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DF–21D ASBM - A Game Changer ?

China is one of a handful of states engaged in a race to deploy a hypersonic strike platform capable of evading modern missile defense systems.

A Game Changer

Peter M. Bilodeau noted in 2011 that "The DF-21D, if fully operational, could reach all current forward bases in the region with the exception of perhaps Guam. Therefore, the US must consider all current forward bases vulnerable to attack.... the US is forced to operate from longer distances. Increased distances, such as missions from Guam, will drive increased sortie durations thus resulting in reduced available sorties over a given period of time. A nominal daily sortie rate for a 500nm combat radius is 3.94 sorties per aircraft per day. If the combat radius increases to 2250nm, the rate drops to 1.79 sorties per aircraft per day."

Gregory R. Bamford noted in 2012 that "The loss of a Nuclear Powered Carrier (CVN) and its associated airwing or an Amphibious Assault Ship (multi-purpose) LHD with its Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) components due to PRC use of the DF-21 ASBM would be a significant strategic defeat for US naval forces in the region. The use of the DF-21, combined with the use of intra-theater ballistic missiles against aircraft, surface units and their associated logistical support bases, could close the South China Sea that would allow the PRC to control a major portion of the SLOCs in East Asia."

"The WU-14 will become China's global strike weapon that would cause a great threat and challenges to the US,” said Professor Arthur Shu-fan Ding, the secretary general of the Taipei-based Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies. A successful model of the vehicle would boost China’s defense, and possibly render existing US missile-defense systems obsolete, according to the professor. China currently has approximately 100 teams of experts working on the project, a hypersonic expert told the South China Morning Post.

Maybe Not a Game Changer

A March 2013 report by Ronald O'Rourke, the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) specialist in naval affairs, suggests China's anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) can be countered, and is not, necessarily, the "game-changer" many defense analysts predict. O'Rourke argues that the DF-21D ASBM can be defeated by "employing a combination of active and passive measures"along the ASBM's "kill chain.”

In "China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities," O'Rourke noted there are several areas in the sequence of events (the "kill chain") where active and passive measures can be taken to stop the missile. These include when the target ship is detected and identified, when that data is transmitted to the ASBM launcher, firing the ASBM, and when the ASBM re-entry vehicle finds the target ship. The Navy could acquire systems for disabling or jamming China's long-range maritime surveillance and targeting systems, destroy ASBMs in various stages of flight, and decoy and confuse ASBMs as they approach their intended targets.

1. The U.S. Navy could do more to control electromagnetic emissions or using deception emitters.
2. Options for destroying ASBMs in flight include developing versions of the SM-3 Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) interceptor missile, including the planned SM-3 Block IIA.
3. The U.S. Navy could accelerate the procurement of the Sea-Based Terminal interceptor, which is the planned successor of the SM-2 Block IV terminal-phase BMD interceptor.
4. ASBMs could be defeated as they approach their intended targets by equipping ships with electronic warfare systems or systems for generating radar-opaque smoke clouds that confuse an ASBM's terminal-guidance radar.

More could be done to develop an ASBM endo-atmospheric target, which currently appears dead in the Pentagon. Despite dire warnings by a variety of defense analysts that the U.S. risks losing an aircraft carrier to a Chinese ASBM, O'Rourke concluded that the U.S. Air Force had already "taken [China's] kill chains apart to the ‘nth' degree.”

"It's necessary for China to boost its missile capabilities, because the PLA's [People’s Liberation Army] weapons are weaker than the US' shields, which are deployed everywhere in the world," Xudong Wang, a satellite adviser to China’s central government, was quoted as saying by the South China Morning Post. "All missiles launched by the PLA, if there was a military conflict, would be intercepted by the US' defense systems before entering the atmosphere,” Wang added.

In written testimony to the US China Commission, Dennis Gormley, senior lecturer at the University of Pittsburgh, raised additional technical questions regarding China’s deployment of the DF–21D such as "whether or not China has truly mastered the terminal guidance and maneuvering capability needed to successfully attack a moving aircraft carrier. Particularly demanding is the development of sensors and warheads that can survive the rigors of atmosphere reentry, including high speeds and temperatures, without adversely affecting required seeker and warhead performance.:" The ability of the Second Artillery to strike its intended target is significant because PLA doctrine appears to consider the possibility of using the DF–21D for precision strikes as well as warning shots. In a tense wartime situation an error in DF–21D targeting, therefore, could mean the difference between deescalation and escalation.