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COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS (cont)

TREND 40: NBC rehearsals. There is seldom a rehearsal to synchronize the NBC force protection plan.

PROBLEMS:

  1. Brigade and Battalion Chemical Officers and the supporting Chemical Company seldom rehearse their scheme of support.
  2. Chemical Officers are one of the few staff officers that do not have their own radio in the TOC. Most Chemical Officers can never use a radio during a battle.
  3. Chemical Officers at all levels are not included as a briefer during OPORDs and rehearsals.

RESULTS:

  1. Chemical Officers have difficulty communicating with other NBC staffs without a radio.
  2. Without a briefing from the Chemical Officer, commanders are not informed on key issues that must be communicated such as MOPP level, operational exposure guides (OEG), auto-masking, and concept of support of the NBC slice.

Techniques:

  1. Have Chemical Officers and the Chemical Company Commander and Platoons Leaders conduct a FM rehearsal. Just as in any other BOS, a rehearsal is the key to success, not only to talk over the plan but to deconflict any issues.
  2. Communication is the key to success during combat operations for Chemical Officers. Give him a radio, even if it is in a vehicle.
  3. Have the FM rehearsal on the Chemical Company command frequency.
  4. The brigade Chemical Officer should include this rehearsal in his NBC portion of the Brigade TACSOP with a standard agenda and time.
  5. Publish this rehearsal time in the brigade timeline along with the maneuver, FS, and CSS rehearsals.
  6. Ensure the Chemical Officers are active participants in the presentation of the OPORD and at the rehearsal.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 41: Military Police (MP) rehearsals. Military Police too often do not conduct effective rehearsals when preparing to execute operations.

PROBLEMS:

  1. While MP leaders generally conduct good troop leading procedures, they normally do not understand the different methods available for conducting rehearsals.
  2. When confronted with time constraints, MP leaders do not know how to prioritize rehearsal efforts.

RESULT: The lack of effective rehearsals normally leads to poorly executed operations, especially when in contact with enemy forces.

Techniques:

  1. Well-resourced and controlled rehearsals are crucial to successful mission accomplishment.
  2. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Newsletter 91-1, Rehearsals, dated April 91, is an excellent guide on rehearsals.
  3. Leaders should consider the following rehearsal techniques:
    • FM radio rehearsals
    • Map rehearsals
    • Sand table/terrain rehearsals
    • Rock/stick drills (Rock drills are useful in synchronizing movement and immediate action/reaction)
    • Backbriefs
  4. Walk-through and full-speed exercises further increase synchronization.
  5. Rehearsals should be done over similar terrain and under similar light/weather conditions as the impending mission.
  6. When prioritizing tasks in rehearsals, missions leaders should consider the following:
    • Actions on the objective
    • Reaction to enemy contact
    • Maneuver drills
    • Movement
    • Contingencies
    • Special teams

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 42: Brigade Support Area (BSA) fire and maneuver controls.

PROBLEMS:

  1. There is lack of established target reference points and sector stakes.
  2. The majority of soldiers cannot tell the difference between an enemy and friendly vehicle.
  3. The BSA soldiers have problems with:
    • Numerous weapon errors
    • Unauthorized discharges
    • Having the basic knowledge of the weapon systems they use

RESULT: These problems contribute to the increased risk of fratricide.

Techniques:

  1. The senior leadership of a battalion should read the following publications:
    • FM 101-5, Appendixes F and N
    • Army Ground and Accident Report Countermeasure, Feb 94
    • CALL/NTC Risk Management for Brigades and Battalions, Jun 95
    • FM 17-97, Cavalry Troop, Oct 95.
  2. FM 17-97 has an example of how risk management and fratricide risk considerations can be incorporated into the five-paragraph OPORD. This is not a change to the OPORD format; rather it should be used during OPORD development to ensure risk management and fratricide reduction measures are included in the order.
  3. During orders briefs or when verbal FRAGOs are issued, an immediate confirmation brief should be given to ensure everyone understands what was said.
  4. The FSB should enforce force protection standards on the BSA tenants and visitors.
  5. Adopt a risk assessment model that includes both safety and tactical hazards.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 43: BSA save plan rehearsals.

PROBLEM: The BSA leadership often fails to plan rehearsals for the save plan at any level.

RESULT: The save plan is seldom executed, and when it does, it seldom reaches the end state the FSB commander required in saving critical assets.

Techniques:

  1. The unit must conduct save plan rehearsals at all levels.
  2. Times should be stated in the operations order.
  3. The rehearsals should be conducted in the basic form then in the degraded mode, i.e., MOPP Level 4, at night, etc.
  4. A more detailed time-distance analysis should be conducted to ensure that the prepare and save triggers allow enough time to clear the BSA prior to the arrival of the enemy.
  5. Routes out of the BSA and priority of unit movement to support a hasty displacement also need to be developed in more detail.
  6. Site selection for an alternate site must include constant coordination with brigade and ensure the site selected is not in view from the old site.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 44: Fire Support Officer (FSO) assignment of task and purpose to targets. Fire support officers (FSOs) do not clearly define task and purpose for targets.

PROBLEMS:

  1. Task force FSOs usually do not adequately define what the task and purpose is for each task force target.
  2. During the wargame, the FSO does not require the S3 to clearly state the intent for each target.

Techniques:

  1. Task force FSOs must emphasize the importance of assigning each target a defined task and purpose. If the maneuver commander/S3 cannot provide this, the target is probably not valid and usually not executable.
  2. Consider other factors during the planning process, to include:
    • Observers
    • Artillery we expect available to service a target
    • What maneuver event will trigger the firing of this target

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 45: Coordination of religious support. Brigade level unit ministry teams are not well integrated into the orders process.

PROBLEMS:

  1. Chaplains and chaplain assistants are frequently left out of the planning cycle. This is due to an inadequate understanding of the orders process as a continuous cycle that involves the integration of simultaneous staff activities towards focusing of combat power on the decisive point.
  2. Chaplains do not effectively integrate religious support input into the warning order/staff estimate/OPORD annex process.
  3. Unit Ministry Teams (UMTs) frequently do not brief at maneuver or CSS rehearsal and do not get a religious support annex into the OPORD.

RESULTS:

  1. Other staff officers get the impression that the UMT does not care about or share the same understanding of the importance of the orders process.
  2. The effect that chaplains and assistants can have on the battlefield is diminished.

Techniques:

  1. UMTs must think seriously about how religious support impacts on a given mission. This will focus them as they get involved in the staff estimate process.
  2. Dramatically increase the cross-talk between UMTs and S2/S3 sections. If chaplains and assistants are more aggressive in providing input into the estimate process, then the religious support annex will take on an important dimension in the overall OPORD. With religious support included in the OPORD, chaplains and assistants would have something of substance to brief at a CSS rehearsal.
  3. It is imperative for both chaplain and chaplain assistant to rehearse their involvement in these processes during train-ups for CTC rotations or other deployments.
  4. Plan for the chaplain to attend LTP. If LTP attendance is not possible, chaplains and assistants can review all of the LTP material at Home Station, and gain a comprehensive understanding of the types of missions and religious support challenges they might encounter.

(TA.4.4.1.2 Coordinate Support)

TREND 46: Religious Support coordination with casualty evacuation planners. Brigade Unit Ministry Teams (UMTs) do not fully coordinate with medical casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) planners for coverage of wounded soldiers.

PROBLEM: Often the relationship between the Brigade combat team (BCT) UMT, Forward Support Battalion (FSB) UMT, and CASEVAC planners and are not well defined or developed. These groups are critical in coordinating religious support to wounded soldiers.

  • BCT UMTs do not take the time to fully understand the overall concept for medical support.
  • The FSB chaplain is usually not consulted as the religious support plan for casualties is developed, resulting in a uncoordinated-integrated plan of execution.
  • CASEVAC planners do not appreciate the dimension that UMTs bring when they work with medical assets to bring religious support to casualties.

Techniques:

  1. Chaplains and assistants must coordinate, early on, with medical planners to insure everyone fully understands the medical concept of support.
  2. UMTs must find ways to integrate into the medical evacuation team so that when UMT members are not around, for instance, they are missed.
  3. The BCT UMT should enlist the support of the FSB chaplain. The FSB chaplain has the habitual relationship with the medical assets and can provide the BCT UMT with valuable information on the concepts and personalities that are present in the FSB medical evacuation section.
  4. UMTs should be conversant with MEDEVAC doctrine and its employment on the battlefield.

(TA.4.4.1.2 Coordinate Support)

TREND 47: Location of the Brigade Support Area (BSA) commander.

PROBLEMS:

  1. Typically, no one in command knows the location of the BSA commander during battle days because that information was lacking in the OPORD.
  2. The BSA commander does not understand where the critical logistical points on the battlefield are where his presence is needed.

RESULT: The BSA commander lacks first-hand knowledge of critical problems, which usually leads to failure in meeting his higher intent.

Techniques:

  1. If the brigade commander's intent is to have 90% of combat power at LD, a critical point for the BSA commander should be the UMCPs prior to battle. Then the commander may move to the TOC once the brigade commander's intent has been met or update the brigade commander from the action point on why his intent was not met.
  2. FSB commanders must map out the critical points prior to conducting the mission:
    • List them by time, phase, or event
    • Incorporate the critical points into the order, thus reinforcing to subordinate commanders what is critical to the FSB commander.

(TA.4.4.3 Provide Command Presence)

TREND 48: Understanding NTC Rules of Engagement (ROE). Soldiers do not understand NTC Rules of Engagement (ROE).

PROBLEMS:

  1. Leaders do not educate soldiers on NTC Rules of Engagement (ROE).
  2. Soldiers do not get briefed on the use of deadly force or even the difference between a mortar signature or an artillery signature or on how to build a grenade IAW the ROE at the NTC.

RESULTS:

  1. Soldiers murder innocent civilians causing international incidents.
  2. Soldiers go to MOPP Level 4 during a mortar attack when the enemy does not have the capabilities of chemical mortar rounds.

Techniques:

  1. Pertinent training events at Home Station should use the NTC ROE. This will improve the knowledge of the ROE at lower levels and improve the productivity of the unit to speed up reconstituting efforts.
  2. Given today's increased likelihood of deploying with little or no notice, commanders must be able to educate soldiers on the various types of ROE they may encounter from peacetime, use of deadly force, and wartime.

(TA.4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

TREND 49: Convoy actions at the halt.

PROBLEMS:

  1. Drivers in Main Support Battalion (MSB) convoys are not disciplined in their actions when a convoy halts en route or at its destination.
  2. Convoy commanders do not set consistent standards; not all vehicle drivers get out and take up defensive positions.

Technique: Units must establish standards, incorporate them into training plans and SOPs, and practice them at Home Station.

(TA.4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

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