B-45 Tornado
Difficulties encountered by B-45 units, while impairing further the training of jet pilots, posed serious operational problems. The B-45's flaws varied in importance, but were numerous. High speeds affected the Gyrosyn compass and the E-4 automatic pilot, when the aircraft's bomb bay doors were open. (The Gyrosyn compass was the trade name for a compass that consisted of a directional gyro synchronized with the horizontal component of the earth's magnetic field by means of a flux gate-the flux gate detecting the direction of the lines of force and transmitting the information electrically to a procession device.) The emergency brake, which was tied to the B-45's main hydraulic system, was unreliable. Because of poorly designed bomb racks, the bomb shackles became unhooked during certain maneuvers. The B-45's airspeed indicator was inaccurate, and the aircraft's fuel pressure gauges were both difficult to read and erratic. Another safety hazard derived from the engines which, when first started, often caught fire because the aspirator system worked improperly. The temperature gauge of the aircraft's tail pipe, moreover, was so poorly calibrated that it could not indicate the temperatures experienced at high altitudes.
Special problems, with many ramifications, stemmed from the B-45's AN/APQ-24 bombing navigation radar system, and the fact that hardly any B-45s had already received such equipment did not minimize present or future difficulties. Malfunctions of the pressurization pump limited the altitude at which the APQ-24's receiver and transmitter component could operate. The modulator component of the system was not pressurized at all and likewise limited the APQ-24's utility. In addition, the faulty position of the radar antenna affected the coverage of targets as soon as the APQ-24 had to operate at an altitude of 40,000 feet. In fact, the radar system's overall location left a great deal to be desired, a shortcoming shared by several other components. When utilizing the APQ-24, the B-45 observer had to manipulate 2 mileage control dials, placed to his right and about 1 foot behind his back, while observing the radar scope directly in front of him. The layout of the B-45's radar system was not any better from a maintenance standpoint. The Air Force still lacked sufficient qualified personnel for maintenance and repair, and it took 8 hours just to remove and replace the APQ 24's modulator, one of the system's numerous troublesome links. Contributing to the dismal maintenance situation were shortages of spare parts, special tools, and ground handling equipment as well as engine hoists, power units, and aero stands
Prior to 1949, the Air Force did not consider seriously the tactical employment of atomic weapons apart from their use for strategic air warfare. The most important reason was the AAF and Air Force's allegiance to the primacy of strategic air warfare per se.(After the German surrender, AAF leaders declared their long held theory of strategic bombing had been proved that massive bombing of selected vital targets in a nation's interior could cripple its war making capabilities and seriously weaken the people's will to resist. Critics argued that strategic bombing had failed to achieve its objectives, that its cost was excessive, and that tactical air power had made the greater contribution to Allied victory.) Despite the controversy, it soon became obvious that Boeing's spectacular B-17 Flying Fortresses and subsequent B-29 Superfortresses had a greater impact on US. policy than the best known World War II fighters. Another factor was the belief that atomic weapons, because of their great cost and the scarcity of fissionable material, would remain relatively few in number. When the development and large quantity production of small nuclear weapons became probable, the Air Force earmarked such weapons again for strategic use, especially as warheads for proposed guided missiles. Nevertheless, the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group conducted a study on the use of the atomic bomb on tactical targets, after evaluating the effect of the bomb on such targets as troops, aircraft, and ships massed for offensive operations, as well as naval bases, airfields, naval task forces, and heavily fortified positions. Concluded in November 1949, the study found nuclear bombs to be effective on all targets. Although informal in nature, the Weapon Systems Evaluation Group's study was noted by the Air Staff. Yet no action was taken until mid 1950, when the outbreak of the Korean War underlined the weakness of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces, should the Russians decide to seize the opportunity to attack in Europe. From then on events moved promptly. The lion's share of the atomic responsibilities, including the retardation mission that normally would fall under the tactical sphere of activities, was retained by the Strategic Air Command (SAC), but the use of atomic or thermonuclear weapons would become Air Force wide. The retardation mission consisted of bombing operations to slow or stop the advances of ground forces. The latter rightly belonged to the fleeting target category, and SAC did not retain the retardation mission permanently.
On November 14, 1950, the Air Staff directed TAC to develop tactics and techniques for the utilization of atomic weapons in tactical air operations (TAC, part of the Continental Air Command since December 1948, regained major command status on 1 December 1950.). The directive received further impetus in January 1951, when an Air Staff program was outlined to ensure that TAC would become atomic capable as soon as feasible. The B-45 was tremendously affected by the new planning. Already established as the Air Force's first multi-jet bomber, the B-45 also became the first light bomber fitted for atomic delivery.
Ordered in the wake of World War II as a SAC medium bomber, the B-45 was designed to carry the A-bomb The deterrent impact of the B-45 remained unknown. Moreover, the aircraft represented but a tiny segment of the Air Force's early atomic armada. But the secrecy surrounding the production of the first atomic weapons created difficulties for which neither the contractor nor the AAF could be blamed. Because of faulty information, the B-45 from the start could not have been used as an atomic carrier without significant internal modifications, the principal obstacle being a large spar extending laterally across the aircraft's bomb bay. However, the problem had become moot quickly, the small, short range B-45 being reclassified as a light bomber in September 1947 and reallocated to TAC. Ironically, the decision to extend the use of atomic weaponry to all combat forces meant that most of the B-45s acquired by TAC would no longer remain under the command's direct control. It also meant that TAC, now due to develop tactical operational techniques with the new weaponry, would have to do so with too few aircraft. In the meantime, the Air Force faced other problems. While the post World War II achievements in the atomic field had been spectacular, and safer and lighter atomic bombs entered the stockpile much sooner than expected, intensive secrecy again had accompanied the new developments. Hence, as in the case of the old atomic bomb, the B-45 would be unable to carry any of the new weapons without first undergoing extensive modification.
In December 1950, 5 months after tentatively earmarking 60 B-45s for atomic duty (Enough for 3 squadrons of 16 aircraft each, plus 12 attrition aircraft. This total, reduced to 40 aircraft in mid 1951, was re increased in mid 1952, when 15 other B 45s were added to the special modification program), the Air Staff directed AMC to modify a first lot of 9 aircraft to carry the small bombs for which designs were then available. This initial project would allow suitability tests by the Special Weapons Command (A separate command of short duration. Established in December 1949, the Special Weapons Command was redesignated Air Force Special Weapons Center and assigned to Air Research and Development Command in April 1952, losing major command status at that time), and give TAC at least a few test aircraft to undertake its new tasks. As a beginning, 5 of the 9 aircraft would be equipped with the scarce AN/APQ-24 system; the remaining 4, with the AN/APN-3 Shoran navigation and bombing system, plus the visual M9C Norden bomb sight. North American would bring the 9 light bombers to the required special weapons configuration for a total cost of $512,000. In mid 1951, the program for operational use of the B-45 in potential atomic operations was established. The aircraft in this program were nicknamed Backbreaker and included, in addition to the B-45 light bombers, 100 of the many F-84 fighter bombers built by the Republic Aviation Corporation (The aircraft were modified F-84Es, identified as F-84Gs). Moreover, the program was accorded a priority second only to a concurrent and closely related modification program involving various SAC bombers. In the early fall of 1951, the program received further impetus. The Air Staff confirmed that modified B-45s, equipment, and allied support had to be supplied to enable units of the 47th Bombardment Wing in the United Kingdom to achieve an operational atomic capability by 1 April 1952. In addition to the first lot of 9 aircraft, the program would count 32 B-45s, the latter aircraft's modification cost being set at $4 million (One B-45A was destroyed by fire in February 1952 and not replaced, thus reducing the total from 41 to 40). Of the $4 million allocated to the project, some of the funds came from other Tactical Air Command projects which had to be canceled. The Air Staff wanted 16 of the planes to be ready by 15 February 1952; the remainder, by 1 April. These were ambitious plans.
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