Military

The following represents the various recommendations the Canadian Board of Inquiry would like to submit for consideration.  Varying from the specific to the general in nature, they are based on the received evidence and testimonies, the analysis performed with the help of the Board specialist advisors, and are presented according to the categories previously covered.

The following recommendations were identified during the course of the investigation and submitted to the DCDS for immediate consideration prior to the completion of the Final Report:

Airspace Coordination Issues  (submitted 13 May 2002)

It is the opinion of the Board that current procedures between Coalition Ground Forces and Coalition Air Forces require review.   More specifically, the way in which                       activation and deactivation procedures are dealt with during combat operations need to be reviewed.  If such procedures are currently in place, it would appear from the evidence collected to date that their use was incomplete.  The Board believes that if the procedures had been more stringently enforced, the chain of events that led to the incident at Tarnak Farm on 17 April 2002 could possibly have been avoided.  If such measures are not sufficient to the task, then a review of those procedures should address in detail the following:

• The Coalition Air Forces Command and Control (C2) nodes and how they are informed of the activation and deactivation of                by Friendly Coalition Ground Forces during the course of extended Combat Operations in a timely and accurate manner;
• If this activation/deactivation process exists, a review of the Live Fire information transmitted to include calibre/type of munitions as well as duration and expected concentration of fire;
• The communication links (if any) that are available to aircrew to expedite critical information during wartime operations and if those communication links are available to aircrew within the theatre of operations; and
• As              change in location and use, the process by which the information is updated and passed to ensure accuracy and timeliness of the information.

If not already put into effect, and until the procedures related to                  are closely reviewed, the Board recommends the following immediate actions:

• Section 4 (Airspace) to the existing Special instructions (SPINS) to Operation Enduring Freedom should have an additional section named COALITION FORCES RANGES IN AFGHANISTAN.  That section should explain all the pertinent details related to the existence and the use of all the small arms ranges currently in use by Coalition Forces in the Afghan theatre of operations;
• All future Airspace Coordination Orders (ACO) should contain a detailed list, including but not limited to timings, weapons to be used, altitude restrictions and coordinating agencies, of all the live firing exercises scheduled to take place, on any given day, on any of the existing small arms ranges currently in use by Coalition Forces in the Afghan theatre; and
• Daily, through Air Tasking Orders (ATO) Special Instructions/Banners, the details of all live firing exercises scheduled to take place in the Afgan theatre of operations during the ATO period need to be reported in order to increase the awareness of all those involved in that theatre.

Ricochet Danger Area Templates (submitted 23 May 2002)

During the conduct of the investigation it became evident that Ricochet Danger Area Templates had not been utilized during the production of safe arcs of fire for the ranges (Captain J. Jasper, 30 April 2002).  This omission did not result in an unsafe range, but future live fire ranges, especially those utilizing a variety of weapons, should follow the procedures directed in Canadian Land Force BGL 381-001 /TS-000 DAT 2001-10-15.  This observation was brought to the attention of the DCDS/J3 International Staff, who directed that Ricochet Danger Area Templates shall be utilized during future live fire training events, 23 May 2002.

During testimony it was learned that the electric detonator for the                      was inserted during preparations at the ammo point.  The soldier carrying the              then moved forward with the section and waited for the end of the serial to complete wiring and attachment of the Clacker.

The proper procedure as per BGL-320-010/FP-001 Chapter 5, Annex B, Appendix 3 (Mines and Booby Traps) states that the weapon preparation is to be completed at the time of use.  Detonators should not be inserted ahead of time.  This procedure was confirmed with Directorate of Army Training (Pioneers and Engineers).

It is clearly understood that the 3 PPCLI BG is in a combat zone and that some procedures need to be modified to allow training to be as realistic as possible.  Therefore, following an appraisal of the procedure for the use of the                          , the BOI recommends that the procedures currently in use be reviewed to ensure that requirements of both combat and safety are being met appropriately and equally.  This procedural observation had no impact on the actual incident of 17 April 02.