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R-16 / SS-7 SADDLER - Western Views

On 02 February, 1961, the Soviets launched a rocket from the Tyuratam range which was immediately identified as a new type. Subsequent launches in March and April 1961 made it clear that a flight test program for a new intercontinental ballistic missile had indeed begun. These events were observed with great interest by the small community of missile intelligence experts — but without tremendous surprise.

By then considerable knowledge had accumulated on the first Soviet ICBM (the SS-6). Although much remained to be discovered about the SS-6, it was known to be a very large missile, that it almost certainly was very expensive, that it used difficult-to-handle liquid oxygen as one of its propellants, and that the Soviets would in all likelihood find this monster next-to-impossible to deploy in sufficient numbers to make it a major threat. The American intelligence community thus found it natural enough that the Russians should come along with a new design which was presumably smaller and easier to transport and deploy than the SS-6, possibly even an ICBM capable of being launched from an underground silo.

By the spring of 1961 the American missile analysts had rolled up their sleeves and plunged into an examination of all the data on this new system. It was not long before there was general agreement within the intelligence community that the new ICBM, designated the SS-7, was indeed smaller and more portable than the SS-6, had a payload of about 4,500 pounds compared to one double that size for the SS-6 and burned "storable" propellants rather than liquid oxygen. The intelligence community had been expecting to see a small ICBM when the SS-7 test program was begun, and therefore no debate occurred on the point.

On October 18, 1963 NIE 11-8-63 "SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK" noted that "Evidence acquired during the past year has led us to modify our estimates as to the size and composition of the Soviet ICBM force in the near term. The most important single development was the interruption of the deployment program during the summer and fall of 1962. The primary reasons for this interruption appear to have been technical, including a probable modification to the second-generation SS-7 ICBM system and persisting difficulties in development of the SS-8. Whatever the reason, however, it is clear that 1962 was a year of reappraisal, in which Soviet planners apparently made important new decisions with respect to their ICBM program. Some of these, for example curtailment of SS-8 deployment, are already evident. For the near term, the result is a somewhat smaller force than previously estimated.

"Of the three Soviet ICBM systems now in the field, the SS-7 has been the most successful in development and is the most widely deployed. Deployment of the large, first generation SS-6 was limited to four launchers at one complex. Deployment of the SS-8 had extended to four complexes before the program was interrupted. However, SS-8 deployment has now been curtailed, and it is believed that expansion of the ICBM force over the next year or so will be primarily in terms of the SS-7."

A National Security Agency history, "The Soviet Land-based Ballistic Missile Program, 1945-1972" An Historical Overview" [TOP SECRET UMBRA] noted that the SS-7 was an ICBM deployed in the Soviet Union at both soft and hard sites. From a rather inauspicious beginning (the first three launches of SS-7s were failures), the missile evolved into an effective weapon system, capable of achieving intercontinental ranges between about 4,000 and 7,000 nautical miles. First tested on 24 October 1960 on the Tyuratam range, this missile was believed to have reached initial operational capability by early 1962, and the first missiles (perhaps as many as 10 in number) oould have been deployerl at soft sites by this time.

Although test and development phases of the SS-7 missile program were conducted at Tyuratam, for the operational deployment of the missile were mainly conducted on the Plesetsk range. High trajectories were flown fram·Tyuratam (370-500 nautical miles); lower trajectories were flown from Plesetsk (330-365 nautical miles).

Both high- and low-ballistic coefficient reentry vehicles were tested at Tyuratam. Only the high-speed reentry vehicles were tested at Plesetsk. The speed of a reentry vehicle is gauged through its ballistic coefficient, which is a reentry-vehicle characteristic whose value is a function of reentry-vehicle weight and shape. The speed with which a reentry-vehicle passes through the atmosphere increases as the ballistic coefficient inceases.

A number of variations of the SS-7 emerged. Designaterd Mods 1, 2, 3, and 4, these variants were distinguished mainly by varying reentcy vehicle weights and configurations. The first, the Mod 1, was tested during initial phases of the SS-7's development. The Mod 2 reentry vehicle, which weighed about 3,500 pounds, the same as that of the Mod 1, was first noted tested in October 1962 to 3,400 and 6,500-nautical mile distances. A heavier reentry vehicle, the Mod 3, was first tested during November 1962 to Kamchatka (a distance of 3,400 nautical miles) and to the Pacific (4,800 nautical miles). The weight of the mod 3 was about 4,200 pounds. A still heavier reentcy vehicle, the Mod 4, was first testerl during the Summer of 1963, to 3,400 and 4,800-nautical mile distances. Weighing about 4,800 pounds, its intended purpose could not be discerned, and it was not believed to have been deployed operationally.

Subsequent SS-7 tests in 1964 and 1965 employed mainly Mod 2 and 3 reentry vehicles, making them the most likely candidates for deployment. Further, comparisons of the SS-5 reentry vehicle with that of the SS-7 Mod 1 indicated that they were probably the same. Since both of these missiles evolved in about the same tine period, and since both reached initial operational capability at about the same time, it is likely that the Soviets had decided upon a standard reentry vehicle for use on both the SS-5 and SS-7.

The SS-7 was about 100 feet in length, with a maximum diameter of 10 and 8 feet for the first and second stages respectively. Ths weight of the missile was about 327,000 pounds, with a second stage weight of about 100,000 pounds. Maximum range for Mod 1 and Mod 2 variants was 7,000 nautical miles; the Mod 3 variant had a maximum range of 6,000 nautical miles. First stage thrust was about 570,000 pounds; second stage thrust was about 203,000 pounds. First stage thrust depicts sea-level measurerrents; second stage thrust (and that of other upper stages where applicable) reflects measurarents in Vacuum.

A two-stage missile, the SS-7's first stage had three liquid-fueled engines and four liquid-fueled vernier engines to assist in control of the missile during first-stage operation. The second stage had one liquid-fueled main engine with four liquid-fueled vernier (for control) engines. Possibly four solid-propellant retroreckets provide first and second stage separation; reentry vehicle separation from the second stage was also probably accomplished by four solid-fueled retro-rockets.

Guidance was inertial, and velocity control was accomplished by main-engine throttling and vernier-engine cutoff. The SS-7's circular error probabile was believed to be between 1.0 and 1.25 nautical miles. As was the case with other Soviet missiles, the SS-7 developmental program was divided into a number of distinct test phases. The first, of "feasibility" tests, extended fran about October 1960 to September 1961. A second period, from about October 1961 to December 1962, was of tests to discern the over-all capabilities of the missile and its supporting systems. A third, from 29 November to an undetermined termination date, was of series-production missles, during which missiles were apparently selected randomnly and tested to verify that they satisfied design specifications. Subsequent test periods ran from January to Decanber 1962, March 1963 to February 1967, and March 1967 to March 1969.

The technique of deploying missiles in silos was relatively new to the Soviets by the time the SS-7 reached operational status. Also, inherent costs, and time-consuming construction that delayed deployrrent, caused silso lag behind missile development in these early years. Consequently, the first SS-7s were probably deployed above ground at soft sites - but with major drawbacks. The launch site itself was highly vulnerable to attack and sabotage. Also, lengthy periods of time were required to prepare the missile for launch. It had to be moved from storage to the launch pad, erected, fueled, and subsystems checked out, causing from one to two hours delay. Conversely, between five and twenty minutes were required to prepare the missile for launch when it was stored in a silo, and it could be held fully fueled for extended perids in a high state of readiness.

Preliminary design of the SS-7 was probably began in 1958, and prduction of test models had probably started by 1959. The first missile tested, on 24 October 1960, failed, as did subsequent launches on 2 February and 3 March 1961. But by early 1962 the Mod 1 was probably operational and deployed, and the Mods 2 and 3 probably achieved initial operational capability in late 1962 and 1963 tespectively. The Mod 4 apparently was not deployed operationally. By mid-1966, production of the SS-7 was believed to have terminated.