Saudi Arabia - Nuclear Power Reactors
Saudi has a long-standing aim to build both energy and military capacity from nuclear technology, and Riyadh has already signed several cooperation agreements with France and China. Saudi Arabia and France signed three nuclear-related cooperation agreements in Paris on June 24 2018. One involves carrying out a feasibility survey for the construction of two power reactors in the country and the other two touch upon various logistics. China National Nuclear Corp (CNNC) also signed a memorandum of understanding with the Saudi Geological Survey (SGS) to develop existing cooperation between the two countries to search for and estimate uranium and thorium resources.
Since 2018, the US administration has shown an interest in helping Saudi realise its nuclear dream by offering knowledge and workforce to the kingdom. “For years, the Trump administration has put the profits of contractors and lobbyists looking to cash in on Saudi Arabia’s nuclear ambitions above public safety—despite glaring warning signs that Saudi Arabia could use any U.S.-supplied nuclear reactors to move toward a nuclear bomb,” Senator Merkley said 30 July 2019. “Saudi Arabia’s indiscriminate use of U.S.-supplied conventional weapons in Yemen show why its acquisition of the biggest bomb of all—a nuclear weapon—would be a disaster. This bipartisan legislation introduces critical safeguards to make sure that any nuclear reactor technology exported from American to Saudi Arabia doesn’t end up fueling a dangerous arms race.”
Transferring sensitive U.S. nuclear technology could allow Saudi Arabia to produce nuclear weapons that contribute to the proliferation of nuclear arms throughout an already unstable Middle East. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman conceded this point in 2018, proclaiming: “Without a doubt, if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.”
Saudi Arabia is planning to build its first nuclear power plant and had been expected to award a construction contract for a 2.8 GW facility by the end of 2018. It has solicited bids from five vendors from the United States, South Korea, France, Russia, and China to carry out the engineering, procurement, and construction work on two nuclear reactors. Construction had been expected to begin in about 2021 at one of the two proposed sites—either Umm Huwayd or Khor Duweihin.
Adding nuclear power to its energy generation mix would allow Saudi Arabia to diversify its energy sources and respond to increased electricity demands. The development of its nuclear power program also aligns with the Kingdom’s Vision 2030 plan, an economic and social reform program that aims to reduce Saudi Arabia's dependence on oil, diversify its economy, and develop public service sectors such as health, education, infrastructure, recreation, and tourism.
Since 2010, Saudi Arabia has expressed interest in nuclear power for electricity generation, desalination and long-term R&D, as well as small and advanced reactor designs. To achieve its civil nuclear goals, Saudi Arabia is pursuing international partnerships to develop its legal and regulatory infrastructure, incorporate advanced technologies, and train and educate its workforce. The KSA’s upcoming tender for two nuclear reactors is valued at over $10 billion and follow-on projects could be worth tens of billions more. Saudi Arabia plans to build 16 nuclear power reactors by 2030, which could potentially cost more than $100 billion.
On 28 March 2019 Secretary Perry issued thirty-seven Part 810 authorizations to U.S. companies allowing them to export unclassified civil nuclear technology to 16 countries. This includes seven authorizations for exports to Saudi Arabia. A Part 810 authorization does not authorize the transfer of nuclear material, equipment or components. The specifics of these authorizations have not been made public because the companies determined that the authorizations contain proprietary business information. No enrichment or reprocessing technology has been authorized to Saudi Arabia.
Part 810 authorizations and 123 agreements are two distinct and different processes based on two separate sections of the Atomic Energy Act. The Part 810 process controls the export of unclassified nuclear technology and assistance. It enables nuclear trade by assuring that nuclear technologies exported by U.S. companies are used only for peaceful purposes. The authorization process involves a thorough interagency review that requires the Department of Energy to secure the concurrence of the Department of State, and consult with the Departments of Defense and Commerce, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
The Department of Energy (DOE) has statutory responsibility for authorizing the transfer of unclassified nuclear technology and assistance to foreign atomic energy activities within the United States or abroad. In accordance with § 57 b (2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), persons may engage, directly or indirectly, in the production or development of special nuclear material outside the United States only upon authorization by the Secretary of Energy, with the concurrence of the Department of State (DOS) and after consulting with the Departments of Defense (DoD) and Commerce (DOC), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). This requirement, as implemented by DOE, applies to technology transfers and assistance related to certain nuclear fuel-cycle activities, commercial nuclear power plants, and research and test reactors. Covered transfers may include the transfer of physical documents or electronic media, electronic transfers or the transfer of knowledge and expertise.
Separately, a 123 agreement is the legal mechanism that allows the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to license the export of nuclear material, equipment and components from the U.S. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is the licensing authority for exports under 123 Agreements. The U.S. has been in ongoing discussions with Saudi Arabia regarding a potential 123 agreement since 2012, and these discussions continue today. All 123 agreements undergo rigorous Congressional review, including 90 days of continuous session review by the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. To date, the U.S. has twenty-three 123 Agreements in force with 48 countries, including China, Russia and India. Additionally, the U.S. has 123 agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the governing authorities on Taiwan.
On 30 July 2019 US Senators Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), Jerry Moran (R-Kan.), and Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.) introduced legislation to require that Ex-Im Bank financing of any nuclear projects in Saudi Arabia meet strict conditions. The bill would ensure that any Saudi nuclear power projects are held to the nonproliferation “gold standard” for nuclear cooperation. It also strengthens congressional oversight of U.S. nuclear exports and financing assistance to Riyadh. The Bank has identified U.S. nuclear energy exports as a key and growing industry, and Saudi Arabia is a leading candidate for such exports as they work to build their first two nuclear power reactors in 2020.
“Congress must take its oversight job seriously and ensure that our exports of civilian nuclear power technologies cannot be diverted to building nuclear weapons. This is especially true when it comes to regimes like Saudi Arabia’s, where Crown Prince Mohamad bin Salman has engaged in reckless conduct and expressed a desire to acquire nuclear weapons,” said Senator Van Hollen. “By imposing the strictest nonproliferation conditions on the transfer of nuclear technology and export financing assistance, this bipartisan legislation will ensure that U.S. taxpayers do not bankroll a Saudi nuclear bomb.”
“It is firmly in our nation’s interests to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in a volatile Middle East,” said Senator Jerry Moran. “This legislation would appropriately restrict Ex-Im Bank funding until safeguards are in place that prohibits Saudi Arabia from using nuclear technology to build nuclear weapons.”
Despite the growing Saudi-Israel friendship, Israel came out with a strong criticism against the US government's plan to sell nuclear technology to the Sunni-majority kingdom. Starting with the Obama presidency, Riyadh and Tel Aviv worked behind the scenes, away from the media glare, to build relations even though they have no formal ties due to the long-standing Palestinian issue. Since Mohammed bin Salman, known as MBS, became Crown Prince in 2017, he has also focused on deepening ties with Israel. Although the threat perception has reduced through MBS’s engagement with Israel to counter Iranian influence, its newfound ally is unwilling to see the kingdom gravitate towards nuclear technology.
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