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Saudi Missiles - DF-3 East Wind

Saudi Arabia does not have weapons of mass destruction. It did, however, buy long-range CSS-2 ballistic missiles from China in 1988. In 1986, China had successfully developed the Dongfeng 3 medium-range ballistic missile, and it has entered the strategic duty. Dongfeng 3 can carry a one megaton nuclear warheads. This figure was very good at that time, and the range can reach 4,000 kilometers at the farthest. China sold several dozen (reportedly between 36 and 60) outmoded DF-3 missiles to the Saudi Strategic Missile Force, minus their nuclear warheads.

Faced with the twin threats of Israel and Iran, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia realized that they needed a "weapon that would improve the morale of our armed forces and people", a "weapon that must be weighed before we can be attacked". Following the king's instructions, in 1985, the Saudi ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar, first moved to make a tentative request to the United States to buy a "Lance" ballistic missile, which the United States rejected. When Bandar disheartened the news back home, the Saudis began to wonder: where to find a country that could provide such weapons quickly without proposing restrictive treaties? Prince Sultan, commander of the Saudi Defence Air Force, recommended to the king thina, which had not established diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia at the time.

In late 1987, Saudi Arabia decided to order a certain number of Dongfeng-3 missiles in cash, while China undertook to plan infrastructure and train people for the deployment of the missiles to Saudi Arabia. The deal is China's largest single arms export to date, worth $3.5 billion, and may now be dismissive of $3.5 billion, but in 1986 China's foreign exchange reserves were only $2,072 million. China sent Lieutenant General Cao Gangchuan, deputy chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army, to Saudi Arabia to discuss the project in detail, and in December 1986, representatives of China and Saudi Arabia began secret negotiations at an air base in southern Saudi Arabia, during which the two sides drafted an outline of a secret project code-named "Yu".

In 1987, Prince Sultan, commander of the Saudi Defense Air Force, came to China from Malaysia and began talks about buying China's Dongfeng-3 ballistic missiles. To prevent reports to the Saudis from being monitored, Prince Sultan walked out of the Hong Kong hotel where he was staying, casually walked into a casually passing hotel, opened a room, called Saudi Arabia in secret language on the public line, and checked out immediately. While in Hong Kong, there was also a small episode: Prince Sultan met King Suleiman Khalifa of Bahrain, who asked Prince Sultan about the purpose of his visit to Hong Kong, to which Prince Sultan replied: I am on holiday. But there were so many Saudi generals in the car that Prince Sultan's answer was clearly hard to convince the King of Bahrain, but fortunately the other side politely failed to follow.

After several rounds of negotiations, China learned the Saudi procurement sincerity, and arranged for Saudi officials to visit the second artillery "East Wind-3" missile base, let them visit the missile from the launch of the tunnel to witness the entire launch process. This is the beginning of this article: the base actually came foreigners. The Saudi delegation was subsequently informed that they were the first foreigners to see the Dongfeng-3 missile entity.

Based on the efforts of both sides, the "East Wind-3" missile purchase negotiations were completed at a gratifying pace, in the second half of 1987, the Saudis decided to pay in cash to order a certain number of Dongfeng-3 missiles, while China assumed the deployment of the missiles for Saudi Arabia planning infrastructure and training personnel. In order to become familiar with the new weapons the Saudis had never thought of before, they set up a secret training base in the desert, where officers and soldiers who had been trained in China would continue to train. During this time, something that made Prince Sultan cry and laugh, because of the need for secrecy of the Dongfeng-3 missile program, the military at the secret base of the army led a near-cut-off life, some military wives asked Prince Sultan whether their husbands had been sent to Afghanistan to fight. Even some military wives assumed that their husbands had died and begged Prince Sultan to formally inform them of their deaths so that they could enjoy their rights in accordance with the rules, fulfill their obligations and pay their respects to their husbands. Although the Dongfeng-3 strategic missile can carry a nuclear warhead, it developed a conventional warhead (code 118 warhead) in accordance with Saudi demand before the missile was decided to be sold to Saudi Arabia, which was also the first conventional warhead of a surface-to-surface medium-range ballistic missile. Although the strike accuracy can not be compared with some later models, but the weight of up to two tons of conventional combat unit strike effect is also considerable. In March 1988, two years after the deal was struck, it was discovered that Saudi Arabia had bought an undisclosed number of CSS-2 "East Wind" intermediate range missiles from China. (1) On April 6, 1988, just as some countries in the Middle East were still engaged in an endless quarrel over the matter, Chinese state media officially made the matter public, CCTV broadcast the 7th National People's Congress, suddenly interspersed a statement by then-Minister of Foreign Affairs Wu Xueqian: "At the request of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, our country has sold some non-nuclear conventional surface missiles." The number of missile varied by source from 30 to 120. The number was later put at 50 missiles and nine launchers. (2) According to Assistant Secretary of State Richard Clarke, the missiles were still not operational in late 1989. (3) However, in early June 1990, Flight International reported that, according to Israeli intelligence, the CSS-2 missiles were deployed and operational at two sites: al-Sulaiyil, about 500 km south of Riyadh and al-Joffer, 100 km south of Riyadh. According to the article, each site houses four to six concrete launch pads and stores approximately 60 missiles. (4)

The East Wind's modified range/payload (5) of 2,500 km/2,000 kg (conventional load) brings many countries within striking range, including Israel, the former Soviet Union, and Iran, though the missiles are said to be targeted on Tehran and other Iranian population centers, rather than Israel. The 2.5 km CEP of the CSS-2 missiles, combined with the cost of the purchase (6) has led to a great deal of speculation about Saudi Arabia's intentions. The missiles are far too inaccurate to be used against any point target with either HE or chemical warheads. King Fahd has pledged that Saudi Arabia will not arm the missiles with unconventional warheads nor use them in a first-strike mode. (7) According to a study by the Congressional Research Service, the Reagan administration received an assurance in writing that the Saudis would not obtain or use chemical or nuclear warheads with the CSS-2 missiles. (8) To further allay such fears, Saudi Arabia signed the NPT in April 1988. To date (August 1996), no ballistic missiles other than the CSS-2 are reported to be operational or under development in Saudi Arabia.

None of the CSS-2s was fired during Desert Storm. On August 2, 1990, just a few months after the Soleil base officially opened, In order to control Kuwait's oil treasures in Iraq's hands, Iraq invaded Kuwait in a brazen state, and less than a day later, the entire territory of Kuwait fell, and the entire military operation took less than 10 hours. This was followed by 100,000 Iraqi troops pushing the territory of eastern Saudi Arabia, posing a serious threat to the kingdom. For the first time, the Saudi military launched the Suleile base of the war readiness procedures, the Saudi official television station soon appeared "East Wind-3" figure: in the tense and orderly arrangements, a number of "East Wind-3" missiles were shipped to the launch base, ready to fulfill their mission. Prince Sultan later recalled that it was the existence of the Dongfeng-3 missile that made then-Iraqi President Saddam Saddam afraid to make a rebellion against Saudi Arabia.

In an interview with the Washington Times, Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan, acknowledging the inaccuracy of the CSS-2 and its consequent potential for killing civilians, said, "King Fahd ruled out that option [launching the missiles against Iraq] because of the fact that you cannot conrol it [the missiles] accurately. Our problem is that our war was not with the Iraqi people; it was with Saddam Hussein and his clique." (9) The multi-billion dollar King Khalid Military City is reported to include nuclear missile silos and nuclear-proofed underground command bunkers with full arming and firing capabilities, th0ough this report seems spurious. (10)

On April 29, 2014, the Saudi Royal Strategic Missile Force demonstrated Saudi Arabia’s Dongfeng-3A medium-range ballistic missile made in China. At the conclusion of major maneuvers of the Saudi forces in 2014 - supposedly the largest ever to have been held in Saudi Arabia - as it has now become known, there was something very special: a parade on the Hafar al-Batin air base near the border with Kuwait and Iraq, two ballistic mid-stretches of the top-secret strategic missile troops of the Sunni kingdom were demonstrated for the first time. The Chinese-type Dong Feng-3 (Eastwind) rockets were wheeled onto trucks and were likely to astonish spectators, including guests from Bahrain, the Emirates and Kuwait. The military exercise and official display of the ballistic missiles, which were acquired secretly from China in 1987 were clear signals Riyadh is directing to both Washington, Tehran and Baghdad. Riyadh acquired the missiles from China during the height of the 'city war' phase of the Iran-Iraq, after Washington refused selling short range ballistic missiles to the kingdom.

More recently, the Kingdom seems to have acquired an entire missile testing and production complex from Pakistan under the Shaheen [Falcon] project, so the display of the DF-3A came at a time when the missiles were being phased out in favor of more mobile solid propellant missiles.

References

1. According to the Los Angeles Times, the sale was made in July 1985 (Jim Mann, "U.S. caught napping by Sino-Soviet missile deal," Los Angeles Times, 4 May 88, p. 1, 8).

2. The Los Angeles Times reported (ibid., p. 8) that Saudi Arabia had purchased between 20 and 25 CSS-2 missiles, of which China is thought to have produced no more than 100. Two days later The Washington Times claimed, "The most recent shipment of about 25 CSS-2s arrived last month, complementing the first shipment of about 25 sent from China last fall." (Bill Gertz, "State, Pentagon worry about Saudi missiles," The Washington Times, 12 May 88, p. A3) These figures differ substanially from the later claim, discussed below, that the Saudis had deployed four to six launchers and 60 missiles at each of two sites.

3. David B. Ottaway, "U.S. Aide Opposes Halting Arms Sales Over Missiles," The Washington Post, 8 Nov 89, p. 37.

4. "Saudi CSS-2 missiles now operational," Flight International, 6-12 June 90, pp. 12-13.

5. The CSS-2 was designed for a nuclear warhead and, therefore, has low accuracy. The unmodified version has a range/ payload of 2,700 km/2,200 kg. (The Military Balance 1989-90, International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 219).

6. The price for the missiles, training, and support is placed at $1 billion to 3.25 billion. (Sunday Times [London], 23 May 88; "East Wind missiles chill U.S. Saudi relations," The Independent, 2 May 88, p. 12).

7. "Saudis Warn Iran They May Use Chinese Missiles," The New York Times, 28 Apr 88, p. 1.

8. Robert Shuey, p. 64.

9. Bill Gertz, "Saudis withheld missile to spare civilians," The Washington Times, 10 June 91, p. A4.

10. Odran Muntz Walsh, "Saudi Arabia's military oasis," Jane's Defence Weekly, 25 May 91, pp. 878-881.