The Little Civil War /
Malenkaya Grajdanskaya Voina /
Dispute of the Century
Disputes within technical councils, ministry staffs, and expert commissions took on such a violent nature that this period in the history of military missile technology (from approximately 1965 through 1975) was called the “little civil war.” “Brother against brother, father against son,” they said ironically in the ministry halls. When old acquaintances and friends met up, they sorted out their relationships from the standpoint of “whose side are you on?” And if they didn’t see eye to eye, a rift formed in their personal relationship.
The main cause of the “little civil war” was a fundamental disagreement in the building of the third generation of missile systems. All told, hundreds of thousands of people were occupied with this work in industry and the army. One of the most serious disputes, dragging into their orbit not only the chief designers, but also the major state leaders, ministers and the Ministry of Defense, was the so-called "dispute of the century" ("small civil war").
At Mozzhorin’s initiative, NII-88 came forward with the proposal to increase the degree of protection of already existing UR-100 and R-36 silo systems and immediately develop a new generation of missiles with on-board computers for the individual guiding of each warhead to its own target. This proposal triggered shrill opposition from the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, our Minister Afanasyev, and General Designer Chelomey. They believed that the already well-developed cooperation of smooth-running missile production and acceptance would be ruined. Factory workloads would now be threatened, and people would need to master the technology and operation of a guidance and control system that used computers. The Rocket Forces would have to train new specialists. Chelomey had spoken out along the following lines: “The MIRV concept is just a fad".
The face-off between the strategic missile concepts reached its apogee during the second half of 1969. KB Yuzhnoye, headed by Yangel, and NII-88, headed by Mozzhorin, with the support of First Deputy Minister Tyulin, VPK Chairman Smirnov, and the loners that had joined them, proposed three basic measures:
- significantly increasing the degree of protection of already existing UR-100 and R-36 launch systems
- developing a new generation of intercontinental MR UR-100 and R-36M missiles carrying multiple independently targetable warheads using a mortar launch, and installing them in well protected silos, and
- curtailing the production and buildup of the number of RVSN launchers.
TsKB Mashinostroyeniye, headed by Chelomey, and the Ministry of Defense, headed by Marshal Grechko, proposed the following:
- modernizing the light UR-100K missiles to replace the UR-100 in existing silos
- developing a long-term strategic system of light UR-100N missiles with multiple independently targetable warheads and increased protection for their silo launchers
- significantly building up the number of strategic missile groupings, and
- gradually phasing out R-36 heavy missiles, replacing them with the UR-100N.
It was recommended by NII-88 to introduce into our missile group and mobile ground-based missile systems, ground or railway, in order to increase the invulnerability of strategic missiles, including with increasing accuracy in firing enemy missiles. This proposal, frankly, did not inspire the IOM leadership, because it violated the well-established mechanism for the wide production of missiles, full and productive loading of the plants. The proposal of the institute had a strong support of the chief designer M.K. Yangelya and was met with hostility by his rival - chief designer VN. Chelomey.
Hardening can be called only such a refinement of the mine structure, when the old shaft of the silo ["mine"] and its foundation are preserved, i.e. increase the strength of the mine is due to the internal hardening of the trunk and protective roof. If the adopted ejection scheme of the launch complex of the UR-100 rocket is retained, this hardening is impossible. The internal thickening of the barrel led to an unacceptable decrease in the area of ??the return ring flue, through which the glowing gases from the engine emerge when the rocket is launched outward.
If, on the other hand, the area of ??the opposite annular gas flue remains unchanged, external hardening of the shaft of the shaft is inevitable, that is, a complete dismantling of the trunk, foundation and head, which is equivalent to the destruction of the old mine and the construction of the new one in its original location. This circumstance made the Ministry of Defense so uncompromisingly to oppose the strengthening of the existing launch complexes of the UR-100 and R-36 missiles.
Therefore, it was proposed to use the mortar launch for launching a new generation of rockets - launching a missile from the transport launch canister with powder gases and launching its engine at an altitude of approximately 20 m. The proposed startup scheme eliminated the need to use backward gas ducts and allowed a considerable part of their volume to be used to strengthen the barrel. In principle, the idea of ??a mortar launch is not new. It was implemented even at the launch of missiles from submarines. However, to apply this principle in terrestrial, strongly fortified, starting complexes required the solution of a number of new technical problems, at that time risky enough, which later were the subject of additional heated battles with opponents of mortar launch of missiles.
But this problem proved to be easily solvable. The proposed principles of mortar launch were warmly supported by M.K. Yangel and subsequently found a brilliant constructive embodiment. TsNIIMash also proposed a light compact pneumatic cushioning system for a container with a missile instead of the proposed multi-tonnage springs, a new aiming system and a number of other basic design solutions for the mine launch facility with the mortar launch of the missile were recommended.
Minister of General Mechanical Engineering Sergey Aleksandrovich Afanasyev, feeling the influence of Vladimir Nikolaevich on the defense minister, decided to consider the proposal of NII-88 (in 1967 he became the Central Research Institute of Mechanical Engineering) at the Scientific and Technical Council of the Central Committee of the Central Committee in Chelomey in Reutov.
The Ministry of Defense, in order to end all discussions about the choice of a new generation of intercontinental strategic light missiles and close disputes about the need to increase the degree of protection of the already constructed mine launch facilities, in June 1968, it assembles its supreme technical body - the Military Technical Council, which will meet at the meeting report V.N. Chelomeya and its main subcontractors. Present are the Minister of Defense, the top command staff of the General Staff and the Strategic Missile Forces, the main designers-subcontractors of Chelomey, the leadership of the Ministry of General Mechanical Engineering, the chiefs of the Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense. Basically - all the supporters or participants in the development of the proposal of Vladimir Nikolaevich. As opponents, only two people were invited: deputy chairman of the military-industrial complex Georgi Nikolayevich Pashkov.
The proposals of Yury Mozzhorin of TsNIIMash were seen as an invasion of the "hunting grounds" of the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense in the formulation of the defense doctrine in the new conditions with the existence of nuclear missile weapons caused an acute negative reaction from the leaders in epaulets. After all, in their own home, a "civilian" expert does not teach the military how to build the defense of the state. The Minister of Defense Grechko could not stand it, got up and abruptly cut me off: "Do not frighten us, do not frighten us!" We will not act according to your scheme. We will not allow the repetition of 1941."
Mozzhorin replied "Comrade Minister!" We have worked in detail and simulated all cases of combat use of nuclear missile weapons in the conditions of preventive and counter-attack strikes. In these cases, it is impossible to achieve victory."
The Military Industrial Commission formalized the agreement, instructing the Yuzhnoye SDO and its main sub-divisions, with the involvement of the Central Research Institute of Nuclear Materials, to carry out the design of the new generation heavy complex R-36M with reinforcement of the constructed launch facilities, and the project of a promising light rocket type UR-100 with a mortar launch placed in a reinforced mine.
A state interdepartmental expert commission was set up under the chairmanship of the President of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Academician M.V. Keldysh to consider the disputes that have arisen between the parties and prepare sound proposals regarding the development of strategic missile weapons. The discussion of the fundamental questions of defense doctrine and the ways of developing strategic missiles, moved to a concrete plane of assessing the effectiveness and technical and economic characteristics (by the criterion of "cost-effectiveness") of the MR-UR100 and UR-100K plus UR-100N missile groups, their advantages and shortcomings. With serious disagreements between the state interdepartmental expert commission, it was not possible to prepare any suitable conclusion. The chairman of the state commission, Academician M.V. Keldysh did not agree withthe conclusion. Therefore, it was decided to bring the matter to the Council of Defense of the country.
The matter ended up in proceedings in the Defense Council, chaired by Central Committee Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. The Defense Council was held in late July 1969 in the Crimea, at Stalin's former summer residence near Yalta. The meeting of the Defense Council took place on a low mountain, on a green picturesque glade, under an awning. The weather was favorable for work, it was not hot.
Leonid Illych said " the decision should provide for a significant increase in the protection of existing mine launch facilities in order to ensure a guaranteed retaliatory strike. A new generation of strategic missiles must necessarily be equipped with an MIRV with individual guidance of warheads on targets to ensure high accuracy of fire and combat readiness of the complexes. It is necessary to begin the development of a mobile railway missile system." After the end of the meeting of the Defense Council, L.I. Brezhnev personally expressed serious dissatisfaction with Ustinov, Grechko, and Afanasyev over the inconsistency of their opinions.
The results of the described meeting of the Defense Council had serious consequences. This included the approval of the supreme political and state leadership of the doctrine of guaranteed retaliatory strike was obtained; the doctrine of deterrence, which TsNIIMash had long and persistently spoken about and wrote.
The Defense Council quite strongly rejected the proposal of the Defense Ministry. And the commander-in-chief of the missile troops, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Nikolai Ivanovich Krylov, received a serious reprimand from Kosygin, when he again repeated the idea that security is not necessary, since the military is not going to sit and wait for them to be struck, but to use missiles first or, as a last resort , in the counter-oncoming strike.
The development of two new missile systems was an excessive luxury. It was enough to limit the first. However, there was a certain positive moment in their parallel creation. The atmosphere of the sharpest rivalry between the two strongest design bureaus made it possible to overcome in a short time all problems in the development of promising technologies for the creation of missiles with MIRV.
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