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Military

COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS (cont)

TREND 30: Engineer battalion command and control. Engineer battalion command and control of all organic and supporting engineer units within the brigade combat team (BCT) is typically inconsistent.

PROBLEMS:

  1. During heavy/light NTC rotations, BCT engineer battalion commanders and staffs often lack involvement in, and visibility of engineer support to the Light Infantry task force (TF) and the Combat Support Equipment (CSE) platoons attached to them for mobility/survivability support.
  2. There is inconsistent situational awareness at BCT level of mobility/countermobility/ survivability operations across entirety of the Brigade to include the Light TF.
  3. Unclear command/support relationships exist between the light engineer platoon and mechanized Engineer PLTs task organized to the Light TF. "Who's in charge?" is a routinely voiced question.
  4. Unclear BCT engineer commander's guidance is given to the Light Engineer platoon leader.
  5. Combat Support Equipment (CSE) platoons are not consistently integrated into the battalion's troop leading procedures.
  6. CSE platoons rarely receive WARNOs, FRAGOs or OPORDs.

Techniques:

  1. According to FM 5-71-3, the engineer battalion commander is the Brigade Engineer and principal advisor to the brigade commander. If not commanding, he should help direct all engineer forces controlled by or supporting the brigade.
  2. The Brigade Engineer must clearly establish who has responsibility as staff engineer of all maneuver TFs of the BCT.
  3. The Brigade Engineer must review/develop command, control and communications to ensure the brigade engineer section has required information and coordination capability across the entire Brigade.
  4. Engineer Battalion must improve development of concept of operation and sub-unit tasks for internally-controlled assets in order to set a sound and timely basis for lower level troop leading procedures.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 31: Defining the role of the Field Artillery battalion liaison officer (LNO).

PROBLEMS:

  1. The role of the liaison officer (LNO) is not defined.
  2. There is seldom an established list of requirements for the LNO in the unit tactical SOP (TACSOP).
  3. While at the supported unit tactical operations center (TOC), LNOs have not facilitated information exchange between units.
  4. Units seldom have established expectations or lists of duties for the LNO to follow during the battle. When they are established, the LNO section do not routinely follow them.

RESULT: The LNO does not know what his unit requires or when it is required.

Techniques:

  1. The LNO plays a critical role in the information exchange between the direct support (DS) battalion TOC and the reinforcing (R) or general support-reinforcing (GS-R) TOC. He represents his unit in the DS TOC. He must update his unit on the DS unit's current situation and any future plans, and keep the DS unit informed on his unit's situation and capabilities. This is especially critical when the DS and R/GS-R units are unlike systems. The LNO may have to pull information from the DS unit and push it to his unit in a timely manner.
  2. The LNO's duties and requirements must be clearly established in the unit's TACSOP.
    • The S3 must enforce these requirements during the battle.
    • The S3 should develop a specific list of information requirements and periodic reports.
    • FM 6-20-1 and FM 6-60 describe the duties of the liaison officer and section. (Appendix E, FM 6-60, contains a good MLRS battalion LNO checklist that can be modified to meet the requirements of a cannon battalion LNO.)
  3. The unit TACSOP should include, but not be limited to, the following:
    • LNO to R/GS-R TOC
      • DS battalion critical fire support tasks
      • DS battalion critical events timeline
      • DS unit locations and scheme of movement
      • Radar deployment order
      • Periodic situation reports
      • Fire support coordination measures
      • Communication net structure, call signs and digital addresses
      • Artillery intelligence (RAG/DAG locations)
      • Maneuver situation updates
    • R/GS-R TOC to the LNO, LNO to DS TOC
      • R/GS-R battalion critical fire support tasks
      • R/GS-R battalion scheme of fires
      • R/GS-R critical events timeline
      • R/GS-R unit locations and scheme of movement
      • Radar zone refinement (if applicable)
      • Artillery intelligence (RAG/DAG locations)
      • Periodic situation reports

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 32: Medical company troop leading procedures. Medical leaders seldom use established troop leading procedures and field orders to ensure timely execution of their plans.

RESULT: On numerous occasions the ambulance platoon deploys to an Ambulance Exchange Point (AXP) in the dark, and after the brigade has started its reconnaissance/counterreconnaissance battle.

Technique: Use FM 71-1 and FM 7-8 as references to train and implement established procedures at Home Station. This will improve leaders' ability to manage their time and provide subordinates with the information needed prior to start of mission. Use of established procedures will facilitate the early movement of ambulance platoons when the company commanders have not completed their orders.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 33: Medical company Tactical Standard Operating Procedures (TACSOP). Over 90 percent of the medical companies deploying to the NTC do not have a company TACSOP.

RESULTS:

  1. Company leadership does not clearly understand their role and responsibilities in a field environment.
  2. Leaders duplicate work and critical leader tasks do not get accomplished effectively, if at all.
  3. Critical tasks are done differently each time, and take longer, since no one knows the standards for completion.

Technique: Develop and distribute a TACSOP that clearly articulates the roles and responsibilities for each leader within the company. Use established medical doctrine and mission training plans as sources for identification of these tasks.

  • Write to the job, not to the personality of the person in the job.
  • Identify each critical task the company must accomplish to be combat ready.
  • Describe how the task is done, and include an established time standard for completion.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 34: CSS Company commander support of the reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan.

PROBLEM: CSS Company commanders fail to support the S2/S3 when the R&S plan is issued, even when specified tasks were provided. LP/OPs are often not in place or, if emplaced, lack the necessary equipment or the knowledge to conduct the mission.

RESULT: The OPFOR mounts raids and enters the BLUFOR Brigade Support Area (BSA) with continued success.

Techniques:

  1. The S2/S3 section should periodically check LP/OP positions confirming the R&S plan.
  2. The commander should have a set of established responsibilities outlined in the Tactical Standard Operating Procedures (TACSOP) specifically focusing on an intelligence collection plan.
  3. The FSB commander should define, communicate, train, and enforce the standard.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 35: Control of engineer operations in the Forward Support Battalion.

PROBLEM: The FSB rarely has a single person in charge of the engineering effort, giving priorities and passing the asset from one unit to the other.

RESULT: The strongest NCO or officer takes the engineers and keeps them all day.

Techniques:

  1. Designate a commander-in-chief, i.e., CSM, or a strong NCO to control engineers.
  2. Develop an engineer matrix. Establish disciplined priorities for engineer support.
  3. Identify exactly where the engineer digging assets to go and in what order they are to complete their projects.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 36: Battalion maintenance officer (BMO) troop leading procedures. Troop leading procedures are not used effectively in the unit maintenance collection point (UMCP).

PROBLEMS:

  1. No mission analysis conducted.
  2. No effective or timely OPORDs issued.
  3. No timelines established.

Techniques:

  1. The BMO must consciously train himself and subordinate leaders in the application of the troop leading procedures.
  2. Focus Home Station training on what happens in the UMCP when the mission is received, when and how OPORDs are issued, and how time is managed.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 37: Management of Timelines.

PROBLEMS:

  1. TF staffs/CPs do not effectively manage a TF timeline.
  2. The inability to manage a written timeline combined with staff sections completing required products in a timely manner.

RESULTS:

  1. Critical events fail to take place, and TF actions hinder troop leading procedures at subordinate levels and ultimately prevents the TF from seeing itself in preparation for combat.
  2. The TF staff does not have enough time to adequately wargame the selected COA.
  3. This caused the orders to lack focus on killing the enemy at the decisive point and often lead to an unclear tasks and purpose to subordinate leaders.

Techniques:

  1. The TF timeline should be developed early in the planning process and then continually updated throughout the process.
  2. The initial timeline should include the staff's planning cycle, critical R&S activities, and company/team troop leading procedures (e.g., boresighting, initial movement times etc.).
  3. As the planning process continues, additional operational critical events are also added to the timeline and continued throughout the wargame process.
  4. Key events off of the synchronization matrix should also be incorporated into the timeline. This allows critical tasks to be tracked throughout the battle and provides a valuable tool.
  5. Upon completion of the planning process the staff should collate the data onto a butcher board and briefed as part of the TF OPORD.
  6. The timeline the staff should include critical TLPs to be conducted at the company/team level. These should include company/team OPORD times, rehearsals, boresight, and LOGPAC.
  7. These requirements are not intended to micro-manage co/tms but rather to provide them a common base to begin their planning and preparation. If changes are required at the TF level the TF commander can then make an informed decision on what events he will impact.

(TA. 4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 38: Automask Criteria. In the TF defensive mission, it is known that the enemy will most likely fire nonpersistent chemicals on where he thinks the TF BPs are as part of Phase 2 fires. However, it is also known the enemy disposition on the battlefield prior to those fires.

RESULTS:

  1. The TF can be proactive and automask prior to Phase 2 fires and begin chemical monitoring.
  2. Automask criteria is often defined by reactive events such as the sounding of the M8 alarm (which only detects nerve agent vapors) or receiving artillery in the vicinity of template chemical targets.

Techniques:

  1. TF conduct a thorough threat assessment during IPB to determine the enemy disposition prior to expected delivery of chemical munitions.
  2. Define automask criteria accordingly, for example the FSE crosses PL ALPHA or 26 n/s grid line.

(TA. 4.4.1 Prepare Orders and Plans)

TREND 39: Graphic control measures in brigade schemes of maneuver. Brigade and task force (TF) schemes of maneuver often lack sufficient graphic control measures and detail for coordinating and integrating maneuver to mass firepower.

PROBLEMS:

  1. Brigade and TF plans for actions on contact, actions on the objective, and expanding the units battlespace beyond its initial objective are routinely not developed.
  2. The planning process often fails to address required graphic control measures for specified tasks (e.g. passage of lines, direct fire control measures, movement routes/axes, air corridors).
  3. Control measures for the shift from the deep fight to the close fight are often not well defined.
  4. Graphic control measures beyond the objective are often omitted, prohibiting forces to quickly transition.
  5. Control measures to protect the force and coordinate the flow of forces from the front to rear are often omitted or done "push-to-talk" during execution.
  6. Units designate checkpoints throughout the area of operation, but rarely use them to assist in controlling the force.
  7. Brigade SOPs are often not used or are so cumbersome that they play little part in providing the details and control measures required for certain specified tasks in the planning process.
  8. Brigade course of action (COA) development and wargaming often stops at the objective; they do little to no "action on the objective" development to assist, or define the fight to ensure the commander's intent is met.
  9. The detailed planning required to transition forces or commit follow-on forces through and beyond the objective is not well rehearsed or synchronized.

Techniques:

  1. Brigade staffs must address all specified tasks and develop the graphic control measures for each task.
  2. Staffs should look at implied tasks and plan the control measures necessary to commit follow-on forces.
  3. Control measures should be in sufficient detail to meet the commander's intent. They must provide subordinate commanders the tools necessary to protect the force, transition to the close fight and expand the battlespace through and beyond the objective.
  4. During Home Station training, staffs should review doctrinal terms and graphics control measures to gain a clear understanding of their meaning and how they effect each BOS.
  5. Units must develop SOPs that facilitate unit actions and be disciplined in using them.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

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