MLF - Johnson Administration
President Lyndon B. Johnson's administration continued the policies that had been initiated by President John F. Kennedy. The foreign policy team assembled by President Kennedy remained largely intact with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Under Secretary George W. Ball, and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy continuing to dominate policy formulation toward Europe. In the aftermath of the Cuban and Berlin crises, relations with the Soviet Union appeared to be entering a new and less directly confrontational phase. At the same time, burgeoning European economic power, revived French nationalism forcefully expressed by President Charles de Gaulle, and Germany's evolving role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization threatened the continued cohesion of the Alliance.
US policymakers focused on the Multilateral Force (MLF) as a means of consolidating the defense of Europe without foregoing control of strategic weapons. It also would give the West Germans a reasonable level of participation in the management of NATO's nuclear weapons. Despite considerable Allied effort to reach a consensus, the MLF did not enjoy widespread support. Although German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard joined with President Johnson to support the MLF, within NATO the French opposed the concept from the beginning. The British had strong reservations about its military aspects, and delayed further consideration of the force until after the 1964 fall elections when a new Labour government was elected.
By divesting itself of nuclear weapons the HMG might help to arrest the present disturbing trend toward proliferation—a trend that had been given a new impetus by the recent Chinese explosion. During the election campaign the Tories had made a great point of saying that the Labor government would turn over the defense of the United Kingdom to the Americans. There were anti-American elements both in the Tory Party and the Labor Party. These elements did not control either party—particularly the Labor Party. However, merely to hand over the British Polaris submarines on a non-returnable basis could well be political suicide.
The new British Government's position on the MLF made clear that it preferred not to participate and that it opposed the force unless it was part of a larger integrated command. The British seemed unable to appreciate the political value of the MLF surface fleet to the other NATO governments involved in the Paris discussions. for the United Kingdom there were two questions: 1)whether there should be a surface fleet at all, and 2) whether the British should be in it, if there were one. The United Kingdom believed the answer to the first was no and hoped to present better alternatives.
The U.S. Government agreed to suspend judgment on the British ideas until they could be discussed with the other NATO Allies. During British Prime Minister Harold Wilson's visit to Washington in December 1964, the President pointed out that his overwhelming interest in the MLF and nuclear forces in NATO was to make sure that Germany participated fully in some form of multilateral force. In the meetings, the two sides exchanged papers attempting to define a British idea for an Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF), which would include the Germans and any other members of the NATO Alliance who wanted to participate.
Neither the MLF nor ANF was approved in 1965, despite U.S. and British efforts and German interest. In response to this failure, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara proposed creation of a Select Committee of Defense Ministers to consider expanded Allied participation in planning for the use of nuclear weapons. McNamara's proposal met with membership approval (except for the French) at a meeting of the NATO Permanent Representatives in June.
All this transpired against a background of increasingly frequent French statements about reexamining the NATO Alliance with the aim of bringing forces and installations in France under French command and freeing French forces from NATO control. Progress on the nuclear question slowed as France provoked a crisis within the European Economic Community (EEC), which it linked with its demand for reorganization of NATO. Once again the ANF/MLF question was eclipsed. The Select Committee, however, was not affected, and held its first formal meeting on November 27, when working groups devoted to studying the nuclear role of the Alliance were established.
Chancellor Erhard attempted to resolve the impasse over Alliance nuclear sharing during a visit to Washington in December 1965, presenting President Johnson with a paper that proposed a “hardware” solution to the problem, which could be considered on a tripartite basis. The President concluded that tripartite consideration of the Chancellor's suggestion should begin early in 1966.
The attention of policymakers was diverted, however, to France's role in the Alliance. On March 7, 1966, President De Gaulle made his long awaited démarche on NATO. He informed President Johnson that France was removing its forces from the NATO integrated command and that all foreign forces and installations in France must be placed under French command. A March 11 aide-memoire filled in the specifics of the French proposal. Despite the elusive character of De Gaulle's political motivation, it became increasingly clear to U.S. policymakers that he intended a fundamental change in France's relationship with the Western Alliance. In the opinion of many observers, De Gaulle had concluded that the Soviet threat had diminished to acceptable levels and sought a France with political and military autonomy, free to pursue its own national interests.
While making clear the seriousness with which he viewed the French decision, President Johnson sought to avoid a direct confrontation with De Gaulle. The United States thus began the complex process of reestablishing the Alliance (effectively without France), working within a NATO framework rather than treating the crisis as a bilateral matter. In his March 22 reply to de Gaulle, President Johnson noted that De Gaulle's proposals would severely affect the security of the whole Alliance, which was fundamental to Western security. He also questioned the wisdom of French reliance on an independent deterrent. President Johnson believed that since nothing could be gained by debating the French on their decision, the task of the United States should be to rebuild the Alliance outside of France as quickly as possible.
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