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Intelligence


Scientific and Technical Intelligence (NTR STD)
Nauchno Texnicheskaya Razvedka

The issue of organizing the OGPU for Scientific and Technical Intelligence (Nauchno Texnicheskaya Razvedka - NTR, not STD) under the OGPU was put up in 1925. F.E. Dzerzhinsky. Since the second half of the 1920s, information on new aircraft equipment, artillery systems, radio equipment for military use, new poisonous substances, processing of oil and the use of its by-products, etc., has been sent to the Center via the NTR channels. Since 1930, the systematic extraction of a secret science -technical information abroad was carried out by the 8th branch of the INO (head Lev Nikolsky, Alexander Orlov, the real name - LL Feldbin).

The most striking example of Comintern operations in the USA was uncovered in connection with the Soviet-directed espionage attempts against research projects dealing with atomic explosives. A series of highy secret scientific efforts had been in progress since the entry of tne United States into the war under a multi-billion dollar War Department program directeced toward utilizing atomic energy to produce an explosive of phenomenal destructiveness.

The successful completion of this program before other belligerent nations were capabls of producing similar explosives was not only essential to the victory of the United Nations but the status of the country as a first-class power after the War. It was believed authoritatively that so mighty was the known potentiality of this explosive that any country possessing it as a monopoly would unquestionably be the most formidable power on earth. The Project was rated among tne top military secrets of the war. Even its existence during initial experiments conducted at the University of Califoxima, Berkeley, was camoufla

ged and protected bv the most stringent military regulations. It was belived that both Germany and Soviet Russia were engaged in experimentation to achieve the atomic explosive. It was conceivable that Germany, by first producing the explosive, could still turn the tide of victory against the United Nations.

As late as October, 1943, it was known that if the Soviet Union could obtain information regarding formulae and experimental steps known to scientists engaged on the Project, then it might be able to shortcut the experimentation of this country and reach a degree of production ahead of the USA. The US Government believed that such a situation would place the United States at the mercy of the Soviet Union.

The very existence of the Project was, accordingly, a top secret; the nature of the experiments and the object of the experimentation were regarded as a secret vital to the welfare of the country.

During the reorganization, these functions were transferred to the 5th management of the CI, then to the 10th CCP department. (The leaders of the 10th department in the post-war period were LR Kvasnikov, then MI Lipatov - from 1969 to 1975). Later, scientific and technical intelligence was led by Mikhail Ivanovich Lipatov (from 1969 to 1975), Leonid Sergeevich Zaitsev (from 1975 to 1992) and Yury Ivanovich Zevakin (since 1992).

The department consisted of seven directions: nuclear; aerospace; electronic; medical; chemical; different technology, information and analytical. Directions worked on a geographic basis. For example, the chemical direction was divided into English-speaking, French-speaking and German branches. The rest of the countries were divided between these branches. The tasks of the information and analytical direction included the development of reconnaissance assignments and the realization of the extracted materials in the organizations and departments of the "customer".

Structurally, the 10th department consisted of seven areas that covered all aspects of scientific activity of defensive importance (nuclear weapons, space-radio electronics, etc.). Directions worked on a geographic basis. Each direction in turn was divided into branches: English-speaking (USA, England, Canada, Israel, Japan); The French-speaking (France and the Benelux countries); German (Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Scandinavia). The rest of the countries were evenly distributed among the three branches. For example, part of the Latin American countries was occupied by the English-speaking department.

After the reorganization of the 10th department into the management of the "T", its structure actually corresponded to the structure of the CCGT. The head of the department was deputy head of the CCGT. In foreign residences, the employees of the "T" administration made up the so-called "X" line, and its head was a deputy resident.

The leadership of the PGU paid special attention to scientific and technical intelligence, since the NATO Coordinating Committee for the Embargo on Strategic Materials to the Soviet Bloc countries (COCOM), established in the 1960s, prevented the legal acquisition of modern technologies for Soviet industry. The successful work of foreign intelligence in this direction is characterized, for example, by such facts. Recruited in 1967 by a resident in Belgium, the scientific columnist for the Standard newspaper, Pzido Klindt, a regular at European scientific and technical salons, supplied secret information he received from aerospace engineers, and even managed to make friends with the Belgian cosmonaut Dirk Fremut, who flew on the US space mission shuttle Atlantis. Klindt was awarded the Soviet order, which was extremely rare.

In February 1974, on the basis of the 10th department of the CCGT, the Department of Scientific and Technical Intelligence was established - the "T" department. (Leaders LS Zaitsev - from 1975 to 1992, YI Zevakin - since 1992) The head of the department was the deputy head of the CCGT. In foreign residences, the employees of the "T" administration made up the so-called "X" line; her boss was a deputy resident. The main customer of the "T" administration was the Military Industrial Commission (MIC), which determined plans for scientific and technical intelligence. She also directed and coordinated the work in the field of scientific and technological progress, which, in addition to the "T" CCGT, was engaged in the GRU of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, the State Committee on Foreign Economic Relations, the special department of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the two departments of the Ministry of Foreign Trade - economic relations with Western countries and imports equipment from capitalist countries.

In 1977, at a closed exhibition in Yasenevo, dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution, it was said that the previous year management of the T had extracted 120,000 scientific and technical documents and more than 20,000 drawings and schemes.

In the 1980s, the work of the scientific and technological revolution intensified. In 1980, the military-industrial complex gave instructions on collecting scientific and technical data 3617 times; 1085 instructions were fulfilled; These data were used in 3396 Soviet scientific projects and experienced design developments. From the report of the military-industrial complex for the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee for 1980, it follows that the KGB carried out 42% of applications, the GRU - 30 (of which 45 for purely military documentation and equipment), MVT-5, SCS, GKES and Academy of Sciences - 3%. 61.5% of the information came from American sources (not only from the US), 10.5 from Germany, 8 from France, 7.5 from the UK, and 3% from Japan.

In 1984, T management identified the following priority tasks: reconnaissance of nuclear weapons and bombs, Minuteman missiles and Trident missiles, Pershing radio control missiles, submarine noise reduction systems, electronic warfare.




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Page last modified: 24-02-2020 18:28:18 ZULU