC needs to introduce measures that ensure adequate supervision of the quality of mission planning and execution by the tactical units authorized to fly OEF missions.  In particular, the CAOC leadership should insist on periodically reviewing mission briefs (perhaps by VTC) to ensure that flight leads are properly interpreting the Commander's intent, the theatre threat, and the various flying orders.

Although most likely already in place, the board strongly feels that a higher priority needs to be given to the verification process in theatre.  More particularly, this inquiry has revealed a definite lack of knowledge or familiarity, at all levels, of basic ACMs (Airspace Control Measures).  Methods of control and verification have to be refined to ensure that the information required for a safe and effective air campaign is passed and clearly understood, from the planner to the flyer.

Staff from Directorate Land Requirements, Directorate of Air Requirements and the Directorate of Artillery Systems Project Management provided the Board with an overview of current capabilities and an overview of future technology developments with respect to "Combat Identification".

In the short term, the Board recommends that a concerted effort be made to develop simple but effective solutions for combat identification,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              .