R-16 / SS-7 SADDLER - The Nedelin Disaster
The first stage of the history of the strategic missile forces spanned the period from 1959 to 1965, the period when the missile forces were taking shape. The first commander of the missile forces was Nedelin who died in 1960 during the tests of the R-16 rocket. He was succeeded by the Hero of the Soviet Union, Marshal Moskalenko Kirill Semyonovich. He was followed by Berezov Sergei Semyonovich. During this period the missile forces were growing rapidly.
A.V. Nedelin outlined the role of nuclear strategy in re-establishing Russia's place as "a great world power" and called for theory that would consider "constant change in the specter, nature and geography of threats."17 Nedelin's theory of nuclear strategy included general foundations of nuclear strategy, theory of nuclear deterrence, theory of combat use of nuclear weapons and theory of nuclear armaments.
Nedelin's approach to nuclear strategy transcended military and technical issues, introducing ethnogenetic and ethno-psychological subjective factors. He said that maritime powers favor sea-based deterrence while continental states favor land-based systems, and he stressed the importance of national willingness to accept losses in pursuing significant goals. He further stressed expansionist sentiments, aggressiveness, steadfastness in assuming burdens and losses in war, and the means to recover after a national catastrophe. By introducing these subjective factors into the risk assessments, Nedelin consciously moved from military-technical criteria for operational success into political calculation.
Mitrofan I. Nedelin was the artillery officer most frequently identified among high ranking officials of the USSR Ministry of Defense in 1952 when he became a deputy minister of defense and was elected a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee. He was raised to the rank of Marshal of Artillery in 1953, when he and P.F.Zhigazev became the first officers to be promoted to marshal since 1947. In 1959 he became the first commander of the Soviet Rocket Forces.
Test flights were to be started on 24 October 1960 at the Baikonur cosmodrome. Of such importance to Soviet leadership was the R-16 that the head of the Soviet ballistic missile force, Marshal Mitrofan Nedelin, was placed in charge. Rushing to test launch the R-16 as a celebratory gift to Khrushchev for the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, design, development, and flight-development testing schedules were dangerously compressed.
Design deficiencies of early Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles in the late 1950s arms race with the USA led the Soviet leadership to initiate the development of a new type of missile, designated the R-16. Rushing to test launch the R-16 as a celebratory gift to Khrushchev for the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, design, development, and flight-development testing schedules were dangerously compressed. Nedelin reportedly had at least two conversations with an impatient Khrushchev over the lack of progress. Khrushchev had made a speech days earlier to the United Nations about the might of Soviet armed forces and claimed that rockets were being produced like “sausages from a machine.”
On October 21–23 the R-16 was moved to the pad and after the initial safety checks had been successfully completed, the rocket was fueled. Due to the failure to follow (or lack of sufficient safety procedures), both Marshal Nedelin and rocket designer Yangel, along with about 150 other non-essential personnel, remained on the launch pad during fueling and testing. Nedelin reportedly set up a chair to observe and direct operations.
Repairs to the replace the blown pyrotechnics on the valves in the automatic control system were made. According to some reports, requests were made to drain the propellant prior to repairs, though there was no established procedure to do so, but Nedelin refused saying that there would be no time for such things in nuclear war. It was possible that once fueled, components would not be able to be used again if the rocket was drained due to the caustic nature of the propellants. Lines were tightened and the leak rate was seemingly deemed acceptable for continuing.
The launch was pushed back to the next day as technicians worked to complete repairs and testing. It appears that many common sense safety procedures were violated, such as soldering joints in the propellant lines on a fully-fueled rocket. A group of high-government officials arrived to view the launch at a stand set up only several hundred meters from the pad. Nedelin reportedly had at least two conversations with an impatient Khrushchev over the lack of progress. Khrushchev had made a speech days earlier to the United Nations about the might of Soviet armed forces and claimed that rockets were being produced like “sausages from a machine.”
After another 30-minute delay, Nedelin insisted on returning to the pad and sitting just a few meters away to oversee things. As the day slipped away and under pressure from superiors, frantic technicians began running tests quickly and simultaneously. According to some reports, the only schematic of the rocket’s electrical system (a rough schematic diagram) was not available as the engineer who had it was not allowed on the pad.
During the hurried, launch pad testing, the automatic control system for the fuel valves had been cycled out of launch position. A technician sent a command to reset it to its launch condition, but this sent a spurious signal to open the propellant line valves of the second-stage engines. A “block” in the electrical system failed to prevent the signal from reaching operational portions of the rocket during testing.
As launch time approached, the membranes that prevented propellants from getting into the propellant lines were opened in preparation for launch. Following this, a set of explosive pyrotechnic devices on the valves of one of the first-stage engines went off, apparently spontaneously. One or both of these resulted in a leak of propellants, though accounts differ on the leak rate.
On October 24th, 1960 fuel valves in the second stage of the Soviet’s R-16 ICBM prototype were inadvertently opened, and hypergolic propellants mixed and burned into the first stage causing a massive explosion at the launch pad. During the test, the accidental engine ignition in the second stage cause an explosion. Poor design of the control system allowed ignition of the second stage during pre-launch processing. A failed “block” in the electrical system did not prevent a spurious command signal from opening the second stage valves and allowing the hypergolic fuel and oxidizer to mix and ignite Repairs to an earlier problem with leaking fuel in the first stage, and subsequent tests of the repairs that were performed quickly and sometimes simultaneously, left components in varying stages of launch readiness.
The hypergolic (self-igniting) propellants of the second stage mixed, lit in the engine and quickly burned through the top of the first stage, which then exploded. The expanding ball of 3000ºF fire and toxic gases instantly killed many personnel, covered others in burning propellant and suffocated some with acidic fumes. The number of personnel and visitors in close proximity to the launch pad exceeded safe limits given that technicians were performing repairs on a fully-fueled rocket. At least 74 people died from the fireball and toxic gases, and approximately 50 more died later from the injuries received that day. Among the dead was Strategic Rocket Forces Marshal Mitrofan Nedelin. Approximately 50 more died later from the injuries received that day.
Initially it was thought to be a failed attempt at launching a Mars probe, only later was it discovered that the test, in fact, was of a new ICBM.
The incident was kept a secret for decades. The incident had long been shrouded in mystery, and was first described in [not entirely accurately] detail by James Oberg's books "Red Star in Orbit" and "Uncovering Soviet Disasters." Even long after the end of the Cold War, much of the history of the Soviet missile program remained shrouded in mystery. According to an article in the 16 October 1965 issue of The Manchester Guardian, Nedelin, and 300 others, were killed in the fall of 1960 when a missile exploded on its launch pad. Quoting as its ·source the "secret reports" of Oleg V. Penkovsky, the Soviet citizen sentenced to death in 1963 for spying for the West, The Guardian noted that the countdown for the missile -- described as one with "a nuclear propellant" -- went smoothly, but the "new missile failed to leave the ground". After waiting 20 minutes, the observers left the shelters, at which time the missile explcrled. The Soviets publicly attributed Nedelin's death to "an air accident."
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