R-36 / SS-9 SCARP
Initially, for the R-36, it was planned to create three variants of the launch complex: ground automated, silo ["mine" group unified (analogous to the Sheksna complex) and silo type OS [Odinochnny Start - Individual Launch]. In 1964, the task was adjusted and only the silo complex of the OS type remained in development. Particular attention was paid to the maximum simplification of the launch positions developed by the Central Design Bureau-34 under the guidance of the most experienced designer E.G.Rudyak.
As a result of the studies carried out, their reliability increased, the refueling of missiles was excluded from the launch cycle, remote monitoring of the main parameters and systems was introduced in the process of combat duty, preparation for launch and remote launch of the missile. A silo ["shaft"] launcher of the OS type consisted of a head and a vertical trunk with a lower part of the silo. The silo housed a launching surface with guides and a gas reflector. The launch platform was non-rotating, since the rocket was turned into the given plane of firing by azimuth by its control system after exiting the silo launcher.
When creating a silo for the R-36 in the Central Design Bureau-34, many original solutions were found. The rocket with the laterally mounted bolls emerged from the silo along the guides located inside the container. At an altitude of 20 meters on command from the control system of the yoke was dropped. The design of the silo and its elements, the system for ensuring the temperature and humidity regime were thought through to the smallest detail. For long-term storage of the loaded rocket in the silo, the system had a system for maintaining the temperature and humidity of the air. For refueling, mobile refills were used. The fuel components were refueled when the missile was put on alert duty.
In connection with the need to increase the survivability of domestic silo-based ICBMs, E.G.Rudyak proposed to create a new silo launcher for R-36 with a security five times higher than existing ones by creating a powerful spring mount.
One of the most difficult was the problem of ensuring the tightness of missiles on alert. On the example of R-36, a large scope of issues had to be solved. V.F.Utkin, then deputy general designer, recalled that under the components of the fuel and their fumes for five years there were 22,817 detachable joints of various types - spherical, flat-lining, lock and nipple. To guarantee their operation, a large program of research and experiments was compiled with the participation of such research institutes as TsNIIMash, the Welding Institute imeni Paton, All-Union Institute of Aviation Motors, All-Union Institute of Light Alloys, Institute of Applied Mechanics of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, YuMZ factories, Kuybyshevsky imeni V.I.Lenin, Zaporizhstal, Dneprostal.
To test the rocket at Baikonur, six kilometers from the site 43 were built launch complex (site 67) and a radio control point (field 68). Later, during the period from 1964-1965, about ten more such launches were erected on this range. On September 28, 1963, the first rocket launch took place at the Baikonur test site, which ended unsuccessfully.
Colonel G.L. Smyslovsky recalled the progress of the missile tests: "In September, the work was completed, testing trials were started with the model of the product: the storage of refueling systems was filled with fuel components from tanks that were supplied to the site by rail. At the technical position, a team was formed to test the R-36 missile, V. A. Polivanov was appointed as the commander of the team. In September 1963, the R-36 missile was tested in a technical position, was taken to the site 67 and installed on the left start, tested, primed, and started pre-launch operations.
"The launch of the first R-36 missile on September 28 was an emergency, which was regretted very much. The cause of the accident was an imperfect design of the stop of the contacts of the rocket lift and the wrong design of the launch pad. At start, as expected, four steering engines with a total thrust of 28 tons were ignited, the rocket shook and weakened the contact of the lifting contacts, the contacts closed before the ignition of the main engines, but the steering engines worked. With a low launch pad between the rocket and the zero mark, a large temperature was created, due to this, the fuel supply pipes burned into the combustion chambers, the rocket began to collapse, and a great fire began.
"All this picture was observed from the bunker, the launcher was destroyed, the boom of the installer and the trolley broke, the platform was filled with the remains of rocket fuel. The next day, work began to eliminate the consequences of the accident. It was necessary to neutralize the site, remove the remains of fuel, the remains of the missile, clean the site. After the analysis of the accident, work began on dismantling the equipment that was put out of operation. It was necessary to replace the installer, launch pad, transport-installation cart, cable network and many other elements of the start equipment."
The chief designer of the complex V.P.Petrov was named the culprit of the accident, although it was possible to name others. It was found out that the launching table 800 mm high did not provide the escape of the gas stream from the chambers of the steering motors. The construction of the contact of the lift contact, taken from the complex of the R-16 missile, was unsuitable for the R-36 rocket. All this was taken into account, finalized and re-installed. They assembled a new launch pad, an installer, a cable network, new pneumatic and hydrocommunications, carried out cargo tests of all systems, complex tests with an electric mock-up.
The launch was ready for the second missile. Instead of V.P.Petrov, who was dismissed, V.N. Soloviev was appointed chief designer. Representatives of design bureaus worked at the complex, which were headed by V.G.Sergeev, V.N.Filippov, A.M.Goltsman, N.A.Krivoshey. On site 67, after the restoration of the left launcher, on December 3, 1963, the second launch of the R-36 missile was made. The start was successful. The third rocket launch on December 13 was an emergency, and the missile was burned at launch. The cause of the accident was the premature passage of the closing contact of the lift, the propulsion engines did not start. The accident was eliminated in a short time, and on January 16, 1964 the fourth successful launch of the missile was made.
In 1964, a whole series of launches of R-36 missiles was carried out. Two were allowed to full range in the water area. The fifth, seventh, eighth and fourteenth launches were emergency on the trajectory due to failure of the steering motors and malfunctions in the operation of the engine engines. All other launches during the year were successful. The 2nd launch group worked with great tension, the work was carried out qualitatively and on time.
In total in 1964 at Site 67 there were conducted 16 launches of R-36 missiles. Simultaneously, during this period, a group silo complex was built on site 80. It consisted of three silos for three types of missiles: R-16, R-36, UR-200. On January 14, 1965, the first R-36U rocket was launched from this complex. The launch was emergency, the rocket exploded in the silo. The cause of the accident was a malfunction in the operation of the turbo-pump unit of the engine of the 1st stage, the bearing of the turbo-pump unit collapsed.
The first launch of the R-36 rocket from the single launch of the site 140 was carried out on July 13, 1965 and was successful. Later, the launches were carried out from the sites 102, 140, 141 and newly constructed launches (sites 103-109, 142). A new highly secure unified command post (UCP) was built at the site of 111. The total number of R-36 rockets from single launches was launched: in 1965 - 14, in 1966 - 6.
The memoirs of G.L. Smyslovsky are supplemented by the chief designer of the Design Bureau of Special Machine Building (VSLM) VS Stepanov: "Chairman of the State Commission for Flight Design Testing Lieutenant-General Mikhail Grigoryevich Grigoriev arrived long before the tests began and began to enter in detail in the course of the matter. He often called me to his place (I was the technical director of the launch complex), meticulously asked around a wide range of questions. We have established good business relationships. His calm, confident manner of behavior created a business atmosphere and contributed to the achievement of a positive result.
The apotheosis of the flight-design tests was the demonstration volley of three missiles. This, in principle, was a success, however, there was a small hitch - "release" of the launch of one of the rockets. She summed up a loose-in-order technological chain - she jumped over the cable-mast rack, and she took off. Minister A. Afanasyev was informed that this was an oversight of the personnel. The rocket was brought back to its original state, and the next day it was successfully launched."
In July 1965 the R-36 rocket the flight tests of the means for overcoming the anti-missile defense systems began. Despite initial failures and refusals, members of the State Commission under the leadership of Lieutenant-General M.G. Grigoriev from the very beginning recognized the missile as promising and in the final success did not doubt. The system of testing and testing of the missile complex that was accepted at that time allowed simultaneously developing flight production of rockets, technological equipment, as well as construction of launch positions, with flight tests.
A powerful missile giant was urgently needed for the defense of the USSR, but at the same time the chairman of the commission deeply understood the need for increased requirements for the operation of missile systems. Safety and reliability can not be reduced under any circumstances. M.G.Grigoriev was persistent and consistent in his demands, in which he found constant support from the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Force, N.I.Krylov. As a result, mutual understanding was achieved. Representatives of the design bureaus and the industry realized that to shake the reasonable and experienced activity of the chairman of the commission for the reception of the complex, to force him to lower the exactingness is a hopeless business.
On May 29, 1966, the entire test cycle was completed, and on July 21, 1967, the R-36 missile in the ballistic version (8K67) with the missile defense system was adopted for use by the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. On the same day, a government decree was adopted on the creation of a space system for maritime reconnaissance within the US satellite and a carrier rocket based on the R-36 missile.
At that time, this missile complex had unique capabilities and was much superior to the American counterpart. Later, the R-36 rocket was continuously improved: the global R-36orb, the R-36P missile with the divisible head of the scattering type, and finally the advanced heavy-duty missile with the detachable warhead with the individual aiming of the combat blocks on the target - R-36M.
On the basis of the R-36 rocket, the Cyclone rockets were also developed, the development of which was started by the decision of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of August 24, 1965. The missile complex R-36M2 (15A18M, in the NATO classification of SS-18, Satan), which made up the main power of the Strategic Missile Force, which had no analogues in the practice of world rocket construction, set the last point in the history of the Cold War.
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