CHAPTER 4. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
This analysis covers the 10-year period from 1995 to 2004. DOE chose this period because it represents the period of time that DOE might require to make and implement decisions on the ultimate disposition of nuclear materials. The environmental impact analyses in this chapter are based on conservative assumptions. The small calculated consequences indicate that DOE estimates small impacts. However, such estimates should not imply that the environmental consequences that could result from the alternatives are known to a precise degree of accuracy. Regardless of the size or degree of impact, this chapter presents the calculated consequences to enable relative comparisons of the alternatives. The results of the analyses indicate that there would be little or no impact on the affected environment discussed in Chapter 3. DOE believes that, in light of planned SRS workforce reductions, it could fill the jobs associated with the implementation of any of the alternatives through the reassignment of current workers (e.g., transition of personnel from the FB-Line to a new oxide processing facility). Thus DOE anticipates no measurable impacts to socioeconomic resources from increases in operations employment. Similarly, DOE believes that current SRS workers could fill any construction jobs associated with the alternatives, thereby having no discernible impact on regional socioeconomic resources. DOE analyzed the potential impacts of the alternatives evaluated in this environmental impact statement in relation to a number of subject areas (e.g., ecological systems) normally examined in such documents. However, because the F-Area is an industrial area with buildings, paved parking lots, and graveled areas with most natural vegetation removed, its value as habitat for wildlife is marginal. No aquatic habitat or wetlands occur in the area. The alternatives described in this eis would not affect threatened and endangered species and their habitat. No SRS facilities have been nominated for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places, and there are no plans for such nomination. In this regard, these facilities meet one of the criteria for listing on the National Register of Historic Places; however, they do not meet other National Register criteria, such as being more than 50 years old. DOE will continue the process of evaluating SRS facilities to determine their eligibility for nomination to the National Register. Because the F-Area is an industrial site constructed during the 1950s, the presence of any important cultural resources remaining is unlikely. For these reasons and because minimal environmental impacts would occur, DOE believes that discussions of the following subjects are unnecessary in this chapter: - Geologic Resources - Ecological Systems - Socioeconomics - Cultural Resources - Aesthetics and Scenic Resources - Noise This chapter describes the impacts of the alternatives related to: - Health Effects of Normal Operations (Section 4.1) - Health Effects from Accidents (Section 4.2) - Air Resources (Section 4.3) - Water Resources (Section 4.4) - Utilities (Section 4.5) - Waste Management (Section 4.6) - Land Use and Transportation (Section 4.7)
4.1 Health Effects of Normal Operations
This section discusses the radiological and nonradiological health effects on the public and workers from all of the alternatives for the stabilization of the F-Canyon plutonium solutions during normal operations, which are planned activities associated with the alternative (e.g., sampling, maintenance). Health effects are represented as additional latent cancer fatalities likely to occur in the general population around the SRS and in the population of workers that would be associated with the alternatives.
4.1.1. RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH EFFECTS
Table 4-1 summarizes the radiological health effects from the combination of airborne and liquid releases (see Section 4.3.1 and 4.4, respectively) for each alternative to enable a comparison of the 10-year health effects; the table represents health effects as latent cancer fatalities. The increase Table 4-1. Estimated radiological health effects from normal operations.a would be small for any alternative (i.e., much less than one additional latent fatal cancer in the population during the lifetimes of the affected individuals). Impacts from alternatives other than No Action include impacts from operation of facilities and storage of materials. The calculated health effects are based on (1) the collective dose to the population around the Site (approximately 620,000 people); (2) the collective dose to all workers in the affected group; and (3) the doses to the hypothetical maximally exposed individual in the public and the maximally exposed worker. The collective population doses include the dose from airborne releases and the dose resulting from the use of the Savannah River for drinking water, recreation, and as a source of food. The estimated worker doses are based on past operating experience and the projected activity maintenance and facility modification schedule for implementing the alternative actions (WSRC 1994a), as shown in Figure 2-2. From these radiological doses, estimates of latent cancer fatalities were calculated using the conversion factor of 0.0004 latent cancer fatality per rem for workers and 0.0005 latent cancer fatality per rem for the public (10 CFR Part 20). The value for the public is greater than that for workers because the public consists of all age groups (including children), while the worker population consists of adults. Under the No-Action Alternative, the effect on the public could be 0.00055 additional cancer death in the population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the Site sometime over their lifetimes. For comparison, 145,700 deaths from cancer due to all causes (see Section 3.6.1) would be likely in the same population over their lifetimes. The effect to SRS workers involved with the No-Action Alternative could be 0.24 cancer death over their lifetimes resulting from exposure to radiation over the 10-year period. In comparison, 136 cancer deaths would be likely from all causes in the same worker population over their lifetimes. The effects on the maximally exposed individual and the maximally exposed worker are not expressed as a latent cancer fatality but as the probability of contracting a fatal cancer from the doses listed in Table 4-1. For the maximally exposed member of the public, the probability of contracting a cancer associated with the 10-year dose would be 1 in 100 million. For the radiation worker, the probability would be 3 in 1,000. These latent cancer probability values would be the same for the Processing to Metal, Processing to Oxide, Vitrification (Defense Waste Processing Facility), and Vitrification (F-Canyon) alternatives for both the maximally exposed individual and the maximally exposed worker. Under these alternatives, the health effects to the public would be 0.00049, 0.0006, 0.00046, and 0.00055 additional cancer deaths, respectively, over the lifetimes of the affected individuals. For the SRS worker population, the effect would be 0.13, 0.19, 0.11, and 0.19 additional cancer deaths, respectively. Tables 4-2 through 4-6 list the radiation dose information that was the basis for the composite radiological health effects. The magnitude of the errors associated with the projected radiation doses for all the alternatives would result in health effects that would be essentially the same for all alternatives.
4.1.2 NONRADIOLOGICAL HEALTH EFFECTS
This section discusses worker nonradiological health impacts from toxic pollutants that could be associated with the F-Canyon plutonium solution stabilization alternatives during normal operations and storage of materials. These releases would be small and, for each expected pollutant, would be only a small percentage of the discharges allowed by Federal and state regulations. Table 4-7 summarizes these impacts. Of these pollutants, benzene is the only carcinogen. The F-Canyon benzene emissions would result in a maximum annual average concentration of 0.001 milligram per cubic meter at the SRS boundary, and DOE modeling indicates that no offsite concentration would exceed this value. DOE calculates that F-Canyon benzene emissions would result in a lifetime probability of a latent cancer of 3 in 1 billion. DOE estimated the worker impacts using a mathematical model to calculate concentrations in and around F-Area (WSRC 1994a) and compared them to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Permissible Exposure Limits (PELs) or ceiling limits. The OSHA limits (29 CFR Part 1910.1000) are time-weighted average concentrations that a facility cannot exceed during any 8-hour work shift of a 40-hour week. The facility cannot exceed OSHA ceiling concentrations during any part of the workday. These exposure limits refer to airborne concentrations of substances and represent conditions under which nearly all workers could be exposed day after day without adverse health effects. However, because of the wide variation in Table 4-2. Estimated doses from the No-Action Alternative for normal operations. Table 4-3. Estimated doses from the Processing to Plutonium Metal Alternative for normal operation. Table 4-4. Estimated doses from the Processing to Plutonium Oxide Alternative for normal operations. Table 4-5. Estimated doses from teh Vitrification (Defense Waste Processing Facility) Alternative for normal operations. Table 4-6. Estimated doses from the Vitrification (F-Canyon) Alternative for normal operations. Table 4-7. Estimated worker nonradiological health summary impacts (milligrams per cubic meter).a individual susceptibility, a small percentage of workers could experience discomfort from some substances at concentrations at or below the permissible limit. DOE expects minimal public health impacts from nonradiological effects. Further, because discharges and emissions would vary little among the alternatives, public health effects would vary little among the alternatives.
4.1.3 ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ASSESSMENT
This eis examines whether communities of people of color or low income could be subject to disproportionately high and adverse impacts of emissions. Even though, as noted above, adverse radiological health impacts are not likely, this assessment presents an analysis to determine if any such impacts could have disproportionate distribution in the spirit of Executive Order 12898. Figures 3-5 and 3-6 identify communities of people of color or low income by census tract. This section presents the predicted average radiation doses received by individuals in the identified communities and compares them to the predicted per capita doses received in the other communities within the 80-kilometer (50-mile) region. Figure 4-1 shows a wheel with 22.5-degree sectors and concentric rings from 16 to 80 kilometers (10 to 50 miles) at 16-kilometer (10-mile) intervals. The fraction of the total population dose was calculated for each sector (Simpkins 1994), the sector wheel was laid over the census tract map, and each tract was assigned to a sector. For this analysis, if a tract fell in more than one sector, it was assigned to the sector with the largest value. To determine the per capita radiation dose received in each type of community, the number of people in each tract was multiplied by that tract's dose value to obtain a total population dose for each tract. These population doses were summed over all sectors of the region for each type of community and divided by the total community population to obtain a community per capita dose. Table 4-8 lists these results. Table 4-8. Estimated per capita 10-year dose by identified communities in 80-kilometer (50-mile) region.a Because these numbers are very small and differ very little, this analysis indicates that people of color or low income in the 80-kilometer (50-mile) region would not receive disproportionate impacts. Table 4-13 (page 4-22) lists predicted doses to the maximally exposed individual and to the downstream population from exposure to water resources for each of the alternatives. The doses reflect people using the Savannah River for drinking water, recreation, and as a source of food. Because the identified communities in the areas downstream from the SRS are well-distributed, and because there would be no adverse impacts to any downstream region (the highest 10-year dose to the maximally exposed individual for any of the alternatives would be 0.0000029 rem for the Processing to Metal or Processing to Oxide Alternative), there would be no environmental justice concerns for any of the alternatives in the downstream areas. Figure 4-1. Identification of annular sectors around the Savannah River Site
4.2 Health Effects from Accidents
This section summarizes the risks to members of the public, workers, and the environment from potential facility accidents associated with the alternatives for stabilization of the plutonium solutions. This assessment does not include solutions other than those containing plutonium (e.g., americium/ curium solutions) because these materials provide no basis for discriminating among alternatives. An accident is an unplanned event leading to an undesirable release of radioactive or hazardous material within a facility or to the environment. A potential exists for facility accidents in all of the alternatives, including the No-Action Alternative. Appendix B provides further detail and discussion on the accident analyses. This assessment is based on potential accidents identified and described in the safety analysis reports for the F-Area facilities and on the inventories of hazardous chemicals in the F-Area facilities that could be required to implement the alternatives. The assessment includes the F-Canyon, FB-Line, FB- Line vault, and F-Area Outside Facilities. The accidents considered include events resulting from external initiators (e.g., aircraft crashes, nearby explosions), internal initiators (e.g., equipment failures, human errors), and natural phenomena initiators (e.g., earthquakes, tornadoes). DOE calculated a baseline set of doses using mathematical models that estimate these doses based on 1-curie releases to an uninvolved worker at 640 meters (2,100 feet), the maximally exposed offsite individual, and the collective offsite population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the Site (see Appendix B for more details). DOE adjusted these doses based on the number of curies estimated for release in each accident. These accident doses were multiplied by estimated accident frequencies to determine the accident risk. When available, the frequency of the projected release is provided in lieu of the frequency of the initiator. Estimates of latent fatal cancers are calculated from the accident doses using the conversion factors of 0.0004 latent cancer fatality per rem for workers and 0.0005 latent cancer fatality per rem for the public (10 CFR Part 20). Appendix B provides the projected latent fatal cancer risks for a spectrum of accidents for each facility that would be involved with the alternatives. To enable a relative comparison of impacts among the alternatives, the accident with the highest consequence was assumed to occur and the maximum latent cancer fatalities were calculated. For F-Canyon and the F-Canyon Vitrification Facility, the accident was a severe fire; for FB-Line, it was a severe earthquake; and for F-Area Outside Facilities, it was a chemical event leading to a ruthenium vapor release. Table 4-9 provides information on the number of latent cancer fatalities that would be likely in the population as a result Table 4-9. Maximum potential impacts from accidents involving plutonium solution alternatives.a,b of the accidents. The information listed for the uninvolved workers and the maximally exposed individual would be the individual's probability of contracting a fatal cancer if the accident occurred. For all the alternatives, the increase would be a small fraction of an individual's chance of developing a fatal cancer from all other causes. The population data are somewhat more meaningful because the conversion factors used to estimate latent fatal cancers are statistically based. Figure 2-2 shows the schedules for the use of facilities for each alternative. The data from Table 4-9 for the number of potential latent cancer fatalities in the population around SRS provide a perspective on risk over time. The frequency for the accidents with the highest consequence (i.e., how often they are likely to occur) is once in 5,000 years for a severe earthquake and once in 17,000 years for a plutonium solutions fire involving solvent. Section B.2.5 explains the method for projecting the frequency of a plutonium solutions fire, which is a "fault-tree" approach. Changes and reductions in latent cancer fatalities are related to the activities associated with the alternatives and the form of the material. For example, in the Processing to Metal or Processing to Oxide Alternative the latent cancer fatalities would increase during processing operations This is because accidents that would not occur during storage, such as those associated with FB-Line, must be included. The possibility of latent cancer fatalities would decrease after processing because the set of accidents associated with storing solutions (transfer errors, leaks, etc.) could no longer occur. For accidents involving the release of hazardous material, the EPICode- computer code (Homann 1988) analyzed the consequences of spills and gaseous releases of hazardous materials used in the F-Area that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) categorizes as "Extremely Hazardous Substances" (29 CFR Part 1910). The assessment calculated chemical concentrations to an uninvolved worker at 640 meters (2,100 feet) and the maximally exposed offsite individual at the nearest Site boundary. The calculated chemical concentrations were compared to Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPG) values issued by the American Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA 1991) or equivalent sanctioned limits if there were no guidelines for the hazardous material. Table 4-10 lists the postulated impacts from maximum reasonably foreseeable accidents (e.g., severe earthquakes) involving hazardous materials in the F-Area. These impacts generally would be based on estimated releases from F-Area Outside Facilities or would assume the release of the "maximum daily amount" in the entire area; they would not change from alternative to alternative. There is a potential for serious worker injury or fatality involving the accidental release of hydrogen fluoride. No other hazardous substance accidents are likely to result in long-term health impacts to workers, the public, or the environment. Table 4-10. Estimated impacts from potential releases of Extremely Hazardous Substances in F-Area resulting from a severe earthquake.
4.3 Air Resources
This section discusses radiological (Section 4.3.1) and nonradiolo gical (Section 4.3.2) air quality impacts to the public from normal operations and storage of material for all of the alternatives. The information in this section was one of the bases for the health effects discussed in Section 4.1.
4.3.1 RADIOLOGICAL AIR QUALITY
This assessment of radiological air quality used the MAXIGASP and POPGASP computer programs (Simpkins 1994) to calculate radiological doses from estimated annual airborne releases of radionuclides. These programs calculate the dose to a hypothetical maximally exposed individual at the SRS boundary and the collective dose to the population within a 80-kilometer (50-mile) radius, respectively. For this assessment, DOE assumed that the population would remain constant over the 10-year period of interest; this assumption is justified because (1) current estimates indicate that the population will increase by less than 5 percent during this period, (2) there are uncertainties in the determination of year-to-year population distributions out to 80 kilometers (50 miles), and (3) the comparison between alternatives would not be affected. The assessment compared maximally exposed individual doses to the SRS airborne dose limit of 10 millirem (0.010 rem) per year (DOE 1993). It estimated annual airborne radionuclide releases for each alternative from emission or environmental monitoring data from F-Canyon operations and the projected schedules for the alternative actions (WSRC 1994a). Table 4-11 summarizes the calculated doses from airborne radionuclide releases for each alternative. The maximum annual doses would be equal to or higher for each of the stabilization alternatives than for the No-Action Alternative; higher doses would be the result of additional releases that would occur due to processing activities in the F-Canyon. Table 4-11. Estimated radiological doses from airborne releases during normal operation. As Table 4-11 indicates, there would be little or no difference in the doses to either the offsite population or the maximally exposed individual from any of the alternatives. All doses would be less than those from the total SRS air emissions. In 1993 the total SRS air emissions resulted in a dose of 0.11 millirem (0.00011 rem) to the maximally exposed individual and 7.6 person-rem to the offsite population. The dose to the maximally exposed individual from the total SRS emissions (0.11 millirem) is approximately 1 percent of the SRS airborne limit of 10 millirem.
4.3.2 NONRADIOLOGICAL AIR QUALITY
For the assessment of nonradiological air quality impacts, DOE used the Industrial Source Complex No. 2 (ISC2) model (EPA 1992) to calculate the SRS boundary concentrations for estimated normal releases of four criteria pollutants [carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, particulate matter less than or equal to 10 microns (PM10), and sulfur dioxide], total suspended particulates, gaseous fluorides, and the six major toxic air pollutants expected from F-Canyon processing (benzene, hexane, nitric acid, sodium hydroxide, toluene, and xylene). The assessment did not include two criteria pollutants: lead because there would be no lead emissions associated with the activities analyzed in this eis, and ozone because F-Canyon sources do not emit it directly. However, ozone can be formed by photochemical reactions of other pollutants including nitrogen oxides and volatile organic compounds. F-Canyon sources do result indirectly in the generation of ozone. Photochemical modeling would be required to assess ozone concentrations; at the present time, adequate input data for such modeling do not exist. Monitoring data, however, indicate that the area in the SRS vicinity is in compliance with the ozone air quality standard. The assessment used the ISC2 short-term model for all calculations except the annual concentrations for the toxic air pollutants, for which it used the long-term model. Emissions data for the worst-case year (the year with the highest emissions) were entered in the model along with the meteorological data discussed in Section 3.3. The assessment estimated nonradiological airborne releases from the F-Canyon main stack for each alternative from emission or environmental monitoring data during past F-Canyon operations, engineering judgment, and the schedule for the alternative actions (WSRC 1994a). Emissions information was not available by alternative for the diesel generators that power the canyon exhaust fans and for the storage tanks that contain diesel fuel or feed chemicals for canyon processes. Therefore, emissions from diesel generators and storage tanks were determined from the SRS air emissions inventory and current operating permit data for F-Area (WSRC 1994e). These generator and storage tank emissions represent maximum usage and capacity; DOE assumes that they would not vary by alternative. The computed SRS boundary incremental concentrations were added to the baseline concentrations and compared to applicable air quality standards. Table 4-12 lists the ISC2 modeling results for each alternative. The impacts associated with the stabilization alternatives except Vitrification through the Defense Waste Processing Facility would be higher for certain pollutants than those for the No-Action Alternative; this would be the result of processing activities in the F-Canyon to both prepare and stabilize the solutions. As Table 4-12 indicates, there would be little or no difference in the increase of pollutants from any of the alternatives. When added to the SRS baseline, all alternatives would result in levels below air quality standards.
4.4 Water Resources
This section describes the impacts on surface-water and groundwater quality during normal operations and storage of materials associated with the alternatives for F-Canyon plutonium solutions. The information in this section was one of the bases for the health effects discussed in Section 4.1. None of the alternatives would result in significant impacts to either surface water or groundwater. This section also presents the methods used for and the results of the assessment of the impacts of normal operational releases of radionuclides and chemicals to surface water for each alternative. The two major sources of liquid effluents would be process cooling water and steam condensate that could become slightly contaminated with small quantities of radionuclides and chemicals. Another source of liquid effluents would be the F-Area sewage treatment plant. Because none of the facilities that would be required for implementing alternatives is within the 100-year floodplain, DOE anticipates no surface-water impacts from floods. This assessment calculated the health effects from radioactive releases to surface water and groundwater to a hypothetical maximally exposed individual living just downriver of SRS and to the collective population using the Savannah River downstream of SRS (including downstream municipal water users at Beaufort-Jasper and Port Wentworth) (Simpkins 1994) using the LADTAP computer code (Hamby 1991). The assumed exposure pathways are drinking water, fish ingestion, shoreline exposure, swimming, and boating. The estimates of radionuclide releases are based on effluent and environmental monitoring data during past F-Canyon operations and the projected schedules for the alternative actions (WSRC 1994a). Plutonium and uranium isotopes would be the major contributors to the offsite population dose; cesium-137 in fish and strontium would be secondary contributors. Table 4-13 summarizes the calculated annual doses to the public from liquid releases to surface waters. For each stabilization alternative, the total population dose from liquid releases would be somewhat lower than that from the No-Action Alternative. The lower total dose would result from the Table 4-12. Estimated maximum incremental air pollutant impacts at the SRS boundary.a(page 1) Table 4-12. Estimated maximum incremental air pollutant impacts at the SRS boundary.a(page 2) Table 4-13. Estimated doses received by the public from liquid pathways.a decrease in releases after the processing of the solutions and their removal from the F- Canyon. The calculated dose to the maximally exposed individual would show the same trend as that for the offsite population dose for each alternative. As Table 4-13 indicates, there would be little or no difference in the doses either to the offsite population or the maximally exposed individual from any of the alternatives. The doses from each alternative would be small compared to the drinking water standard of 4 millirem per year. All alternatives would involve the release of chemicals to Fourmile Branch via process cooling water. Although the gross amount of material would not be constant, the concentration of these materials for all alternatives would not vary. The estimated release concentrations are listed below (WSRC 1994a): - Nitrate (40 micrograms per liter) - Ammonia (30 micrograms per liter) - Manganese (10 micrograms per liter) - Uranium (20 micrograms per liter) - Lead (6 micrograms per liter) - Nickel (50 micrograms per liter) - Chromium (20 micrograms per liter) - Aluminum (200 micrograms per liter) - Copper (10 micrograms per liter) - Zinc (70 micrograms per liter) Proposed or final Federal drinking water standards would apply at the nearest downstream drinking water supply in the Savannah River, after dilution of the release with river water. Although these would not apply to the release itself, the chemical concentrations listed above would not exceed such standards (Arnett, Karapatakis, and Mamatey 1994) or South Carolina Water Quality Standards (SCDHEC 1993). In general, the release concen- trations would be comparable to those previously measured in Fourmile Branch (Arnett 1994). Lead, nickel, chromium, and copper were not detected in measurements performed in 1993 (Arnett 1994); the discharge concentrations of these chemicals would be comparable to those measured in 1992 (Arnett 1993). Zinc, which was not detected in 1993 in Fourmile Branch but was detected there in 1992, would be discharged at concentrations two orders of magnitude less than South Carolina Water Quality Standards, which are based on the taste and odor of drinking water. The maximum effluent discharge flow rate would be approximately 0.5 percent of the normal creek flow rates.
4.5 Utilities
DOE based its estimates of the annual consumption rates of water, electricity, steam, and fuel on past operational experience and the projected usage for each alternative. Table 4-14 lists these estimates. Next, DOE compared these annual consumption rates to the SRS utility capacities described in Table 4-15 to determine the potential for impacts. Existing capacities and distribution systems at the SRS would be adequate to support any of the alternatives; no new generation or treatment facilities would be necessary. Table 4-14. Estimated annual utility consumption by alternative.a (page 1) Table 4-14. Estimated annual utility consumption by alternative.a (page 2) Table 4-15. Current capacities and usage and energy at the Savannah River Site.a Over the 10-year period (1995 through 2004), DOE estimates that the smallest increase in total demand for utilities would result from the Processing to Plutonium Metal Alternative. The largest increases would be associated with the No-Action and Vitrification (Defense Waste Processing Facility) Alternatives, which would place greater demands on utility systems because SRS facilities (e.g., F-Area and the proposed Defense Waste Processing Facility) would operate at higher levels and for longer periods than they would for the other alternatives, which would place these facilities in standby modes more quickly. As listed in Table 4-14, DOE estimates that implementation of the Vitrification (Defense Waste Processing Facility) Alternative would involve peak demands of approximately 25,200 megawatt- hours of electricity, 1,360 million liters (359 million gallons) of water, 120 million kilograms (265 million pounds) of steam, and 800,000 liters (211,000 gallons) of fuel. These changes would represent modest increases over baseline usage (ranging from 4 percent for electricity to 17 percent for fuel) and would be well within current system capabilities and usage limits. The other alternatives would result in smaller increases in energy usage and would have no adverse impact on utility services at SRS.
4.6 Waste Management
The SRS generates several different types of waste, including low-level waste, high-level waste, transuranic and mixed waste. SRS-generated low-level waste, prior to compacting, averages 19,000 cubic meters (671,000 cubic feet) per year, excluding waste associated with major decontamination and decommissioning and environmental restoration projects that DOE will perform in the future (WSRC 1994c). There are 51 waste tanks and 3 evaporators at SRS for storing and reducing the volume of liquid radioactive waste. On September 30, 1993, approximately 126,000 cubic meters (4,450,000 cubic feet) of high-level liquid radioactive waste were stored on the Site (WSRC 1994c). At the end of 1993, SRS had approximately 9,900 cubic meters (350,000 cubic feet) of transuranic waste in storage, and generates approximately 765 cubic meters (27,000 cubic feet) of this waste annually. Table 4-16 lists estimated generation rates of Defense Waste Processing Facility canisters for each alternative. These estimates are based on current and past SRS operations (WSRC 1994a), and include the waste associated with operations of facilities and storage of materials. Table 4-16. Equivalent DWPF canister generation rates for each alternative. As listed in Tables 4-16 and 4-17, DOE estimates that, over the 10-year period, the smallest increase for all waste types would occur if it implemented the Processing to Plutonium Metal Alternative. The largest increase in saltstone [6,461 cubic meters (8,450 cubic yards) after 10 years] would result from implementing the Processing to Oxide Alternative, while the largest increase in low-level waste [14,371 cubic meters (18,796 cubic yards) after 10 years] would result from implementing the Processing to Oxide Alternative. With the exception of vitrification, the impact on SRS waste management capacities from implementing any of the alternatives would be minimal because the Site can accommodate all the waste generated with existing and planned radioactive waste storage and disposal facilities. None of the alternatives is likely to generate substantial quantities of mixed waste.
4.7 Land Use and Transportation
None of the alternatives would impact SRS land use. Under the Plutonium to Oxide Alternative, a new facility containing equipment to process, package, and store the plutonium oxide could require approximately 4.5 acres of previously disturbed F-Area land. During the construction of a new facility, occasional spills of oil and fuel could occur. In the event of spills, cleanup would be consistent with the SRS Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasures Table 4-17. Waste generation rates for each alternative.a,b Plan. Consistent with best management practices, DOE would mitigate erosion and fugitive dust by the constructing barriers to control soil runoff and by watering to lessen fugitive dust emissions. Transportation impacts related to modification and construction activities would not be likely to increase measurably. Traffic would remain at or below current Site levels because workers for any new activities would come from the current SRS workforce.
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