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R-36 / SS-9 SCARP

A 1963 RAND study [Counterforce and Damage-Limiting Capabilities in Central War. 1970 (U)" by Fred Hoffman, Harvey Averch, Manrin Lavin, David McGarvty and Sorrel Wildhorn - August 1963 R-420-PR] referenced an "SS-9 system, a hypothetical, Minuteman-like ICBM.... the assumed SS-9 ICBM resembles a U.S. Minuteman - it is perhaps slightly heavier and uses storable liquid propellants instead of a solid propellant motor. The SS-9 is a later missile system than the SS-7, reflecting some technological innovations, easier producibility and greater dispersal and hardness.... Minuteman-like SS-9s [might be] split evenly between two forms of basing that accentuate survivability, missile launching submersible barges, and superhard silos.... The submersible barges are usually hidden from view, mobile, and resistant to overpressures of several hundred psi. The particular design ... contains 10 missiles per barge and may operate in the Caspian Sea, the Sea of Aral, or Lake Baikal. Although submersible barge basing promises an extraordinary degree of resistance to counterforce attacks, prudence might induce the Russians to insure their retaliatory capability by acquiring variety."

The SS-9 intercontinental ballistic missile was long an enigma to U.S. intelligence. The SS-9 was the world's largest missile at the time and its Mod 4 carried three MRV warheads. In the 1970s, many American analysts concluded that the SS-9's three large warheads were designed to eliminate the Minuteman missiles, which were deployed in groups of three in a pattern similar to the footprint of the SS-9 warheads. The SS-9s and later weapons threatened America's fixed, land-based strategic missiles. The Soviet SS-9 ICBM force alone was capable of delivering a megatonnage of nuclear warheads several times greater than that of the entire U.S.force of ICBMs and SLBMs.

The Soviets paraded SS-9 intercontinental ballistic missiles in Red Square in the mid-1960s. These missiles were the centerpiece of the Soviet nuclear threat for much of the following decade. The American search for survivable ICBM basing concepts, beyond the Minuteman basing, started in the mid-1960's when technology pointed to the eventual vulnerability offixed targets.

This search received initial emphasis when the Soviets deployed the SS-9 missile, seemingly aimed at destroying Aermican ICBM launch control centers -- an act clearly indicating theirintent to be capable of attacking ard destroying US military forces. There was evidence that the SS-9's were actually targeted against US ICBM launch control centers (LCCs). If the Soviets assumed that the destruction of a given LCC would disable several ICBM launchers, then this alternative targeting would have made sense. It was also possible other factors led them to deploy the SS-9 force as they did, such as a desire to deploy more than one iCBM design as a hedge against technological risk.

The Soviets achieved their first hard target capability with deployment of the SS-9 in 1966. Initially, there were varying estimates of accuracy and yield of the SS-9 MOD 1 and MOD 2. Despite some uncertainty in estimates of accuracy and yield, which results in a range of probability values prior to 1975, the S-9 MOD l and MOD 2 were the only Sov!et ICBMs with the combination of accuracy and yield which could be effective in attacking hard targets.

This capability, however, was dependent upon the successful employment of the two-on-one targeting technique to increase the probability of damage. Use of this technique could be relatively easy if the nuclear effects of the first RV were allowed to dissipate before the second is employed. But this could take can hour or so, more than enough time for the side attacked to launch its surviving missiles. Thus, for the attack to be effective, the two RVs would have to be closely spaced in time. Such spacing would increase the risk that the second RV would be disabled or thrown off course by the effects of the first detonation. American analysis of the phenomenology indicates that a "window" would occur about 5 to 60 seconds after the first detonation during which a second RV could reliably reach a target.

If in-line targeting were used the damage expectancy could be no better than the non-reprogramrnable reliability of the missile system. Cross targeting could overcon1e this limitation, but, in fact, the contribution of the second RV would be primarily to ensure the arrival of at least one reliable weapon; it would not add much to the likelihood of damage otherwise.

On 21 January 1969, through NSSM 3, President Nixon commissioned a study reviewing “our military posture and the balance of power.” On 12 February, the NSC heard a disturbing briefing from the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff. According to it, the Soviets should come out “ahead or equal” in a nuclear exchange, with 58 to 87 percent of the Soviet population surviving compared to 31 to 64 percent for the United States. The main reasons were that Soviet warheads could deliver more megatonnage and the US population was more concentrated. When the NSC reconvened on 14 February 1969, attendees worried that a new Soviet SS-9 intercontinental ballistic missile could be accurate and powerful enough, when outfitted with MIRVs, to destroy the hardened silos housing 1,000 Minuteman ICBMs. “We may have reached a balance of terror . . . ,” President Nixon remarked. “We remember our [superiority for] massive retaliation gave us freedom to act. This has changed.”

By June 1969, the threat to both Minuteman fields and bomber forces looked more serious than it had back in January. According to a National Intelligence Estimate, the Soviets had 258 SS-9 ICBM launchers operational or under construction. All tests that had been tracked involved multiple re-entry vehicles, meaning that an SS-9’s three warheads were not independently guided after separation from the launch vehicle. Even so, SS-9s had the range, yield, and accuracy to attack Minuteman silos—and MIRVing might follow. A Joint Staff officer advised General Wheeler that the Estimate “supports (but not unanimously) a grim view of the Soviet strategic force growth—in both an absolute sense and relative to the US strategic posture. It would appear that a prudent planner would tend toward the pessimistic alternative.”

American planners in the 1960s had assumed that if both superpowers had an adequate retaliatory capability neither would prepare for or risk a first strike. By 1970, the evidence was reasonably conclusive that the Soviet Union, rejecting this assumption, was deploying strategic weapons systems designed for a first-strike capability. This evidence included the continued Soviet production and deployment of ICBM's after having attained a clear numerical and megatonnage advantage; the emphasis on SS-9s designed as counter-force weapons capable of destroying U.S. hardened missile silos; and the development of MRV with warheads also designed as counter-force weapons.

On 12 February 1970 the Chief of the Imagery Exploitation Group at NPIC sent memo IEG/MSD-200/70 to the Executive Director of NPIC. Members of the SS-9 Variant Committee maintained liaison and evaluated new information concerning the SS-9 variant problem. New developments at the Tyuratam Missile Test Center possibly related to the SS-9 variant problem were noted at Complexes C and H and Launch Group Q. Some of the activity may be correlated with telemetry of recent firings of a variant of the SS-9 missile. Analysis of Radint indicated that the trajectory backtracks of two Mod-2 vehicles and one Mod-4 vehicle launched during the period were compatible with previous SS-9 launches from Tyuratam Complex H.

Photography of the SS-9 R&D facilities at Tyuratam showed activity levels which were compatible with the firings. Several propellant cars were observed between firings in Complex H, the R&D launch area,and a missile dolly was observed at pad H-1 one day prior to a Mod-4 launch. An unusually high level of activity was also observed at the instrumentation area which supported the SS-9 launches from Complex H. About 20-25 vehicles and electronic vans were observed on photographic coverage of the Complex C instrumentation facilities. The activity seen on photography therefore tended to indicate a high degree of Soviet interest in these flights, and suggested that the missiles all were launched from the prime SS-9 R&D facility - Complex H.

While the specific nature of renewed R&D interest in the SS-9 Mod-2 was unknown, its occurrence at a time when Mod-4 R&D was assessed to be in thefinal stages suggested that testing of another SS-9 variant could begin shortly after Mod-4 development was completed. Members of the committee regularly confered with one another on any new information concerning the problem. Significant developments or any breakthroughs on the part of the committee were to be reported to the Executive Director of NPIC immediately; otherwise, a status report would be forwarded on a quarterly basis.

As its title suggests, the "Interim Agreement Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Offensive Arms" was limited in duration and scope. Signed at Moscow May 26, 1972, SALT I was intended to remain in force for five years. (See preceding section on SALT.) Both countries undertook to continue negotiations for a more comprehensive agreement as soon as possible, and the scope and terms of any new agreement were not to be prejudiced by the provisions of the 1972 accord. In view of the many asymmetries in the two countries forces, imposing equivalent limitations required rather complex and precise provisions. Launchers for light or older ICBMs cannot be converted into launchers for modern heavy ICBMs. This prevents the Soviet Union from replacing older missiles with missiles such as the SS-9, which in 1972 was the largest and most powerful missile in the Soviet inventory and a source of particular concern to the United States. Within these limitations, modernization and replacement are permitted, but in the process of modernizing, the dimensions of silo launchers cannot be significantly increased.

A 1973 assessment by the National Security Agency [>The Soviet Land-based Ballistic Missile Program, 1945-1972] noted that the SS-9 provided the Soviet Union with a very reliable ICBM, capable of delivering huge payloads to intercontinental distances with a high degree of accuracy. Reaching operational capability in the mid-1960s, the SS-9 was capable of ranges between about 5,000 and, 7,000 nautical miles. Some 300 or so SS-9s were believed to have been deployed in hardened silos.

Although first launched on 3 December 1963, the initial design of subsystems for the SS-9 was probably started as early as 1958, with over-all design of the missile probably begun about, the same time the SS-7 reached initial operational capability. It was believed that the same team that designed the SS-7 was also responsib1e for the design of the SS-9.

Apparently the Soviets had placed urgent priorities on the deployment of an improved ICBM in the 1961-to-1962 time period, evidenced by the SS-7 and S8-8 programs, which, were marked by haste and an unusually high rate of failures. The SS-9 developmental program, however, seemed to be more deliberately planned and managed, and more carefully and methodically pursued.

Within a year of the first test of an SS-7, for example, an average of four missiles a month were being launched. But this firing rate was not achieved in the SS-9 program until two years after the initial launch. Following the initial launch in December 1963, 12 SS-9s were fired in the next 10 months. Eight of these were launched to Kamchatka, with one in-flight failure, and four to the Pacific, again with one in-flight failure. When compared to the initial 10-month test program of the SS-7, the percentage of in-flight failures of the SS-9 was slightly over 15 percent - contrasting sharply with an in-flight failure rate of about 35 percent for the SS-7.

Early in its developmental program, the SS-9 was involved in two demonstration exercises. The first, occurring on 30 May 1964, involved a launch from Tyuratam to Kamchatka. An SS-7 and SS-10 were also fired as part of this exercise. The three missiles were fired within a four~hour period, representing the first time the Soviets had successfully launched three different categories of ICBMs in one exercise. At the time, the SS-9 and SS-10 were still early in their developmental programs, these launches representing only the sixth of an SS-9, and the third of an SS-10. The second demonstration involving an SS-9 early in its test program occurred on the Tyuratam range on 24, 25, and 26 September 1964.

Two Soviet teams were apparently responsible for these efforts. The first, designated Group A, handled activities on the first day, when an SS-10, SS-8, and SS-6 were launched, the SS-6 as a booster for Kosmos 46. The second day saw the launch of an SS-9 to the Pacific, a distance of 7,000 nautical miles, and an SS-7 to Kamchatka. Group B apparently handled these efforts. On the final day an SS-7 was launched to Kamchatka.

These events, probably held for visiting dignitaries, were highly significant for a number of reasons. First, all ICBMs that had been tested on the Tyuratam range to that time were involved, representing one of the most intensive periods of operations ever conducted on the range in such a short time. Also of significance was the launch of the SS-9 to the extended-range Pacific impact area, after only 11 previous firings of the missile.

For this early beginning, the SS-9 evolved into a missile capable of performing a variety of functions. Four separate reentry vehicles have been associated with it (called Mods 1, 2, 3 and 4).

The first of the reentry variants, the Mod 1, weights about 9,500 pounds and was capable of 7,000-nautical mile ranges. The Mod 2 carried a heavier payload of 13,500 pounds to a range of about 5,300 nautical miles. Test and development programs these variants were conducted between December 1963 and December 1965, and both reached initial operational capability in 1966. Also, the SS-9 Mod 2 version was involved in a number of special events in later years, including one launched during a demonst~ation for the French Premier on 8 October 1972.

The Mod 3 variant is an FOBS/DICBM (Fractional Orbital Bombardment System / Depressed Trajectory ICBM). First tested in December 1965, the Mod 3 was believed to be capable of ranges up to 7,400 nauticai miles. Tests for Mod 3 deployment reportedly began in September 1969, and between :that date and September 1970 three launches were noted.

The Mod 4 was a multiple reentry vehicle (MRV), capable of delivering three 3,200-pound payloads to a maximum range of about 5,200 nautical miles. The Mod 4 was the first such multiple reentry vehicle developed by the Soviets. First launched on 28 August 1968, developmental launches to the Pacific and to Kamchatka continued to at least 5 November 1971. Twenty-one launches of the Mod 4 were noted in this period.

Tests of another "phase" of the Mod 4 began on 24 January 1973. Six tests of modified reentry vehicles of the Mod 4 category were noted in that year. These reentry vehicles were lighter and capable of higher reentry speeds than previous Mod 4 models. This modified version is referred to as the SS-9 Mod 4A. In 1972, five SS-9s were also noted being launched in tests of what was apparently a new type of reentry vehicle, the forerunner of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).

Radio guidance, used early in the SS-9 test program to supplement the missile's inertial guidance .system, was discontinued in 1965. Pr1or to 1965, a radio-guidance system augmented the inertial-guidance systems, in certain Soviet missiles, enhancing missile performance. However, this radioi guidance technique was not seen in use after 1965, when it was last observed associated with the SS-9. The development of more reliable a11-inertial guidance systems apparently made the concept unnecessary.

The SS-9 was assessed as being one be the most accurate operation ICBMs in the Soviet arsenal. The circular error probability (CEP) of the missile's wathead was estimated at between 0.4 and 0.5 nautic:al miles; whereas, for example, CEPs of the SS-7 and SS-8 were estimated at 1.0-tol.25 and 1 nautica:l miles, respectively. Also, the SS-9 was capable of delivering huge warheads. The Mod 1 warhead, for example, had a yield estimated to be between 12 and 18 megatons and the Mod 2 had a yield between 18 and 25 megatons. By comparison, the explosive force of the nuclear warhead of the SS-7 was est~mated to be between 2 and 5 megatons, and that of the SS-8 between 2.0 and 3.5 megatons.

Over-all length of the two-stage SS-9 is about 107 feet, including the reentry vehicle, with a maximum diameter of about 10 feet. Its first stage had three double-chambered liquid bipropellant main engines, with four liquid bip~opellant vernier-thrust units providing attitude control. Retro-rockets were used for separation. Weighing an average of about 410,000 pounds, the first stages of the Mods 1, 2 and 4 were capable of developing about 540,000 pounds of thrust. The gross weights of the second stages of the Mods 1 and 4 variants averaged about 127,000 pounds, with a main-engine thrust averaging about 210,000 pounds.