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1.1 Background

                                   
The Savannah River Site (SRS) occupies an area of approximately
800 square kilometers (300 square miles) adjacent to the Savannah
River, primarily in Aiken and Barnwell Counties in South
Carolina.  The Site is approximately 40 kilometers (25 miles)
southeast of Augusta, Georgia, and 32 kilometers
(20 miles) south of Aiken, South Carolina (Figure 1-1).  Figure
1-2 shows the locations of the
principal SRS facilities.
The past mission of the Savannah River Site included the
production of plutonium-239 for national defense.  Figure 1-3
shows the historic nuclear material production cycle for
plutonium-239.  During the Cold War, SRS produced, processed, and
recovered special radioactive isotopes for use in nuclear
weapons.  First, material was fabricated in the Materials Area
(M-Area) for use in the SRS reactors.  Uranium-235 was fashioned
into long thin cylinders and clad with aluminum to form reactor
fuel assemblies.  Uranium-238 was clad with aluminum to form
reactor targets for the production of plutonium-239.  The fuel
and targets were loaded into one of the reactors (e.g., K-
Reactor).  The fuel assemblies provided the source of the
neutrons that sustained the nuclear reaction in the reactors and
produced the desired product, plutonium-239.
After irradiation, the targets were transferred to water-filled
basins to allow short-lived radioactive isotopes to decay.  The
uranium-238 targets were transferred to the F-Canyon for plutonium-
239 recovery.  The targets were chemically dissolved into liquid
solutions, and the plutonium-239 was recovered, converted to a
metal form in the FB-Line facility, and either shipped to other
U.S.  Department of Energy (DOE) facilities or stored at the SRS. 
Typically, plutonium solutions were in storage no longer than 6
months.  The separated fission products were transferred as waste
to the F-Area high-level waste tanks.  Other processing activities
resulted in the generation of transuranic, low-level, hazardous,
and mixed waste.
On March 13, 1992, DOE suspended F-Canyon chemical separations
activities to address a potential safety concern regarding the
survival of the canyon ventilation system should an earthquake occur.  
That concern was addressed; however, on April 28, 1992, prior to 
the resumption of separations operations, the Secretary of Energy 
directed the phaseout of reprocessing operations at the Savannah River Site,
which included operations in F- and H-Canyons.  The Secretary
directed that the phaseout plan consider efforts that would
accelerate transition of the F-Area facilities to a standby
condition.  The Secretary also stated:  "It should be recognized
that any phaseout activities that are not typical of
  Figure 1-1.  Location of principal Savannah River Site. 
  Figure 1-2.  Location of principal SRS facilities. 
  Figure 1-3.  Nuclear materials production cycle at the Savannah 
              River Site.
ongoing or previous facility operations are subject to
appropriate National Environmental Policy Act review" (Claytor
1992).
In September 1992 the Savannah River Site prepared a plan that
detailed the actions that DOE would have to take to phase out
reprocessing.  The plan included contemplated actions for
removing the material that remained in the canyons as a result of
the suspension of chemical separation activity in March 1992.  In
February 1993 the Site requested approval from DOE to restart
F-Canyon after the completion of operational readiness reviews
conducted as part of the response to the March 1992 safety
concern.  The SRS made this startup request in light of the
Secretary's direction to accelerate the transition of F-Area
reprocessing facilities to a standby condition and because all
contemplated actions were typical of ongoing or previous facility
operations.
During this same period, DOE was drafting new requirements for
the operational readiness review necessary for the startup or
restart of nuclear facilities.  Under these requirements,
facilities had to be able to demonstrate the capability to
perform satisfactorily in relation to a broad range of topics
associated with the safe operation of a nuclear facility.  DOE
promulgated these requirements in DOE Order 5480.31, "Startup and
Restart of Nuclear Facilities," which it issued in September
1993.  DOE decided that the SRS should apply these requirements
to the F- and H-Canyons and, in November 1993, determined that 
the Site should hold the proposed F-Canyon (and FB-Line)
restart in abeyance until it had completed a restart review in
accordance with the new Order.  In January 1994 DOE determined
that unless there was an emergency condition, there should be no
processing in F-Canyon before the completion of an environmental
impact statement.  In March 1994 DOE issued a Notice of Intent to
prepare an environmental impact statement on the interim
management of nuclear materials at the Savannah River Site to
determine what actions, if any, would be required to ensure safe
management of the nuclear material at the Savannah River Site
until the Department could make disposition decisions.
In May 1994 the Manager of the Savannah River Operations Office
recommended that the DOE Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs
seek alternative arrangements for compliance with the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to allow stabilization of the
plutonium solutions in F-Canyon and the Mark-31 targets stored in
the L-Reactor Disassembly Basin.  This recommendation was based
on the determination that the material presents risks to workers,
the public, and the environment in the form of radiation exposure
from normal operations and potential accidents, which DOE could
reduce by converting the material to a solid stable form.
In June 1994 the DOE Office of Environment, Safety and Health
performed an independent evaluation of the SRS request for
alternative arrangements for compliance with NEPA (DOE 1994a). 
The report from this evaluation characterized the following
potential facility accidents to be of serious concern:  (1) the
potential for inadvertent criticality due to precipitation of
plutonium from the F-Canyon plutonium solutions, and (2)
potential radiological releases to the environment due to leakage
of plutonium solutions through vessel cooling coils.  The loss of
facility personnel was an issue of "marginal" concern, with the
note that this could become a serious concern if the current
trend continued.  The report did not include the Mark-31 targets
in the material of serious concern.  DOE evaluated the SRS
request for alternative arrangements for compliance with NEPA in
light of the Office of Environment, Safety and Health's evaluation and determined
that the appropriate action would be to accelerate the evaluation
of stabilization alternatives for the F-Canyon plutonium
solutions by preparing a separate expedited environmental impact
statement on this subject.
In an earlier assessment, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board "concluded from observations and discussions with others
that imminent hazards could arise within two to three years
unless certain problems are corrected....The Board is especially
concerned about....(s)everal large tanks in the F-Canyon at the
Savannah River Site (that) contain tens of thousands of gallons
of solutions of plutonium and trans-plutonium isotopes....The
trans-plutonium solutions remain from californium-252 production;
they include highly radioactive isotopes of americium and curium. 
These tanks, their appendages, and vital support systems are old,
subject to deterioration, prone to leakage, and are not
seismically qualified.  If an earthquake or other accident were
to breach the tanks, F-Canyon would become so contaminated that
cleanup would be practically impossible.  Containment of the
radioactive material under such circumstances would be highly
uncertain....  Therefore, the Board recommends...(t)hat
preparations be expedited to process the dissolved plutonium and
trans-plutonium isotopes in tanks in the F-Canyon at the Savannah
River Site into forms safer for interim storage.  The Board
considers this problem to be especially urgent" (DNFSB 1994).
Plutonium is a radioactive and highly toxic material.  Plutonium
is also fissile, which means that if enough plutonium is arranged
in a particular geometric configuration, it can sustain a nuclear
chain reaction (i.e., achieve a critical mass).  The solutions
stored in the F-Canyon contain enough plutonium to pose a
criticality concern.  The chemistry and concentration of these
solutions must be maintained within specified limits to ensure
that the plutonium remains in solution and does not precipitate
as a solid to the bottom of the tanks.  Such precipitation could
result in an inadvertent criticality and potential exposure of
workers and the public.  Maintaining the safety of the solutions 
in storage requires frequent sampling, analyses, and chemical 
additions (e.g., nitric acid to account for evaporation).  
This becomes increasingly difficult over time
because the chemistry of the solutions changes due to radiation
effects and degradation of the solvent.  There is limited
historic experience and analytical data on extended storage of
large quantities of plutonium in solution.  For example,
unexpected precipitation of plutonium solids was found in two of
the F-Canyon storage tanks in 1993 at chemistry and concentration
levels where precipitation had never been observed.  In response,
DOE took immediate measures to add chemicals (e.g., boron to
reduce criticality concerns) to the tanks and return the
precipitated plutonium to solution.  However, unexpected chemical
changes and the associated potential for an inadvertent
criticality continue to be of concern.
An inadvertent criticality is only one of the potential accidents
that could result from maintaining the plutonium solutions. 
Others include transfer errors, fires, vessel cooling coil
failures, earthquake, uncontrolled reaction (i.e., violent
chemical reaction), tank overflows, and tank leaks.  The risk
associated with each of these accidents is the possible exposure
of workers and the public to radioactive material released as a
result of an accident.  For example, a tank leak or overflow
accident could release a large amount of radioactive material
into the canyon structure.  The material would become airborne
and be carried out of the canyon by the facility ventilation
system.  This airborne material would be removed by the special
filters associated with the ventilation system.  However, if a
sufficient amount of such material was released in the canyon, a
significant quantity could get past the filters and into the
atmosphere.  The wind could carry the airborne radioactive
material off the Site where the public could receive a radiation
dose as a result of exposure to the material.
The reduction of risk would come from the fact that many of the
accidents associated with the plutonium solutions would be
eliminated by converting this plutonium to a solid (such as
metal).  For example, the leak and overflow accident mentioned 
above would be eliminated because the solid form of the material 
would not be likely to leak or overflow from its container.  
In fact, of the major credible accidents for the plutonium 
solutions in F-Canyon, the only accidents still applicable after 
conversion to a solid would be earthquake, fire, and inadvertent 
criticality.  The transfer error, tank leak, vessel cooling 
coil failure, tank overflow, and uncontrolled reaction accidents 
would not be applicable because they involve an initial release of 
plutonium in a liquid form and a subsequent transport of the material 
to workers or the public via the air or, in some cases, water.   
If the material is not a liquid, these accidents cannot release it.
In the eis on the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials, DOE is
evaluating the risks associated with the continued storage of all
nuclear materials at the SRS.  DOE anticipates that it will issue
the Draft Interim Management of Nuclear Materials eis for public
comment in February 1995.  That eis will identify any materials
that would pose safety concerns within approximately 10 years and
will evaluate alternatives for stabilization.  Although the
process of identifying materials of concern is still under way as
part of the evaluation DOE is performing for the Interim
Management of Nuclear Materials eis, the materials currently
identified as posing potential concerns represent less than 1
percent of all the nuclear materials stored at the SRS.  These
materials contain a variety of radionuclides (e.g., plutonium,
highly enriched uranium, americium), vary in physical form
(powders, metals, liquids), and are in a wide range of storage
containers (cans, drums, tanks, etc.) and facilities (chemical
separations facilities, vaults, spent fuel pools, etc.).  As a
result, the range of reasonable alternatives for each material
(or material type) can vary greatly.
For many of the materials, the range of alternatives does not
involve either F-Canyon or FB-Line because neither facility has
the capability to process or handle such materials.  In fact, of
all the nuclear materials of concern identified to date, only
irradiated fuels and targets stored in reactor basins and various 
scrap forms of plutonium-bearing materials stored in vaults 
involve the potential use of F-Canyon or FB-Line for stabilization.  
However, alternatives for these materials could involve portions 
of the F-Canyon and FB-Line processes (specifically, the dissolution 
unit operation or the capability for dissolution) that are not 
operational and that DOE would not declare operable as a result of 
any alternative evaluated under this eis.
DOE anticipates that alternatives for the materials evaluated in
the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials eis will be based on
several factors, including but not limited to:
   1. The degree to which the alternative alleviates the safety
  concerns identified;
   2. The determination of how quickly the alternative could be
  implemented to alleviate safety  concerns associated with
  the material;
   3. The degree to which the alternative relies on proven
  technology;
   4. The use of existing capabilities where feasible to minimize
  taxpayer costs; and
   5. The consistency of the alternative with national or DOE
  objectives.
DOE acknowledges that the existing capabilities at the F-Canyon,
FB-Line, and other facilities will be a factor in selecting an
alternative for analysis.  Similarly, DOE acknowledges that the
operational status of such facilities can affect how quickly the
Department could implement certain alternatives.
However, as discussed above, DOE will consider other factors. 
For this reason, the alternatives evaluated in this eis would not
tend to determine the subsequent development or limit the
alternatives evaluated in the Interim Management of Nuclear
Materials eis.

1.2 Purpose and Need for Action

The purpose of DOE's action is to eliminate the risk to its
workers, the public, and the environment from continued storage
of the plutonium in a liquid form.  In the current liquid form, a
number of accidents could result in a release of the plutonium to
the environment and potential exposure of workers or the public. 
These accidents could be the result of personnel errors,
equipment failures, or natural phenomena (e.g., earthquake).  By
converting the plutonium to a solid stable form, DOE can
eliminate the potential for plutonium releases from such accidents.  
While DOE expects some reductions in environmental impacts from 
normal operations on conversion of the solutions to a solid form, 
DOE's primary objective is to eliminate risks from accidents that could occur.

1.3 Related National Environmental Policy Act Documents

On March 17, 1994, DOE announced in the Federal Register its
intention to prepare an eis to assess the interim management of
all nuclear materials currently stored at the SRS.  The original
scope of that Interim Management of Nuclear Materials eis
included the F-Canyon plutonium solutions.  However, because of
the need to address the inherent risk of storing plutonium in a
liquid form, DOE decided to prepare this separate eis.  On August
23, 1994, DOE published an amendment to the Notice of Intent for
the eis for the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials at the
SRS.
In addition, DOE is preparing a Programmatic eis for Disposition
of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials, as announced in the Federal
Register on June 21, 1994.  This programmatic eis will evaluate
the long-term storage of weapons-usable fissile materials,
primarily plutonium-239 and highly enriched uranium, and the
disposition of such materials that the President has declared
surplus to national defense needs.  The decisions on weapons-usable
fissile material long-term storage and disposition and their 
implementation could require 10 years or more.  This F-Canyon 
Plutonium Solutions eis describes proposed interim actions that 
DOE could accomplish before making decisions related to the 
disposition of surplus weapons-usable fissile material.
On April 6, 1994, DOE issued a Notice of Intent to prepare a
Savannah River Site Waste Management eis, which will provide a
basis for selecting a sitewide strategic approach to managing
present and future waste generated at SRS.  These waste streams
would be generated by several activities including ongoing
operations and potential actions, new missions, environmental
restoration, and decontamination and decommissioning programs. 
The SRS Waste Management eis will include the treatment of
wastewater discharges in the F- and H-Effluent Treatment Facility,
F- and H-Area tank operations and waste removal, and the construction 
and operation of a replacement high-level waste evaporator in the 
H-Area Tank Farm. The SRS Waste Management eis will also evaluate the 
Consolidated Incineration Facility technology for mixed waste.  The 
Record of Decision is scheduled for July 1995.
Also on April 6, 1994, DOE issued a Notice of Intent to prepare
the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) Supplemental eis to
examine the environmental impacts of completing construction and
operating the DWPF at SRS.  This document supplements an eis that
DOE issued in 1982, and will assist DOE in deciding whether and 
how to proceed with the DWPF in light of changes to processes and 
facilities that have occurred since the issuance of
the 1982 eis.  The Final Supplemental eis was made available in 
November 1994.  The Record of Decision is scheduled for December 1994 .  
One of the alternatives considered in this eis, Vitrification 
(Defense Waste Processing Facility), would depend on a DOE decision under the
DWPF Supplemental eis, to complete construction and to operate
the DWPF.
In January 1991 the then Secretary of Energy announced that the
Department would prepare a programmatic environmental impact
statement examining alternatives for the reconfiguration of the
nuclear weapons complex.  On October 28, 1994, the Department
issued a notice it would separate the current Reconfiguration
Programmatic eis into separate analyses:  a Tritium Supply and
Recycling eis and a Stockpile Stewardship and Management eis. 
The latter eis includes activities required to maintain a high
level of confidence in the safety, reliability, and performance
of nuclear weapons, as well as maintenance, evaluation, and
repair of replacement activities.