B-45C
Few new features separated the B-45C from the B-45A. The B-45C was equipped for air refueling (The air refueling arrangement consisted of a boom receptacle located on the top of the fuselage, about midway, and of a single point refueling receptacle on the left side aft of the bomb bays) and fitted from the start with wing tip tanks (The B-45C was often flown with 1,200 gallon wing tip tanks; when full, each fuel tank weighed some 7,500 pounds). The RB-45C also looked like the B-45A, except for a small bump on the tip of the aircraft's nose, where a forward oblique camera was enclosed. The RB-45C, in addition, featured a water injection system for increased take off thrust that utilized two 214-gallon droppable tanks suspended beneath the nacelles by means of assisted take off suspension hooks. If preferable, the RB-45C could make use of 2 droppable assisted take off rockets located on the underside of the nacelles. The RB-45C included sweeping internal changes. Five stations were provided, and these stations could mount 10 different types of cameras. However, the crew could not move to the aft camera compartment when the RB-45C was flying; in flight access to the bomb bays was possible, but only if the bomb bays were empty, the bomb bay doors were closed, and the pressurized compartments were depressurized.
North American began working on the B-45C design on September 22, 1947, 2 months after the AAF had endorsed the aircraft's production. Design of the RB-45C was initiated in January, 1949, when the entire B-45 program was significantly reduced. The additional production of 2 B-45Cs and 49 RB-45Cs (Manufacturer's Model NA-162), under contract since 17 June 1948, was canceled either in late 1948 or early 1949. Although money was a factor, the Air Force's belief that a reconnaissance version of the B-47 would be superior to the best RB-45 nailed the cancellation.
The Air Force decided to buy a sizable fleet of B-45Cs on 3 July 1947 and signed the necessary document (Contract AC 18000) in October of the same year. But after only 10 B-45Cs were completed, numerous change orders were issued that drastically altered the October contract. Procurement was limited to the 10 B-45Cs already built, plus 33 airframes that were to be modified on the production lines to serve as photo mapping and reconnaissance aircraft. As it turned out, the RB-45C order marked the end of the B-45 production run. Lt. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay replaced Gen. George C. Kenney as Commander of the Strategic Air Command on 19 October 1948. SAC's new Commanding General had commanded the B-29 strikes against Japan during World War II and lost no time in re-emphasizing to Air Force officials at the highest level the importance of reconnaissance. In fact, every bomber produced after World War II had a genuine reconnaissance counterpart, or could be used for reconnissance. In the latter case, it might take but a few hours to prepare a given aircraft for the reconnaissance role, or to bring back the reconnaissance bomber to its original configuration. Sometimes the 2 versions of 1 aircraft were assigned to the same unit.
The B-45C first flew on May 3, 1949; the RB-45C in April, 1950.
The Air Force started taking delivery of the B-45C in May 1949 and of the RB-45C in June 1950. Even though a few of the aircraft were deployed overseas in late 1950, no B/RB-45C unit reached an initial operational capability (IOC) before 1951. The RB-45Cs were earmarked for SAC, primarily. The command's inventory reached a peak of 38 aircraft in 1951, some B-45s being included in this total. However, no B/RB-45 aircraft remained on the SAC rolls in 1953. Yet, this did not spell the RB-45's end.
The B/RB-45s were not officially committed to the Korean War, but 3 TAC B/RB-45s reached the Far East in the fall of 1950 (The B/RB 45s were not shown on the Air Force listing of aircraft which participated in any fashion in the 3 year conflict). The small detachment, TAC personnel and civilian technical representatives included, departed for Japan in late September for the express purpose of measuring the reconnaissance capability of a configuration which had not yet been given the most telling of all tests, that of actual combat. Arrival of the RB-45s was well timed, as the RB-29s of the 91st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron were no longer able to perform with impunity the special missions ordered by Far East Air Forces or the targeting and bomb damage assessment photography desired by its Bomber Command. Eager to maintain its reconnaissance capability in the face of the Soviet built MiG jets, Bomber Command on January 31, 1951 took control of the RB-45 detachment and attached it to the 91st Squadron. The RB-45 crews managed to outrun and outmaneuver the MiGs for several months. Yet, on April 9, 1951, one of the too few RB- 45s barely escaped a numerically far superior enemy. In the ensuing months, while the RB-29s were no longer allowed to enter northwestern Korea, even with escort, the RB-45s could still go into the MiG infested area if they had jet fighter escort. However, after another harrowing experience on November 9, 1951, the RB-45s also were restricted by Far East Air Forces from entering the sensitive areas of northwestern Korea in daylight. In January 1952, the 91st Squadron was directed to convert to night operations, but testing soon showed that the squadron's RB-45s could not be used for night photography because the aircraft buffeted too badly when its forward bomb bay was opened to drop flash bombs. In any case, deficiencies confirmed soon after the RB-45s had reached Japan (The 91st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron thought the RB-45s were so unsafe for ditching that a Japan based rescue plane held a station orbit over the Sea of Japan each time these planes crossed to Korea), plus the many commitments levied on the 33 aircraft, had foretold the eventual end of the RB-45's Korean experience.
The Air Force accepted 10 B-45Cs and 33 RB-45Cs between May 1949 and October 1951.
The Air Force prorated the basic cost of the entire program ($1.1 million). Consequently, the B/RB-45Cs carried the price tag of the B-45As.
Some B-45s, after undergoing in production modifications, assumed a training role usually assigned to elderly, surplus aircraft. This unusual project took shape early in 1949, when Secretary of the Air Force W. Stuart Symington informed Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal that future technological trends in aircraft and weapons development called for various types of special training. Even though the procurement of aircraft had been cut, in line with President Truman's fiscal policy, steps had to be taken to keep improving the striking power of the Air Force within the approved 48 group structure. Hence, Mr. Symington recommended and Mr. Forrestal approved the conversion of 16 B-45Cs for tow target duty in order to teach anti aircraft gunners high speed, high altitude firing. The B-45C conversion project, accomplished by North American, was allocated $1.6 million. Broken down, this meant that the modification of each aircraft cost about $80,000 and that $20,000 covered the spare components required by every plane. 'Targets and reels were supplied from current Air Force stocks. But as Mr. Symington had pointed out, there was no exact troop basis for the computation of tow target requirements. The 16 TB 45Cs proved insufficient for antiaircraft gunnery practice, so a few early B-45As were also converted as tow target airplanes. Unfortunately, the low thrust of the Allison J35 engines of the first B-45As prevented the additional conversions from performing well, and the TB 45A association with the tow. target program was of short duration.
Production of the B-45C was completed on 13 April 1950, that of the RB-45C in October 1951, when the last aircraft were delivered. The B/RB-45C phaseout followed the B-45A pattern. In mid 1959, only 1 RB-45C remained in the Air Force inventory.
In early 1950, the Air Force considered using some B-45s as aerial tankers for F-84s carrying special weapons. TAC wanted to know in particular the speed at which refueling, by means of the probe and drogue system, could best be accomplished. The command also asked how much extra fuel could be carried by the B-45, taking into consideration the weight of refueling gear and tanks. Although no actions were taken following these investigations, the Air Force determined that Republic F-84s could operate with a B-45 "Mother" aircraft as a "cell." The most serious handicap would be the necessity for lights during night formation. Without lights, night formation could be conducted with reasonable safety only under bright moonlight. It was also determined that, as a tanker, 1 B-45 aircraft could service 4 planes as well as 2, with the exception that the fuel available for each fighter would be proportionally reduced.
One major milestone took place in 1950, when a SAC RB-45C and a Boeing KB-29B tanker completed the first air refueling of a jet aircraft. On 29 July 1952, a 91st Strategic Reconnaissance Wing RB-45C (Serial Number 48 042), a SAC aircraft commanded by Maj. Louis H. Carrington, made the first nonstop, trans Pacific flight from Elmendorf AFB, Alaska, to Yokota AB, Japan. This flight, made possible by 2 KB-29 inflight refuelings, earned Major Carrington and his 2 man crew the Mackay Trophy for 1952.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
