Skorpion
The first half of the 1960s became the period of deployment in the US of a naval strategic nuclear missile system. A similar system was born at that time in the USSR. At the beginning of 1963, the United States had already ten nuclear submarines, each carrying 16 ballistic missiles with underwater launch - Polaris A-1 and A-2 with a range of 2200 and 2800 km, respectively. The Americans planned to build 45 such submarine missile carriers (in fact, up to 1967, 41 SSBNs entered service), and from the 11th ship they were to arm the Polaris SLBM of modification A-3 with a range of 4600 km. Construction of the SSBN was also planned in the UK and France.
In addition, at the end of 1962, the United States initiated the creation of 25 surface-to-surface missile ships with eight BRs Polaris A-3s in each of the so-called Multi-Lateral Force (MLF) of NATO. The construction of these ships was to be financed by the USA, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Holland, Belgium, Turkey and Greece, and their crews were supposed to be formed from representatives of the eight listed NATO member countries. The program was planned to be implemented within ten years, and it was believed that the main ship could be commissioned in 3.5 years after issuing the order for its construction, which was supposed to be carried out in the FRG and other NATO countries.
The rocket carrier ships were to be built on the basis of high-speed (20 knots) American transports of the Mariner type, which had a displacement of about 18,000 tons. In appearance, they did not have to differ from ordinary commercial vessels. Western military experts believed that such missile carriers, which were on patrolling in zones of intensive navigation (the Eastern Atlantic, the Mediterranean Sea), will have sufficient secrecy, since their detection and recognition among nearly three thousand other vessels that are daily in the same areas, becomes a difficult task for the probable enemy.
Soviet propaganda immediately declared such ships "pirate", although the foreign press reported that they would carry a special naval flag of the NATO MLF. On the apparent seriousness of these intentions, NATO was shown, in particular, by the installation of four launchers for the Polaris SLBM on the Italian light cruiser Giuseppe Garibaldi. It was carried out in late 1962 during the stay of the ship in the USA. Then, several launches of the training modifications of the SLBM were carried out. The navy ultimately did not equip the ship with missiles.
The plans to create a grouping of surface missile vessels of the NATO MLF caused serious concern for the military and political leadership of the USSR, since their implementation could aggravate the then serious gap between the Soviet Union and the United States in the number of deployed surface-based and sea-launched ballistic missiles.
At the beginning of 1963, the USSR had 29 diesel-electric and 8 nuclear missile submarines, which accommodated 104 missiles. At the same time, the Soviet boats were "low-flying", and their missiles - relatively "short-range". Thus, five submarines of avenue AB-611 and one avenue PW-611 carried two R-11FM missiles (range - only 150 km), and twenty-two diesel submarines pr.629 and eight nuclear pr.658 -three P -13 complex D-2 (range - up to 700 km). Unlike the American, at that time all the Soviet missiles had a surface launch. Designed to replace the D-2 on the existing submarines, a new D-4 complex with R-21 submarine launch missiles with a range of 1400 km, at that time there was only one submarine at Pr.629-B, where the launch tubes for two missiles were installed.
Since the new multi-rocket atomic submarines of Pr.667-A (16 R-27 missiles of the D-5 complex with underwater launch and a range of 2400 km) were still being developed, and it was clearly inadvisable to continue the construction of the "low-missile" submarines of pr.629 and 658, there came a nearly five-year pause in missile boats- the first ships pr.667-A were laid in 1964, and surrendered to the Navy only in 1967.
In the years 1963-1966. the improvement of Soviet underwater nuclear missile system was carried out only by re-equipment of existing missile submarines with the D-4 complex. At the same time, the development of the D-9 naval missile system with an intercontinental range of fire and the design of its carrier - atomic submarine pr.667-B with twelve SLBMs was developing.
Along with the creation of nuclear submarine missile carriers and ground-based complexes of intercontinental ballistic missiles in the early 1960s, scientific research organizations of industry (SRI-88 of the State Committee for General Mechanical Engineering and CRI-45 of the State Committee for Shipbuilding, subsequently - Central Research Institute of Machine Building Minobshchemash and Central Research Institute. acad. A.N. Krylov SMEs) carried out exploratory studies of ways of speedy build-up of the nuclear missile potential due to the creation of non-traditional systems of ICBM basing, which are more secretive from detection by the enemy and, consequently, and greater combat stability than conventional ground-based ICBMs. At the same time, the main object of research was the UR-100 ICBM (developer - OKB-52, chief designer - V.N.Chelomey) as the smallest in their mass-size characteristics among all land-based ICBMs being developed at the time, and ahead of the development of marine DBs R-29 complex D-9 (SKB-385, chief designer - V.P.Makeev), which also had an intercontinental range (up to 9000 km).
As the development of these studies in 1964, under TsKB-18 under the leadership of Chief Designer S.N.Kovalev, predesign projects were carried out under the numbers 602 and 602A : deployment of UR-100M ICBMs (D-8 complex) on a submerged launcher in the form of a vertical cylinder with eight launching tubes located around it, as well as a diesel-electric submarine (also with eight tubes). The first of them were intended for placement in inland water basins and in the coastal seas, and the latter in the the outer seas. Further development of these works was not received.
In these studies, the variants of deployment of UR-100M ICBMs and also the D-9 complex on surface carriers deployed not only on open seas but also on inland waterways and reservoirs were considered. Since the main factor responsible for increasing the combat stability of surface ships with ICBMs compared to land-based launches was the complexity of their recognition from space, preference was given to options simulating conventional civilian craft.
The only significant and undeniable advantage of the surface missile carrier over the submarine was considered to be a more reliable system of command radio communications, which provided him with practically the same high readiness for launching missiles as for ground-based ICBMs. In addition, it was assumed that surface missile carriers, unlike underwater ones, will be able to be built practically at any of the country's shipbuilding plants, so that their construction in addition to missile submarines will ensure the fastest build-up of the nuclear missile potential deployed on mobile carriers.
In 1963, at the direction of the Minister of Shipbuilding Boris Butoma, TsKB-17 was involved in the work on surface missile carriers, which at that time was headed by B.G.Chilikin. The actual head of these works in the bureau was B.V.Shmelev.
The analysis of possible areas for the use of surface missile carriers disguised as civilian vessels showed that the most suitable for this purpose are the water areas adjacent to Soviet territory in the northwest and northeast (Barents, White and Sea of Okhotsk), patrolling in which ships with SLBM intercontinental range can keep at gunpoint facilities for the most part (about 90%) of the US territory. Since there were about five hundred floating craft for various purposes in all these waters, the identification of missile carriers operating under the naval flag, but identical in appearance to those civil courts characteristic of these areas, seemed quite a difficult task for the probable enemy.
The pr.550 (type "Amguema"), serially built at that time in Komsomolsk-on-Amur and in Kherson, with a deadweight of 8,700 tons had an icebreaker hull shape, a propeller with detachable blades and a diesel-electric power plant, which allowed them to work independently on the Northern Sea Route.
Initially, the main option was the deployment of UR-100M missiles of the D-8 complex on the ship. However, despite the violent resistance of V.N.Chelomey, R-29 missiles of the D-9 complex were considered the most suitable for use from surface ships. Although they lagged behind the completion of development from the UR-100, but they had a completely autonomous control system, while the UR-100 were guided on the active site by radio-correction and therefore could only be used from areas equipped with ground control points (RUP).
Sketch No. 909 of the carrier vehicle of the D-9 missile weapon complex on the basis of vessel V.550 was developed by TsKB-17 on the basis of the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR of August 10, 1964, No. 680-280 and the order of the SSC on August 25, 1964 under a contract with the Navy GVM dated March 19, 1965, the SCS Order of February 27, 1965, the project was given the conventional name "Scorpion".
The resolution provided for the issuance by the Navy of the TsKB-17 tactical and technical task in the IV quarter of 1964 and the completion of the preliminary design in the II quarter. 1965 However, the Navy was not enthusiastic about this project and finally issued tactical-technical characteristics [TTZ] only on April 17, 1965. The main designer of the project was Yu.A.Makedon, and his deputy - B.V.Shmelev. The functions of the main observer from the Navy were carried out by engineer-captain 2nd rank B.A.Kolyzayev.
In accordance with the TTZ, a missile weapon complex (RD) D-9 was to be installed on the ship, ensuring the launch of BR-29 from geographic areas of 35-75 degrees, at air temperature from -30 to +50 degrees, wind speed up to 25 m / s, onboard rolling with amplitude up to 10 deg, and pitching - up to 4 deg.
The complex included the following main elements:
- eight R-29 SLBMs stored in fully equipped and fueled fuel components in unmanned from Pr. 701 and Pr.667-B vertical tubes at 4C-75 launchers (it was provided for the possibility of finding a SLBM on the ship for six months) and a five-minute readiness to the launch (the loading of the SLBM onto the ship was provided by the basic means);
- testing and launching electrical equipment of the control system RO;
- Documentation system;
- Telemetry control system;
- Optical-electronic control system for linking the missile and navigation systems to the base planes of the ship.
To ensure the operation of the SLBM complex, the ship provided for: a navigation complex capable of determining the ship's position with an accuracy of 3 km and a direction with an accuracy of 0.5 deg .; ship computing complex; system of common time.
The missile system was serviced by a number of special shipborne systems, including: a ventilation system and microclimate in the launch tubes; cooling system of missile instrument compartments; a system for controlling the vapor concentration of fuel components in tubes; system of emergency oxidizer discharge from the tanks of the SLBM overboard and fuel into the mine; system of neutralization of the remains of fuel components in tubes, etc.
For the automated reception from the coastal signal about the announcement of combat readiness No. 1, the command to use the SLBM and to remove the blocking of the unauthorized launch of missiles, the transmission of confirmation of the receipt of commands and their execution, provided for a command radio system with two or three times the redundancy of equipment, providing round-the-clock reception of signals in the form digit code with a high degree of reliability and reliability (0.99) with simultaneously operating two medium-wave and three short-wave channels.
In addition, to receive orders, reports, information about the situation, and also to maintain a two-way communication with coastal command posts, cooperating ships and aircraft, the ship was equipped with two sets of radio transmitters and four radio receivers, three radio stations, and special equipment. Radar facilities included two navigational radar "Volga" and a system of state recognition "Khrom-KM". Infrared equipment for the joint swimming "Fire-50" was also envisaged.
No means of self-defense were provided on the ship. The protection of the ship was taken in the scope of the project of the mobilization equipment of ships, pr.550, and included, in addition to conventional anti-nuclear protection measures, only a demagnetizing device.
Since the project envisaged the use of the hull of vessel V.550 with preservation of its main dimensions, hull, and architecture, the main issues that arose in the development of pr. 909 became the following:
- rational use of the premises of the transport vessel for the placement of the SLBM complex. providing its systems and devices with the preservation of the identity of the appearance of the ship with the ship pr.550 ;
- accommodation doubled compared to pr.550 personnel (places for 114 people, including 26 officers, 16 chief administrators and midshipmen, instead of 67 people);
- Achievement of a two-axis unsinkable standard;
- power supply to additional consumers of electricity:
- obtaining a cruising range of 5,000 miles with autonomy for provisions and fuel for auxiliary diesel generators and auxiliary boilers for 180 days.
The launching tubes of the SLBM complex were placed in two rows across the ship in a separate compartment with a length of 7.2 m located directly to the stern in the area of the assumed position of the center of gravity. At the same time, the average superstructure was extended by 3 m in comparison with Pr.550. Light deck covers of the launch tubes were supposed to be coated with a wooden floor covering.
The control and maintenance posts of the SLBM complex were located adjacent to the compartment of the launch tubes. At the same time, the radio part of the navigation complex was made retractable, and the covers of their tubes were masked under the overhead decks of the upper deck.
Considering the greater autonomy of the ship, it was tried to provide for improved living conditions. The living quarters (six 1-bed and ten 2-bed cabins for officers, four 2-bed and the same 4-berth cabins for the chiefs and midshipmen, three 6-, three 10- and two 12-person cabins for the private composition) were placed in the middle superstructure together with the wardroom and the dining room of the team. All rooms were serviced by air conditioning.
The location of the SLBM complex, residential, office and other premises together with the equipment of new fuel and ballast tanks led to the almost complete use of the volume of the hull and the superstructure of the vessel, pr.550. Since there were no cargo holds on the ship, in order to disguise it as a civil vessel, the coaches of the cargo hatchways and their closures had to be made false, like most of the cargo arrows saved in pr.550 (with the exception of the two necessary for loading provisions) as well as a beam antenna between the masts, equipped with a drop device before launching the BR. As a result, the main difference between the silhouettes of the ship is pr. 909 and the ship pr.550 was determined only by the presence on the first additional antennas of radio communication.
The hull of the ship was preserved under Pr.550, which was designed according to the "Rules of the USSR Marine Register" edition of 1956 (for the class Arctic). The superstructure and pipe were made of aluminum-magnesium alloy, which allowed the ship to be stable in accordance with the Navy's requirements for ships of the 1st rank, while reducing the amount of solid ballast received by 200 tons.
Particular attention in the development of the project was given to the issues of ensuring the launch of missiles during the rocking of the ship. In the Central Research Institute-45, sea trials of the ship's model were carried out, which made it possible to determine the parameters of its pitching on the waves and to assess the possibilities for improving them by setting up roll silencers. Since the de-icing of rolling was to be carried out both on the go and without a move, the liquid soak was adopted in the project. CRI-45 investigated two of their types: the Fram of the 1st kind and the Flum cistern with a free surface in the connecting channel. It was found that with the size of tanks accepted in the project (the total length is 0.065L, the mass of the liquid is 2.4% of the displacement), both types provide a reduction in the amplitude of rolling by about 1.3 times.
As shown by model tests, at all course angles to the wave with waves up to 6 points inclusive and nonoperating depressors, the maximum amplitude of the rolling roll did not exceed 10 degrees, and the keel pitch - 4 degrees, that is, they do not go beyond the limits at which rockets can be launched. These data coincided with full-scale measurements of the rolling parameters performed by the Central Research Institute-45 on the vessel "Olenek", Pr.550.
Unsinkability of the ship in accordance with the TTZ was to be ensured by flooding any two adjacent compartments with a total length of at least 20% of the length of the ship. This required the installation of three additional (in comparison with pr.550 ) transverse bulkheads, reception of solid (970 tons), and at standard displacement - and liquid (666 tons) ballast. In addition, to eliminate the asymmetry of flooding, the tanks of opposite sides were connected by flow tubes.
The power plant was adopted at Pr.550 single-shaft diesel-electric, which includes four main diesel generators with a capacity of 1800 hp each . and a 7000-hp direct-current propulsion motor, which provides the ship with a speed of 15 knots.
The auxiliary electric power plant consisted of eight diesel alternators with a capacity of 300 kW each located in two power plants (separated to increase survivability along the length of the ship). For heating and other household needs, two auxiliary boilers with a steam capacity of 4 t / h were provided, as well as (as in pr.550 ), four utilization boilers of 0.1 t / h. Stocks of fuel, lubricating oil and feedwater for boilers were taken on the basis of the provision of a specified range of 5,000 miles by a 15-kilometer stroke and the model of use of the ship stipulated in the TTZ during one autonomous campaign (13 days - a course with a speed of 15 knots and 167 days - parking in full combat readiness) and amounted to 3765 tons.
Admission to the ship, which has the architecture of an ordinary dry cargo ship, so significant (about 35% of the total displacement) of the liquid cargo stock has led to the need for equipment in the former cargo holds of "tall" tanks separated by horizontal barriers.
Displacement of the ship was 6940 tons empty, standard - 7630 tons, and full - 11660 tons, which was significantly less than expected from its foreign counterpart.
In addition to the development of the sketch design for the Scorpion ship in the main version ( draft 909 ), the TsKB-17 carried out, in essence, in an initiative manner, a reduced sketch design for a 1,111 surface missile carrier, the minimum in terms of the location of the D-9 complex with 8 BR-29 displacement, disguised as a hydrographic vessel. The main requirements of the Navy for such a ship were issued to TsKB-17 only on June 5, 1965.
The principal differences between the vessel of project 1111 and the main variant were:
- Decrease in autonomy for stocks of provisions and fuel for auxiliary diesel generators from 180 to 30 days;
- application of a two-shaft GEM consisting of two "58" type diesel engines with a rated capacity of 4500 hp, which provides a speed of 18 knots. (16 knots with a long total capacity of 5,500 hp) and an EEU comprising six 300 kW diesel generators;
- more complete than in pr. 909 , satisfaction of Navy requirements in terms of protection (1.7 times less safe radius for an atomic explosion, introduction of measures to reduce not only electromagnetic, but also acoustic, and also thermal fields), stability and unsinkability ;
- availability of equipment for conducting hydrographic works to mask.
In addition, the hull of the ship was designed not according to the rules of the USSR Marine Register, but in accordance with the "Rules for the calculation of the strength of the hull structures of surface ships," which ensured a noticeable economy of its mass.
The width of the ship (16.5 m) was accepted as maximum permissible under the conditions of stability and placement of missile tubes four in a row across the ship, and the coefficient of overall completeness was equal to 0.56 instead of 0.64 at Pr . 909 . As a result, the standard displacement of the ship was 4,790 tons, and the full displacement - 5,530 tons, that is, more than twice less than on pr.909.
Such a significant reduction in the displacement of the ship led to a deterioration in the parameters of its pitching, and therefore, at a level of 6 points, even with the operating depressors (passive Flum tanks, which reduce the amplitude of the rolling roll by a factor of 1.6), the ship would have to maneuver, angles to the wave of 75-170 deg. According to the estimates of TsKB-17, the labor intensity and the cost of building the spacecraft of pr.1111 would be respectively 1.62 and 1.13 times less than that of the ship pr909 .
Construction of ships of the "Scorpion" type was planned at the plant No. 199 in Komsomolsk-on-Amur. CDB-17 optimistically assumed that, subject to the completion of technical projects in the fourth quarter of 1965, the main ships could be built in 1968.
Sketches pr. 909 and 1111 were completed by TsKB-17 in July-August 1965, and their materials were presented to the leadership of SMEs and the Navy command. Both projects were developed by CDB-17 almost by the forces of two departments: the project department (the head of A.B.Morin) and the theory of the ship (chief S.F.Petukhov). Among the participants in the development, in addition to Yu.A.Makedon and B.V.Shmelev, mention should be made of V.N.Snytsersky, E.D.Epshtein, A.M. Khmelev, A.A.Bodyagina.
TsKB-17 recommended further design of the Scorpion ships for both variants, believing that the creation of surface missile carriers in two modifications would have made it difficult for the probable enemy to detect and recognize them among dozens of other ships and ships that are constantly in the Barents and Okhotsk Seas. CRI-45 in its conclusion on pp. 909 and 1111 , submitted to the leadership of SMEs in September 1965, noted that the creation in addition to nuclear submarine missile carriers a number of surface carriers of D-9 missile systems can be justified by the following:
- By building such ships, the number of strategic BRs deployed on mobile carriers will be increased, without prejudice to the program for the construction of nuclear submarines of other purposes and at minimal cost;
- the presence in the structure of our fleet of not only underwater but also surface vehicles of strategic missile forces will force potential adversaries to attract additional forces and means for tracking these ships in peacetime, thus diverting them from solving other problems.
Further in the conclusion it was said that the construction of the Scorpion ships on both variants could be justified only on condition that it would lead to a significant increase in the combat stability of the system of surface missile carriers as a whole due to the difficulty of their recognition among other civil and military ships and ships. However, ships 1111 disguised as hydrographic ships will have a small number of similar ones, they can easily be identified, so their creation along with the ships of pr. 909 will not lead to a noticeable increase in the combat stability of the system.
Meanwhile, the ships of Project 909 had relative to the ships pr.1111 the following advantages:
- higher secrecy, since vessels close to them by the silhouette are present in large numbers in the northern and Far Eastern sea theaters, while specially constructed hydrographic vessels similar to Pr.1111 are absent in the USSR;
- increased readiness for immediate use of weapons due to higher values of the operational tension factor (KOH) and the "weather factor" (repeatability of the wave, at which rockets can launch according to the conditions of rolling) were increased by at least 1.2 times.
At the same time, in terms of the total costs for the construction and operation of the ship (taking into account the cost of the SLBMs, the cost of supplying fuel in the sea from tankers, etc.), attributed to the number of real launches of SLBM (the product of the number of missiles at KOH and " "), Both ships will be practically equivalent. Therefore, the further development of the ship "Scorpion" TsNII-45 recommended to conduct on pr.909 on the basis of the plant, which was mastered by the plant No. 199 of Pr.550.
Projects 909 and 1111 did not pass the usual procedure for review and approval in the SMEs and the central office of the Navy. In the fall of 1965 it became clear that the planned program for the construction of surface missile carriers for the NATO MLF would not be realized, and therefore further work on the Scorpion project was not carried out.
Evaluating the project "Scorpio" in retrospect, it should be noted that its implementation would not accelerate the buildup of nuclear missile potential, since the number of warships built in the Soviet Union had always been limited not so much to shipbuilding capabilities as to the supply of weapons systems (missile and navigation systems complexes and other products of instrument manufacture). Therefore, the construction of surface ships with a set of D-9 would inevitably reflected on the construction program equipped with the same weapons of nuclear submarines, *especially since some of them were also built at the plant No. 199 in Komsomolsk-on-Amur. In these conditions, the creation of surface-mounted rocket carriers like the Scorpion could in fact have only political significance, as a response to the relevant NATO programs, and with the abandonment of them, it was completely natural that such work ceased in the USSR.
American shipbuilders developed high-speed Mariner transports that could carry eight Polaris A-3 missiles with a range of up to 4600 km. Their main feature was similarity with the vessels of the commercial fleet. Every year for 20 years, the US leadership planned to launch one ship of the "Mariner" type, and in the beginning of 1963, experimental launches of missiles from the modernized Italian cruiser "Giuseppe Garibaldi" were already conducted. In case of war such missile carriers together with nuclear submarines could easily get lost in the ocean spaces and at any moment strike a sudden blow to the USSR.
At that time in the Soviet Union, under the leadership of the general designer Vladimir Chelomey, the newest ship of the Dolphin project was already being created. It could carry four cruise missiles "P-25" which were intended for the destruction of surface and coastal targets. Its main feature, at the request of the head of the country, Khrushchev's advice was the ability to covertly move under the water like a submarine, surf the surface and attack the enemy at the speed of a torpedo boat, and then quickly SLBMeak away from it in the underwater position. In addition, by the middle of 1963, 40 submarines were part of the Soviet missile arsenal, which could carry only two or three missiles with a relatively short range of up to 900 km, so that to attack the enemy's targets the Soviet submarines had to be approached as close as possible to the objects. This circumstance made domestic submarines vulnerable to anti-submarine forces.
In 1963, the Nevsky PKB was commissioned to create the first ship of the project 909 carrier ballistic missiles. The basis was a dry cargo ship of ice navigation project 550, displacement of 9000 tons. On the ship behind the armored control deck and the "false" superstructures, eight tubes with ballistic missiles "R-29", with a flight range of over 9000 km, were to be placed vertically in two rows. It is no accident that the ship was given the designation " Scorpion "". In July 1964, proposals for a new ship were ready. In parallel, at the initiative of designers, a draft of another 1111 project was prepared. With the same combat load, the military vessel was to have half the displacement and have the silhouette of the hydrographic vessel. These ships were supposed to patrol on the routes of the Barents and Okhotsk Seas, where up to 500 civilian vessels were constantly plied. It was impossible to distinguish them from civilian vessels, and at that time almost the entire territory of the United States was under attack.
Particular attention in the development of the project was given to ensuring the launch of missiles in sea waves. In the Central Research Institute-45, sea trials of the ship model were carried out, which made it possible to determine the parameters of its pitching and to assess the possibility of their improvement by installing the soothing rollers. On the ship the missile carrier was installed an active soot.
Construction of ships of the " Scorpion " type was planned at the plant No. 199 in the city of Komsomolsk-on-Amur. The Central Design Bureau hoped with hope that, subject to the completion of technical projects in the fourth quarter of 1965, the main ships of the missile carriers could already be launched in 1968. Both options were submitted to the country's Defense Council, but soon after the removal of Nikita Khrushchev from the post of head of the USSR in 1964, the US abandoned the secretive deployment of missiles and focused on the construction of an atomic missile submarine fleet. In the USSR, the development of the project " Scorpion " and 1111 was discontinued.
Elements | Pr. 909 |
Pr. 1111 |
NATO MLF |
| Type of missile complex | D-9 | D-9 | "Polaris" A-3 |
|
Number of launch tubes (ammunition) |
8 (8) | 8 (8) | 8 (8) |
|
Safe radius medium-caliber atomic bomb, M |
3500 | 2100 | N/d |
| Displacement, T: |
|
|
|
| Empty | 6940 | 3700 | N/d |
|
Standard with water in tanks Uspokoitelja and with liquid Ballast |
8560 | 4790 | N/d |
| Full | 11660 | 5230 | 18000 |
| Main dimensions, M: |
|
|
|
| Length of the largest (by KWL) | 133.1 (123) | 106 (97) | 171 |
| Width of the largest (on KWL) | 18.8 (18.5) | 16.5 | 23.2 |
| The height on the amidships | 11.6 | 13.5 | N/d |
|
Draught average at full Displacement |
7.82 | 5.54 | 8.8 |
| Main Power Plant: |
|
|
|
| Type | Diesel-Electic | Diesel |
Boiler- Turbine |
| Power on shafts, L. S. | 1 & #215; 7000 | 2 & #215; 4000 | 1 & #215; 19000 |
|
Power of diesel Generators auxiliary pp, KW |
8 & #215; 300 | 6 & #215; 300 |
|
| Speed of full stroke, uz. | 15 | 18 | 20 |
| Range, miles (at speed, uz.) | 5000 * (15) | 5000 (16) | 12000 (n/a) |
| Autonomy, day | 180 | 30 | 100 |
| Crew, pers. | 105 | 107 | 215 |
| Cost of construction, mln. Rub. |
|
|
|
| Head ship | 18.9 | 15.5 | N/d |
| Serial 3-rd ship | 16.2 | 12.5 | N/d |
|
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