5 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
The implementation of the alternatives described in Section 3 would have impact on the environment. This section analyzes the impacts that each alternative would have on workers, the public, and the environment. The environmental impact analyses focus on the alternatives identified in this EIS and are addressed in the following sections: . 5.1 Anticipated Impacts of the Preferred Alternative . 5.2 Anticipated Impacts of the Truck Transfer Alternative . 5.3 Anticipated Impacts of the Rail Transfer Alternative . 5.4 Anticipated Impacts of the New Storage Alternative . 5.5 Anticipated Impacts of the No Action Alternative. In addition to these subsections, Section 5.6 discusses unavoidable adverse impacts to the environment. Section 5.7 evaluates the relationship between short-term and long-term uses of the affected environment. Section 5.8 discusses the irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources. Section 5.9 compares and contrasts the environmental impacts of all alternatives. The environmental impacts of each alternative are identified and evaluated in the following subsections. . Geology, Seismology, and Soils . Water Resources and Hydrology . Physical Environment . Biological and Ecological Resources . Population and Socioeconomic . Transportation . Land Use . Cultural Resources . Anticipated Health Effects Under Normal Conditions . Health Effects Under Accident Conditions . Potential Mitigation Measures.
5.1 ANTICIPATED IMPACTS OF THE PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE
The analysis of the environmental impacts of the preferred alternative
considers:
. The construction and operation of the RCSTS to replace the ECSTS;
. Retrieval of Tank 102-SY using one of two retrieval systems;
. Use of existing storage capacity in DSTs to manage wastes, and;
. Continued operations of the mixer pump in Tank 101-SY to mitigate
hydrogen generation.
The primary components of the RCSTS, the retrieval systems, and mixer pump
operations in Tank 101-SY are described in detail in Section 3.1.
5.1.1 GEOLOGY, SEISMOLOGY, AND SOILS
This section discusses the impact the preferred alterative would have on geologic resources, seismology, and soils. Construction under the preferred alternative would modify the existing terrain, restrict access to part of the Hanford Site, and disturb soil resources.
5.1.1.1 Geologic Resources
- The impact to the geologic environment by the facilities proposed by the preferred alternative would be minimal. Restriction of public access to mineral deposits already exists at the Hanford Site. Restriction of resource access for site operations would have minimal impact since sand and gravel resources are readily available at other areas within the Hanford Site. Adequate soils engineering would be employed during site preparation to preclude any potential for subsidence. Faulting has not been identified in the construction site vicinity. Due to the generally subdued topography of the proposed RCSTS site and pipeline alignment, landslides or slope failure would not present a hazard. The construction and operation of the facilities proposed as part of the preferred alternative would not impact the geology of the site.
5.1.1.2 Seismology
- Seismologic hazards, discussed in Section 4.1.2, would
not impact facilities proposed as part of the preferred alternative.
The RCSTS would be designed to resist a variety of loads including dead, live,
pressure, thermal, and seismic loads. The seismic loads are those resulting
from:
. Passage of seismic waves (i.e., wave-propagation effects)
. Seismic-induced building settlements and seismic anchor movements
. Soil failure due to liquefaction, landslide, etc.
. Transfer of stress between the inner and outer pipelines at their
connection points.
The seismic design of the facilities proposed as part of the preferred
alternative would be according to the general requirements of DOE Order
6430.1A, its primary reference LLNL/UCRL 15910 and the Brookhaven National
Laboratory (BNL) guidelines 52361. The design basis earthquake (DBE) for
which items would be designed is specified by DOE as the maximum horizontal
ground surface acceleration (WHC 1994a, WHC 1993a, WHC 1993b). The
consequences of a seismic rupture of the RCSTS are evaluated in Section
5.1.10. Seismic hazards are not expected to affect continued use of the ECSTS
pending completion of the RCSTS, due to the unlikely probability of a seismic
accident event rupturing the ECSTS.
5.1.1.3 Soils
- The majority of the 200 East and 200 West Areas and the proposed RCSTS construction sites are covered with sandy soil that supports vegetative cover (sagebrush and various grasses) (PNL 1995). Vegetation protects the soil from wind erosion. The sandy soil would be susceptible to both short-term and long-term wind erosion if it were exposed during clearing for construction. Wind erosion would be prevented through normal dust control procedures throughout construction. The preferred alternative would include revegetation of the sites to mitigate construction activities from disturbance and removal of native soil and vegetation along the proposed route of the RCSTS. A detailed discussion of planned revegetation activities is provided in Subsection 5.1.4. Without irrigation, none of the soils affected by the RCSTS could be considered prime or unique farmlands, prime forest lands, or prime pasture lands (Brincken 1994).
5.1.2 WATER RESOURCES AND HYDROLOGY
This section discusses the impact the preferred alternative would have on water resources and hydrology. Potential spills and leaks from the proposed RCSTS or the ECSTS are not expected during normal operations. The potential for accidental releases is discussed in Section 5.1.10. Under normal operating conditions no impacts to water resources are anticipated. Even in the unlikely event of a transfer pipeline break in either the ECSTS or RCSTS, ground-water resources would be protected by the thick vadose zone in this area and the tendency for many radionuclides to be retained in the soils. The enhanced secondary containment provided by the RCSTS provides an added level of protection not present in the ECSTS. Standard construction procedures for dust suppression using water would not be expected to effect water resources due to the small amount of water that would be used, rapid evaporation, and the thick vadose zone in this area.
5.1.3 PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT
This section discusses the impact the preferred alternative would have on the physical environment. Impacts of the preferred alternative on the physical environment are examined in terms of the following elements of the environment: . Air Quality . Radiation . Sound Levels and Noise.
5.1.3.1 Air Quality
- Air quality impacts have been considered for
construction and routine operations of the preferred alternative. This
subsection describes the analytical approach applied to construction emissions
and operation emissions.
. Construction Emissions - Construction activities for the Tank 102-SY
retrieval system would occur primarily within the tank farm area
currently covered with gravel, therefore, potential dust emissions would
be limited to RCSTS construction. Particulate emissions, primarily
blowing dust, would result from RCSTS project excavation and fill
activities. Estimates of the fugitive dust emissions from previous air
emission analysis (Rittman 1994) would be applicable to the construction
of the RCSTS.
Emissions were estimated using an EPA fugitive dust emission factor of
1.04 x 10-4 g/s/m2 (2.05 x 10-8 lb/s/ft2) assuming a 30-day month. By
reclaiming surface soils during RCSTS installation, construction
operations would limit the total area of exposed soil surface. For
purposes of analysis in this EIS, it is assumed that 2.3 ha (5.7 acres)
would be subject to wind erosion at any time during RCSTS construction.
The average dust emission rate from this area would be 2.4 g/s (5.1 x
10-3 lb/s).
Air concentrations of fugitive dust downwind of the proposed
construction area were computed as an area source using the ISCLT2
program from EPA. Hanford Site wind data collected at the HMS between
1983 and 1991 were used in the modeling. Results are shown in Table
5-1. The wind direction east-southeast (ESE) produced the largest
concentrations of fugitive dust. Based on the data in Table 5-1, the
Ecology Air Quality Standard of 60 yg/m3 (3.7 x 10-9 lb/ft3) would not be
exceeded.
Fugitive Dust Emissions from RCSTS Construction
Concentration
(yg/m3)bm
300 43.33
400 33.05
500 26.22
700 18.00
1,000 11.39
2,000 4.24
5,000 1.09
10,000 0.39
a1 m = 3.281 ft
byg/m3 = 6.2x10-11 lb/ft3
The construction of the RCSTS or the retrieval system proposed in Tank
102-SY, would not produce fugitive dust concentrations in excess of EPA
or Ecology Air Quality Standards. Construction activities would include
mitigation activities to control fugitive dust emissions from the
construction site, including watering exposed areas and stabilizing
spoils piles by use of vegetation or soil fixative.
. Operations Emissions - Airborne emissions from the existing tank farm
ventilation operations in the 200 West and East Areas are known to
exist. Operations from existing mixer pump or ECSTS activities are not
expected to result in on-site or off-site health effects from toxic gas
emissions, based on An Environmental Assessment for Proposed Pump Mixing
Operations to Mitigate Episodic Gas Releases in Tank 241-101-SY
DOE/EA/0803 (DOE 1992a). RCSTS activities would have no routine toxic
chemical emissions.
Limited monitoring for on-site airborne concentrations of volatile
organic compounds reported in the Hanford Site Environmental Report for
Calendar Year 1993 (PNL 1994a) indicate that levels are below Ecology's
acceptance source impact levels (ASILs) for benzene and carbon
tetrachloride. That report indicated that measured on-site
concentrations were close to background levels.
5.1.3.2 Radiation
- Airborne emissions of radioactive materials from normal operation of facilities under the preferred alternative would not result in any measurable increase in radioactivity in off-site air, water, soil, vegetation, and animals. Section 5.1.9 discusses in detail estimated emissions of radioactive materials from normal operations under the preferred alternative.
5.1.3.3 Sound Levels and Noise
- Potential noise impacts from constructing and operating the RCSTS and the retrieval system at the Hanford Site would not be expected to exceed maximum noise limits set by the State of Washington. The distance between the RCSTS and the retrieval system to the nearest receptor location is significant, creating a large buffer zone for noise abatement and control. Although occasional recreational usage of the Hanford Site occurs along the Columbia River and Route 240, protection of the public from potential noise impacts would be maintained by the distance from the proposed project site to these areas. During construction, equipment may temporarily increase ambient noise levels at the proposed project site. Noise levels created by construction equipment have been measured and typical data are presented in Figure 5-1. Occupational noise exposure would be monitored within the work areas expected to exhibit noise levels beyond limits set by OSHA and threshold limit values established by the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH). A hearing conservation program including the use of OSHA-approved hearing protection would be implemented to protect workers during these operations, as necessary.
5.1.4 BIOLOGICAL AND ECOLOGICAL RESOURCES
The construction of the preferred alternative would require removal of vegetation, destruction of habitat, and the generation of dust and noise. Although these actions would be temporary, they may have both short-term and long-term effects upon site vegetation and wildlife. Figure (Page 5-8) Figure 5-1. Construction Equipment Noise Ranges The following subsections examine the potential effects of the preferred alternative: . Vegetation . Wildlife . Threatened or Endangered Species.
5.1.4.1 Vegetation
- Construction of the preferred alternative would remove vegetation from the RCSTS route and associated facility maintenance areas. In addition, construction staging, laydown, and spoils stockpiling areas would require the removal of vegetation and would disturb soil, but these areas would be revegetated by seeding with native species after construction is complete. The areas disturbed during construction of the RCSTS would be similarly revegetated after construction, except for the areas requiring access for monitoring and maintenance. If decommissioning at the end of the useful life of the RCSTS requires removal of the pipeline, the corridor would be disturbed again. All these disturbed land areas would have long-term changes in vegetation cover. Land surfaces disturbed by construction and left to revegetate without intervention would become quickly dominated by Russian thistle and cheatgrass, ubiquitous non-native annual plants highly adapted to the arid conditions of south-central Washington. If native perennial species were not killed by the surface disturbance they would probably resprout and remain a presence. If they were killed by the surface disturbance, they would be slow to reestablish from seed because of competition from the cheatgrass. Among native shrubs, grey rabbitbrush would be best able to establish after disturbance. Rabbitbrush/cheatgrass plant communities are common in previously disturbed sites. The RCSTS construction on the proposed route would disturb a corridor with a width of 30 m (100 ft) and a length of about 10 km (32,000 ft), resulting in approximately 30 ha (74 acres) of disturbed land. About 9 ha (23 acres) of the corridor would be mature sagebrush/cheatgrass habitat. The remaining 21 ha (51 acres) would be disturbed areas occupied by grey rabbitbrush/cheatgrass habitat or barren areas, including roads (see Figure 4-16). Much of the proposed RCSTS route follows an existing dirt road about 4.6 m (15 ft) wide, so in these areas the width of clearing of the sagebrush habitat is calculated as 26 m (85 ft) rather than 30 m (100 ft). An optional route segment from the fence at the eastern edge of the 200 West Area to the vent station about midway along the proposed RCSTS was evaluated to determine if it would offer a significantly lower impact on mature sagebrush habitat (see Figure 4-16). This optional route was selected for evaluation because it could use the approximately 10 m (30-ft) wide access road along the north side of the ECSTS to reduce the width of the construction corridor. This optional route, however, is about 305 m (1,000 ft) longer than the proposed route. The effect of the proposed RCSTS on mature sagebrush habitat by using this optional segment would be a reduction of approximately 0.6 ha (1.6 acres) of mature habitat loss compared with the proposed route. Changing to this optional segment would have significant cost implications. An alternate eastern segment from the vent station to the 200 East Area paralleling the ECSTS was also evaluated. Because of the distribution of mature sagebrush patches, disturbed areas, and contaminated areas that must be avoided, using this alternate segment would increase the loss of mature habitat by 2.1 ha (5.3 acres) over the proposed route. The 9 ha (23 acres) of sagebrush/cheatgrass habitat would experience long-term effects. Part of this area could be revegetated by seeding with native species after construction, but an estimated one-quarter of the width of the corridor would be subject to future disturbance for access and maintenance. The soil disturbance from construction activities would result in compaction, mixing of soil horizons, and wind erosion, conditions which favor species that thrive on disturbed soil. Sagebrush communities are expected to require decades to become established and reach maturity. Seeding for revegetation of the impacted grey rabbitbrush habitats may also include sagebrush seed to encourage more complete development of shrub steppe vegetation with the highest value for wildlife species of concern. Areas of the corridor that are currently barren and not subject to ongoing disturbance would be similarly revegegated once construction of the facilities and pipeline is complete. Mitigation besides revegetation of the areas temporarily disturbed by the construction would be required. If the assumption is made that it would not be possible to restore within a reasonable time the sagebrush/cheatgrass habitat on the area that would be temporarily disturbed, then a full 9 ha (23 acres) would need mitigation. The mature sagebrush habitat would be replaced at a ratio of 3:1 for this project. Sites would be selected that fit into a site-wide program if one is developed later. If the worst-case mitigation debt of 9 ha (23 acres) of sagebrush habitat is assumed, then a 3:1 ratio equals 28 ha (69 acres) of compensation. Figure 5-2 shows the proposed area for such compensation to occur. It has over 530 ha (1,300 acres) available for potential habitat restoration. The site-disturbing activities that might be associated with restoration of sagebrush habitat would be minimized, and the impacts on the restoration sites would be minor and localized. Specific plots of adequate acreage will be selected and evaluated for cultural resources and ecological baseline information as part of the MAP. Since there would be no ground disturbance to the ECSTS, no habitat impact would occur from its use during the time the RCSTS is constructed.
5.1.4.2 Wildlife
- Clearing vegetation in the vicinity of the RCSTS pipeline corridor to construct the facilities and pipeline would result in a loss of habitat in that vicinity for some of the wildlife species on the Hanford Site. The anticipated clearing schedule would avoid the bird nesting season. Construction-related impacts would most likely affect: . The loggerhead shrike and sage sparrow (discussed in section 5.1.4.3) . Nesting song birds (such as horned lark and western meadowlark) . Small mammals . Reptiles, including the sagebrush lizard. Small mammals, reptiles, and crawling insects that require shade from vegetation would be subjected to habitat fragmentation (i.e., creation of relatively large habitat discontinuities where shrub cover is removed) if the area is not revegetated. Figure (page 5-12) Figure 5-2. Composition Area for Lost Sagebrush Habitat Revegetating would minimize the operational impacts. Habitat restoration, a means of mitigation, would change grass-dominated habitat to sagebrush habitat and would favor some species to the detriment of others (for example, favor shrikes over horned larks). Overall, the effect of converting grass-dominated habitat to sagebrush-dominated habitat would be minor because the grass- dominated habitats are abundant and tend to support few sensitive species. In addition, wildlife diversity would be expected to increase as a result. Construction noise would temporarily displace some species. Some roadkills would be expected for small mammals and reptiles that remain in the vicinity as heavy equipment moves across the Hanford Site. The operation of the RCSTS would not have any impact on wildlife populations.
5.1.4.3 Threatened or Endangered Species
- No threatened or endangered plant species occur at either the 200 East or West Areas or along the RCSTS corridor. The stalked-pod milkvetch, a State of Washington monitor species, has been found at several locations along the RCSTS corridor in both disturbed and undisturbed sagebrush habitats and may be affected. It may be interspersed in the proposed construction areas including potential mitigation sites. Even though some specimens of this species would be lost, the overall Hanford Site population would not be affected. The loggerhead shrike, a Federal and state candidate species, the sagebrush lizard, a Federal candidate species, and the sage sparrow, a state candidate species, require mature sagebrush/cheatgrass habitat. The loss of 9 ha (23 acres) out of about 93,000 ha (230,000 acres) on the Hanford Site of mature sagebrush/cheatgrass would be a direct loss of habitat for these species and other species that use the site. During spring 1995 surveys, 11 shrike nests were found along the RCSTS corridor. Three sage sparrows were found along the RCSTS corridor. These species would not be nesting on the potential mitigation sites and would not be affected by the mitigation activity. The preferred alternative would include establishing compensatory habitat restoration sites to mitigate the disturbance of native soil and removal of vegetation in the construction area. The potential options for habitat restoration sites are discussed in Appendix D.
5.1.5 POPULATION AND SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS
This section examines the impact the preferred alternative would have on population and socioeconomics in the region of influence. For purposes of this analysis, the socioeconomic region of influence was defined as those counties in the State of Washington where Hanford employees reside. The analysis includes impacts to the local economy, income, population, housing, and local infrastructure, and an evaluation of environmental justice.
5.1.5.1 Local Economy and Employment
- The preferred alternative would require 20 workers from Hanford's existing workforce for the anticipated 4-month construction period for either retrieval system proposed for Tank 102-SY. An additional 80 workers would be required for a duration of 21 months for the construction of the RCSTS. Twenty of these workers would come from the existing workforce and the remaining 60 would be new hires. The operations workforce of five would come from existing personnel. This information is summarized in Table 5-2.
Effects of the Preferred Alternative on Employment
Construction Operations
Supporting
Actions
No. Existing/ Duration No. Existing/ Duration
Jobs New Hires (mos) Jobs New Hires (yrs) Assumptions
Retrieval 20 20/0 4 4 4/0 Approx. 2 Retrieval
System for of Tank
Tank 102- 102-SY
SY only
RCSTS 80 20/60 21 5 5/0 30 TWRS
activities
complete in
30 years
For every job created at the Hanford Site, 1.2 jobs are created locally, for
every new hire from outside the region of influence, 1.3 persons would move
into the local region. The total employment multiplier is 2.2 and population
growth is 2.2 x 1.3, or 2.86. These multipliers are based on the
socioeconomic input/output analysis performed by PNL in 1987 and 1989
(DOE 1991). All operations personnel would come from the existing workforce.
For 60 temporary construction jobs (i.e., new hires) created at the Hanford
Site under the preferred alternative, 132 new jobs would be created locally.
Some of these jobs may be filled from the workers in the community available
as a result of DOE cutbacks expected in 1995. New hires moving into the
region of influence are not expected to increase population above 1995 peak
levels and would, therefore, not have significant socioeconomic impacts.
5.1.5.2 Income - Construction of the preferred alternative would generate
construction income for the region of influence. It is expected this income
would impact beyond Benton and Franklin Counties, although a majority of the
income would flow into these two counties over a period of 2 years.
Construction costs associated with services, goods, and materials would
constitute the majority of the income generated to Benton and Franklin
Counties. Potential fabrication of project components outside the local area
could reduce beneficial income impacts to the local area.
5.1.5.3 Population
- As discussed in Section 5.1.5.1, the population growth
multiplier has been determined to be 2.86. Therefore, assuming all 60 new
hires move into the community from outside the region of influence, a
population increase of 172 persons could occur. However, the actual increase
is expected to be less since jobs may be filled by the available workforce
resulting from general DOE cutbacks at the Hanford Site. The actual number
depends on the availability of qualified workers for the new construction
jobs. The maximum increase is less than 5 percent of the expected DOE
cutbacks, and therefore, problems typically associated with sudden population
growth are not anticipated.
5.1.5.4 Housing
- The preferred alternative would not have a significant
impact on the housing market within the region of influence. The demand for
single-family units and rental units as well as other modes of housing is
expected to decline as a result of the DOE cutbacks. Housing for new hires is
expected to be readily available as previous Hanford Site employees leave the
region of influence to pursue employment elsewhere. No housing shortage or
price increase is anticipated to result from this alternative.
5.1.5.5 Local Infrastructure
- Due to a relatively small amount of temporary
employment, and therefore population growth, provided by this alternative, the
demand for public education, police and fire protection, and medical service
is not expected to increase above 1995 peak levels. In light of the DOE
cutbacks, overburdening of these community services would not result from the
preferred alternative.
5.1.5.6 Environmental Justice
- As discussed above, the primary
socioeconomic impact of the preferred alternative would be from temporary
construction workers hired for the project duration. However, this impact
would be offset by DOE workforce reductions. In addition, as demonstrated in
Section 5.1.10, no health effects to any off-site population are anticipated.
Therefore, no disproportionate impacts to low-income or minority populations
would occur as a result of this alternative. Appendix C provides a more
detailed discussion of environmental justice issues.
5.1.6 TRANSPORTATION
The following sections summarize the impacts to the Hanford Site
transportation system for the preferred alternative.
5.1.6.1 Vehicular Traffic and Circulation
- Construction of the RCSTS and the
retrieval system would occur between the 200 East and West Areas as described
in Section 3.3.5.2. Construction vehicles transporting heavy equipment,
material, and workers would enter the 200 Areas via State Highways 24 and 240,
the new 240 State Route Access Road, and Route 3. The construction phase for
the RCSTS would be expected to last approximately 21 months. During the
construction phase, the expected volume of construction related vehicles at
any one time would vary. As a worst-case condition, a daily maximum of 80
construction personnel would utilize the Hanford Site roadways during
construction of the RCSTS. Based on a vehicle occupancy rate of 1.35
passengers per vehicle, the incremental increase in traffic volume would be
approximately 60 daily trips. Because the amount of construction-generated
vehicles would be relatively small compared to the daily traffic on these
roadways (see Section 4.6) and because the affected roadways are currently
operating at acceptable LOS, adverse traffic impacts are not expected during
construction.
Roadways which could be used as alternate routes to the 200 East and West
Areas include Route 10, Route 2 South/Route 11A, and Route 5. Adverse impacts
to these roadways are not expected to occur as a result of the proposed
alternative. These roadways are currently operating at acceptable LOS and
would be able to accommodate the comparatively minor volumes of construction
related vehicles without deteriorating existing traffic conditions.
Since the RCSTS would be located underground and operated remotely with
existing Hanford Site workforce (Trost, Epperson 1995), no increase in
vehicular traffic would be expected to occur from its operation. Similarly,
the proposed retrieval system in Tank 102-SY would also be operated by a
small, existing workforce. No new personnel or facilities are required to
operate the existing mixer pump, therefore, no impacts to on-site traffic
conditions would be associated with this component of the preferred
alternative. No adverse impacts to roadways are anticipated due to the
operation of the preferred alternative.
5.1.6.2 Other Transportation Facilities
- Bus line service and capacity would
not be adversely impacted by the preferred alternative. Based on the
available capacity of all roadways serving the 200 East and West Areas, it is
expected that the majority of construction personnel would travel to the job
site via their personal vehicles or carpool. The bus service to the 200 Areas
which was previously available has been reduced. If this service were
restored or a private bus service replaced it, a significant increase in bus
service usage would not be expected as part of the preferred alternative.
It is expected that vessel traffic on the Columbia River would not be
significantly affected by the construction of the RCSTS and retrieval system.
A small increase in vessel traffic may occur during the construction of the
RCSTS to transport construction material and equipment, but this would be
temporary. The increase in vessel traffic is not expected to increase vessel
traffic congestion or affect the safe transit of other commercial or
recreation vessels either at the Port of Benton or on the Columbia River.
During construction of the RCSTS and retrieval system, prefabricated materials
may be transported to the 200 Areas via the existing on-site rail system.
Rail service to the 200 East and West Areas is currently provided by spur
lines located approximately 0.4 km (0.25 mi) away. Because rail usage to the
200 East and West Areas is very infrequent, transporting construction
materials via rail would not cause rail traffic congestion. Rail transport of
construction materials would result in minimal delays to vehicles using site
roadways.
5.1.7 LAND USE
The preferred alternative would not alter the current or foreseeable future
land use patterns or aesthetic and visual resources of the 200 East and West
and 600 Areas. Each of these topics are discussed in the following
subsections.
5.1.7.1 Land-Use Patterns
- The preferred alternative would be located in the
200 East and West Areas and the portion of the 600 Area located between the
200 East and West Areas. This portion of the Hanford Central Plateau has been
used exclusively for fuel reprocessing, waste processing, and management for
approximately the last 50 years. These areas contain underground storage
tanks, ECSTS, and other waste-handling facilities.
While the preferred alternative would require the commitment of approximately
30 ha (74 acres) of land for the RCSTS, this facility would be consistent with
the overall site cleanup mission which is expected to last for several
decades. In addition, no other appropriate land uses would be precluded
because the site of the proposed action is dedicated to waste storage and
handling during the site cleanup mission. Decommissioning of the facilities
would also be compatible with existing land use.
The preferred alternative would be consistent with The Future for Hanford:
Uses and Cleanup Final Report: dated December 1992 (FSUWG 1992). The Hanford
Future Site Uses Working Group, the author of this report, was established
through DOE as a part of the scoping of the HRA EIS. This scoping effort
enabled participants to articulate their visions of possible future site uses
for the Hanford Site. The group divided the Hanford Site into six
geographical areas. The Central Plateau, where the 200 East and West and 600
Areas are located, is one of the six areas. The Working Group report
recognized the Central Plateau's historic and present use and recommended that
waste management activities be concentrated in that area during the site
cleanup mission.
5.1.7.2 Aesthetic and Visual Resources
- The potential visual impact of a
proposed project is the degree to which visual quality would be altered and
the affect of the alteration on viewers. The RCSTS connecting the 200 East
Area and the 200 West Area would be underground and, therefore, present no
visual impact to off-site viewers after the completion of construction.
5.1.8 CULTURAL RESOURCES
As discussed in Subsection 4.8, field surveys conducted over the 200 East and
West Areas and the 600 Area between those two areas, in the vicinity of the
proposed RCSTS corridor and its optional route segment, have not identified
archeological or historical sites of significance. In addition, no
archeological or religious sites of Native American concern have been
identified in the proposed project area. As a consequence, construction of
the preferred alternative would not adversely affect cultural resources.
Cultural resource reviews have been performed for the area identified for
revegetation. Two potential sites were located within the 530 ha (1,300 acre)
area identified for habitat restoration. Cultural sites located in this large
area would be avoided during mitigation activities by excluding workers from
the vicinity of these sites. Detailed avoidance measures for known sites will
be specified in the MAP. In the event a potential resource is discovered
during construction of the RCSTS or during habitat restoration, work would
immediately cease and a qualified archaeologist and the affected tribes would
be contacted to determine whether the material is of archaeological interest
or cultural significance. If cultural materials are located, procedures
outlined in the NHPA and the Hanford Cultural Resources Management Plan would
be followed. Prior to any site disturbance a detailed MAP will formalize
field procedures which would be utilized to prevent impacts to cultural
resources should they be encountered.
5.1.9 ANTICIPATED HEALTH EFFECTS UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS
This section discusses the potential cause and magnitude of health effects
that are anticipated to occur under normal conditions as a result of
implementation of the preferred alternative. These health effects could
result from direct exposure to ionizing radiation or inhalation of toxic and
radioactive materials. The various types of health effects that can occur and
the relationship between exposure and health effects is discussed in
Appendix E. This section evaluates health effects in terms of latent cancer
fatalities (LCFs) for radiation exposures and in terms of incremental cancer
risk and systemic toxic effects for chemical exposures. The preferred
alternative is described in Section 3.1.1 and briefly summarized here.
The preferred alternative consists of continued operation of the 150-hp mixer
pump in Tank 101-SY, continued pumping of SST SWLs in the 200 West Area,
continued storage of WAFW, retrieval of sludge from Tank 102-SY, and
construction of the RCSTS. The sludge in Tank 102-SY would be retrieved at a
minimum dilution ratio of 2:1 (diluent:sludge) using either the ITRS or past
practice sluicing system (PPSS) and transferred to the 200 East Area.
Retrieval would occur prior to the cross-site transfer of complexed SWLs to
avoid mixing with the 269,000 L (71,000 gal) of sludge in Tank 102-SY. The
sludge is classified as TRU waste and could be dissolved if mixed with
complexed waste. TRU waste is waste other than HLW that contains more than
100 nanocuries (nCi)/g of alpha-emitting TRU nuclides with half-lives greater
than 20 years. The reliability of the ECSTS is questionable and its solids
handling capability presently unknown. It is assumed that the ECSTS would be
used for cross-site transfers of liquid waste until either no usable lines
remain or the RCSTS becomes operational.
Activities considered as normal conditions under the preferred alternative
would include:
. Facility Construction
. Facility Operation
. Facility Decontamination and Decommissioning.
Each of these activities is discussed relative to health effects in the
following subsections.
5.1.9.1 Facility Construction
- Construction activities under the preferred
alternative would include:
. RCSTS Construction
. Retrieval System Construction.
The retrieval system would be either an ITRS or a PPSS.
Potential exposures of workers and members of the general public to direct
radiation, radioactive materials, and chemicals during construction activities
are discussed below:
. RCSTS Construction - Construction of the RCSTS would involve excavation
and other earth-moving activities along the 10 km (6.2 mi) route and
work in and around contaminated areas such as existing piping, valve
pits, and diversion boxes. Workers would be exposed to direct radiation
during construction activities in or around existing piping, process
pits, and diversion boxes. The total estimated dose from direct
radiation during construction work in these contaminated areas is 26.3
person-rem (Light 1994) and, based on an occupational risk factor of 4 x
10-4 LCFs per person-rem, would be expected to result in 0.01 LCFs. The
estimated dose assumes that existing contamination levels within process
pits and diversion boxes would be reduced by partial decontamination
prior to beginning construction in these areas. Exposure to direct
radiation during construction activities would also be reduced by
applying the ALARA principle in planning work tasks and implementing
procedures specific to the task and conditions encountered.
Exposures to airborne radioactive material and chemicals would also be
possible during construction activities in contaminated areas.
Inhalation exposures could occur during excavations and grinding or
cutting of contaminated pipelines and concrete. Release of airborne
contaminants to the environment would be controlled using temporary
enclosures or, for large outdoor areas, using wetting or soil fixatives.
Other measures to control inhalation exposures would include
decontaminating work areas, using protective equipment, and implementing
procedures specific to the work.
. Retrieval System Construction - Construction of either an ITRS or PPSS
for Tank 102-SY would be expected to result in exposure of workers to
direct radiation and to airborne radioactive materials and chemicals.
Estimates of these exposures are not available for Tank 102-SY but can
be inferred from estimates for ITRS construction for other tanks in the
SY Tank Farm.
ITRS construction activities would include erection of an ICE building,
construction of new and modification of existing pump and valve pits,
and construction of tank mixing, transfer, and cooling systems (WHC
1994b). Estimated exposure for Tank 101-SY ranges from 170 person-rem
to 380 person-rem depending on whether the existing mitigation mixer
pump is used for retrieval operations or is replaced with a more
powerful mixer pump (personal communication Van Beek 1995). Estimated
exposure for Tank 103-SY, including mixer pump installation, is 400
person-rem (personal communication Van Beek 1995). 137Cs is the
predominant gamma-emitting radionuclide in wastes in the SY Tank Farm
and, since the 137Cs inventory is approximately 40 times higher in Tank
103-SY than Tank 102-SY (WHC 1993c), it is considered unlikely that dose
during ITRS construction for Tank 102-SY would exceed 400 person-rem.
Based on a risk factor of 1 x 10-4 LCFs per person-rem, adverse health
effects are not expected as the result from exposure to direct radiation
during ITRS construction for Tank 102-SY.
Construction of a PPSS for Tank 102-SY would also require installation
of equipment inside the tank and modifications in existing contaminated
process pits and would be expected to result in direct radiation
exposures similar to those for construction of the ITRS.
Exposures to airborne radioactive material and chemicals would also be
possible during in-tank installation of ITRS components and other
construction activities. Release of airborne contaminants to the
environment would be controlled using temporary enclosures or, for large
outdoor areas, using wetting or soil fixatives. Other measures to
control inhalation exposures would include decontaminating work areas,
using protecting equipment, and implementing procedures specific to the
work.
5.1.9.2 Facility Operations
- Facility operations under the preferred
alternative would include operation of the Tank 101-SY 150 hp mixer pump,
retrieval of Tank 102-SY, SWL pumping activities, and cross-site transfer
operations via the transfer pump in Tank 102-SY and both the ECSTS and RCSTS.
These activities involve sampling and monitoring waste and ventilation
systems, inspection and surveillance, and maintenance of equipment and
facilities. Workers and members of the general public could be exposed to the
following emissions during these activities:
. Direct Radiation
. Airborne Emissions of Radioactive Material
. Airborne Emissions of Chemicals.
Estimated doses and resultant health effects for each of these exposures are
discussed in the following list.
. Direct Radiation - Workers performing routine operations, maintenance,
and surveillance would be exposed to direct radiation during mixer pump
operations, SWL pumping, and associated cross-site transfers. Workers
could also be exposed to direct radiation during Tank 102-SY retrieval
operations. Many of these activities are similar to those now being
performed by tank farm workers
Worker exposure records prior to construction of DSTs indicate that tank
farm workers had received an average annual dose of 630 mrem from direct
radiation exposure (DOE 1980). The DSTs are now the main focus of tank
farm operations and include many design features such as improved
shielding and remotely-operated and remotely-monitored systems. An
examination of more recent radiation exposure records of tank farm
workers indicates that the average annual individual dose has dropped to
14 mrem (DOE 1992b). Activities performed by these workers include SWL
pumping and inter-farm waste transfer.
Additional activities performed by tank farm workers under the preferred
alternative would include cross-site waste transfers and Tank 102-SY
sludge retrieval operations. Since the wastes involved are similar to
those currently being handled and the additional activities involve
systems reflecting the continuing improvement in radiation protection
design, an annual individual dose of 14 mrem is considered
representative of the dose that would be received by workers involved in
the preferred alternative. Based on this dose and an occupational risk
factor of 4 x 10-4 LCFs per person-rem, workers involved in operations
under the preferred alternative are not expected to incur any adverse
health effects as the result of exposure to direct radiation.
. Airborne Emissions of Radioactive Material - Workers and members of the
general public could be exposed to airborne emissions of radionuclides
from SSTs awaiting retrieval, or during SWL pumping, or from the SY Tank
Farm during operation of the Tank 101-SY mitigation mixer pump,
retrieval of Tank 102-SY, and cross-site transfer operations. Emissions
from the SSTs, SWL pumping, and operation of the Tank 101-SY mitigation
mixer pump are expected to be the same as those for the same activities
under the no action alternative. These emissions are discussed in
Section 5.5.9 and are not expected to result in any adverse health
effects.
Source terms for airborne emissions of radionuclides during DST
retrieval operations were considered by Ligotke, et al (PNL 1994b). The
report estimated that the dry aerosol source term would be one to two
orders of magnitude greater during sluicing operations than during
operation of two 300-hp mixer pumps. The report also concluded that
existing DST ventilation systems could control airborne emissions during
mixer pump operations provided that the ability of each ventilation
system to control moisture to prevent plugging and failure of HEPA
filters was evaluated and modified as necessary. Methods of controlling
ventilation system moisture include chiller/condensers, HEME, and
heaters that could be incorporated in the ventilation system for either
method as needed to control emissions during the few weeks that the
retrieval system would operate.
Based on these considerations, airborne emissions of radionuclides under
the preferred alternative are expected to be essentially the same as
those under current conditions. In 1993, airborne emissions from stacks
in tanks farms accounted for 1 percent (1.3 x 10-5 mrem) of total dose
to the maximally exposed individual from all stack emissions in the 200
East Area and 0.003 percent (3.1 x 10-8 mrem) of the total dose to the
maximally exposed individual from all stack emissions in the 200 West
Area. The population dose from all airborne emissions from the 200
Areas in 1993 was 0.17 person-rem. These doses are considered to be
representative of those that would be received by the maximally exposed
off-site individual and the off-site population from airborne emissions
under the preferred alternative. Based on a non-occupational risk
factor of 5 x 10-4 LCFs per person-rem, no adverse health effects are
expected to be incurred in the off-site population as the result of
implementation of the preferred alternative.
. Airborne Emissions of Chemicals - Workers and members of the general
public could be exposed to airborne emissions of chemicals from SSTs
awaiting retrieval, or during SWL pumping, or from the SY Tank Farm
during operation of the Tank 101-SY mitigation mixer pump, retrieval of
Tank 102-SY, and cross-site waste transfer operations.
A FONSI has been issued for operation of the Tank 101-SY mitigation
mixer pump based on an EA (DOE 1992b) that assumed operating conditions
that would produce chemical emissions greater than those produced by
mixer pump operation under the preferred alternative. The report
evaluating source terms for dry aerosols during retrieval operations
(PNL 1994b) did not estimate source terms for non-condensible vapors.
Heat generated by mixing or sluicing operations during retrieval could
cause an increase in the source term of volatile organics. Emissions of
volatile organics could be controlled by including charcoal filters in
the ventilation system.
Airborne emissions from other activities are expected to be comparable
to emissions for normal operations in recent years. Monitoring data on
emissions of airborne chemicals from tank farm vents and stacks is
limited. Considerably more data are available from personal monitors
worn by workers during routine tank farm operations (Hewitt 1995).
Data for the S, SX, and SY Tank Farms in the 200 West Area has shown
that airborne concentrations of toxic chemicals including volatile
organics are consistently only a few percent of 8-hour time weighted
average (TWA) concentrations. Detailed discussion of these emissions is
provided in Section 5.5.9.2 and Appendix E. Atmospheric dispersion
would reduce these concentrations at the site boundary. In cases where
the expected ambient concentrations are not well-known, workers are
required to wear appropriate respirators or use supplied air systems.
On the basis of these considerations, no adverse health effects are
anticipated to result from airborne emissions of chemicals under the
preferred alternative.
5.1.9.3 Facility Decontamination and Decommissioning
- The RCSTS that would
be constructed under the preferred alternative would require decontamination
and decommissioning. Decontamination and decommissioning of other facilities
such as the existing DSTs and SSTs and the ECSTS are to be addressed in detail
in a separate future EIS. The generic impacts of decontamination and
decommissioning of TWRS facilities will be included in the TWRS EIS.
The design of the RCSTS incorporates the following features that would
simplify decontamination of the RCSTS and reduce the amount of material
requiring disposal as radioactive waste:
. Use of modular, separable components to isolate and minimize
contamination
. Use of washable or strippable coatings to minimize contamination
. Minimization of the lengths of pipeline and duct runs that would be
subject to contamination.
These features would help minimize worker exposure and the potential for
health effects by reducing the amount of time workers would be handling
contaminated material and equipment.
5.1.10 HEALTH EFFECTS UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS
This section discusses the human health effects that could occur as the result
of potential accidents during the implementation of the preferred alternative.
Initiating events, frequencies of occurrence, and quantities of respirable
hazardous materials released during a range of potential accidents are
discussed in detail in Appendix F. No construction accident fatalities are
anticipated for this alternative based on the death rate of 31 per 100,000
workers (National Safety Council 1994). The types of health effects that can
occur and the relationship between exposure and health effects are discussed
in Appendix E. This section evaluates health effects in terms of LCFs for
radiation exposures. Health effects for exposures to chemicals during
accidents that involve exposure to both radioactive materials and toxic
chemicals are not specifically evaluated. A previous analysis (WHC 1994c)
concluded that radiological releases are limiting in these cases provided the
release duration is at least 2 minutes and 40 seconds. The minimum duration
of combined radiological and chemical releases evaluated under the preferred
alternative is 2 hours. The effects of a "flash" release of toxic gases
during ITRS operations are discussed in Section 5.1.10.3 as an illustration of
potential health effects when tank waste levels are reduced over a relatively
short period of time.
Safety analyses performed during the facility design process describe
accidents as "anticipated," "unlikely," "extremely unlikely," or "incredible."
These terms describe the likelihood of an accident occurring during the
lifetime of the facility and each term corresponds to a range of annual
accident frequencies. These frequencies are used in conjunction with risk
acceptance guidelines to determine whether design changes are needed to
mitigate the consequences of particular accidents (WHC 1988). For EAs and
EISs, accidents are described as "reasonably foreseeable" or "not reasonably
foreseeable." As indicated in Table 5-3, these terms also correspond to
ranges of accident probabilities. Safety analysis and NEPA documents also
describe accidents as being within or beyond the design basis. Design basis
accidents (DBAs) are accidents that are considered credible enough to be used
to establish design and performance requirements for systems, structures, and
components important to safety. Design basis accidents generally have
Table 5-3
Accident Frequency Descriptions and Categories
Description Annual Frequency (yr-1) Category
Anticipated - May occur more 1
than once during the lifetime
of the facility
Reasonably
Foreseeable
10-1
10-2
Unlikely - May occur at some 10-3
time during the lifetime of the
facility
10-4
Extremely Unlikely - Probably 10-5
will not occur during the
lifetime of the facility
10-6
Incredible - Not credible 10-7
during the lifetime of the
facility
< 10-7 Not Reasonably
Foreseeable
frequency of 10-6 per year or greater. Design modifications are not generally
made to mitigate "incredible" accidents although incredible accidents with
catastrophic consequences may be included in NEPA documents.
The accidents considered in Appendix F include scenarios both within and
beyond the design bases of the systems, structures, and components comprising
the preferred alternative. Based on frequencies of occurrence and quantities
of hazardous materials released, a subset of these accidents was selected for
evaluation of reasonably foreseeable health effects.
The actions proposed under the preferred alternative involve use of the
following systems:
. Existing Cross-Site Transfer System
. Replacement Cross-Site Transfer System
. Waste Retrieval Systems.
The types and quantities of waste that would be managed under the preferred
alternative are summarized in Table 5-4. Detailed characterizations of the
wastes listed in Table 5-4 are provided in Appendix E.
Table 5-4
Volumes of Tank Waste Transferred from the 200 West Area
under the Preferred Alternative
Waste Typea Volume (kgal) b Systems Used
SWL
Complexed 575 RCSTS
Uncharacterized 1,221
Non-Complexed 2,426 ECSTS
RCSTS
Salt Well Total 4,222
WAFW 469 ECSTS
RCSTS
Tank 102-SY Slurry 325 ITRS or PPSS
RCSTS
Grand Total 5,016
Source: Salt Well Volumes (WHC 1995a)
Salt Well Pumping Schedule (WHC 1994b)
Tank 102-SY Slurry (WHC 1995c)
aTanks BX-111, T-111, and C-106 are excluded.
b1 kgal = 3,780 L
5.1.10.1 Existing Cross-Site Transfer System
- Transfer pipe breaks and spray
releases could occur during operation of the ECSTS under the preferred
alternative and result in release of tank waste to the soil column and to the
atmosphere. The consequences of these accidents are identical to those
discussed in Section 5.5.10 for the no action alternative; however, the
probability is less that these accidents would occur under the preferred
alternative. Under the preferred alternative, the ECSTS would be used for
transfers of non-complexed SWL and only until the ECSTS fails or the RCSTS is
available.
5.1.10.2 Replacement Cross-Site Transfer System
- Transfer pipe breaks and
spray releases could occur in the RCSTS during implementation of the preferred
alternative. Their frequency of occurrence would be less than for similar
events in the ECSTS because the improved design of the RCSTS would tend to
reduce the occurrence of most initiating events and the higher pumping rate
would reduce the period of time required to transfer a given volume of waste.
As with the ECSTS, both transfer piping breaks and spray releases are
evaluated. Additional information is provided in Appendix F, Section F.3.2.1
for transfer pipeline breaks and Section F.3.2.2 for spray releases.
. Transfer Pipe Breaks - Two types of transfer piping breaks are evaluated
for the RCSTS. The mitigated case assumes the material balance
calculations result in detection of the leak within 2 hours and the
unmitigated case assumes that the leak is undetected for 8 hours.
A recent assessment of RCSTS pipeline break accidents (WHC 1995d)
considered excavations and beyond design basis earthquakes as initiating
events for transfer pipe breaks. Based on a usage factor of 30 percent
for the RCSTS, the annual frequency of an unmitigated excavation-
initiated pipe break was found to be an incredible but reasonably
foreseeable event while the earthquake-initiated accident was not
reasonably foreseeable. At a pumping rate of 140 gallons per minute
(gpm), the RCSTS would only need to operate for approximately 5 days per
year to transfer all of the wastes shown in Table 5-4. Based on the
corresponding usage factor over the five-year interim period, the
probability of an unmitigated RCSTS pipe break is incredible (1.7 x
10-7) for an excavation-initiated event and not reasonably foreseeable
(1.2 x 10-8) for the seismic-initiated event.
The total probability of an unmitigated RCSTS pipe break due to both
initiating events during the interim action is incredible (1.8 x 10-7).
The consequences of the accident depend on the type of waste being
pumped at the time and the probability that a given waste would be
involved depends on the volume of the waste. Consequences and
probabilities for each type of waste under the preferred alternative are
shown in Table 5-5. For reference, consequences are included for the
hypothetical bounding slurry waste (BSW). Radionuclide concentrations
for these wastes are discussed in Appendix E, Section E.4.1. The
unmitigated RCSTS transfer pipe break accident would be incredible
during transfer of SWL and not reasonably foreseeable during transfer of
Tank 102-SY slurry and WAFW. Based on a risk factor of 4 x 10-4
LCF/person-rem for workers and 5 x 10-4 LCF/person-rem for the general
public, no health effects would be expected for accidents involving
Table 5-5
Estimated Health Effects from a RCSTS Unmitigated Transfer Pipe Break
under the Preferred Alternative
Release Location 244-A Lift Station (200 East Area)
Waste SWL 102-SY/WAFW BSW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 0:1 0:1 1:1
Probability Incredible Not Reasonably Not Applicable
Foreseeable
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.068 3.0 11
ICR 3 x 10-5 0.001 4 x 10-3
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 1.0 43 160
ICR 4 x 10-4 0.02 0.06
Collective Dose (person-rem) 27 1200 4,300
LCF 0.01 0.5 2
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 0.0021 0.088 0.33
ICR 1 x 10-6 4 x 10-5 2 x 10-4
Collective Dose (person-rem) 31 1,300 5,000
LCF 0.02 0.7 2
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 0.0025 0.11 0.40
ICR 1 x 10-6 5 x 10-5 2 x 10-4
either waste. If the accident involved the hypothetical BSW, no adverse
health effects would be expected for the maximally exposed involved and
uninvolved workers but 2 LCFs would be expected in both the uninvolved
worker population and the general public.
The probabilities of mitigated RCSTS transfer pipe breaks under the
preferred alternative are extremely unlikely (3.2 x 10-6) for the
excavation accident, and incredible (2.3 x 10-7) for the seismic
accident. Differences between the mitigated and unmitigated accident
scenarios are discussed in Appendix F, Section F.3.2.1. The
consequences and probabilities associated with each type waste under the
preferred alternative are shown in Table 5-6. No adverse health effects
would be anticipated for any waste including BSW.
Table 5-6
Estimated Health Effects from a RCSTS Mitigated Transfer Pipe Break
under the Preferred Alternative
Release Location 244-A Lift Station (200 East Area)
Waste SWL 102-SY/WAFW BSW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 0:1 0:1 1:1
Probability Extremely Incredible Not Applicable
Unlikely
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.024 1.0 3.8
ICR 9 x 10-6 4 x 10-4 0.001
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.34 15 55
ICR 1 x 10-4 0.006 0.02
Collective Dose (person-rem) 9.4 400 1,500
LCF 0.004 0.2 0.6
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 7.1 x 10-4 0.031 0.11
ICR 4 x 10-7 2 x 10-5 6 x 10-5
Collective Dose (person-rem) 11 460 1,700
LCF 0.005 0.2 0.9
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 8.7 x 10-4 0.038 0.14
ICR 4 x 10-7 2 x 10-5 7 x 10-5
. Pressurized Spray Releases - Pressurized spray releases are potentially
catastrophic accidents that could occur in RCSTS diversion boxes. Under
the preferred alternative, there would be only one RCSTS diversion box
constructed, Diversion Box 1 in the 200 West Area. The RCSTS
preliminary safety analysis report (PSAR) identifies the need to
mitigate the consequences of a pressurized spray release from a
diversion box but does not estimate an accident frequency. Because of
the severity of the unmitigated accident consequences, an accident event
sequence was developed and used to estimate accident probability (see
Appendix F, Section F.3.2.2). This analysis reflects the unique design
features of the RCSTS diversion boxes which allow access for most
maintenance and inspection tasks without creating a direct path to the
atmosphere. Based on this analysis, a probability of 1.8 x 10-10 was
estimated for RCSTS unmitigated spray release during the interim period.
Thus this accident is not reasonably foreseeable and not considered
further in this EIS.
The mitigated spray release scenario assumes that the spray released
from a failed valve is confined within the diversion box and that only
vapor produced by the spray escapes through small spaces around
penetrations (WHC 1995e). A mitigated RCSTS spray release is an
anticipated event under the preferred alternative but is not expected to
result in any adverse health effects, even based on BSW. Accident
probabilities and consequences for each waste type are shown in Table
5-7.
Table 5-7
Estimated Health Effects from a RCSTS Mitigated Spray Release
under the Preferred Alternative
Release Location Diversion Box 1 (200 West Area)
Waste SWL 102-SY/WAFW BSW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 0:1 0:1 1:1
Probability Anticipated Unlikely Not Applicable
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 5.5 x 10-5 0.0024 0.0087
ICR < 10-7 9 x 10-7 3 x 10-6
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.0029 0.12 0.45
ICR 1 x 10-6 5 x 10-5 2 x 10-4
Collective Dose (person-rem) 0.014 0.58 2.1
LCF 5 x 10-6 2 x 10-4 9 x 10-4
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 2.5 x 10-6 1.1 x 10-4 3.9 x 10-4
ICR < 10-7 < 10-7 2 x 10-7
Collective Dose (person-rem) 0.051 2.2 8.1
LCF 3 x 10-5 0.001 0.004
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 9.3 x 10-6 4.0 x 10-4 0.0015
ICR < 10-7 2 x 10-7 7 x 10-7
5.1.10.3 Waste Retrieval Systems
- This section evaluates selected accidents
that could occur during retrieval of the sludge from Tank 102-SY with either
the ITRS or the PPSS. No safety documentation currently exists for the
application of either system to Tank 102-SY. However, a safety assessment for
use of the ITRS on Tanks 101-SY and 103-SY (WHC 1995f) is under review and has
been used as the basis for evaluating ITRS accidents under the preferred
alternative. An EA has been prepared for retrieval of Tank C-106 using the
PPSS (DOE 1995) and a FONSI has been issued. The preliminary safety
evaluation that supports the EA (WHC 1994d) has been used as the basis for
evaluating PPSS accidents under the preferred alternative.
The consequences and probabilities of pipe breaks and spray releases are
evaluated for both systems. A minimum dilution ratio of 2:1 (diluent:sludge)
is anticipated to ensure pumpability of the retrieved material. For purposes
of evaluation, it is assumed that the entire 961,000 L (254,000 gal) of
supernatant now in Tank 102-SY is used to dilute the 269,000 L (71,000 gal) of
sludge.
. Initial Tank Retrieval System - The accident scenarios for the ITRS (WHC
1995f) and for the RCSTS (WHC 1995e) were developed by WHC and share
many similarities for pipe leaks and sprays.
The frequency of an unmitigated ITRS pipe break is based on event trees
developed by Lindberg (WHC 1995d) for pipe breaks in the RCSTS initiated
by excavations and beyond design basis earthquakes. For this EIS, an
operational failure was added and the total probability of an
unmitigated RCSTS pipe break estimated as extremely unlikely. As
discussed in Section 5.1.10.2, this probability is dominated by
operational failure of the 6.5 mi RCSTS pipeline. Based on the much
shorter length of pipe in the ITRS and shorter usage time, the ITRS
unmitigated pipe break is considered to be incredible during retrieval
of Tank 102-SY. Based on analogy to the RCSTS, the mitigated ITRS pipe
break is considered to be unlikely. The consequences of these accidents
are shown in Table 5-8. Based on risk factors of 4 x 10-4 for workers
and 5 x 10-4 for the general public, no adverse health effects would be
expected for a mitigated or unmitigated pipe break accident during ITRS
retrieval of Tank 102-SY. If the accident involved hypothetical BSW,
Table 5-8
Estimated Health Effects from ITRS Pipe Breaks
under the Preferred Alternative
Release Location SY Tank Farm
Mitigation Unmitigated Mitigated
Waste 102-SY BSW 102-SY BSW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 0:1 0:1 0:1 0:1
Probability Incredible Not Unlikely Not
Applicable Applicable
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 2.6 19 0.64 4.8
ICR 0.001 0.008 3 x 10-4 0.002
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 37 280 9.4 69
ICR 0.01 0.1 0.004 0.03
Collective Dose (person-rem) 250 1,800 62 460
LCF 0.1 0.7 0.02 0.2
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 0.045 0.33 0.011 0.083
ICR 2 x 10-5 2 x 10-4 6 x 10-6 4 x 10-5
Collective Dose (person-rem) 980 7,200 250 1,800
LCF 0.5 4 0.1 0.9
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 0.14 1.0 0.034 0.25
ICR 7 x 10-5 5 x 10-4 2 x 10-5 1 x 10-4
LCF would be expected for an unmitigated pipe break and may occur for
the mitigated case.
Pressurized spray leaks could occur within pump and valve pits used
during ITRS operations and would produce severe consequences if the
spray is not confined within the pit. The design of ITRS pits is more
similar to that of older pits and diversion boxes than to that of the
RCSTS. In light of pit design and the relatively small volume of Tank
102-SY slurry, the probability of an unmitigated ITRS spray release is
estimated to range from extremely unlikely to incredible and that of the
mitigated spray release is estimated to range from anticipated to
unlikely. Accident consequences, assuming a 60-second exposure for the
involved worker and 8-hour exposure for other individuals and
populations, are shown in Table 5-9. For the unmitigated spray release,
deaths from acute radiation exposure would be expected among uninvolved
workers and 700 LCFs would be expected in the general population.
Health effects would be approximately seven times greater if the
accident involved BSW.
Table 5-9
Estimated Health Effects from ITRS Spray Releases
under the Preferred Alternative
Release Location SY Tank Farm
Mitigation Unmitigated Mitigated
Waste 102-SY BSW 102-SY BSW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 0:1 0:1 0:1 0:1
Probability Extremely Not Anticipated Not
Unlikely to Applicable to Unlikely Applicable
Incredible
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 1,400 11,000 1 x 10-4 7.7 x 10-4
ICR 0.6 4 < 10-7 3 x 10-7
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 74,000 5.5 x 105 0.0054 0.040
ICR 30 200 2 x 10-6 2 x 10-5
Collective Dose (person-rem) 4.3 x 105 3.2 x 106 0.031 0.23
LCF 200 1,000 1 x 10-5 9 x 10-5
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 68 500 4.9 x 10-6 3.7 x 10-5
ICR 0.03 0.3 < 10-7 < 10-7
Collective Dose (person-rem) 1.3 x 106 9.8 x 106 0.096 0.71
LCF 700 5,000 5 x 10-5 4 x 10-4
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 220 1,600 1.6 x 10-5 1.2 x 10-4
ICR 0.1 0.8 < 10-7 < 10-7
The 8-hour exposure time assumed for uninvolved workers and the general
population is very conservative; however, LCFs would still be expected
in the general population if the unmitigated release lasted only 30
minutes. As shown in Table 5-9 for the mitigated ITRS spray release,
ensuring that the spray is confined within the pit virtually eliminates
the possibility of adverse health effects.
The ITRS safety analysis also evaluated a release of toxic gases from
the ventilation system as the level of waste in the tank was reduced
during a waste transfer (WHC 1995f). Although evaluated as an
anticipated accident, this type of release would be expected to occur
whenever the waste level in a tank containing dissolved gasses is
significantly reduced. A process simulator was used to estimate the
concentration of ammonia and nitrogen oxide at the ventilation system
exhaust for a range of ventilation rates at a drawn down rate of 93 cm
(37 in) of waste per day. These concentrations were compared to the
toxic chemical risk guidelines developed by Davis (WHC 1994c). These
guidelines establish a correspondence between the frequency of a release
and airborne concentrations of toxic chemicals. For an anticipated
release, onsite concentrations should not exceed ERPG-1. ERPG-1 is
defined by the American Industrial Hygiene Association as "The maximum
airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all
individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing other
than mild transient adverse health effects or perceiving a clearly
defined objectionable odor." Using a sum-of-the-fractions method, the
concentrations of ammonia and nitrogen oxide were approximately 5
percent of ERPG-1.
. Past Practice Sluicing System - Accident scenarios developed for the
PPSS (WHC 1994d) involve the same general types of accidents, pipe
breaks and spray releases, as those evaluated for the ITRS but use
somewhat different assumptions and parameter values in estimating
release durations and accident frequencies. These differences appear to
be due to the application of an older set of assumptions rather than to
any fundamental differences in the systems, equipment, and components.
To standardize the basis for comparison with other systems, the PPSS
accident scenarios have been modified to reflect the assumptions used in
safety assessments for the RCSTS and ITRS. The details of these changes
are discussed in Appendix F, Section F.1.3.4. The principal changes are
elimination of reliance on the seismic shutoff switch to terminate pipe
leaks and elimination of the assumption of three independent operator
errors to cause loss of confinement for spray leaks. Release rates per
unit time have not been altered.
The preliminary safety evaluation (PSE) for the Tank 106-C PPSS (WHC
1994d) evaluated pipe breaks caused by operational failures and by
earthquakes. That system includes approximately 600 m (2,000 ft) of
piping and was assumed to operate 8,770 hr/yr. The length of piping
that would be used in a PPSS for Tank 102-SY is unknown but would be
expected to be similar to that for the ITRS if Tank 102-SY supernatant
is used as the sluicing fluid. It is also anticipated that retrieval
operations using the PPSS would require approximately the same length of
time as the ITRS. Accordingly, the probability of an unmitigated PPSS
pipe break is considered to be incredible and that for a mitigated PPSS
pipe break is considered to be unlikely. Consequences shown in Table 5-
10 assume an 8-hour leak for the unmitigated accident and a 2-hour leak
for the mitigated accident. Under these assumptions, no adverse health
effects would be expected among workers but 2 LCFs would be expected in
the general population as the result of a PPSS unmitigated pipe break
under the preferred alternative based on Tank 102-SY waste. If the
accident involved BSW, the maximally exposed uninvolved worker would
have a 1 in 10 chance of developing a fatal cancer (0.1 ICR) and 6 LCFs
would be expected in the general population. No adverse health effects
would be expected for the mitigated accident with Tank 102-SY waste and
the consequences of the mitigated accident with BSW would be similar to
those for the unmitigated accident with Tank 102-SY waste.
Pressurized spray leaks could occur within pump and valve pits used
during PPSS operations and produce severe consequences if the spray is
not confined within the pit. For this evaluation, the probability of
unmitigated and mitigated PPSS spray leaks is assumed to be the same as
for the ITRS. The unmitigated spray release is considered to be
extremely unlikely to incredible and the mitigated spray release to be
anticipated to unlikely. As shown in Table 5-11, the PPSS unmitigated
Table 5-10
Estimated Health Effects from PPSS Pipe Breaks under the Preferred Alternative
Release Location SY Tank Farm
Mitigation Unmitigated Mitigated
Waste 102-SY BSW 102-SY BSW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 0:1 1:1 0:1 1:1
Probability Incredible Not Unlikely Not
Applicable Applicable
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 6.4 24 1.6 5.9
ICR 0.003 0.009 6 x 10-4 0.002
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 93 340 23 86
ICR 0.04 0.1 0.009 0.03
Collective Dose (person-rem) 610 2,300 150 570
LCF 0.2 0.9 0.06 0.2
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 0.17 0.61 0.042 0.15
ICR 8 x 10-5 3 x 10-4 2 x 10-5 8 x 10-5
Collective Dose (person-rem) 3,500 13,000 880 3,300
LCF 2 6 0.4 2
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 0.52 1.9 0.13 0.48
ICR 3 x 10-4 0.001 7 x 10-5 2 x 10-4
Table 5-11
Estimated Health Effects from PPSS Spray Releases
under the Preferred Alternative
Release Location SY Tank Farm
Mitigation Unmitigated Mitigated
Waste 102-SY BSW 102-SY BSW
Dilution 0:1 0:1 0:1 0:1
(diluent:waste)
Probability Extremely Not Anticipated Not
Unlikely to Applicable to Unlikely Applicable
Incredible
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 1,000 3,800 1.4 x 10-5 5.1 x 10-5
ICR 0.4 2 < 10-7 < 10-7
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 54,000 2.0 x 105 7.2 x 10-4 0.0027
ICR 20 80 3 x 10-7 1 x 10-6
Collective Dose 3.1 x 105 1.2 x 106 0.0041 0.015
(person-rem) 100 500 2 x 10-6 6 x 10-6
LCF
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 50 180 6.5 x 10-7 2.4 x 10-6
ICR 0.02 0.09 < 10-7 < 10-7
Collective Dose 9.7 x 105 3.6 x 106 0.013 0.047
(person-rem) 500 2,000 6 x 10-6 2 x 10-5
LCF
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 160 600 2.1 x 10-6 7.8 x 10-6
ICR 0.08 0.3 < 10-7 < 10-7
spray leak would be expected to cause adverse health effects.
Based on 8-hour exposures, death of the maximally exposed
uninvolved worker, 100 LCFs in the maximally exposed uninvolved
worker population, and 500 LCFs in the general population would be
anticipated. No adverse health effects would be expected for the
mitigated PPSS spray release.
Consequences based on the BSW would be approximately five time
greater for the mitigated and unmitigated accidents. In view of
the stage of design of retrieval systems for Tank 102-SY, these
health effects are not considered to be significantly different
from those for the ITRS.
5.1.11 POTENTIAL MITIGATION MEASURES
This section discusses the potential mitigation measures for the preferred
alternative.
Fugitive dust emissions during construction would be mitigated by watering of
exposed areas and stabilizing spoils piles by use of vegetation or soil
fixative.
The preferred alternative would include the establishment of revegetation
sites to mitigate the removal of native soil and vegetation in the areas of
the construction activities. The potential options for habitat restorations
are discussed in Subsection 5.1.4 and Appendix D.
5.2 ANTICIPATED IMPACTS OF THE TRUCK TRANSFER
ALTERNATIVE
The analysis of the environmental impacts of the truck transfer alternative
considers:
. The construction and operation of new load and unload facilities;
. Additional roadway segments;
. Operation of a transfer vehicle, and;
. Continued operation of the mixer pump in Tank 101-SY to mitigate hydrogen
generation.
The primary components that would make up the truck transfer alternative are
described in detail in Section 3.1.2.
5.2.1 GEOLOGY, SEISMOLOGY, AND SOILS
Minimal impacts on geological resources or soils would be expected from the
truck transfer alternative. Because the majority of roadways, facilities
proposed for the alternative already exist, and since the load and unload
facilities would be located on relatively subdued topographical surfaces, a
minimal amount of site modification would be required. This would slightly
modify the existing terrain, restrict access to part of the Hanford Site, and
insignificantly disturb soil resources.
5.2.1.1 Geologic Resources
- The impact to the geologic environment from the
truck transfer alternative would be minimal. Restriction of public access to
mineral deposits already exists at the Hanford Site. Restriction of resource
access for Hanford Site operations would have minimal impact since sand and
gravel resources are readily available at other areas within the Hanford Site.
Adequate soils engineering would be employed during site preparation to
preclude any potential for subsidence. Faulting, as described in Section
4.1.1, has not been identified in the Hanford Site vicinity. Due to the
generally subdued topography of the proposed site, landslides or slope failure
would not present a hazard. The construction and operation of the facilities
proposed for the truck transfer alternative would not impact the geology of
the Hanford Site.
5.2.1.2 Seismology
- Seismic hazards discussed in Section 4.1.2 would not
impact the facilities proposed as part of the truck transfer alternative.
The proposed loading and unloading facilities would be designed to resist a
variety of loads including dead, live, pressure, thermal, and seismic loads.
The seismic loads are those resulting from:
. Passage of seismic waves (i.e., wave-propagation effects)
. Seismic-induced building settlements and seismic anchor movements
. Soil failure due to liquefaction, landslide, etc., if applicable
. Transfer of stress between the inner and outer pipelines at their
connection points.
The seismic design of the facilities proposed in the truck transfer
alternative would be according to the general requirements of DOE Order
6430.1A, its primary reference LLNL/UCRL-15910 and BNL 52361. The DBE for
which items would be designed is specified by DOE as the maximum horizontal
ground surface acceleration (WHC 1994a, WHC 1993a, WHC 1993b). Seismic
hazards are not expected to affect continued use of the ECSTS until the truck
transfer facilities are built due to the amount of waste to be transferred and
the unlikely probability of an accident event rupturing the ECSTS.
5.2.1.3 Soils
- The majority of the 200 East and West Areas and the potential
construction sites for the load and unload facilities and roadway segments are
covered with sandy soil that supports vegetative cover (sagebrush and various
grasses) (PNL 1995). Vegetation protects the soil from wind erosion. The
sandy soil would be susceptible to both short-term and long-term wind erosion
if it were exposed during clearing for construction. Wind erosion would be
prevented through normal dust control procedures throughout construction.
Without irrigation, none of the soils affected by the truck transfer
alternative are prime or unique farmlands, prime forest lands, or prime
pasture lands (Brincken 1994).
5.2.2 WATER RESOURCES AND HYDROLOGY
Potential spills and leaks from the facilities proposed as part of the truck
transfer alternative are not expected during normal operations. The potential
for accidental releases associated with the truck transfer alternative is
dealt with in Section 5.2.10. Under normal operating conditions no impacts to
water resources are anticipated. Even in the unlikely event of a spill to the
ground, ground-water resources would be protected by the thick vadose zone in
this area and the tendency for many radionuclides to be retained in the soils.
Design features incorporating double containment of the transfer vessels and
spill handling capabilities at load and unload facilities would provide an
added level of protection for ground-water resources.
5.2.3 PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT
Impacts of the truck transfer alternative on the physical environment are
examined in terms of the following elements of the environment:
. Air Quality
. Radiation
. Sound Levels and Noise.
5.2.3.1 Air Quality
- Air quality impacts have been considered for
construction and routine operations of the truck transfer alternative. This
subsection describes the analytical approach applied to construction and
operational emissions.
. Construction Emissions - Airborne particulate emissions from construction
of load and unload facilities and additional roadway segments were
estimated using emission factors identified in Section 5.1.3.1. The
total area of disturbance for the truck transfer facilities is estimated
to be approximately 2 ha (5 acres). The average dust emission rate would
be 2.2 g/s (4.9 x 10-3 lb/s). Based on the size of the construction
areas and the duration of ground disturbance activities, construction-
related emissions from the truck transfer alternative would not exceed
the applicable air quality standards described in Section 4.
Construction measures to control fugitive dust emissions would include
water application to unstable soils or soil fixative application, as
necessary.
. Operations Emissions - Routine operations of the truck transfer
alternative are assumed to produce negligible or very minor chemical
emissions, mainly from tanker air displacement during filling. No
exceedances of Ecology ASILs are assumed for this alternative, as the
load and unload facilities would employ HEPA filters for filtration of
ventilating air which would control particulate matter at a high removal
efficiency. Due to the number of daily truck transfer trips, the amount
of time the vehicle engines would be operating and the short duration it
would take to transfer the waste from West to East Areas, vehicle
emissions are not expected to exceed ASILs.
5.2.3.2 Radiation
- Airborne emissions of radioactive materials from normal
operation of facilities proposed as part of the truck transfer alternative
would not result in any measurable increase in radioactivity in off-site air,
water, soil, vegetation, and animals. Section 5.2.9 assesses the impacts from
emissions of radioactive materials under the truck transfer alternative.
5.2.3.3 Sound Levels and Noise
- Potential noise impacts from construction
and operation of the truck transport facilities would not be expected to
exceed maximum noise levels set by the State of Washington. Due to the
distance of potential receptors, duration of noise-generating activities and
existing ambient noise levels at the Hanford Site, no noise impacts are
expected as part of the truck transfer alternative. If necessary, a hearing
conservation program including the use of OSHA-approved hearing protection
would be implemented for workers during operations.
5.2.4 BIOLOGICAL AND ECOLOGICAL RESOURCES
The impacts of the truck transfer alternative on biological and ecological
resources would be minimal because little or no habitat would be disrupted.
The only new construction would be the load and unload facilities and a small
roadway segment, and they would be in previously disturbed areas. Therefore,
no mature sagebrush habitat would be affected. Due to location of the
proposed truck transport facilities and the lack of significant habitat
disturbance, adverse impacts to wildlife species and threatened or endangered
species are not expected. An increase in road kills would not be expected
from the additional activities through the area since the truck transfers
would be infrequent and be moving very slowly.
5.2.5 POPULATION AND SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS
This section examines the impact the truck transfer alternative would have on
population and socioeconomics in the region of influence. The analysis
includes impacts to the local economy, income, population, housing, and local
infrastructure, and an evaluation of environmental justice.
5.2.5.1 Local Economy and Employment
- As shown on Table 5-12, the truck
transfer alternative would require an initial construction workforce of 35
workers for the truck transport facility for a duration of 1.5 years. Ten
would come from the existing workforce and 25 would be new hires for the
anticipated 18-month construction period. Operation of the transport
facilities would require 12 persons from existing Hanford Site personnel.
Table 5-12
Effects of Truck Transfer Supporting Actions on Employment
Supporting Construction Operations
Actions
No. Existing/ Duration No. Existing/ Duration Assumptions
Jobs New Hires (mos) Jobs New Hires (yrs)
Truck 35 10/25 18 12 12/0 30 TWRS
Transport activities
Facilities complete in
(load and 30 years
unload/
roadway)
Source: (WHC 1995g)
For every job created at the Hanford Site, 1.2 jobs are created locally. For
every new hire from outside the region of influence, 1.3 persons would move
into the local region. The total employment multiplier is 2.2 and population
growth is 2.2 x 1.3, or 2.86. These multipliers are based on the
socioeconomic input/output analysis performed by PNL in 1987 and 1989
(DOE 1991). All operations personnel would come from the existing workforce.
For 25 temporary construction jobs created under the truck transfer
alternative, 55 new jobs would be created locally. Some of these jobs may be
filled from the workers available in the community as a result of 1995 DOE
cutbacks expected in 1995. New hires moving into the region of influence are
not expected to increase population above 1995 peak levels and would therefore
not have significant socioeconomic impacts.
5.2.5.2 Income
- Construction for the truck transfer alternative would
generate construction income for the region of influence. It is expected this
income would impact beyond Benton and Franklin Counties, although a majority
of the income would flow into these two counties over a period of one and one-
half years. Construction costs associated with services, goods, and materials
would constitute the majority of the income generated to Benton and Franklin
Counties. Potential fabrication of project components outside the location
could reduce income impacts to the local area.
5.2.5.3 Population
- As discussed in Section 5.2.5.1, the population growth
multiplier has been determined to be 2.86. Therefore, assuming all 25 new
hires move into the community from outside the region of influence, a
population increase of 72 could occur. However, the actual increase is
expected to be less since jobs may be filled by the available workforce
resulting from general DOE cutbacks at the Hanford Site. The actual number
depends on the availability of qualified workers for the new construction
jobs. The maximum increase is less than 2 percent of the expected DOE
cutbacks, and therefore problems typically associated with sudden population
growth are not anticipated.
5.2.5.4 Housing
- The truck transfer alternative would not have a significant
impact on the housing market. The demand for single-family units and rental
units as well as other modes of housing is expected to decline as a result of
the DOE cutbacks at the Hanford Site. Housing for new hires is expected to be
readily available as former Hanford Site employees leave the region of
influence to pursue employment elsewhere. No housing shortage or price
increase is anticipated to result from this alternative.
5.2.5.5 Local Infrastructure
- Due to the relatively small amount of
temporary employment (and therefore, population growth) provided by this
alternative, the demand for public education, police and fire protection, and
medical services is not expected to increase above 1995 peak levels. In light
of DOE cutbacks, overburdening of these community services would not result
from this alternative.
5.2.5.6 Environmental Justice
- The primary socioeconomic impact of the truck
transfer alternative would be from temporary construction workers hired for
the project duration. However, this impact would be offset by DOE workforce
reductions. In addition, no health effects to any off-site population are
anticipated. Therefore, no disproportionate impacts to low-income or minority
populations would occur as a result of this alternative. See Appendix C for a
more detailed discussion of environmental justice issues.
5.2.6 TRANSPORTATION
The following subsections summarize the impacts to the Hanford Site
transportation system for the truck transfer alternative relevant to vehicular
and other transportation facilities.
5.2.6.1 Vehicular Traffic and Circulation
- Construction vehicles
transporting heavy equipment and workers during construction of the truck
transfer facilities would utilize the same roadways described in
Section 5.1.6.1. Construction of truck transfer facilities is expected to
last approximately 1.5 years. The volume of construction vehicles during this
time would vary. As a worst-case condition, construction of the truck
transfer facilities would require up to 35 additional construction personnel.
Based on vehicle occupancy rates, an estimated 26 additional vehicle trips
would be generated. Because the amount of construction generated vehicles
would be a relatively small incremental increase in vehicle traffic compared
to the existing daily traffic on affected roadways and because the affected
roadways are currently operating at acceptable service levels, construction
generated traffic from the truck transfer alternative is not expected to
adversely affect any roadway.
As described in Section 3.1.2.1, the truck transfer alternative provides for
either the LR-56(H) or the modified tanker truck to transport waste cross-
site. The principal road that would accommodate transport of waste via truck
is Route 3, the road that directly connects the 200 East and West Areas.
Route 3 currently handles approximately 1,500 vehicles per day and operates at
a "C" LOS during peak hours. Waste transfer of diluted HLW utilizing either
the LR-56(H) or the tanker truck is not expected to have significant impacts
to on-site traffic circulation.
The truck transfer alternative proposes waste transfer of SWL from SSTs and
WAFW, utilizing either the LR-56(H) or the modified tanker truck. The volume
of SWL from SSTs and West Area facility waste to be transferred on an annual
basis would be approximately 5 million L (267,000 gal). Assuming an average
volume of waste distribution transfer from SSTs and West Area facilities,
approximately three daily waste transfer trips would be generated using the
LR-56(H). Using the same assumptions, approximately one daily waste transfer
trip would be generated using the modified tanker truck. While the estimated
transfer trips could be accommodated by the affected roadways for either waste
transfer vehicle, potential traffic circulation impacts could occur from the
required administrative controls discussed in Section 4.6.1 (i.e., road
barricades, speed limitations, escorts, etc). Significant adverse traffic
circulation impacts would not be expected with SWL or WAFW transfer using
either the LR-56(H) or the modified tanker truck based on:
. The number of transfer trips generated
. Shipping during off-peak hours
. Providing prior notice to on-site operations.
5.2.6.2 Other Transportation Facilities
- Bus line service, vessel traffic,
and rail service would not be adversely impacted by the truck transfer
alternative. Based on the available capacity of all transportation routes
affected by the truck transfer alternative and the expected infrequent use of
these transport modes, adverse impacts to these other transportation
facilities from the truck transfer alternative are not expected.
5.2.7 LAND USE
The truck transfer alternative would not alter the current or foreseeable
future land use patterns or aesthetic and visual resources of the 200 East and
West and 600 Areas. Each of these topics are discussed in the following
subsections.
5.2.7.1 Land Use Patterns
- The truck transfer alternative would require the
commitment of approximately 0.8 ha (2 acres) of land for the load and unload
facilities and 1.48 km (.92 mi) of new roadway. The area affected by the
truck transfer alternative is currently used and designated for waste storage
and handling. The truck transfer alternative would be consistent with all
applicable land use guidance documents, as discussed in Sections 5.1 and 5.2.
In addition, no other appropriate land uses would be precluded with
implementation of this alternative.
5.2.7.2 Aesthetic and Visual Resources
- The load and unload facilities
proposed as part of the truck transfer alternative are anticipated to be one-
story, rectangular structures. Due to the relatively small size of the load
and unload facilities in relation to existing on-site structures, the existing
industrialized character of the 200 East and West Areas, and the distance
between potential viewers and the proposed truck transfer facilities, there
would be no visual impact to off-site viewers with implementation of
the truck transfer alternative.
5.2.8 CULTURAL RESOURCES
As discussed in Subsection 4.8, field surveys conducted over the 200 East and
West Areas have not identified archeological or historical sites of
significance. In addition, no archeological or religious sites of Native
American concern have been identified in the proposed project area. As a
consequence, construction of the truck transfer alternative would not
adversely affect cultural resources.
5.2.9 ANTICIPATED HEALTH EFFECTS UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS
This section discusses the potential cause and magnitude of health effects
that are anticipated to occur under normal conditions as the result of
implementation of the truck transfer alternative. These health effects could
result from direct exposure to ionizing radiation or inhalation of toxic and
radioactive materials. The various types of health effects that could occur
and the relationship between exposure and health effects are discussed in
Appendix E. This section evaluates health effects in terms of LCFs for
radiation exposures and in terms of ICR and systemic toxic effects for
chemical exposures. The truck transfer alternative is described in Section
3.1.2 and briefly summarized here.
The truck transfer alternative consists of continued operation of the mixer
pump in Tank 101-SY, continued pumping of SST SWLs in the 200 West Area,
continued storage of WAFW, use of tanker trailer trucks for cross-site
transfer of wastes to the 200 East Area, and construction of two new HLW load
and unload facilities to support loading and unloading of the tanker trailer
trucks with HLW and high-activity wastes. It is assumed that the ECSTS would
be used for cross-site transfer of non-complexed liquids until either no
usable lines remain or tanker trailer trucks are available for this purpose.
Complexed SWLs would be transferred to the 200 East Area using tanker trailer
trucks to avoid mixing with the TRU sludge in Tank 102-SY, the staging tank
for the ECSTS in the 200 West Area.
Two tanker trailer truck transfer options are considered. The first is a
slightly modified version of the LR-56(H) cask used in France for transport of
HLW. The 3,800-L (1,000-gal) capacity double containment cask is mounted on a
truck trailer car and has 5-cm (2-in) lead-equivalent shielding. The second
is a 19,000-L (5,000-gal) double-shell steel tank with 5-cm (2-in) lead-
equivalent shielding. The tank would be mounted on a truck trailer. Several
other DOE sites use similar tanks for waste transport, but no other DOE site
is known to transport HLW in 19,000-L (5,000-gal) tanks (WHC 1993d).
Activities considered as normal conditions under the truck transfer
alternative would include:
. Facility Construction
. Facility Operation
. Facility Decontamination and Decommissioning.
Each of these activities relevant to health effects is discussed in the
following subsections.
5.2.9.1 Facility Construction
- Two new HLW load and unload facilities would
be constructed under the truck transfer alternative. These facilities would
be capable of handling HLW and other high-activity wastes.
Design documents required by DOE Order 4700.1 have not been prepared for the
HLW load and unload facilities; however, aspects of facility design have been
discussed by Howden (WHC 1993d). One facility is assumed to be located in the
vicinity of the A Tank Farm in the 200 East Area and one in the vicinity of
the SY Tank Farm in the 200 West Area (WHC 1995h). Construction could involve
excavation and other earth-moving activities in contaminated soils and
construction in the vicinity of contaminated existing process pits and piping.
These activities could result in exposure to direct radiation and airborne
contaminants and one similar to those during construction of the RCSTS. The
RCSTS construction dose of 26.3 person/rem (Light 1994) is considered to bound
radiation exposures to workers during construction of the HLW load and unload
facilities. Release of airborne contaminants to the atmosphere would be
controlled by using temporary enclosures or, for large outdoor areas, soil
fixatives. Other measures to control exposures would include decontamination
of work areas, use of protective equipment, and implementation of work
procedures specific to the work. No exposure of the off-site public would be
anticipated during construction of the load and unload facilities.
5.2.9.2 Facility Operations
- Facility operations under the truck transfer
alternative would include operation of the Tank 101-SY mixer pump, continued
pumping of the SST SWLs in the 200 West Area, continued storage of WAFW, and
transfer of waste to the 200 East Area using both the ECSTS and tanker trailer
trucks. These activities involve sampling and monitoring of waste and
ventilation systems, inspection and surveillance, and maintenance of equipment
and facilities.
Workers and members of the general public could be exposed to the following
emissions during these activities:
. Direct Radiation
. Airborne Emissions of Radioactive Materials
. Airborne Emissions of Chemicals.
Estimated doses and resultant health effects for each of these exposures are
discussed in the following list.
. Direct Radiation - Workers performing routine operations, maintenance,
and surveillance would be exposed to direct radiation during mixer pump
operations, SWL pumping, tanker trailer truck loading and unloading, and
associated cross-site transfers. Many of these activities are similar
to those now being performed by tank farm workers.
Worker exposure records prior to construction of DSTs indicate that tank
farm workers had received an average annual dose of 630 mrem from direct
radiation exposure (DOE 1980). The DSTs are now the main focus of tank
farm operations and include many design features such as improved
shielding and remotely-operated and remotely-monitored systems. An
examination of more recent radiation exposure records of tank farm
workers indicates that the average annual individual dose has dropped to
14 mrem (DOE 1992b). Activities performed by these workers include SWL
pumping and inter-farm waste transfer.
The design of the HLW load and unload facility would incorporate
features to reduce radiation exposures to operations personnel. These
features would include use of modular separable components to isolate
and minimize contamination; use of washable or strippable coatings to
simplify decontamination; use of remote manipulators for operations and
maintenance; and minimization of the surface area that would be subject
to contamination.
Radiation and contamination surveys would be required before the tanker
trailer truck leaves the load facility and as it arrives at the unload
facility. Workers performing these surveys would be exposed to direct
radiation. A recent evaluation (WHC 1995h) estimated a dose of 1.6
person-rem/trip. This estimate assumed two Health Physics (HP)
technicians spent 8 hours each per trip in a 100 mrem/hr field and is
considered to be extremely conservative. Exposure times of 20 minutes
for each technician to take smears and exposure rate measurements is
considered more reasonable and would result in a dose of 0.07 person-rem
per trip. Due to differences in capacity and geometry, exposure rates
may be different for the LR-56(H) and the 19,000 L (5,000 gal) tanker
trailer truck. In the absence of a design for the latter, a dose of
0.07 person-rem trip is considered reasonable for both.
The total dose to HP technicians during vehicle surveys under the truck
transfer alternative would depend on the volumes and types of waste
transferred. Dose associated with the transfer of each type of waste is
shown in Table 5-13. If the ECSTS remained serviceable during the
interim period, only complexed SWL would require transport by tanker
trailer truck and the cumulative dose to the technicians would be 38
person-rem for transfer of known complexed SWL using the LR-56(H) and 8
person-rem using the 19,000 L (5,000 gal) tanker. If all SWL and WAFW
Table 5-13
Estimated Worker Exposure during Vehicle Surveys
under the Truck Transfer Alternative
19,000-L
LR-56(H) (5,000-gal) Tanker
Waste Type
Trips Person-Rem Trips Person-Rem
SWL
Complexed 575 38 115 8
Uncharacterized 1,221 81 244 16
Non-Complexed 2,426 162 485 32
Sub-Total 4,222 281 844 56
WAFW 469 31 94 6
Total 4,691 312 938 62
from the 200 West Area were transported, cumulative dose would increase
to 312 person-rem for the LR-56(H) and 62 person-rem for the 5,000 gal
tanker. Based on an occupational risk factor 4 x 10-4 LCFs per person-
rem, 0.1 LCFs would be expected for transfer of all of these liquids
using the LR-56(H) and 0.02 LCFs would be expected if the 19,000-L
(5,000-gal) tanker trailer truck were used. In either case adverse
health effects would be unlikely. Estimates of the potential dose to
the driver of the truck are not available. Informal calculations were
performed for this EIS based on the mean of all liquids inventory in the
SST, estimated by Hey and Savino (WHC 1994e). The calculations indicate
that dose rates of approximately 20 mrem/hr can be expected at the
driver position for the LR-56(H). This exposure rate combined with an
assumed average speed of 24 kmph (15 mph) over the 10 km (6.5 mi)
distance yields an unacceptably high dose to drivers under the truck
transfer alternative. A formal shielding analysis is necessary and
restrictions on the quantities of radioactive materials transport may be
necessary to ensure that radiation exposure during transport is
consistent with ALARA principles.
Exposures to workers operating and maintaining the HLW load and unload
facilities would be reduced by the following design features:
- Use of modular, separable components to isolate and minimize
contamination
- Use of washable or strippable coatings to simplify decontamination
- Use of remote manipulators for operations and maintenance
functions
- Minimization of the surface area that would be subject to
contamination.
. Airborne Emissions of Radioactive Materials - Workers and members of the
general public could be exposed to airborne emissions of radioactive
materials as the result of implementation of the truck transfer
alternative. Emissions from continued operation of the Tank 101-SY
mixer pump and from salt well pumping activities would be expected to be
the same as for the no action alternative and are discussed in Section
5.5.9. Other emissions could occur during loading and unloading of the
tankers, an activity that would replace transfer of the SWLs to Tank
102-SY under the no action alternative.
Estimates of emissions from the HLW load and unload facilities are not
available; however, emissions are monitored at the ventilation system
stack at the existing 204-AR Waste Unloading Facility. The 204-AR
facility is located in the 200 East Area and is the most modern of the
load and unload facilities at the site. It is designed for unloading of
low-level waste (LLW) from 76,000 L (20,000 gal) rail cars. Air from
the unloading area and the catch tank is passed through two HEPA filters
and is exhausted from a single stack equipped with a CAM used for
monitoring radiation. Emissions from this stack were below the limit of
detection in 1992 (DOE 1992c) and 1993 (DOE 1994a). The total dose to
the maximum individual from all stack emissions in the 200 West Area
during 1993 was 0.0012 mrem (DOE 1994a). On this basis, no adverse
health effects are anticipated as the result of airborne emissions of
radionuclides under the truck transfer alternative.
. Airborne Emissions of Chemicals - Workers and members of the general
public could be exposed to airborne emissions of chemicals as the result
of implementation of the truck transfer alternative. Emissions from
continued operation of the Tank 101-SY mixer pump and from SWL pumping
would be expected to be the same as for the no action alternative.
Other emissions of chemicals could occur during loading and unloading of
the tankers, an activity that would replace transfer of SWL to Tank
102-SY under the no action alternative.
It is anticipated that workers would not be present in the bay while
waste is being transferred to or from the tanker trailer and that air
from the bay and vent lines would pass through HEPA filters prior to
discharge. Workers in the vicinity of the discharge could be exposed to
VOCs that were not released during SWL pumping. The magnitude of this
exposure is expected to be similar to that from transfer of SWLs and
West Area Facility Waste to Tank 102-SY under the no action case. Thus
operation of the load and unload facilities under the truck transfer
alternative is not expected to result in any increase in health effects
due to emissions for toxic chemicals.
5.2.9.3 Facility Decontamination and Decommissioning
- The load and unload
facilities that would be constructed in the 200 East and West Areas under the
truck transfer alternative would require decontamination and decommissioning.
Decontamination and decommissioning of facilities such as the existing DSTs
and SSTs and the ECSTS considered in this EIS and of TWRS facilities are to be
addressed in detail in a separate, future EIS.
The design of these new facilities incorporates features that would simplify
their decontamination and reduce the amount of material that requires disposal
as radioactive waste. These features include use of modular, separable
components to isolate and minimize contamination; use of washable or
strippable coatings to minimize contamination; and minimization of the lengths
of pipe and duct runs that would be subject to contamination.
5.2.10 HEALTH EFFECTS UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS
This section discusses the human health effects that could occur as the result
of potential accidents during the implementation of the truck transfer
alternative. Initiating events, frequencies of occurrence, and quantities of
respirable hazardous materials released during a range of potential accidents
are discussed in detail in Appendix F. No construction accident fatalities
are anticipated for this alternative based on the death rate of 31 per 100,000
workers (National Safety Council 1994). The types of health effects that can
occur and the relationship between exposure and health effects are discussed
in Appendix E. This section evaluates health effects in terms of LCFs for
radiation exposures. Health effects for exposures to chemicals during
accidents that involve exposure to both radioactive and toxic materials are
not specifically evaluated. A previous analysis (WHC 1994c) concluded that
radiological releases are limiting in these cases provided the release
duration is at least 2 minutes and 40 seconds. The minimum release duration
of combined radiological and chemical releases evaluated under the truck
transfer alternative is 30 minutes.
The accidents considered in Appendix F include scenarios both within and
beyond the design bases of the options and facilities comprising the truck
transfer alternative. Terms used to categorize accidents and the
corresponding frequency ranges are summarized in Table 5-3. Based on
frequencies of occurrence and quantities of hazardous materials released, a
subset of these accidents was selected for evaluation of reasonably
foreseeable health effects.
The actions proposed under the truck transfer alternative involve the use of
the following systems:
. Existing Cross-Site Transfer System
. Truck Tanker Trailers
. Load/Unload Facilities.
The types and quantities of waste that would be handled by each system are
summarized in Table 5-14. Detailed characterizations of the wastes listed in
Table 5-14 are provided in Appendix E. Accidents that could occur in each of
Table 5-14
Volumes of Tank Waste Transferred from the 200 West Area under the Truck
Transfer Alternative
Waste Typeb Volume (kgal) a Systems Used
SWL
Complexed 575 Truck Load/Unload
Uncharacterized 1,221
Non-Complexed 2,426 ECSTS, Truck Load/Unload
Salt Well Total 4,222
WAFW 469 ECSTS, Truck Load/Unload
Grand Total 4,691
Source: Salt Well Volumes (WHC 1995a)
Salt Well Pumping Schedule (WHC 1994b)
a1 kgal = 3,780 L
bTanks BX-111, T-111, and C-106 are excluded.
these systems are discussed in the following sections. To bound the
probability of accidents under the truck transfer alternative, it is assumed
that all wastes shown in Table 5-14 are handled using truck tanker trailers
and the new load/unload facilities.
5.2.10.1 Existing Cross-Site Transfer System
- Transfer pipe breaks and spray
releases could occur during operation of the ECSTS under the truck transfer
alternative and result in release of tank waste to the soil column and to the
atmosphere. The consequences of these accidents are identical to those
discussed in Section 5.5.10 for the no action alternative; however, the
probability is less that these accidents would occur under the truck transfer
alternative. Under the truck transfer alternative, the ECSTS would be used
for transfers of non-complexed salt well liquids and only until the ECSTS
fails or the truck tanker trailers and supporting load/unload facilities are
available.
5.2.10.2 Truck Tanker Trailer
- Two types of tanker trailer trucks are
considered for use under the truck transfer alternative. The LR-56(H) is a
French-designed vehicle with a nominal capacity of 3,800 L (1,000 gal). The
design includes a 1.3-cm (0.5-in) stainless steel tank with a 1.3-cm (0.5-in)
stainless steel secondary containment, 5-cm (2-in) lead equivalent shielding,
and impact limiters. The second type is a 19,000-L (5,000-gal) tanker trailer
truck that is not yet designed. It is assumed to have design features similar
to the LR-56(H).
These vehicles would transport SWL and WAFW between new HLW load and unload
facilities in the 200 West and East Areas. The new HLW load and unload
facilities are assumed to be located in the vicinity of the SY Tank Farm in
the 200 West Area and the A Tank Farm in the 200 East Area. Roads would be
constructed to connect these facilities with the existing road network (see
Figure 3-18). The total road distance between the load and unload facilities
would be 10 km (6.5 mi) (WHC 1995h). Accidents involving the load/unload
facilities are considered in Section 5.2.10.3. This section evaluates
accidents that could occur while the vehicles are enroute.
The original LR-56 has a French Type B(U) certification. Type B packages are
designed to withstand punctures, severe impacts, and sustained fires.
Unilateral Type B certifications [Type B(U)] are not valid outside the
certifying country. The LR-56(H) is a slightly modified version for use at
Hanford. It may be difficult to design a 19,000-L (5,000-gal) bulk liquid
container to meet Type B specifications. There are no plans to obtain United
States Type B certifications for either tanker trailer truck for use at the
Hanford Site. As a result, the containment capabilities of these two tankers
are assumed to be typical of packages used to transport much lower quantities
and concentrations of radioactive material. Release of liquid waste is
assumed to occur in accidents involving collisions with subsequent
uncontrolled fires and rollovers (WHC 1993d).
The use of Hanford Site data to develop accident frequencies for the truck
transfer alternative is discussed in Section F.4.1.3 of Appendix F. The
probability of an accident that would release the entire contents of the
tanker during the interim period is extremely unlikely: 3.2 x 10-5 for the
LR-56(H) and 6.4 x 10-6 for the 19,000-L (5,000-gal) tanker.
Health effects from the loss of 100 percent of the tank contents are shown in
Table 5-15 for the LR-56(H) and in Table 5-16 for the 19,000-L (5,000-gal)
tanker trailer truck. No adverse health effects would be expected for either
size tank, even if the accident involved BSW. Dose and health effects for
these accidents are directly proportional to tank capacity and that
probability is inversely proportional. As a result risk, as measured by the
product of consequence and probability, is the same for the two truck options.
5.2.10.3 Load and Unload Facility
- Accidents could also occur during loading
and unloading operations. Although the load and unload facilities have not
been designed, spray leaks and spills during loading and seismically-induced
breaches of the transport container would be similar to those postulated for
the existing 204-AR LLW unloading facility (WHC 1991a).
The leak scenario assumes that a large fraction (0.1 percent) of the waste
spilled becomes airborne and, for this reason, is considered to bound spray
release scenarios. In the absence of specific design information, this type
of release is considered to be anticipated to unlikely. As indicated in Table
5-17, no adverse health effects would be expected as the result of spills
during loading and unloading of tankers with SWL, WAFW, or BSW.
The seismically-induced breach scenario also assumed that 0.1 percent of the
spilled waste, in this case the entire contents of the transport vehicle,
would become airborne. The probability of this accident scenario occurring
during the implementation of the truck transfer alternative is unlikely or 1.5
x 10-3 for the LR-56(H) and 3.0 x 10-4 for the 19,000-L (5,000-gal) tank.
Estimated doses and health effects for facilities in the 200 West and 200 East
Areas are shown in Tables 5-18 and 5-19, respectively. No adverse health
effects would be expected for SWL, or WAFW for the LR56(H) tanker truck. A
1:1 dilution of BSW was used for comparison with SWL and WAFW which have low
solids contents. This scenario is similar to, but more conservative than that
considered for in-transit tank breaches (Tables 5-15 and 5-16) in that it
assumes a greater respirable fraction released and a longer on-site exposure
time. If the accident should involve BSW, adverse health effects would be
expected in the maximum uninvolved worker population and the general
population. No adverse health effects would be expected for SWL from the
19,000 L (5,000-gal) truck tanker, however, adverse health effect could occur
among the general public from the WAFW.
Table 5-15
Estimated Health Effects from In-Transit Breach of a LR-56(H) Tanker
under the Truck Transfer Alternative
Release Location 200 West Area
Waste SWL WAFW BSW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 0:1 0:1 1:1
Probability Unlikely Extremely Not Applicable
Unlikely
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 8.8 x 10-4 0.038 0.14
ICR 4 x 10-7 2 x 10-5 6 x 10-5
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.013 0.55 2.0
ICR 5 x 10-6 2 x 10-4 8 x 10-4
Collective Dose (person-rem) 0.085 3.6 13
LCF 3 x 10-5 0.001 0.005
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 1.9 x 10-5 8.3 x 10-4 0.0031
ICR < 10-7 4 x 10-7 2 x 10-6
Collective Dose (person-rem) 0.40 17 64
LCF 2 x 10-4 0.009 0.03
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 6.1 x 10-5 0.0026 0.0096
ICR < 10-7 1 x 10-6 5 x 10-6
Release Location 200 East Area
Waste SWL WAFW BSW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 0:1 0:1 1:1
Probability Unlikely Extremely Not Applicable
Unlikely
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 8.8 x 10-4 0.038 0.14
ICR 4 x 10-7 2 x 10-5 6 x 10-5
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.013 0.55 2.0
ICR 5 x 10-6 2 x 10-4 8 x 10-4
Collective Dose (person-rem) 0.35 15 56
LCF 1 x 10-4 0.006 0.02
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 2.7 x 10-5 0.0011 0.0042
ICR < 10-7 6 x 10-7 2 x 10-6
Collective Dose (person-rem) 0.40 17 64
LCF 2 x 10-4 0.009 0.03
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 3.3 x 10-5 0.0014 0.0052
ICR < 10-7 7 x 10-7 3 x 10-6
Table 5-16
Estimated Health Effects from In-Transit Breach of a 19,000-L (5,000-Gal)
Tanker under the Truck Transfer Alternative
Release Location 200 West Area
Waste SWL WAFW BSW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 0:1 0:1 1:1
Probability Extremely Extremely Not Applicable
Unlikely Unlikely
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.0044 0.19 0.7
ICR 2 x 10-6 8 x 10-5 3 x 10-4
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.064 2.8 10
ICR 3 x 10-5 0.001 0.004
Collective Dose (person-rem) 0.42 18 67
LCF 2 x 10-4 0.007 0.03
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 9.6 x 10-5 0.0041 0.015
ICR < 10-7 2 x 10-6 8 x 10-6
Collective Dose (person-rem) 2.0 86 320
LCF 0.001 0.04 0.2
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 3.0 x 10-4 0.013 0.048
ICR 2 x 10-7 7 x 10-6 2 x 10-5
Release Location 200 East Area
Waste SWL WAFW BSW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 0:1 0:1 1:1
Probability Extremely Extremely Not Applicable
Unlikely Unlikely
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.0044 0.19 0.7
ICR 2 x 10-6 8 x 10-5 3 x 10-4
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.064 2.8 10
ICR 3 x 10-5 0.003 0.004
Collective Dose (person-rem) 1.8 75 280
LCF 7 x 10-4 0.03 0.1
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 1.3 x 10-4 0.0057 0.021
ICR < 10-7 3 x 10-6 1 x 10-5
Collective Dose (person-rem) 2.0 86 320
LCF 0.001 0.04 0.2
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 1.6 x 10-4 0.007 0.026
ICR < 10-7 4 x 10-6 1 x 10-5
Table 5-17
Estimated Health Effects from a HLW Spill in the Load and Unload Facilities
under the Truck Transfer Alternative
Release Location 200 West Area
Waste SWL WAFW BSW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 0:1 0:1 1:1
Probability Anticipated to Unlikely Not Applicable
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 6.6 x 10-4 0.029 0.11
ICR 3 x 10-7 1 x 10-5 4 x 10-5
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.0035 0.15 0.55
ICR 1 x 10-6 6 x 10-5 2 x 10-4
Collective Dose (person-rem) 0.024 1.0 3.8
LCF 1 x 10-5 4 x 10-4 0.002
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 4.5 x 10-6 1.9 x 10-4 7.2 x 10-4
ICR < 10-7 1 x 10-7 4 x 10-7
Collective Dose (person-rem) 0.10 4.4 16
LCF 5 x 10-5 0.002 0.008
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 1.4 x 10-5 5.9 x 10-4 0.0022
ICR < 10-7 3 x 10-7 1 x 10-6
Release Location 200 East Area
Waste SWL WAFW BSW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 0:1 0:1 1:1
Probability Anticipated to Unlikely Not Applicable
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 6.6 x 10-4 0.029 0.11
ICR 3 x 10-7 1 x 10-5 4 x 10-5
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.0035 0.15 0.055
ICR 1 x 10-6 6 x 10-5 2 x 10-4
Collective Dose (person-rem) 0.096 4.1 15
LCF 4 x 10-5 0.002 0.006
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 6.2 x 10-6 2.6 x 10-4 9.8 x 10-4
ICR < 10-7 1 x 10-7 5 x 10-7
Collective Dose (person-rem) 0.10 4.4 16
LCF 5 x 10-5 0.002 0.008
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 7.5 x 10-6 3.2 x 10-4 0.0012
ICR < 10-7 2 x 10-7 6 x 10-7
Table 5-18
Estimated Health Effects from Seismic Breach of LR-56(H) at the Load and
Unload Facilities under the Truck Transfer Alternative
Release Location 200 West Area (SY Tank Farm)
Waste SWL WAFW BSW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 0:1 0:1 1:1
Probability Unlikely Unlikely Not
Applicable
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.019 0.79 2.9
ICR 7 x 10-6 3 x 10-4 0.001
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.96 41 150
ICR 4 x 10-4 0.02 0.06
Collective Dose (person-rem) 5.5 240 880
LCF 0.002 0.1 0.4
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 8.7 x 10-4 0.037 0.14
ICR 4 x 10-7 2 x 10-5 7 x 10-5
Collective Dose (person-rem) 16 680 2,500
LCF 0.008 0.3 1
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 0.0029 0.13 0.47
ICR 1 x 10-6 6 x 10-5 2 x 10-4
Release Location 200 East Area (A Tank Farm)
Waste SWL WAFW BSW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 0:1 0:1 1:1
Probability Unlikely Unlikely Not
Applicable
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.019 0.79 2.9
ICR 7 x 10-6 3 x 10-4 0.001
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.96 41 150
ICR 4 x 10-4 0.02 0.06
Collective Dose (person-rem) 25 1,100 4,000
LCF 0.01 0.4 2
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 0.0012 0.053 0.20
ICR 6 x 10-7 3 x 10-5 1 x 10-4
Collective Dose (person-rem) 16 680 2,500
LCF 0.008 0.3 1
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 0.0015 0.066 0.24
ICR 8 x 10-7 3 x 10-5 1 x 10-4
Table 5-19
Estimated Health Effects from Seismic Breach of 19,000-L (5,000-Gal) Tanker at
the Load and Unload Facilities under the Truck Transfer Alternative
Release Location 200 West Area (SY Tank Farm)
Waste SWL WAFW BSW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 0:1 0:1 1:1
Probability Unlikely Extremely Not Applicable
Unlikely
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.092 4.0 15
ICR 4 x 10-5 0.002 0.006
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 4.8 210 760
ICR 0.002 0.08 0.3
Collective Dose (person-rem) 28 1,200 4,400
LCF 0.01 0.5 2
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 0.0044 0.19 0.69
ICR 2 x 10-6 9 x 10-5 3 x 10-4
Collective Dose (person-rem) 78 3,400 12,000
LCF 0.04 2 6
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 0.015 0.63 2.3
ICR 7 x 10-6 3 x 10-4 0.001
Release Location 200 East Area (SY Tank Farm)
Waste SWL WAFW BSW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 0:1 0:1 1:1
Probability Unlikely Extremely Not Applicable
Unlikely
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.092 4.0 15
ICR 4 x 10-5 0.002 0.006
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 4.8 210 760
ICR 0.002 0.08 0.3
Collective Dose (person-rem) 130 5,400 20,000
LCF 0.05 2 8
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 0.0062 0.27 0.98
ICR 3 x 10-6 1 x 10-4 5 x 10-4
Collective Dose (person-rem) 78 3,400 12,000
LCF 0.04 2 6
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 0.0077 0.33 1.2
ICR 4 x 10-6 2 x 10-4 6 x 10-4
5.2.11 POTENTIAL MITIGATION MEASURES
Minimal land disturbance in the truck transfer alternative results in a
limited need for mitigation. Watering and soil stabilization to control
fugitive dust emissions during construction will be performed. Post-
construction planting of disturbed areas which are not required as part of the
new facilities would also be performed to help control erosion.
5.3 ANTICIPATED IMPACTS OF THE RAIL TRANSFER ALTERNATIVE
The analysis of the environmental impacts of the rail transfer alternative
considers:
. The construction and operation of new load and unload facilities;
. Additional railway segments;
. Operating rail transfer vehicles; and
. Continued operation of the mixer pump in Tank 101-SY to mitigate
hydrogen generation.
The primary components of the rail transfer alternative are described in
Section 3.1.3.
5.3.1 GEOLOGY, SEISMOLOGY, AND SOILS
The rail transfer alternative would not have significant impacts on geological
resources or soils. A minimum amount of site modifications would be required
since the majority of the railways affected by the rail transfer already exist
and a relatively small amount of soil disturbance would be required with
construction of the load and unload facilities. This would slightly modify
the existing terrain, restrict access to part of the Hanford Site, and
insignificantly disturb soil resources.
5.3.1.1 Geologic Resources
- The impact to the geologic environment of the
rail transfer alternative would be minimal. Restriction of public access to
mineral deposits already exists at the Hanford Site. Restriction of resource
access for site operations would have minimal impact since sand and gravel
resources are readily available at other areas within the Hanford Site.
Adequate soils engineering would be employed during site preparation to
preclude any potential for subsidence. Faulting, as described in Section
4.1.1, has not been identified in the site vicinity. Due to the generally
subdued topography of the proposed site, landslides or slope failure would not
present a hazard. The construction and operation of the facilities proposed
for the rail transfer alternative would not impact the geology of the Hanford
Site.
5.3.1.2 Seismology
- Seismic hazards discussed in Section 4.1.2, would not
impact the facilities proposed as part of the rail transfer alternative. The
proposed load and unload facilities and the new rail segments would be
designed to resist a variety of loads including dead, live, pressure, thermal,
and seismic loads. The seismic loads are those resulting from:
. Passage of seismic waves (i.e., wave-propagation effects)
. Seismic-induced building settlements and seismic anchor movements
. Soil failure due to liquefaction, landslide, etc., if applicable
. Transfer of stress between the inner and outer pipelines at their
connection points.
The seismic design of the facilities proposed as part of the rail transfer
alternative would be according to the general requirements of DOE Order
6430.1A, its primary reference LLNL/UCRL-15910 and Guidelines BNL 52361. The
DBE for which items would be designed is specified by DOE as the maximum
horizontal ground surface acceleration (WHC 1994a, WHC 1993a, WHC 1993b).
Seismic hazards are not expected to affect continued use of the ECSTS until
the rail transfer facilities are built due to the amount of waste to be
transferred and the unlikely probability of an accident event rupturing the
ECSTS.
5.3.1.3 Soils
- The majority of the 200 East and West Areas and the
potential construction sites for the load and unload facilities and railway
segments are covered with sandy soil that supports vegetative cover (sagebrush
and various grasses) (PNL 1995). Vegetation protects the soil from wind
erosion. The sandy soil would be susceptible to both short-term and long-term
wind erosion if it were exposed during clearing for construction. Wind
erosion would be minimized through normal dust control procedures throughout
construction.
Without irrigation, none of the soils affected by the rail transfer
alternative are prime or unique farmlands, prime forest lands, or prime
pasture lands (Brincken 1994).
5.3.2 WATER RESOURCES AND HYDROLOGY
This section discusses the impacts the new storage alternative would have on
water resources and hydrology.
Potential spills and leaks from the facilities proposed as part of the rail
transfer alternative are not expected during normal operations. The potential
for accidental releases associated with the rail transfer is dealt with in
Section 5.2.10. Under normal operating conditions no impacts to water
resources are anticipated. Even in the unlikely event of a spill to the
ground, ground-water resources would be protected by the thick vadose zone in
this area and the tendency for many radionuclides to be retained in the soils.
Design features incorporating double containment and spill handling
capabilities at the load and unload facilities would provide an added level of
protection for ground-water resources.
5.3.3 PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT
Impacts of the rail transfer alternative on the physical environment are
examined in terms of the following elements of the environment:
. Air Quality
. Radiation
. Sound Levels and Noise.
5.3.3.1 Air Quality
- Air Quality impacts have been considered for
construction and routine operations of the rail transfer alternative. This
section describes the analytical approach applied to construction and
operational emissions.
. Construction Emissions - Airborne emissions from construction of load
and unload facilities and additional railway segments were estimated
using emission factors identified in Section 5.1.3.1. The total area of
disturbance for the truck transfer facilities is estimated to be
approximately 2 ha (5 acres). The average dust emission rate would be
2.2 g/s (45 x 10-3 lb/s). Based on the size of the construction areas
and the duration of ground disturbance activities, construction-related
emissions from the truck transfer alternative would not exceed the
applicable Air Quality Standards described in Section 4.
Construction measures to control fugitive dust emissions would include
water application to unstable soils or soil fixative application, as
necessary.
. Operations Emissions - Routine operations of the rail transfer
alternative are projected to produce minimal chemical emissions, mainly
from tanker air displacement during filling and diesel locomotive use.
No exceedances of Ecology ASILs are assumed for this alternative, as the
load and unload facilities will employ HEPA filters for filtration of
ventilating air which would control particulate matter at a high removal
efficiency.
5.3.3.2 Radiation
- Airborne emissions of radioactive materials from normal
operation of facilities proposed as part of the rail transfer alternative
would not result in any measurable radiation increase in off-site air, water,
soil, vegetation, and animals. Section 5.3.9 assesses the impact from
emissions of radioactive material under the rail transfer alternative.
5.3.3.3 Sound Levels and Noise
- Potential noise impacts from construction
and operation of the rail transport facilities would not be expected to exceed
maximum noise levels set by the State of Washington. Due to the distance of
potential receptors, infrequent use of rail facilities, duration of noise-
generating activities while rail facilities are in use and existing ambient
noise levels at the Hanford Site, no noise impacts are expected as part of the
rail transfer alternative. If necessary, a hearing conservation program
including the use of OSHA-approved hearing protection would be implemented for
workers during operations.
5.3.4 BIOLOGICAL AND ECOLOGICAL RESOURCES
The impacts of the rail transfer alternative on biological and ecological
resources would be minimal because very little habitat would be disrupted.
The only new construction would be the load and unload facilities and a small
railway segment, and they would be in previously disturbed areas. Therefore,
little or no mature sagebrush habitat would be affected. An increase in road
kills would not be expected from the additional activities through the area,
since the rail transport vehicles would be moving very slowly and not pose
much threat to most wildlife species.
5.3.5 POPULATION AND SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS
This section examines the impact the rail transfer alternative would have on
population and socioeconomics in the region of influence. The analysis
includes impacts to the local economy, income, population, housing, and local
infrastructure, and an evaluation of environmental justice.
5.3.5.1 Local Economy and Employment
- The rail transfer alternative would
require an initial construction workforce of 35 workers for the rail transport
facility for a duration of 1.5 years. Ten would come from the existing
workforce and 25 would be new hires. Operation of the transport facility
would require 12 persons from existing Hanford Site personnel (see Table
5-20).
Table 5-20
Effects of Rail Transfer Supporting Actions on Employment
Construction Operations
Supporting
Actions
No. Existing/ Duration No. Existing/ Duration
Jobs New Hires (mos) Jobs New Hires (yrs) Assumptions
Rail Transport 35 10/25 18 12 Existing 30 TWRS
Facilities activities
(load and complete in
unload 30 years
rail spur)
Source: (WHC 1995g)
For every job created at the Hanford Site, 1.2 jobs are created locally. For
every new hire from outside the region of influence, 1.3 persons would move
into the local region. The total employment multiplier is 2.2 and population
growth is 2.2 x 1.3, or 2.86. These multipliers are based on the
socioeconomic input/output analysis performed by PNL in 1987 and 1989
(DOE 1991). All operations personnel would come from the existing workforce.
For 25 temporary construction jobs created under the rail transfer
alternative, 55 new jobs would be created locally. Some of these jobs may be
filled from the workers available in the community as a result of DOE cutbacks
expected in 1995. New hires moving into the region of influence are not
expected to increase population above 1995 peak levels and would not have
significant socioeconomic impacts.
5.3.5.2 Income
- Construction for the rail transfer alternative would
generate construction income for the region of influence. It is expected this
income would impact beyond Benton and Franklin Counties, although a majority
of the income would flow into these two counties over a period of one and one-
half years. Construction costs associated with services, goods, and materials
would constitute the majority of the income generated to Benton and Franklin
Counties. Potential fabrication of project components outside the local area
could reduce income impacts to the local area.
5.3.5.3 Population
- As discussed in Section 5.3.5.1, the population growth
multiplier has been determined to be 2.86. Therefore, assuming all 25 new
hires move into the community from outside the region of influence, a
population increase of 72 could occur. However, the actual increase is
expected to be less since jobs may be filled by the available workforce
resulting from general DOE cutbacks at the Hanford Site. The actual number
depends on the availability of qualified workers for the new construction
jobs. The maximum increase is less than 2 percent of the expected DOE
cutbacks, and therefore problems typically associated with sudden population
growth are not anticipated.
5.3.5.4 Housing
- The rail transfer alternative would not have a significant
impact on the housing market. The demand for single-family units and rental
units as well as other modes of housing is expected to decline as a result of
the DOE cutbacks at the Hanford Site. Housing for new hires is expected to be
readily available as former Hanford Site employees leave the region of
influence to pursue employment elsewhere. No housing shortage or price
increase is anticipated to result from this alternative.
5.3.5.5 Local Infrastructure
- Due to the relatively small amount of
temporary employment, and therefore, population growth, provided by this
alternative, the demand for public education, police and fire protection, and
medical services are not expected to increase above 1995 peak levels. In
light of DOE cutbacks, overburdening of these community services would not
result from this alternative.
5.3.5.6 Environmental Justice
- As discussed above, the primary socioeconomic
impact of the rail transfer alternative would be from temporary construction
workers hired for the project duration. However, this impact would be offset
by DOE workforce reductions. In addition, no health effects to any off-site
population are anticipated. Therefore, no disproportionate impacts to low-
income or minority populations would occur as a result of this alternative.
See Appendix C for a more detailed discussion of environmental justice issues.
5.3.6 TRANSPORTATION
Vehicular Traffic and Circulation - Potential transportation impacts from the
rail transport alternative would result from construction of the new rail
transfer facilities and rail car operations. Potential transportation impacts
from construction of rail transfer facilities would be essentially identical
to those discussed in Section 5.2.6.1. The following discussion summarizes
potential impacts from waste transfer activities during rail car operations.
The rail car that would be used to transport waste has a 38,000-L (10,000-gal)
capacity. If all SWL and WAFW were transferred by rail car, approximately 470
train trips would be required to transfer all the waste. Assuming an average
volume of waste transfer from SSTs and West Area facilities, approximately two
daily waste transfer trips would be generated using the rail car. Current
rail usage to the 200 East and West Areas is infrequent. The 15.6-km (9.7-mi)
railway distance between the 200 East and West Areas would not experience any
rail traffic congestion problems, nor would there be any adverse impacts to
the rest of the Hanford Site railway from HLW transfer via rail car. With
respect to potential circulation effects from road closures during rail car
operations, significant impacts would not be expected due to shipping
restrictions to off-peak hours, early notification, and the short duration of
road closures.
5.3.7 LAND USE
The rail transfer alternative would not alter the current or foreseeable
future land use patterns or aesthetic and visual resources of the 200 East and
West and 600 Areas. Each of these topics are discussed in the following
sections.
5.3.7.1 Land Use Patterns
- The rail transfer alternative would require the
commitment of approximately 0.8 ha (2 acres) of land for the load and unload
facilities and 490 m (1,600 ft) of new railway. The area affected by the rail
transfer alternative is currently used and designated for waste storage and
handling. The rail transfer alternative would be consistent with all
applicable land use guidance documents, reports, and DOE orders. In addition,
no other appropriate land uses would be precluded with implementation of this
alternative.
5.3.7.2 Aesthetic and Visual Resources
- The load and unload facilities
proposed as part of the rail transfer alternative are anticipated to be one-
story, rectangular structures. Due to the relatively small size of the load
and unload facilities in relation to existing on-site structures, the existing
industrialized character of the 200 East and West Areas, and the distance
between potential viewers and the proposed rail transfer facilities, there
would be no visual impact to off-site viewers with implementation of the rail
transfer alternative.
5.3.8 CULTURAL RESOURCES
As discussed in Section 4.8, field surveys conducted over the 200 East and
West Areas have not identified archeological or historical sites of
significance. In addition, no archeological or religious sites of Native
American concern have been identified in the proposed project area. As a
consequence, construction of the rail transfer alternative would not adversely
affect cultural resources.
5.3.9 ANTICIPATED HEALTH EFFECTS UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS
This section discusses the potential cause and magnitude of health effects
that are anticipated to occur under normal conditions as the result of
implementation of the rail transfer alternative. These health effects could
result from direct exposure to ionizing radiation or inhalation of toxic and
radioactive materials. The various types of health effects that could occur
and the relationship between exposure and health effects are discussed in
Appendix E. This section evaluates health effects in terms of LCFs for
radiation exposures and in terms of incremental cancer risk and systemic toxic
effects for chemical exposures. The rail transfer alternative is described in
Section 3.1.3 and briefly summarized here.
Under the rail transfer alternative, a shielded rail tanker car would be used
to transfer wastes to the 200 East Area. Two high-activity, HLW load and
unload facilities, would be constructed to support use of the rail car. One
facility is assumed to be in the vicinity of the SY Tank Farm in the 200 West
Area and the other in the vicinity of the A Tank Farm in the 200 East Area.
Operation of the mixer pump in Tank 101-SY, SST SWL pumping, and storage of
WAFW would all continue. It is assumed that the ECSTS would continue to be
used for cross-site transfer of non-complexed liquid wastes until either no
usable lines remain or rails cars are available for this purpose. Complexed
SWLs would be transferred to the 200 East Area using the rail tanker car to
avoid mixing with the TRU sludge in Tank 102-SY, the staging tank for the
ECSTS in the 200 West Area.
The 38,000-L (10,000-gal) rail tanker car for HLW has not been designed
although a 76,000-L (20,000-gal) rail car is used for transfer of LLW at the
Hanford Site. Several other DOE sites use similar 19,000-L (5,000-gal) tanks
for waste transport but no other DOE site is known to transport HLW in
19,000-L (5,000-gal) or larger tanks (WHC 1993d). The 38,000-L (10,000-gal)
rail tanker car is assumed to be of double-shell stainless steel construction
with 5-cm (2-in) lead-equivalent shielding (WHC 1993d, WHC 1995h).
Activities considered as normal conditions under the rail transfer alternative
would include:
. Facility Construction
. Facility Operation
. Facility Decontamination and Decommissioning.
Each of these activities relevant to health effects is discussed in the
following sections.
5.3.9.1 Facility Construction
- Facility construction activities and
associated health effects under the rail transfer alternative are identical to
those for the truck transfer alternative discussed in Section 5.2.9.1
5.3.9.2 Facility Operation
- Workers and members of the general public could
be exposed to direct radiation and airborne radiological and chemical
emissions during normal operations under the rail transfer alternative. These
exposures include:
. Direct Radiation
. Airborne Emissions of Radioactive Materials
. Airborne Emissions of Chemicals.
Estimated doses and resultant health effects for each of these exposures are
discussed in the following list.
. Direct Radiation - Workers performing routine operations, maintenance,
and surveillance would be exposed to direct radiation during jet mixer
pump operations, salt well pumping, rail tanker loading and unloading,
and associated cross-site transfers. Activities associated with the
mixer pump, SWL pumping, and inter-farm transfers would be essentially
the same as are now being performed by tank farm workers. Tank workers
receive an average annual dose of 14 mrem (DOE 1992b).
As discussed in Section 5.2.9 for the truck transfer alternative,
radiation and contamination surveys would be performed on departing and
arriving tankers. The larger capacity rail tanker cars would require
fewer trips to transport the waste than either tank trailer truck
option. Exposure rates on the exterior of the rail tanker would not be
expected to be significantly greater due to self-shielding by the waste
and approximately the same length of time is assumed to be required to
conduct each survey. Therefore, the dose of 0.07 person-rem per trip
estimated for tank trailer trucks is also considered reasonable for
surveys of the rail tanker cars.
The dose received by health physics technicians performing these surveys
would depend on the extent to which the ECSTS could be used, as
indicated in Table 5-21. If only known complexed SWL were transported
using rail tanker cars, the total dose would be 4 person-rem. If all
the SWL and WAFW were transported using rail tanker cars, the total dose
would be 31 person-rem. Based on an occupational risk factor of 4 x
10-4 LCF/person-rem, 0.01 LCFs would be expected for transfer of all
these wastes.
No significant direct radiation exposure is anticipated to the train
crew. Site requirements specify that at least one spacer car be placed
immediately before and after the car containing HLW (WHC 1993e). These
spacer cars are expected to reduce radiation exposures to negligible
levels at normally occupied positions in the train.
Exposures to workers operating and maintaining the HLW load and unload
facilities under the rail transfer alternative are expected to be
Table 5-21
Estimated Worker Exposure during Vehicle Surveys
under the Rail Transfer Alternative
Waste Type Trips Person-Rem
SWL
Complexed 58 4
Uncharacterized 122 8
Non-Complexed 243 16
423 Subtotal 28
WAFW 47 3
470 Total 31
identical to those discussed in Section 5.2.9.2 for the truck transfer
alternative.
. Airborne Emissions of Radioactive Materials - Airborne emissions under
the rail transfer alternative are expected to be identical to those
discussed in Section 5.2.9.2 for the truck transfer alternative.
. Airborne Emissions of Chemicals - Airborne emissions of chemicals under
the rail transfer alternative are expected to be identical to those
discussed in Section 5.2.9.2 for the truck transfer alternative.
5.3.9.3 Facility Decontamination and Decommissioning
- The load and unload
facilities that would be constructed in the 200 East and West Areas under the
rail transfer alternative would require decontamination and decommissioning.
Decontamination and decommissioning of facilities such as the existing DSTs
and SSTs and the ECSTS considered in this EIS and of TWRS facilities are to be
addressed in detail in a separate, future EIS.
The design of these new facilities incorporates features that would simplify
their decontamination and reduce the amount of material requiring disposal as
radioactive waste. These features include use of modular, separable
components to isolate and minimize contamination; use of washable or
strippable coatings to minimize contamination; and minimization of the lengths
of pipe and duct runs that would be subject to contamination.
5.3.10 HEALTH EFFECTS UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS
This section discusses the human health effects that could occur as the result
of potential accidents during the implementation of the rail transfer
alternative. Initiating events, frequencies of occurrence, and quantities of
respirable hazardous materials released during a range of potential accidents
are discussed in detail in Appendix F. No construction accident fatalities
are anticipated for this alternative based on the death rate of 31 per 100,000
workers (National Safety Council 1994). The types of health effects that can
occur and the relationship between exposure and health effects are discussed
in Appendix E. This section evaluates health effects in terms of LCFs for
radiation exposures. Health effects for exposures to chemicals during
accidents that involve exposure to both radioactive and toxic materials are
not specifically evaluated. A previous analysis (WHC 1994c) concluded that
radiological releases are limiting in these cases provided the release
duration is at least 2 minutes and 40 seconds. The minimum release duration
of combined radiological and chemical releases evaluated under the truck
transfer alternative is 30 minutes.
The accidents considered in Appendix F include scenarios both within and
beyond the design bases of the options and facilities comprising the rail
transfer alternative. Terms used to categorize accidents and the
corresponding frequency ranges are summarized in Table 5-3. Based on
frequencies of occurrence and quantities of hazardous materials released, a
subset of these accidents was selected for evaluation of reasonably
foreseeable health effects.
The actions proposed under the rail transfer alternative involve the use of
the following systems:
. Existing Cross-Site Transfer System
. Rail Tanker Cars
. Load/Unload Facilities.
The types and quantities of waste that would be handled by each system are
summarized in Table 5-22. Detailed characterizations of the wastes listed in
Table 5-22 are provided in Appendix E. Accidents that could occur in each of
Table 5-22
Volumes of Tank Waste Transferred from the 200 West Area under the Rail
Transfer Alternative
Waste Typeb Volume (kgal) a Systems Used
SWL
Complexed 575 Rail
Uncharacterized 1,221 Load/Unload
Non-Complexed 2,426 ECSTS Rail
Load/Unload
Salt Well Total 4,222
WAFW 469 ECSTS Rail
Load/Unload
Grand Total 4,691
Source: Salt Well Volumes (WHC 1995a)
Salt Well Pumping Schedule (WHC 1994b)
a1 kgal = 3,780 L
bTanks BX-111, T-111, and C-106 are excluded.
these systems are discussed in the following sections. To bound the
probability of accidents under the rail transfer alternative, it is assumed
that all wastes shown in Table 5-22 are handled using rail tank cars and the
new load/unload facilities.
5.3.10.1 Existing Cross-Site Transfer System
- Transfer pipe breaks and spray
releases could occur during operation of the ECSTS under the truck transfer
alternative and result in release of tank waste to the soil column and to the
atmosphere. The consequences of these accidents are identical to those
discussed in Section 5.5.10 for the no action alternative; however, the
probability is less that these accidents would occur under the rail transfer
alternative. Under the rail transfer alternative, the ECSTS would be used for
transfers of non-complexed SWL and only until the ECSTS fails or the rail tank
cars and supporting load/unload facilities are available.
5.3.10.2 Rail Tanker Car
- The rail tanker car for HLW transport at the
Hanford Site has not been designed. It is assumed that the design would
include a 1.3-cm (0.5-in) stainless steel tank with a 1.3-cm (0.5-in)
stainless steel secondary containment, 5-cm (2-in) lead equivalent shielding,
and impact limiters. The tank would have a nominal capacity of 38,000 L
(10,000 gal) and would be mounted on a flat car. It is considered impractical
to design a bulk liquid container of this size to meet Type B requirements.
The rail tanker cars would be used to transport SWL and WAFW between new HLW
load and unload facilities in the 200 West and East Areas. The new HLW load
and unload facilities are assumed to be located in the vicinity of the SY Tank
Farm in the 200 West Area and the A Tank Farm in the 200 East Area. Rail
spurs would be constructed to connect these facilities with the existing rail
network (see Figure 3-13). The total rail distance between the load and
unload facilities would be 15.5 km (9.7 mi) (WHC 1995h).
Derailments are considered the only reasonably foreseeable accident during
transport that would result in release of any radioactive material. As part
of the accident assessment for this EIS, fractional release frequencies for
rail accidents were developed for the tank cars currently used for liquid LLW
transport at the Hanford Site (WHC 1993e) (see Table F-10). It was estimated
that the frequency of release of any material during a derailment is 1.5 x
10-8/km (2.4 x 10-8/mi) and the frequency of releasing 90 to 100 percent of the
contents is 3.7 x 10-9/km (5.9 x 10-9/mi). The probability of a derailment
accident releasing the entire contents of the rail car is extremely unlikely
(2.7 x 10-5) during SST interim stabilization activities under the rail
transfer alternative. This is equivalent to a frequency of 5.7 x 10-8 per
trip.
Health effects of the loss of 100 percent of the tank contents during transit
are shown in Table 5-23. No adverse health effects would be expected for in-
transit accidents involving SWL, WAFW, or BSW. Although doses for this
accident under the rail transfer alternative are higher than for the truck
transfer alternative, doses for both alternatives are so low that they would
be indistinguishable on the basis of observable health effects.
Table 5-23
Estimated Health Effects from In-Transit Breach of a 38,000-L (10,000-Gal)
Rail Tanker under the Rail Transfer Alternative
Release Location 200 West
Waste SWL WAFW BSW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 0:1 0:1 1:1
Probability Extremely Extremely Not Applicable
Unlikely Unlikely
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.0089 0.38 1.4
ICR 4 x 10-6 2 x 10-4 6 x 10-4
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.13 5.6 21
ICR 5 x 10-5 0.002 0.008
Collective Dose (person-rem) 0.85 37 140
LCF 3 x 10-4 0.01 0.05
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 1.9 x 10-4 0.0083 0.031
ICR 1 x 10-7 4 x 10-6 2 x 10-5
Collective Dose (person-rem) 4.1 170 640
LCF 0.002 0.09 0.3
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 6.1 x 10-4 0.026 0.097
ICR 3 x 10-7 1 x 10-5 5 x 10-5
Release Location 200 East
Waste SWL WAFW BSW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 0:1 0:1 1:1
Probability Extremely Extremely Not Applicable
Unlikely Unlikely
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.0089 0.38 1.4
ICR 4 x 10-6 2 x 10-4 6 x 10-4
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.13 5.6 21
ICR 5 x 10-5 0.002 0.008
Collective Dose (person-rem) 3.5 150 560
LCF 0.001 0.06 0.2
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 2.7 x 10-4 0.012 0.042
ICR 1 x 10-7 6 x 10-6 2 x 10-5
Collective Dose (person-rem) 4.1 170 640
LCF 0.002 0.09 0.3
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 3.2 x 10-4 0.014 0.052
ICR 2 x 10-7 7 x 10-6 3 x 10-5
5.3.10.3 Load and Unload Facility
- Accidents could also occur during loading
and unloading operations. As discussed in Section 5.2.10.3, the leak scenario
developed for the 204-AR LLW loading facility (WHC 1991a) is considered to
bound the quantity of respirable material released and the frequency of
occurrence of leaks and sprays at the HLW load and unload facilities. Health
effects would be identical to those shown in Table 5-17 since the quantity of
material released in this scenario depends on the filling rate and not the
capacity of the transport vehicle. No adverse health effects would be
expected for accidents involving SWL, WAFW, or BSW. A 1:1 dilution of BSW was
used for comparison with SWL and WAFW which have low solids content. In the
absence of specific design information, a leak during loading is considered to
be anticipated to unlikely.
Doses and health effects for a seismically-induced breach of a 38,000-L
(10,000-gal) rail tanker car are shown in Table 5-24. The probability of this
accident scenario would be unlikely (1.5 x 10-4) and is dominated by accidents
involving SWL. No adverse health effects would be expected for accidents
involving SWL but could occur in the maximally exposed uninvolved worker
population and in the general population for accidents involving WAFW or BSW.
The volume of WAFW is relatively small and the probability of a seismically-
induced breach of a rail tanker loaded with WAFW is extremely unlikely.
5.3.11 POTENTIAL MITIGATION MEASURES
This section discusses the potential mitigation measures for the rail transfer
alternative relative to fugitive dust emissions. Fugitive dust emissions
during construction of the facilities proposed as part of this alternative
would be mitigated by watering of exposed areas and stabilizing spoils piles
by use of vegetation or soil fixative.
Table 5-24
Estimated Health Effects from Seismic Breach of 38,000-L (10,000-Gal) Rail
Tanker at the Load and Unload Facilities under the Rail Transfer Alternative
Release Location 200 West Area (SY Tank Farm)
Waste SWL WAFW BSW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 0:1 0:1 1:1
Probability Unlikely Extremely Not Applicable
Unlikely
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.18 7.9 29
ICR 7 x 10-5 0.003 0.01
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 9.6 410 1,500
ICR 0.004 0.2 0.6
Collective Dose (person-rem) 55 2,400 9,000
LCF 0.02 0.9 4
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 0.0087 0.37 1.4
ICR 4 x 10-6 2 x 10-4 7 x 10-4
Collective Dose (person-rem) 160 6,800 25,000
LCF 0.08 3 10
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 0.029 1.3 5.0
ICR 1 x 10-5 6 x 10-4 0.002
Release Location 200 East Area (A Tank Farm)
Waste SWL WAFW BSW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 0:1 0:1 1:1
Probability Unlikely Extremely Not Applicable
Unlikely
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.18 7.9 29
ICR 7 x 10-5 0.003 0.01
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 9.6 410 1,500
ICR 0.004 0.2 0.6
Collective Dose (person-rem) 250 11,000 40,000
LCF 0.01 4 20
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 0.012 0.53 2.0
ICR 6 x 10-6 3 x 10-4 0.001
Collective Dose (person-rem) 160 6,800 25,000
LCF 0.08 3 10
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 0.015 0.66 2.4
ICR 8 x 10-6 3 x 10-4 0.001
5.4 ANTICIPATED IMPACTS OF THE NEW STORAGE ALTERNATIVE
The analysis of the environmental impacts of the new storage alternative
considers:
. Construction and operation of the NTF which consists of two new DSTs and
associated facilities;
. RCSTS to replace the ECSTS;
. ITRS in Tank 101-SY, and;
. Retrieval system proposed in Tank 102-SY.
The facilities proposed as part of the new storage alternative are described
in detail in Section 3.4.
5.4.1 GEOLOGY, SEISMOLOGY, AND SOILS
Construction of the new storage alternative would modify the existing terrain,
restrict access to part of the Hanford Site, and disturb soil resources. This
section discusses the influence that the new storage alternative would have on
geologic resources, seismology, and soils.
5.4.1.1 Geologic Resources
- The impact to the geologic environment by the
facilities proposed by the new storage alternative would be minimal.
Restriction of public access to mineral deposits already exists at the Hanford
Site. Restriction of resource access for Hanford Site operations would have
minimal impact since sand and gravel resources are readily available at other
areas within the Hanford Site.
Adequate soils engineering would be employed during site preparation to
preclude any potential for subsidence. Faulting, as described in
Section 4.1.1, has not been identified in the construction site vicinity. Due
to the generally subdued topography of the proposed site and pipeline
alignment, landslides or slope failure would not present a hazard. The
construction and operation of the facilities proposed as part of the new
storage alternative would not impact the geology of the Hanford Site.
5.4.1.2 Seismology
- Seismic hazards, discussed in Section 4.1.2 would not
impact facilities proposed as part of this alternative. The NTF, RCSTS,
associated facilities, and retrieval systems would be designed to resist a
variety of loads including dead, live, pressure, thermal, and seismic loads.
The seismic loads are those resulting from:
. Passage of seismic waves (i.e., wave-propagation effects)
. Seismic-induced building settlements and seismic anchor movements
. Soil failure due to liquefaction, landslide, etc., if applicable
. Transfer of stress between the inner and outer pipelines at their
connection points.
The seismic design of the facilities proposed as part of the new storage
alternative would be according to the general requirements of DOE Order
6430.1A, its primary reference LLNL/UCRL-15910 and Guidelines BNL 52361. The
DBE for which items would be designed is specified by DOE as the maximum
horizontal ground surface acceleration (WHC 1994a, WHC 1993a, WHC 1993b).
Seismic hazards are not expected to affect continued use of the ECSTS until
the RCSTS is built due to the amount of waste to be transferred and the
probability of an accident event rupturing the ECSTS. Impacts to the ITRS or
a retrieval system in Tank 102-SY are not expected since it would be
seismically designed as part of the DST.
5.4.1.3 Soils
- The majority of the 200 East and West Areas and the
construction sites for the proposed NTF and RCSTS are covered with sandy soil
that supports vegetative cover (sagebrush and various grasses) (PNL 1995).
Vegetation protects the soil from wind erosion. The sandy soil would be
susceptible to both short-term and long-term wind erosion if it were exposed
during clearing for construction. Wind erosion would be prevented through
normal dust control procedures throughout construction.
The new storage alternative would include revegetation of the NTF sites to
mitigate construction activities, (disturbance and removal of native soil and
vegetation) and along the proposed route of the RCSTS. A detailed discussion
of planned revegetation activities is provided in Section 5.1.4.
Without irrigation, none of the soils affected by the NTF and RCSTS are prime
or unique farmlands, prime forest lands, or prime pasture lands (Brincken
1994).
5.4.2 WATER RESOURCES AND HYDROLOGY
This section discusses the impacts the new storage alternative would have on
water resources and hydrology. Potential spills and leaks from the ECSTS or
the proposed RCSTS, Tank 101-SY, Tank 102-SY retrieval system ITRS, or NTF are
not expected during normal operations. No leaks have been recorded from the
28 DSTs installed in the 200 East and West Areas, supporting the supposition
that the new DSTs would not leak during normal operations and that potential
for impacts to water resources from the new storage alternative would be
remote.
The potential for accidental releases is discussed in Section 5.2.10. Under
normal operating conditions no impacts to water resources are anticipated.
Even in the unlikely event of accidental release from any element of this
alternative, ground-water resources would be protected by the thick vadose
zone in this area and the tendency for many radionuclides to be retained in
the soils. Secondary containment is provided by both the RCSTS and NTF
providing an added level of protection for ground-water resources.
5.4.3 PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT
Impacts of the new storage alternative on the physical environment are
examined in terms of the following elements of the environment:
. Air Quality
. Radiation
. Sound Levels and Noise.
5.4.3.1 Air Quality
- Air quality impacts have been considered for
construction and routine operations of the new storage alternative. This
section describes the analytical approach applied to construction emissions
and operational emissions.
. Construction Emissions - Construction activities for Tank 101-SY and
Tank 102-SY retrieval systems would primarily occur within the tank farm
area currently covered with gravel, therefore, potential dust emissions
would be limited to RCSTS and NTF construction. Airborne emissions from
construction of the NTF option sites and RCSTS were estimated using an
EPA fugitive dust emission factor of 1.04 x 10-4 g/s/m2 (2.05 x 10-8
lb/s/ft2) assuming a 30-day month. The area of the RCSTS would be
approximately 2.3 ha (5.7 acres). Thus, the average dust emission rate
from this site would be 2.4 g/s (5.1 x 10-3 lb/s). The area for any of
the NTF option sites would be approximately 5 ha (12 acres). Thus, the
average dust emission rate from this site would be 5.2 g/s (0.01 lb/s).
Airborne emissions from construction of the retrieval systems are not
expected.
Air concentrations downwind of the RCSTS and downwind of the proposed
NTF were computed using the ISCLT2 program from EPA. The wind direction
ESE produced the largest concentrations of fugitive dust. Results of
fugitive dust modeling for the RCSTS and the NTF are shown in Table
5-25.
Distance in Table 5-25 is measured from the center of the construction
area. As the distance from the construction area increases, the average
dust loading would decrease. At large distances, the area source
appears no different than a point source. During NTF construction, the
Ecology Air Quality Standard of 60 -g/m3 (3.7 x 10-9 lb/ft3) would be
exceeded within 500 m (1,640 ft) from the area source.
Table 5-25
Air Concentrations from RCSTS and NTF Construction Dust Emissions
Concentration Concentration
Distance (-g/m3)b RCSTS (-g/m3)b
(m)a Source NTF Source
300 43.33 76.57
400 33.05 60.38
500 26.22 47.95
700 18.00 32.36
1,000 11.39 21.26
2,000 4.24 8.27
5,000 1.09 2.16
10,000 0.39 0.78
a1 m = 3.281 ft
b-g/m3 = 6.2x10-11 lb/ft3
Receptors located more than 500 m (1,640 ft) downwind would not, on
average, be exposed to fugitive dust concentrations which exceed
applicable air quality standards. The construction of the RCSTS and NTF
would not produce fugitive dust concentrations in excess of EPA Air
Quality Standards beyond the Hanford Site boundary.
Because of distance and scheduling, it is expected that fugitive dust
emissions from the new storage alternative would not cause an exceedance
of particulate matter (PM) or PM10 ambient air quality standards.
Construction activities would include activities to control fugitive
dust emissions from the construction site, including watering exposed
areas and stabilizing spoil piles by use of vegetation or soil fixative.
. Operations Emissions - Potential environmental impacts of airborne
emissions of toxic contaminants and particulate matter from the NTF
ventilation systems were conservatively estimated using the EPA
dispersion model ISCST2. Methods for estimating and data are discussed
in Appendix E. These estimates assumed that emissions for two storage
tanks originate from an NTF in the 200 East Area (Site E) or the 200
West Area. Site E results would be representative of results from
optional Site D in the 200 East Area.
The maximum 24-hour and annual ground level concentrations for the
estimated emissions from two new DSTs are shown for expected air
contaminants in Table 5-26. The table also shows the Ecology ASILs for
each contaminant. As shown in Table 5-26, no exceedances are predicted.
Operations from the ECSTS, RCSTS, or the retrieval systems are not
expected to result in on-site or off-site effects based on their
enclosed design.
5.4.3.2 Radiation
- Airborne emissions of radioactive materials from normal
operation of facilities under the new storage alternative would not result in
any measurable increase of radioactivity in off-site air, water, soil,
vegetation, and animals. Emissions from all 177 existing tanks are already a
minor contributor to overall site emissions (DOE 1992c). Although emissions
from two DSTs under the new storage alternative would be added to he overall
emissions, ventilation systems on these two DSTs would be expected to be at
least as effective as those on existing tanks in reducing emissions. Section
5.2.9 assesses the impacts from emissions of radioactive materials under the
new storage alternative.
5.4.3.3 Sound Levels and Noise
- Potential noise impacts from constructing
and operating the new storage alternative, NTF, retrieval systems, and RCSTS
at the Hanford Site would not be expected to exceed maximum noise levels set
by the State of Washington.
The distance between the NTF, RCSTS, and the retrieval systems to the nearest
receptor location is significant, creating a large buffer zone for noise
abatement and control. Although occasional recreational usage of the Hanford
Site occurs along the Columbia River and State Highway 240, the public would
be protected from potential noise impacts by the distance from the proposed
project site to these areas.
Table 5-26
Maximum 24-Hour and Annual Ground Level Concentrations for Emissions from Two DSTs
ASILs
24-Hour Concentration (-g/m3) Annual Concentration (-g/m3) WAC 173-460-150
Extreme Case, Distance From Distance From Distance From Distance From
2 Tank Emissions Source, On-site Source, Off-site Source, On-site Source, Off-site 24-Hr ASIL Annual ASIL
Contaminants (g/s) 400m 10,771m 200m 12,978m (-g/m3) (-g/m3)
Acetone 2.3x10-3 4.1x10-2 3.4x10-3 1.3x10-2 1.0x10-2 5.9x103 NA
Benzene 5.7x10-6 1.0x10-4 8.3x10-6 3.2x10-5 2.5x10-5 NA 1.2x10-1
1-Butanol 1.4x10-2 2.5x10-1 2.0x10-2 7.9x10-2 6.2x10-2 5.0x102 NA
Carbon Tetrachloride 4.3x10-8 7.6x10-7 6.3x10-8 2.4x10-7 1.9x10-7 NA 6.7x10-2
2-Hexanone 1.7x10-4 3.0x10-3 2.5x10-4 9.7x10-4 7.5x10-4 6.7x101 NA
4-Methyl-2-Pentanone (MIBK) 1.2x10-2 2.1x10-1 1.8x10-2 6.8x10-2 5.3x10-2 6.8x101 NA
Normal Paraffin Hydrocarbon 1.7x10-2 3.0x10-1 2.5x10-2 9.7x10-2 7.5x10-2 NA NA
(Kerosene)
Tributyl Phosphate 4.1x10-10 7.2x10-9 6.0x10-10 2.3x10-9 1.8x10-9 7.3 NA
Ammonia 4.9x10-6 8.7x10-5 7.2x10-6 2.8x10-5 2.2x10-5 1.0x102 NA
Silver (Ag) 2.8x10-15 4.9x10-14 4.1x10-15 1.6x10-14 1.2x10-14 3.0x10-2 NA
Arsenic (As) 1.8x10-13 3.2x10-12 2.6x10-13 1.0x10-12 8.0x10-13 2.3x10-2 NA
Barium (Ba) 9.1x10-16 1.6x10-14 1.3x10-15 5.2x10-15 4.0x10-15 1.7 NA
Calcium (Ca) 6.1x10-15 1.1x10-13 8.9x10-15 3.5x10-14 2.7x10-14 1.7x101 NA
Copper (Cu) 1.4x10-15 2.5x10-14 2.0x10-15 7.9x10-15 6.2x10-15 3.3 NA
Magnesium (Mg) 1.2x10-15 2.1x10-14 1.8x10-15 6.8x10-15 5.3x10-15 3.3x10-1 NA
Sodium (Na) 3.3x10-11 5.8x10-10 4.8x10-11 1.9x10-10 1.5x10-10 6.7 NA
Lead (Pb) 4.1x10-15 7.2x10-14 6.0x10-15 2.3x10-14 1.8x10-14 5.0x10-1 NA
Antimony (Sb) 5.6x10-15 9.9x10-14 8.2x10-15 3.2x10-14 2.5x10-14 1.7 NA
Selinium (Se) 3.6x10-15 6.4x10-14 5.3x10-15 2.0x10-14 1.6x10-14 6.7x10-1 NA
Aluminum Oxide (A1O2) 1.2x10-11 2.1x10-10 1.8x10-11 6.8x10-11 5.3x10-11 6.7 NA
Hydroxide (OH-) 5.1x10-12 9.0x10-11 7.5x10-12 2.9x10-11 2.3x10-11 NA NA
Fluoride (F-) 9.8x10-13 1.7x10-11 1.4x10-12 5.6x10-13 4.3x10-12 5.3 NA
Iron Hydroxide (III) Fe(OH)3 1.7x10-12 3.0x10-11 2.5x10-12 9.6x10-12 7.5x10-12 3.3 NA
Chromium (III) Hydroxide 4.6x10-13 8.1x10-12 6.7x10-13 2.6x10-12 2.0x10-12 1.7 NA
(Cr(OH)3)
NA = Not applicable
During construction, equipment may temporarily increase ambient noise levels
at the proposed project site. Noise levels created by construction equipment
have been measured and typical data are presented in Figure 5-1. Occupational
noise exposure would be monitored within the work areas expected to exhibit
noise levels beyond limits set by OSHA and threshold limit values established
by the ACGIH. A hearing conservation program including the use of OSHA-
approved hearing protection would be implemented to protect workers during
these operations, if necessary.
5.4.4 BIOLOGICAL AND ECOLOGICAL RESOURCES
The construction of the new storage alternative would require removal of
vegetation, destruction of habitat, and the generation of dust and noise for
construction of two new tanks at either the 200 West Area or at one of two
sites at the 200 East Area in addition to the RCSTS. Although construction
activities would be temporary, they may have both short-term and long-term
effects upon site vegetation and wildlife. The following sections examine the
potential effects of the new storage alternative upon:
. Vegetation
. Wildlife
. Threatened or Endangered Species.
5.4.4.1 Vegetation
- Construction of the new storage alternative would remove
vegetation from the tank sites and associated facility maintenance areas. In
addition, construction staging, laydown, and spoils stockpiling areas would
require the removal of vegetation and would disturb soil, but these areas
would be revegetated by seeding with native species after construction is
completed. The areas disturbed for construction of the RCSTS would be
similarly revegetated after construction, except for the parts requiring
access for monitoring and maintenance. If decommissioning of the facilities
requires their removal at the end of their useful life, the site would be
disturbed again at that time. All these disturbed land areas would have
long-term changes in vegetation cover.
The RCSTS construction disturbance effects would be similar to the effects as
described in Section 5.1.4. The vegetation at the three NTF optional sites is
dominated by mature sagebrush. At any of the three sites, about 20 ha (50
acres) would be affected by construction activity. About two-thirds of that
area would be needed for the tanks and support facilities and the remainder
would be revegetated following construction.
Altogether, the disturbance from the RCSTS and NTF totals about 30 ha (73
acres) of big sagebrush/cheatgrass habitat, which would experience long-term
effects. About one-third of this area probably could be revegetated after
construction, but some of that would be subject to future disturbance because
of its proximity to actively-used areas and for future decommissioning. The
soil disturbance from construction activities would result in compaction,
mixing of soil horizons, and wind erosion, conditions which favor species that
thrive on disturbed soil. These conditions would make establishment of
native-plant dominated communities more difficult. Big sagebrush communities
are expected to require decades to become established and reach maturity.
However, some key habitat components for wildlife could be obtained quickly by
transplanting mature sagebrush. Seeding for revegetation of the impacted grey
rabbitbrush habitats may also include sagebrush seed to encourage more
complete development of shrub steppe vegetation with the highest value for
wildlife species of concern. Areas that are currently barren would be
similarly planted once construction of the facilities and pipeline is
complete.
Mitigation besides revegetation of the acreage temporarily disturbed by the
construction would be required. If the assumption is made that it would not
be possible to restore within a reasonable time the sagebrush/cheatgrass
habitat on the area that would be temporarily disturbed, then a full 30 ha
(73 acres) would need mitigation. However, different parts of the
construction area would receive different kinds of disturbance, and it may be
more realistic to assume that some of the area would be restored to sagebrush
cover.
The mature sagebrush habitat would be replaced at a ratio of 3:1. Sites would
be selected that have a high likelihood of acceptance into a site-wide program
if one is developed later. If the worst-case mitigation debt of 30 ha (73
acres) of sagebrush habitat is assumed, then a 3:1 ratio equals 89 ha (219
acres) of compensation area. If one assumes that one-third of the 30 ha (73
acres) of other habitats can be restored to sagebrush habitat, then about 59
ha (146 acres) would be needed in candidate restoration areas. Figure 5-2
shows the proposed area for restoration to occur. It has over 530 ha (1,300
acres) available for potential habitat restoration/enhancement. The site-
disturbing activities that might be associated with restoration of sagebrush
habitat would be minimized, and the impacts on the restoration sites would be
minor and localized. Specific plots with adequate acreage will be selected
and evaluated for cultural resources and ecological baseline information as
part of the MAP.
5.4.4.2 Wildlife
- Clearing vegetation in the vicinity of the NTF option
areas and the RCSTS pipeline corridor to construct the facilities and pipeline
would result in a loss of habitat in that vicinity for some of the wildlife
species on the Hanford Site. The anticipated clearing schedule would avoid
the bird nesting season. Construction-related impacts would most likely
affect the loggerhead shrike and sage sparrow (discussed in section 5.1.4.3),
as well as nesting song birds (such as horned lark and western meadowlark),
ground birds, small mammals, and reptiles, including the sagebrush lizard.
Small mammals, reptiles, and crawling insects that require shade from
vegetation would be subjected to habitat fragmentation (i.e., creation of
relatively large habitat discontinuities where shrub cover is removed) if the
area is not revegetated. Revegetating would minimize the operational impacts.
Habitat restoration, a means that may be used for mitigation, would change
grass-dominated habitat to sagebrush habitat and would favor some species to
the detriment of others (for example, favor shrikes over horned larks).
Overall, this effect would be minor because the grass-dominated habitats are
abundant and tend to support few sensitive species. In addition, wildlife
diversity would be expected to increase as a result.
Construction noise would temporarily displace some species. Roadkills would
be expected for small mammals and reptiles that remain in the vicinity as
heavy equipment moves across the sites. The operation of the facility would
not have any significant impact on wildlife populations.
5.4.4.3 Threatened or Endangered Species
- No threatened or endangered plant
species occur at either the 200 East or West areas or along the RCSTS
corridor. The stalked-pod milkvetch, a State of Washington monitor species,
has been found at several locations along the RCSTS corridor in both disturbed
and undisturbed sagebrush habitats and may be affected. It may be
interspersed in the proposed construction areas including potential mitigation
sites. Even though some specimens of this species would be lost, the overall
Hanford Site population would not be affected. Piper's daisy, a state-listed
sensitive species, has been found in the gravel pit near the 200 East Area
site and might occur in a portion of the expected site disturbance areas. It
is unlikely that any disturbance of this species would affect the overall
site-wide population of the species.
The loggerhead shrike, a Federal and state candidate species, the sagebrush
lizard, a Federal candidate species, and the sage sparrow, a state candidate
species, require mature sagebrush habitat. The loss of 30 ha (73 acres) out
of about 93,000 ha (230,000 acres) on the Hanford Site of sagebrush/cheatgrass
would be a direct loss of habitat for these species and other species that use
sagebrush habitat. During spring 1995 surveys, 11 shrike nests were found
along the RCSTS corridor, all of which would be affected by construction. Two
loggerhead shrike nests were found on the alternate Tank Site D inside the 200
East Area. One sage sparrow was found on alternate Tank Site E outside the
200 East Area, while two were found on the 200 West Area tank site. All of
these animals would be displaced if tanks are constructed at that site. These
species would not be nesting on the potential mitigation sites and would not
be affected by the mitigation activity.
5.4.5 POPULATION AND SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS
This section examines the impacts the new storage alternative would have on
population and socioeconomics in the region of influence. The analysis
includes impacts to the local economy, income, population, housing, and local
infrastructure, and an evaluation of environmental justice.
5.4.5.1 Local Economy and Employment
- The new storage alternative would
require an initial construction workforce of 20 workers for a duration of 8
months for the installation of the ITRS in Tank 101-SY and retrieval system in
Tank 102-SY (4 months for each tank). Eighty workers would be required for a
duration of 21 months for the construction of the RCSTS, 20 of whom would come
from the existing workforce. In addition, 150 workers would be required for
the construction of the NTF, expected to take 3 years. Twenty-five of the NTF
construction workers would come from the existing site workforce, while the
remaining 125 would be new hires. The workforce required to operate the ITRS
in Tank 101-SY, retrieval system in Tank 102-SY, RCSTS, and NTF would total
59, all of whom would come from the existing workforce. These workforce
figures are summarized in Table 5-27.
Table 5-27
Effects of New Storage Alternative on Employment
Construction Operations
Supporting
Actions
No. Existing/ Duration No. Existing/ Duration
Jobs New Hires (mos) Assumptions Jobs New Hires (yrs) Assumptions
ITRS/ 20 20/0 8 Retrieval 4 4/0 Approx. Tanks 101-SY
Retrieval Systems built 2 and 102-SY
System independently would be
(101/102) retrieved
sequentially
NTF (E/W 150 25/125 36 _ 50/0 50/0 30 TWRS
option) activities
complete in
30 years
RCSTS 80 20/60 21 _ 5 5/0 30 TWRS
activities
complete in
30 years
Source: (WHC 1995g)
For every job created at the Hanford Site, 1.2 jobs are created locally. For
every new hire from outside the region of influence, 1.3 persons would move
into the local region. The total employment multiplier is 2.2 and population
growth is 2.2 x 1.3, or 2.86. These multipliers are based on the
socioeconomic input/output analysis performed by Pacific Northwest
Laboratories (PNL) in 1987 and 1989 (DOE 1991). All operations personnel
would come from the existing workforce. For 185 temporary construction jobs
(i.e., new hires) created at the Hanford Site under the new storage
alternative, 407 new jobs would be created locally. Some of these jobs may be
filled from the workers available in the community as a result of DOE cutbacks
expected in 1995. New hires moving into the region of influence are not
expected to increase population above 1995 peak levels and would not have
significant socioeconomic impacts.
5.4.5.2 Income
- Construction for the new storage alternative would generate
construction income for the region of influence. It is expected this income
would impact beyond Benton and Franklin Counties, although a majority of the
income would flow into these two counties over a period of 2 years.
Construction costs associated with services, goods, and materials would
constitute the majority of the income generated to the region of influence.
Potential fabrication of project components outside the local area could
reduce the beneficial income impacts to the local area.
5.4.5.3 Population
- As discussed in Section 5.4.5.1, the population growth
multiplier has been determined to be 2.86. Therefore, assuming all 185 new
hires move into the community from outside the region of influence, a
population increase of 529 could occur. However, the actual increase is
expected to be less since jobs may be filled by the available workforce
resulting from general DOE cutbacks at the Hanford Site. The actual
population increase depends on the availability of qualified workers for the
new construction jobs. The maximum increase is approximately 10 percent of
the expected DOE cutbacks, and therefore, problems typically associated with
sudden population growth are not anticipated.
5.4.5.4 Housing
- The new storage alternative would not have a significant
impact on the housing market in the region of influence. The demand for
single-family units and rental units as well as other modes of housing is
expected to decline as a result of the DOE cutbacks at the Hanford Site.
Housing for new hires is expected to be readily available as former Hanford
Site employees leave the region of influence to pursue employment elsewhere.
No housing shortage or price increase is anticipated to result from this
alternative.
5.4.5.5 Local Infrastructure
- Due to the relatively small amount of
temporary employment, and therefore, population growth, the demand for public
education, police and fire protection, and medical service is not expected to
increase above 1995 peak levels. In light of DOE cutbacks, overburdening of
these community services would not result from this alternative.
5.4.5.6 Environmental Justice
- As discussed above, the primary
socioeconomic impact of the new storage alternative would be from temporary
construction workers hired for the project duration. However, this impact
would be offset by DOE workforce reductions. In addition, no health effects
to any off-site population are anticipated. Therefore, no disproportionate
impacts to low-income or minority populations would occur as a result of this
alternative. Appendix C provides a more detailed discussion of environmental
justice issues.
5.4.6 TRANSPORTATION
The following sections summarize the impacts to the Hanford Site
transportation system for the new storage alternative.
5.4.6.1 Vehicular Traffic and Circulation
- Potential transportation impacts
from this alternative would result from both NTF, retrieval system, and RCSTS
construction. While traffic impacts for constructing the RCSTS portion of
this alternative would be identical to the additional 60 daily trips described
in Section 5.1.6.1, there would be additional construction traffic associated
with the NTF. As a worst case condition, construction of the NTF and
retrieval system would simultaneously require up to 170 construction
personnel. Based on vehicle occupancy rates, an estimated 126 additional
vehicle trips would be generated. Construction of the NTF is estimated to
take 3 years. Because the amount of construction-generated vehicles would be
relatively small compared to the daily traffic on these roadways and because
the affected roadways are currently operating at acceptable service levels,
the incremental increase in traffic from the new storage alternative is not
expected to adversely affect roadway service levels.
Since the RCSTS would be located underground and operated remotely with
existing Hanford Site workforce (Trost, Epperson 1995), no increase in
vehicular traffic is expected to occur from its operation. Similarly, the
estimated 54-person operational workforce for the NTF and retrieval systems
would come from the existing Hanford Site workforce (Trost, Epperson 1995)
resulting in no increase in vehicular traffic. No significant impacts to
roadways are anticipated due to the operation of the new storage alternative.
5.4.6.2 Other Transportation Facilities
- As described in Section 5.1.6.2,
bus line service, vessel traffic, and rail service would not be adversely
affected by the new storage alternative. Based on the available capacity of
all transportation routes affected by the new storage alternative and the
expected infrequent use of these transport modes, adverse impacts to these
other transportation facilities are not expected.
5.4.7 LAND USE
The new storage alternative would not alter the current or foreseeable future
land use patterns or aesthetic and visual resources of the 200 East and West
and 600 Areas. Each of these topics are discussed in the following sections.
5.4.7.1 Land Use Patterns
- The new storage alternative would require the
commitment of approximately 50 ha (124 acres) of land for the RCSTS and NTF.
The area affected by the new storage alternative is currently used and
designated for waste storage and handling during the site cleanup mission.
The new storage alternative would be consistent with The Future for Hanford:
Uses and Cleanup (FSUWG 1992).
5.4.7.2 Aesthetic and Visual Resources
- To determine the impacts to
aesthetic and visual resources, a visual assessment was conducted, which
focused on the potential visibility of the new storage alternative from local
roads, population centers, and dispersed recreation use areas. Visual impact
assessment is based on the visual character of the NTF and the degree of
potential visibility to viewers in context with the local setting to determine
the degree of visual contrast or change resulting from the new storage
alternative.
Night lighting is common throughout the 200 West and East Areas; therefore, it
is assumed that additional lighting at the NTF would not be seen as a
significant change to night visibility. The assessment of the technical
options for the new storage alternative focuses on the apparent size and shape
of the facilities in relationship to existing structures. The proposed
facilities would not have reflective surfaces; therefore, glare from the
proposed NTF would not be an issue.
The most significant visual features of the NTF would be the support facility
building and stack. The support facility would be a two-story, 12,000-m2
(125,000-ft2) building. The stack on a site would be approximately 45-m (150-
ft) tall.
The NTF would not have prominent visual features as seen from public viewing
areas because of the distance from viewers which is no closer than
approximately 4 km (2.5 mi) and the developed conditions near both site
locations (see Figure 5-3). Of the two project areas, the proximity of the
200 West Area NTF location to State Highway 240 would make it more discernable
to the public. Visual impacts, if any, associated with the RCSTS pipeline
would be short-term and primarily concerned with increased visibility of
airborne dust during the construction period.
The existing character of the 200 East and West Areas is industrialized and
the addition of the NTF at either location would blend in with prior
development. This would result in an overall visual change that would not be
readily apparent, due to viewing distances and the lack of visual contrast
with the immediate surroundings.
5.4.8 CULTURAL RESOURCES
As discussed in Section 4.8, field surveys conducted over the 200 East and
West Areas, particularly in the vicinity of the optional sites for the NTF,
and the RCSTS corridor and its optional route segments, have not identified
archeological or historical sites of significance. In addition, no
archeological or religious sites of Native American concern have been
identified in the the proposed project area. As a consequence, construction
of the new storage alternative would not adversely affect cultural resources.
Cultural resource reviews have been performed for the areas identified for
revegetation. Two potential sites were located within the 530 ha (1,300 acre)
area identified for habitat restoration. Cultural sites located in this large
area would be avoided during mitigation activities by excluding workers from
the vicinity of these sites. Detailed avoidance measures for known sites will
be specified in the MAP. In the event a potential resource is discovered
during construction, work would immediately cease and a qualified
archaeologist and the affected tribes would be contacted to determine whether
the material is of archaeological interest or cultural significance. If
cultural materials are located, procedures outlined in the NHPA and the
Hanford Cultural Resources Management Plan would be followed. Prior to any
site disturbance, a detailed MAP will formalize field procedures which would
be utilized to prevent impacts to cultural resources should they be
encountered.
Figure (Page 5-100)
Figure 5-3. Project Visibility Analysis
5.4.9 ANTICIPATED HEALTH EFFECTS UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS
This section discusses the potential cause and magnitude of health effects
that are anticipated to occur under normal conditions as the result of
implementation of the new storage alternative. These health effects could
result from direct exposure to ionizing radiation or inhalation of toxic and
radioactive materials. The various types of health effects that could occur
and the relationship between exposure and health effects are discussed in
Appendix E. This section evaluates health effects in terms of LCFs for
radiation exposures and in terms of ICR and systemic toxic effects for
chemical exposures. The new storage alternative is described in Section 3.1.4
and briefly summarized here.
The new storage alternative consists of continued pumping of SST SWLs in the
200 West Area, construction of the NTF, construction of ITRS for Tank 101-SY,
construction of a retrieval system for Tank 102-SY, construction of the RCSTS,
retrieval and 1:1 dilution (diluent:waste) of the contents of Tank 101-SY, and
retrieval and 2:1 dilution of the sludge in Tank 102-SY. The NTF would be
used to store the diluted contents of Tank 101-SY and would be constructed
either in the 200 West Area or at one of two sites in the 200 East Area. If
the NTF is constructed in the 200 East Area, a diversion box would be added to
the RCSTS to connect the NTF. The sludge in Tank 102-SY would be retrieved
using either the ITRS or PPSS.
The ECSTS would be used for transfer of non-complexed SWL and West Area
facility waste until no usable lines remain or the RCSTS becomes operational.
The RCSTS would be used for transfer of the retrieved and diluted sludge from
Tank 102-SY and complexed SWL. If the NTF is constructed in the 200 East
Area, the RCSTS would also be used to transfer the retrieved and diluted
contents of Tank 101-SY.
Activities considered as normal conditions under the new storage alternative
would include:
. Facility Construction
. Facility Operation
. Facility Decontamination and Decommissioning.
Each of these activities is discussed relative to health effects in the
following sections.
5.4.9.1 Facility Construction
- Construction activities under the dilution
alternative would include:
. NTF Construction
. Retrieval System Construction
. RCSTS Construction.
Potential exposures of workers and members of the general public to direct
radiation, radioactive materials, and chemicals during construction activities
are discussed in the following list.
. NTF Construction - No exposures to radioactive materials, direct
radiation, or chemicals are anticipated during construction of the NTF.
Dust emissions would result from excavation, temporary spoil storage,
backfilling, and finish grading associated with the NTF in either the
200 East or West Areas, but would be reduced by wetting of disturbed
areas. Areas of surface and subsurface contamination are known to exist
within the 200 East and West Areas (WHC 1991b, PNL 1994a). Areas within
and around existing process pits and diversion boxes are also
contaminated. However, since all NTF construction and piping tie-ins
would be in uncontaminated areas in the 200 West and East Area sites, no
exposures are anticipated.
. Retrieval System Construction - Construction of the ITRS for Tank 101-SY
and construction of either an ITRS or PPSS for Tank 102-SY would be
expected to result in exposure of workers to direct radiation and to
airborne radioactive materials and chemicals.
Construction of one or more ITRSs in the SY Tank Farm would include
erection of an ICE building, construction of new pump and valve pits,
modification of existing pump and valve pits, and construction of tank
mixing, transfer, and cooling systems (WHC 1994b). Some construction
activities would be performed in contaminated areas. The potential for
such exposures would be greatest during installation of equipment and
instruments in and around the tanks and their process pits. Exposures
could also occur during excavation, grading, and construction in
potentially contaminated areas within the SY Tank Farm.
The Tank 101-SY ITRS would use the mitigation 150-hp mixer pump
currently installed in Tank 101-SY to mix waste for retrieval
operations. The estimated dose to workers from direct radiation during
construction of this ITRS is 170 person-rem (personal communication Van
Beek 1995). If it became necessary to remove the mitigation mixer pump
and install more powerful mixers pumps for retrieval of 101-SY, dose
would increase to 380 person-rem.
Construction dose estimates are not available for either an ITRS or PPSS
for Tank 102-SY; however, the estimated dose to construct an ITRS that
includes new mixer pumps for Tank 103-SY is 400 person-rem (personal
communication Van Beek 1995). Cesium, 137Cs, is the predominant gamma-
emitting nuclide in both Tanks 103-SY and 102-SY, and since Tank 103-SY
inventory of 137Cs is 40 times greater than Tank 102-SY, it is unlikely
that dose during construction of an ITRS for Tank 102-SY would exceed
400 person-rem. An EA has been prepared and a FONSI has been issued for
the PPSS for Tank 106-C (DOE 1995). Preparation of this tank for
sluicing requires installation and modification of equipment inside the
tank and in contaminated pits and, in this respect, is similar to the
ITRS. Although the EA does not provide a specific estimate of
construction dose, Tank 106-C is a high-heat Watchlist tank containing
HLW and construction doses are expected to be similar to or greater than
those for construction of a similar system for Tank 102-SY.
Based on this approach, retrieval system construction dose would be
expected to range from 170 person-rem for the planned ITRS for Tank 101-
SY to 780 person-rem for retrieval of both Tanks 101-SY and 102-SY.
Based on an occupational risk factor of 4 x 10-4 LCF/person-rem, from
0.07 to 0.3 LCFs would be expected among construction workers.
Radiation exposure during construction activities would be reduced by
decontamination of work areas, applying the ALARA principle in planning
work tasks, and implementing procedures specific to the task and
conditions encountered. Exposure to airborne contaminants would be
further reduced by using protective equipment, fixatives, and temporary
enclosures.
. RCSTS Construction - Construction of the RCSTS would involve excavation
and other earth-moving activities along the 10-km (6.2-mi) route and
work in and around contaminated areas such as existing piping, valve
pits, and diversion boxes. These activities and the resultant exposures
would be identical to those discussed in Section 5.1.9 for the preferred
alternative.
The total estimated dose from direct radiation during construction work
in these contaminated areas is 26.3 person-rem (Light 1994) and, based
on an occupational risk factor of 4 x 10-4 LCFs per person-rem, would be
expected to result in 0.01 LCFs. Exposure to direct radiation during
construction activities would be reduced by decontamination of work
areas, applying the ALARA principle in planning work tasks, and
implementing procedures specific to the task and conditions encountered.
Exposures to airborne radioactive material and chemicals would also be
possible during construction activities in contaminated areas.
Inhalation exposures could occur during excavations and grinding or
cutting of contaminated pipelines and concrete. Release of airborne
contaminants to the environment would be controlled using temporary
enclosures or, for large outdoor areas, using wetting or soil fixatives.
Other measures to control inhalation exposures would include
decontamination of work areas, use of protective equipment, and
implementation of procedures specific to the work.
5.4.9.2 Facility Operation
- Workers and members of the general public could
be exposed to direct radiation and airborne radiological and chemical
emissions during normal operations involving the SY Tank Farm, SWL pumping
activities, operation of the retrieval systems, and cross-site waste transfer
operations via both the ECSTS and RCSTS.
Workers and members of the general public could be exposed to the following
emissions during these activities:
. Direct Radiation
. Airborne Emissions of Radioactive Materials
. Airborne Emissions of Chemicals.
Estimated doses and resultant health effects for each of these exposures are
discussed in the following list.
. Direct Radiation - Workers performing routine operations, maintenance,
and surveillance would be exposed to direct radiation during mixer pump
operations, SWL pumping, waste retrieval operations, and associated
cross-site waste transfers. With the exception of retrieval and
possible cross-site transfer of Tank 101-SY in the place of continued
operation of the mitigation mixer pump, these activities are identical
to those discussed in Section 5.1.9 for the preferred alternative. Many
of these activities are similar to those now being performed by tank
farm workers.
Each of the new systems operated under the new storage alternative
incorporate many design features to minimize radiation exposure. These
features include use of modular, separable components to isolate and
minimize contamination; use of washable or strippable coatings to
minimize contamination; and minimization of the lengths of pipeline and
duct runs that would be subject to contamination. The retrieval
systems, ITRS or PPSS, would operate for approximately two weeks per
tank.
Based on these considerations, the annual individual dose of 14 mrem
currently received by tank farm workers (Light 1994) is considered
representative of the dose that would be received by workers involved in
the new storage alternative. Based on an occupational risk factor of
4 x 10-4 LCFs per person-rem, workers involved in operations under the
new storage alternative are not expected to incur any adverse health
effects as the result of exposure to direct radiation.
. Airborne Emissions of Radioactive Materials - Workers and members of the
general public could be exposed to airborne emissions of radioactive
materials as the result of implementation of the new storage
alternative. These emissions would be identical to those under the
preferred alternative, except that emissions from Tank 101-SY with its
mitigation mixer pump would be replaced by emissions from the brief
operation of the ITRS and subsequent emissions from the NTF.
Retrieval of Tank 101-SY would make use of the existing mitigation mixer
pump. Operation of the mixer pumps in Tanks 102-SY and 101-SY would
generate heat within the waste and could cause increased releases of
airborne radioactive material from the SY Tank Farm ventilation system
for the period of mixer pump use due to increased volatilization and
evaporation of the waste. Therefore, the ITRS design includes a cooling
system to control temperature during operation of the mixer pumps.
Airborne emissions of radionuclides would occur from the NTF following
retrieval and dilution of Tank 101-SY. The primary ventilation system
for the NTF would consist of a condenser, HEME, heater, HEMF, and two-
stage HEPA filter with a high-efficiency gas absorption (HEGA) between
the HEPA stages (DOE 1994b). Treated air would be discharged from a 46-
m (150-ft) tall, 1.8-m (6-ft) diameter stack. Doses for a nominal and
extreme case were evaluated in National Emission Standards for Hazardous
Air Pollutants Application for Approval to Construct Multi-Function
Waste Tank Facility (DOE 1994b) for a four-tank NTF in the 200 East Area
and a two-tank NTF in the 200 West Area. The nominal case assumes a
heat load of 32,000 watts [110,000 British Thermal Unit (BTU)/hr] for
both tanks. The extreme case assumes a heat load of 205,000 watts
(700,000 BTU/hr) for one tank and 32,000 watts (110,000 BTU/hr) for the
other tanks. Radionuclide emissions for the nominal and extreme cases
are shown in Table 5-28 for a two-tank NTF located in either the 200
East or 200 West Area.
Table 5-28
Radionuclide Emissions from the NTF
Emissions (Ci/yr)
Radionuclide
Nominal Case a Extreme Case b
3H 7.13 x 10-1 1.77 x 100
90Sr 7.93 x 10-8 5.96 x 10-7
90Y 7.77 x 10-8 5.83 x 10-7
106Ru NA 2.48 x 10-6
106Rh NA 2.46 x 10-6
113Sn NA 4.45 x 10-6
125Sb NA 2.21 x 10-5
129I 3.54 x 10-5 7.17 x 10-5
137Cs 2.27 x 10-9 1.51 x 10-8
137mBa 2.18 x 10-9 1.41 x 10-8
239Pu 1.92 x 10-11 3.70 x 10-11
Source: (DOE 1994b)
aNominal case assumes two tanks at 32,000 watts (110,000 BTU/hr) and a
discharge of 0.5 m3/s [1,000 standard cubic feet per minute (scfm)].
bExtreme case assumes one tank at 32,000 watts (110,000 BTU/hr), one
tank at 205,000 watts (700,000 BTU/hr), and a discharge of 0.5 m3/s (1,000
scfm).
The CAP88-PC computer program (DOE 1992d) was used to estimate
inhalation doses to the maximally exposed on-site and off-site
individuals and to the off-site population based on the NTF emissions
shown in Table 5-28. The results are shown in Table 5-29 based on the
current site boundary. Based on these extremely low doses, no adverse
health effects would be expected to result from operation of the NTF.
. Airborne Emissions of Chemicals - Workers and members of the general
public could be exposed to airborne emissions of chemicals as the result
of emissions of chemical under the new storage alternative. These
emissions would be identical to those under the preferred alternative,
except that emissions from Tank 101-SY with its mitigation mixer pump
would be replaced by emissions from the brief operation of the ITRS and
subsequent emissions from the NTF.
Table 5-29
Estimated Annual Inhalation Dose from Airborne Emissions from the NTF
200 East Area 200 West Area
Nominal Extreme Nominal Extreme
Maximally Exposed On- 2.5 x 10-5 6.1 x 10-5 2.5 x 10-5 6.1 x 10-5
site Individual (mrem)
Maximally Exposed Off- 1.6 x 10-5 3.5 x 10-5 1.3 x 10-5 2.7 x 10-5
site Individual (mrem)
Off-site Population 8.5 x 10-4 1.9 x 10-3 8.5 x 10-4 1.9 x 10-3
(person-rem)
The existing Tank 101-SY mitigation mixer pump would be used for
retrieval operations. Operation of the ITRS mixer pump would generate
heat within the waste and could cause increased releases of airborne
chemicals from the SY Tank Farm ventilation system for the period of
mixer pump use due to increased volatilization and evaporation of the
waste. The ITRS design includes a cooling system to control temperature
during operation of the mixer pumps. If necessary, HEGA filters may be
added to the ventilation system to provide additional control of VOCs.
Chemical emissions from the NTF have been estimated for nominal and
extreme cases (WHC 1994f). The nominal case assumes a heat load of
32,000 watts (110,000 BTU/hr) for both tanks. The extreme case assumes
a heat load of 205,000 watts (700,000 BTU/hr) for one tank and 32,000
watts (110,000 BTU/hr) for the other tank. Chemical emission estimates
from two tanks for the nominal and extreme cases are shown in Table 5-
30. Airborne concentrations of these chemicals at points within and
along the Hanford Site boundary are shown in Table 5-26.
Table 5-30
Chemical Emissions from the NTF
Emissions (g/s)
Chemical
Nominal Case a Extreme Case b
Acetone 2.2 x 10-3 2.3 x 10-3
Benzene NA 5.7 x 10-6
1-Butanol 1.4 x 10-2 1.4 x 10-2
Carbon Tetrachloride NA 4.3 x 10-8
2-Hexanone 5.8 x 10-5 1.7 x 10-4
4-Methyl-2-Pentanone 4.1 x 10-3 1.2 x 10-2
Kerosene 1.4 x 10-10 1.7 x 10-2
Tributyl Phosphate 1.4 x 10-10 4.1 x 10-10
Ammonia 3.4 x 10-6 4.9 x 10-6
Ag 2.8 x 10-15 2.8 x 10-15
As 1.8 x 10-13 1.8 x 10-13
Ba 9.1 x 10-16 9.1 x 10-16
Ca 6.1 x 10-15 6.1 x 10-15
Cu 1.4 x 10-15 1.4 x 10-15
Mg 1.2 x 10-15 1.2 x 10-15
Na 3.3 x 10-11 3.3 x 10-11
Pb 4.1 x 10-15 4.1 x 10-15
Sb 5.6 x 10-15 5.6 x 10-15
Se 3.6 x 10-15 3.6 x 10-15
AlO2 1.2 x 10-11 1.2 x 10-11
OH- 5.1 x 10-12 5.1 x 10-12
F- 9.8 x 10-13 9.8 x 10-13
Fe(OH)3 1.7 x 10-12 1.7 x 10-12
Cr(OH)3 4.6 x 10-13 4.6 x 10-13
Source: (WHC 1994f)
aNominal case assumes two tanks at 32,000 watts (110,000 BTU/hr) and a
discharge of 0.5 m3/s (1,000 scfm).
bExtreme case assumes one tank at 32,000 watts (110,000 BTU/hr), one
tank at 205,000 watts (700,000 BTU/hr), and a discharge of 0.5 m3/s (1,000
scfm).
NA = Not Applicable
Three of these chemicals are Class A toxins under Washington
Administration Code (WAC) 173-460-150: benzene, arsenic, and lead. The
anticipated airborne concentrations of these chemicals would be orders
of magnitude below applicable ASILs and no observable increase in cancer
fatalities would be expected. A number of chemicals in the NTF
emissions are Class B toxins and have the potential to cause adverse but
noncarcinogenic health effects. The 24-hour ASILs for these compounds
are set at levels at which no health effects would be expected based on
occupational exposures. As seen in Table 5-26, airborne concentrations
of these chemicals are all far below these threshold levels. This
finding is consistent with the data from personal monitors worn by
workers performing tasks in the SY Tank Farm.
5.4.9.3 Facility Decontamination and Decommissioning
- The ITRS, NTF, and
RCSTS are new facilities that would be constructed and would require
decontamination and decommissioning. Decontamination and decommissioning of
other facilities such as the existing DSTs, SSTs, and the ECSTS is not
considered in this EIS. Decontamination and decommissioning of TWRS
facilities would be addressed in detail in a future EIS.
The design of these new facilities incorporates the following features that
would simplify their decontamination and reduce the amount of material
required disposal as radioactive waste:
. Use of modular, separable components to isolate and minimize
contamination
. Use of washable or strippable coatings to minimize contamination
. Minimization of the lengths of pipeline and duct runs that would be
subject to contamination.
5.4.10 HEALTH EFFECTS UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS
This section discusses the human health effects that could occur as the result
of potential accidents during the implementation of the new storage
alternative. Initiating events, frequencies of occurrence, and quantities of
respirable hazardous materials released during a range of potential accidents
are discussed in detail in Appendix F. The types of health effects that can
occur and the relationship between exposure and health effects are discussed
in Appendix E. This section evaluates health effects in terms of LCFs for
radiation exposures. Health effects for exposures to chemicals during
accidents that involve exposure to both radioactive and toxic materials are
not specifically evaluated. A previous analysis (WHC 1994c) concluded that
radiological releases are limiting in these cases provided the release
duration is more than 2 minutes and 40 seconds. The minimum release duration
of combined radiological and chemical releases evaluated under the new storage
alternative is 2 hours.
The accidents considered in Appendix F include scenarios both within and
beyond the design bases of the facilities comprising the new storage
alternative. Terms used to categorize accidents and the corresponding
frequency ranges are summarized in Table 5-3. Based on frequencies of
occurrence and quantities of hazardous materials released, a subset of these
accidents was selected for evaluation of reasonably foreseeable health
effects.
The actions proposed under the new storage alternative involve the use of the
following systems:
. Existing Cross-Site Transfer System
. New Tanks Facility
. Replacement Cross-Site Transfer System
. Initial Tank Retrieval System
. Past-Practices Sluicing System.
The types and quantities of waste that would be handled by each system are
summarized in Table 5-31. Detailed characterizations of the wastes listed in
Table 5-31 are provided in Appendix E. Accidents that could occur in each of
these systems are discussed in the following sections. To bound the
probability of accidents under the new storage alternative, it is assumed that
all wastes shown in Table 5-31 requiring cross-site transfer are transferred
using the RCSTS.
Table 5-31
Volumes of Tank Waste Transferred Under the New Storage Alternative
NTF in 200 West NTF in 200 East
Waste Typea
Volume Systems Volume Systems
(kgal)b Used (kgal)b Used
Salt Well Liquid
Complexed 575 RCSTS 575 RCSTS
Uncharacterized 1,221 1,221
Non-Complexed 2,426 ECSTS 2,426 ECSTS
RCSTS RCSTS
Salt Well Total 4,222 4,222
West Area Facility 469 ECSTS 469 ECSTS
Waste RCSTS RCSTS
101-SY Slurry (1:1) 2,198 ITRS 2,198 ITRS
NTF NTF
RCSTS
102-SY Slurry (0:1) 325 ITRS or 325 ITRS or
PPSS PPSS
RCSTS RCSTS
Grand Total 7,214 7,214
Source: Salt Well Volumes (WHC 1995a)
Salt Well Pumping Schedule (WHC 1994b)
102-SY Slurry (WHC 1995c)
aTanks BX-111, T-111, and C-106 are excluded.
b1 kgal = 3,780 L
5.4.10.1 Existing Cross-Site Transfer System
- Transfer pipe breaks and spray
releases could occur during operation of the ECSTS under the new storage
alternative and result in release of tank waste to the soil column and to the
atmosphere. The ability of the ECSTS to handle slurry waste is currently
unknown and, as indicated in Table 5-31, it is assumed that only non-complexed
SWL and WAFW could be transferred using the ECSTS. These transfers would be
made until the ECSTS fails or the RCSTS is available.
5.4.10.2 New Tanks Facility
- The NTF would be constructed either at a site
in the southeast area of the 200 West Area (Figure 3-18) or at "Site E" or
"Site D" in the 200 East Area (Figure 3-19). A relatively large number of
accident scenarios have been evaluated for the NTF (WHC 1994a, WHC 1994g), and
are summarized in Appendix F, Section F.1.3. Based on the frequency of
occurrence and the quantities of respirable materials released (see Table F-
3), the following accident scenarios were selected to represent the range of
adverse health effects that could be associated with the NTF:
. Pressurized Spray Leaks
. Beyond Design Basis Tank Leak
During the interim period, the NTF would contain the diluted contents of Tank
101-SY. A dilution ratio of 1:1 (diluent:waste) is assumed. To bound health
effects associated with potential future use of the NTF, accident consequences
are also evaluated using BSW at a 1:1 dilution.
. Pressurized Spray Leaks - Pressurized spray leaks could occur in NTF
transfer pits and valve pits. As with most spray leaks involving tank
waste, consequences can be severe if the spray is not confined within
the pit. Spray leaks could also occur in NTF transfer piping outside of
pits. The unmitigated case considered here has the most severe
consequences of a group of unmitigated spray leaks involving both pits
and transfer piping (WHC 1994a, WHC 1994g). This accident involves a
spray release from a defective leak detection riser flange on a transfer
pipeline. A sequence of seven events must occur to pressurize the
flange and the flange must be defective for the release to occur. The
probability that this would occur is estimated to range from extremely
unlikely to not reasonably foreseeable. The basis for this large range
of probabilities is discussed in Appendix F, Section F.1.3.2.
The health effects that could result from an unmitigated pressured spray
release in the NTF are shown in Table 5-32. As indicated by the results
for 101-SY diluted waste, no adverse health effects would be expected
should this accident occur during the interim period. These health
effects are based on a risk factor of 4 x 10-4 LCF/person-rem for
workers and 5 x 10-4 LCF/person-rem for the general population. No
maximally exposed individual would experience more than a 3 in 100
chance of developing a fatal cancer as the result of the accident (0.03
ICR) and no more than 0.6 LCFs would be expected in a maximally exposed
population. If the accident involved BSW, 300 LCFs would be expected in
Table 5-32
Estimated Health Effects from a NTF Unmitigated Spray Releases
under the New Storage Alternative
Release Location NTF 200 West 200 East "E" 200 East "D"
Waste 101-SY 101-SY 101-SY
Dilution (diluent:waste) 1:1 1:1 1:1
Probability Incredible to Not Reasonable Foreseeable
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 1.3 1.3 1.3
ICR 5 x 10-4 5 x 10-4 5 x 10-4
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 69 69 69
ICR 0.03 0.03 0.03
Collective Dose (person-rem) 320 660 930
LCF 0.1 0.3 0.4
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 0.06 0.074 0.078
ICR 3 x 10-5 4 x 10-5 4 x 10-5
Collective Dose (person-rem) 1,200 1,200 1,200
LCF 0.6 0.6 0.6
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 0.22 0.091 0.095
ICR 1 x 10-4 5 x 10-5 5 x 10-5
Release Location 200 West 200 East "E" 200 East "D"
Waste BSW BSW BSW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 1:1 1:1 1:1
Probability Not Applicable
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 730 730 730
ICR 0.3 0.3 0.3
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 38,000 38,000 38,000
ICR 20 20 20
Collective Dose (person-rem) 1.8 x 105 3.7 x 105 5.1 x 105
LCF 70 100 200
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 33 41 43
ICR 0.02 0.02 0.02
Collective Dose (person-rem) 6.8 x 105 6.8 x 105 6.8 x 105
LCF 300 300 300
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 120 50 52
ICR 0.06 0.02 0.03
the general population and acute radiation effects, possibly including
death, would be expected for workers. This spray release would not be
possible if leak detection risers were eliminated (WHC 1995e).
Spray leaks inside NTF process and valve pits would be anticipated to
unlikely events but their consequences are readily mitigated by ensuring
that cover blocks are in place. The probability that such a spray leak
would result in the release of waste to the atmosphere is unlikely to
extremely unlikely for the NTF. As indicated in Table 5-33, no adverse
health effects would be expected for a mitigated NTF spray release for
either Tank 101-SY waste or BSW at a 1:1 dilution.
. Beyond Design Basis Tank Leak - The beyond design basis tank leak
accident scenario is initiated by an earthquake and uses very
conservative assumptions regarding the amount of waste in the below-
ground tank that would reach the surface. The probability of this
accident ranges from extremely unlikely to not reasonably foreseeable
(WHC 1994g). No adverse health effects would be expected based on the
diluted Tank 101-SY waste inventory as shown on Table 5-34. Adverse
health effects may occur in the case of the diluted BSW. With BSW, the
maximally exposed uninvolved worker would incur an ICR of 0.1 (1 chance
in 10) and a single LCF would be expected among the maximum uninvolved
worker population. Up to 4 LCFs could occur in the maximally exposed
off-site population.
5.4.10.3 Replacement Cross-Site Transfer System
- Transfer pipe breaks and
spray leaks could occur during the operation of the RCSTS under the new
storage alternative. In cases where the same wastes would be transferred,
accident probabilities and health effects are the same as those for the
preferred alternative.
If the NTF is constructed in the 200 West Area under the new storage
alternative, then only one RCSTS diversion box would be constructed and the
diluted contents of Tank 101-SY would not be transferred. Accordingly,
accident probabilities and health effects would be identical to those for the
preferred alternative (see Section 5.1.10.2 and Tables 5-5 through 5-11).
Table 5-33
Estimated Health Effects from a NTF Mitigated Spray Releases
under the New Storage Alternative
Release Location 200 West 200 East "E" 200 East "D"
Waste 101-SY 101-SY 101-SY
Dilution (diluent:waste) 1:1 1:1 1:1
Probability Unlikely to Extremely Unlikely
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 1.6 x 10-6 1.6 x 10-6 1.6 x 10-6
ICR < 10-7 < 10-7 < 10-7
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 3.3 x 10-4 3.3 x 10-4 3.3 x 10-4
ICR 1 x 10-7 1 x 10-7 1 x 10-7
Collective Dose (person-rem) 0.0016 0.0032 0.0045
LCF 6 X 10-7 1 x 10-6 2 x 10-6
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 5.7 x 10-7 7.2 x 10-7 7.6 x 10-7
ICR < 10-7 < 10-7 < 10-7
Collective Dose (person-rem) 0.011 0.011 0.011
LCF 5 X 10-6 5 X 10-6 5 X 10-6
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 2.3 x 10-6 8.8 x 10-7 9.3 x 10-7
ICR < 10-7 < 10-7 < 10-7
Release Location 200 West 200 East "E" 200 East "D"
Waste BSW BSW BSW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 1:1 1:1 1:1
Probability Not Applicable
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 9.0 x 10-4 9.0 x 10-4 9.0 x 10-4
ICR 4 x 10-7 4 x 10-7 4 x 10-7
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.18 0.18 0.18
ICR 7 x 10-5 7 x 10-5 7 x 10-5
Collective Dose (person-rem) 0.87 1.8 2.5
LCF 3 x 10-4 7 x 10-4 0.001
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 3.2 x 10-4 3.9 x 10-4 4.2 x 10-4
ICR 2 x 10-7 2 x 10-7 2 x 10-7
Collective Dose (person-rem) 6.0 6.0 6.0
LCF 0.003 0.003 0.003
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 0.0013 4.9 x 10-4 5.1 x 10-4
ICR 6 x 10-7 2 x 10-7 3 x 10-7
Table 5-34
Estimated Health Effects from a NTF Beyond Design Basis Tank Leak
under the New Storage Alternative
Release Location 200 West 200 East "E" 200 East "D"
Waste 101-SY 101-SY 101-SY
Dilution (diluent:waste) 1:1 1:1 1:1
Probability Extremely Unlikely to Not Reasonably
Foreseeable
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.030 0.030 0.030
ICR 1 x 10-5 1 x 10-5 1 x 10-5
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.43 0.43 0.43
ICR 2 x 10-4 2 x 10-4 2 x 10-4
Collective Dose (person-rem) 2.4 4.5 6.5
LCF 9 X 10-4 0.002 0.003
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 6.1 x 10-4 7.5 x 10-4 7.9 x 10-4
ICR 3 x 10-7 4 x 10-7 4 x 10-7
Collective Dose (person-rem) 14 14 14
LCF 0.007 0.007 0.007
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 0.0022 9.2 x 10-4 9.6 x 10-4
ICR 1 X 10-6 5 x 10-7 5 x 10-7
Release Location 200 West 200 East "E" 200 East "D"
Waste BSW BSW BSW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 1:1 1:1 1:1
Probability Not Applicable
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 16 16 16
ICR 0.007 0.007 0.007
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 240 240 240
ICR 0.1 0.1 0.1
Collective Dose (person-rem) 1,300 2,500 3,600
LCF 0.5 1 1
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 0.34 0.41 0.43
ICR 2 x 10-4 2 x 10-4 2 x 10-4
Collective Dose (person-rem) 7,400 7,400 7,400
LCF 4 4 4
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 1.2 0.51 0.53
ICR 6 x 10-4 3 x 10-4 3 x 10-4
If the NTF is constructed in the 200 East Area under the new storage
alternative, a second RCSTS diversion box would be constructed to service the
NTF and the diluted contents of Tank 101-SY would be transferred using the
RCSTS. The addition of diluted contents of Tank 101-SY to the wastes
transferred using the RCSTS would result in a slight increase in the
probability of releases from RCSTS transfer pipe breaks under the new storage
alternative. The addition of this waste and of a second RCSTS diversion box
would slightly more than double the total probability of an RCSTS spray
release but only slightly increase the probability at a given diversion box.
In terms of the accident frequency description and categories summarized in
Table 5-3, the probabilities of RCSTS accidents would be the same whether the
NTF is constructed in the 200 East or 200 West Areas.
. Transfer Pipe Breaks - Transfer pipe break accident scenarios for the
new storage alternative are identical to those for the preferred
alternative. The maximum leak volume released to the environment under
both alternatives would occur when the break is at the 244-A Lift
Station in the 200 East Area. The break could be initiated by an
excavation or a beyond design basis earthquake. The total probability
that an unmitigated RCSTS pipe leak would occur under the new storage
alternative is incredible: 1.8 x 10-7 if the NTF is in the 200 West Area
and 2.6 x 10-7 if the NTF is in the 200 East Area.
Accident probabilities and health effects for each type of waste are
shown in Table 5-35. Based on risk factors of 4 x 10-4 LCF/person-rem
for workers and 5 x 10-4 LCF/person-rem for the general public, no
adverse health effects would be expected. If the accident involved BSW,
no adverse health effects would be expected for the maximally exposed
involved and uninvolved workers but 2 LCFs would be expected in both the
maximally exposed uninvolved worker population and maximally exposed
general population.
Table 5-35
Estimated Health Effects from a RCSTS Unmitigated Transfer Pipe Break
under the New Storage Alternative
Release Location 244-A Lift Station (200 East Area)
Waste 101-SY SWL 102-SY/ BSW
WAFW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 1:1 0:1 0:1 1:1
Probability Not Incredible Not Not
Reasonably Reasonably Applicable
Foreseeable Foreseeable
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.020 0.068 3.0 11
ICR 8 x 10-6 3 x 10-5 0.001 4 x 10-3
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.29 1.0 43 160
ICR 1 x 10-4 4 x 10-4 0.02 0.06
Collective Dose (person-rem) 7.8 27 1200 4,300
LCF 0.003 0.01 0.5 2
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 5.9 x 10-4 0.0021 0.088 0.33
ICR 3 x 10-7 1 x 10-6 4 x 10-5 2 x 10-4
Collective Dose (person-rem) 9.0 31 1,300 5,000
LCF 0.004 0.02 0.7 2
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 7.3 x 10-4 0.0025 0.11 0.40
ICR 4 x 10-7 1 x 10-6 5 x 10-5 2 x 10-4
. Pressurized Spray Leaks - Pressurized spray leak accident scenarios for
the new storage alternative are identical to those for the preferred
alternative. As discussed in Section 5.1.10.2, an unmitigated RCSTS
spray is not reasonably foreseeable during the interim period.
The probability of a mitigated RCSTS spray release is anticipated: 2.5 x
10-2 if the NTF is in the 200 West Area and 6.1 x 10-2 if the NTF is in
the 200 East Area. The latter probability includes accidents at both
Diversion Box 1 and Diversion Box 2.
The probability of mitigated RCSTS transfer pipe leaks under the new
storage alternative is extremely unlikely: 3.5 x 10-6 if the NTF is in
the 200 West Area and 5.0 x 10-6 if the NTF is in the 200 East Area.
Accident probabilities and health effects for each type of waste are
shown in Table 5-36. No adverse health effects would be expected for
any interim waste or for BSW.
Table 5-36
Estimated Health Effects from a RCSTS Mitigated Transfer Pipe Break
under the New Storage Alternative
Release Location 244-A Lift Station (200 East Area)
Waste 101-SY SWL 102-SY/ BSW
WAFW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 1:1 0:1 0:1 1:1
Probability Extremely Extremely Incredible Not
Unlikely Unlikely Applicable
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.0068 0.024 1.0 3.8
ICR 3 x 10-6 9 x 10-6 4 x 10-4 0.001
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.099 0.34 15 55
ICR 4 x 10-5 1 x 10-4 0.006 0.02
Collective Dose (person-rem) 2.7 9.4 400 1,500
LCF 0.001 0.004 0.2 0.6
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 2.1 x 10- 7.1 x 10-4 0.031 0.11
ICR 4 4 x 10-7 2 x 10-5 6 x 10-5
1 x 10-7
Collective Dose (person-rem) 3.1 11 460 1,700
LCF 0.002 0.005 0.2 0.9
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 2.5 x 10- 8.7 x 10-4 0.038 0.14
ICR 4 4 x 10-7 2 x 10-5 7 x 10-5
1 x 10-7
Accident probabilities and health effects for mitigated RCSTS spray
releases from Diversion Box 1 and Diversion Box 2 are shown in Table
5-37 for each type waste. Based on risk factors of 4 x 10-4 LCF/person-
rem for workers and 5 x 10-4 LCF/person-rem for the general public, no
adverse health effects would be expected for any interim waste or BSW
for mitigated RCSTS spray releases from either diversion box.
Table 5-37
Estimated Health Effects from a RCSTS Mitigated Spray Release
under the New Storage Alternative
Release Location Diversion Box 1 (200 West Area)
Waste 101-SY SWL 102-SY/WAFW BSW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 1:1 0:1 0:1 1:1
Probability Anticipated Anticipated Unlikely Not
Applicable
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 1.5 x 10-5 5.5 x 10-5 0.0024 0.0087
ICR < 10-7 < 10-7 9 x 10-7 3 x 10-6
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 8.2 x 10-4 0.0029 0.12 0.45
ICR 3 x 10-7 1 x 10-6 5 x 10-5 2 x 10-4
Collective Dose (person-rem) 0.0039 0.014 0.58 2.1
LCF 2 x 10-6 5 x 10-6 2 x 10-4 9 x 10-4
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 7.1 x 10-7 2.5 x 10-6 1.1 x 10-4 3.9 x 10-4
ICR < 10-7 < 10-7 < 10-7 2 x 10-7
Collective Dose (person-rem) 0.015 0.051 2.2 8.1
LCF 7 x 10-6 3 x 10-5 0.001 0.004
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 2.7 x 10-6 9.3 x 10-6 4.0 x 10-4 0.0015
ICR < 10-7 < 10-7 2 x 10-7 7 x 10-7
Release Location Diversion Box 2 (200 East Area)
Waste 101-SY SWL 102-SY/WAFW BSW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 1:1 0:1 0:1 1:1
Probability Anticipated Anticipated Unlikely Not
Applicable
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 1.6 x 10-5 5.5 x 10-5 0.0024 0.0087
ICR < 10-7 < 10-7 9 x 10-7 3 x 10-6
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 8.2 x 10-4 0.0029 0.12 0.45
ICR 3 x 10-7 1 x 10-6 5 x 10-5 2 x 10-4
Collective Dose (person-rem) 0.011 0.039 1.7 6.2
LCF 4 x 10-6 2 x 10-5 7 x 10-4 0.002
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 9.4 x 10-7 3.3 x 10-6 1.4 x 10-4 5.2 x 10-4
ICR < 10-7 < 10-7 < 10-7 3 x 10-7
Collective Dose (person-rem) 0.015 0.051 2.2 8.1
LCF 7 x 10-6 3 x 10-5 0.001 0.004
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 1.1 x 10-6 4.0 x 10-6 1.7 x 10-4 6.3 x 10-4
ICR < 10-7 < 10-7 < 10-7 3 x 10-7
5.4.10.4 Initial Tank Retrieval System
- Transfer pipe breaks and spray leaks
could occur during the operation of the ITRS under the new storage
alternative. The ITRS would be used to retrieve and dilute the contents of
Tank 101-SY and may also be used to retrieve and dilute the sludge in Tank
102-SY. A 1:1 dilution (diluent:waste) is anticipated for Tank 101-SY where
mitigation of episodic gas releases is an issue. A minimum dilution of 2:1
(diluent:sludge) is required for Tank 102-SY sludge. Since the ITRS is
designed to provide in-line dilution, undiluted waste would be present in the
system during the earlier stages of retrieval. To bound health effects,
accident consequences are based on radionuclide concentrations in undiluted
waste.
The ITRS accident scenarios under the new storage alternative are identical to
those discussed in Section 5.1.10.3 for the preferred alternative. ITRS
accident probabilities are expected to be approximately the same for retrieval
of Tanks 101-SY and 102-SY. Health effects for unmitigated and mitigated ITRS
transfer pipe leaks are shown in Table 5-38 and 5-39 respectively. Health
effects for retrieval of Tank 102-SY and BSW are identical to those for the
preferred alternative. Health effects for ITRS transfer pipe leaks during
retrieval of Tank 101-SY are only a few percent of those for retrieval of Tank
102-SY.
Health effects for unmitigated and mitigated ITRS spray releases are shown in
Tables 5-40 and 5-41, respectively. Adverse health effects would be expected
for unmitigated ITRS spray releases during retrieval of both Tanks 102-SY and
101-SY as well as during retrieval of BSW. Unmitigated spray releases during
retrieval of Tank 102-SY would be expected to cause deaths among exposed
workers due to acute radiation effects. In addition, 200 LCFs would be
expected in the maximally exposed worker population and 700 LCFs expected in
the maximally exposed off-site population. Health effects for accidents
involving Tank 101-SY slurry would be a few percent of those involving Tank
102-SY slurry; however, latent cancer fatalities would still be expected in
uninvolved worker and off-site populations. Health effects of unmitigated
ITRS spray releases involving BSW would be approximately ten times greater
than those for 102-SY slurry. The probability of an ITRS unmitigated spray
release is considered to be extremely unlikely to incredible. No adverse
health effects would be expected for a mitigated ITRS spray release.
Table 5-38
Estimated Health Effects from ITRS Unmitigated Pipe Breaks
under the New Storage Alternative
Release Location SY Tank Farm
Waste 101-SY 102-SY BSW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 0:1 0:1 0:1
Probability Incredible Incredible Not Applicable
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.034 2.6 19
ICR 1 x 10-5 0.001 0.008
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.50 37 280
ICR 2 x 10-4 0.01 0.1
Collective Dose (person-rem) 3.3 250 1,800
LCF 0.001 0.1 0.7
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 6.0 x 10-4 0.045 0.33
ICR 3 x 10-7 2 x 10-5 2 x 10-4
Collective Dose (person-rem) 13 980 7,200
LCF 0.007 0.5 4
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 0.0018 0.14 1.0
ICR 9 x 10-7 7 x 10-5 5 x 10-4
Table 5-39
Estimated Health Effects from ITRS Mitigated Pipe Breaks
under the New Storage Alternative
Release Location SY Tank Farm
Waste 101-SY 102-SY BSW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 0:1 0:1 0:1
Probability Anticipated Unlikely Not Applicable
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.0086 0.63 4.8
ICR 3 x 10-6 3 x 10-4 0.002
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.13 9.4 69
ICR 5 x 10-5 0.004 0.03
Collective Dose (person-rem) 0.83 62 460
LCF 3 x 10-4 0.02 0.2
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 1.5 x 10-4 0.011 0.083
ICR < 10-7 6 x 10-6 4 x 10-5
Collective Dose (person-rem) 3.3 250 1,800
LCF 0.002 0.1 0.9
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 4.6 x 10-4 0.034 0.25
ICR 2 x 10-7 2 x 10-5 1 x 10-4
Table 5-40
Estimated Health Effects from an ITRS Unmitigated Spray Release
under the New Storage Alternative
Release Location SY Tank Farm
Waste 101-SY 102-SY BSW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 0:1 0:1 0:1
Probability Extremely Unlikely to Not Applicable
Incredible
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 19 1,400 11,000
ICR 0.008 0.6 4
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 1,000 74,000 5.5 x 105
ICR 0.4 30 200
Collective Dose (person-rem) 5,700 4.3 x 105 3.2 x 106
LCF 2 200 1,000
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 0.91 68 500
ICR 5 x 10-4 0.03 0.3
Collective Dose (person-rem) 18,000 1.3 x 106 9.8 x 106
LCF 9 700 5,000
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 3.0 220 1,600
ICR 0.001 0.1 0.8
Table 5-41
Estimated Health Effects from an ITRS Mitigated Spray Release
under the New Storage Alternative
Release Location SY Tank Farm
Waste 101-SY 102-SY BSW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 0:1 0:1 0:1
Probability Anticipated to Unlikely Not Applicable
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 1.4 x 10-6 1 x 10-4 7.7 x 10-4
ICR < 10-7 < 10-7 3 x 10-7
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 7.2 x 10-5 0.0054 0.040
ICR < 10-7 2 x 10-6 2 x 10-5
Collective Dose (person-rem) 4.2 x 10-4 0.031 0.23
LCF 2 x 10-7 1 x 10-5 9 x 10-5
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 6.6 x 10-8 4.9 x 10-6 3.7 x 10-5
ICR < 10-7 < 10-7 < 10-7
Collective Dose (person-rem) 0.0013 0.096 0.71
LCF 6 x 10-7 5 x 10-5 4 x 10-4
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 2.2 x 10-7 1.6 x 10-5 1.2 x 10-4
ICR < 10-7 < 10-7 < 10-7
5.4.10.5 Past-Practices Sluicing System
- The PPSS could be used instead of
the ITRS for retrieval of Tank 102-SY. Accident scenarios, probabilities, and
health effects for the transfer pipe breaks and spray leaks that could occur
during retrieval would be identical to those for this activity under the
preferred alternative (see Section 5.1.10.3 and Tables 5-10 and 5-11).
5.4.11 POTENTIAL MITIGATION MEASURES
This section discusses the potential mitigation measures for the new storage
alternative relevant to fugitive dust and removal of vegetation.
Fugitive dust emissions during construction would be mitigated by watering of
exposed areas and stabilizing spoils piles by use of vegetation or soil
fixative.
Construction of the new storage alternative would remove vegetation from the
tank sites and associated facility maintenance areas. In addition,
construction staging, laydown, and spoils stockpiling areas would require the
removal of vegetation and would disturb soil, but these areas would be
available for revegetation after completion of construction. The areas
disturbed for construction of the RCSTS would be revegetated after
construction, except for the parts requiring access for monitoring and
maintenance. All these land areas would have long-term changes in vegetation
cover. See Appendix D for details of the revegetation and mitigation plan.
5.5 ANTICIPATED IMPACTS OF THE NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE
The no action alternative consists of continued interim stabilization of SSTs
by salt well pumping. SWL in SSTs in the 200 West Area, residual free liquid
supernatant from Tank 102-SY and WAFW would be transferred to the 200 East
Area through the ECSTS. Flammable gas mitigation for Tank 101-SY would be
accomplished by continued operation of the mitigation mixer pump. No waste
would be transferred from Tank 101-SY.
5.5.1 GEOLOGY, SEISMOLOGY, AND SOILS
No impact on geological resources or soils would be expected from the no
action alternative. Because the facilities already exist, there would be no
need for site modification.
5.5.2 WATER RESOURCES AND HYDROLOGY
No new contaminants are expected to be released to the surface or groundwaters
by the no action alternative. The potential for accidental releases is
discussed in Section 5.5.10. Even in the unlikely event of a transfer line
break in the ECSTS, groundwater resources would be protected by the thick
vadoze zone in this area and the tendency for many radionuclides to be
retained in the soils. Present waste streams discussed in Section 4.2 which
influence the surface and ground-water regimes would remain unchanged. No new
impacts would result.
5.5.3 PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT
The impacts from operations of SSTs and Tank 101-SY have been evaluated in
terms of the following elements of the environment:
. Air Quality
. Radiation
. Sound Levels and Noise.
5.5.3.1 Air Quality
- Emissions from Tank 101-SY are released from stack
296-P-23. Emissions from Tank 102-SY are also included in this stack. This
stack and 127 other emission sources, inclusive of the subject SSTs, are
registered with the Washington Department of Health. The monitoring program
for stack 296-P-23 is compliant with the requirements of 40 CFR 61, National
Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, and records the radionuclide
emissions as total alpha and total beta and would be less than 0.1 mrem/yr to
the maximally exposed individual if all control devices were removed. As
described in Section 5.5.9, chemical emissions from normal operations of SSTs
do not exceed regulatory standards. Public exposures resulting from these
releases are below all applicable limits (DOE 1992c). A discussion of
releases from Tank 101-SY under the no action alternative is provided under
Section 5.5.9.
5.5.3.2 Radiation
- Airborne emissions of radioactive materials from normal
operation of facilities proposed under the no action alternative would not
result in any measurable increase in radioactivity in off-site environmental
media. Environmental media include air, water, soil, vegetation, and animals.
Emissions from all 177 existing tanks are already a minor contribution to
overall site emissions (DOE 1992c) and levels of radioactivity in the Hanford
Site environs has decreased since production activities ceased (PNL 1993).
5.5.3.3 Sound Levels and Noise
- No change in existing sound levels and noise
would result from the no action alternative.
5.5.4 BIOLOGICAL AND ECOLOGICAL RESOURCES
The no action alternative would not involve new construction or modification
of the environment. Hence, there would be no new biological or ecological
impacts.
5.5.5 POPULATION AND SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS
No additional workers would be required to implement the no action
alternative. Since all workers required to continue existing operations are
already employed at the Hanford Site and incorporated into the local and
regional economy, there would be no incremental increase in regional
employment, income, or population growth as a result.
5.5.6 TRANSPORTATION
The no action alternative would not result in any adverse impacts to the
existing Hanford Site road and railway transportation systems. Since no new
construction or operational personnel would be required to operate the
existing mixer pump and ECSTS, no additional construction or operational
vehicles would be generated.
5.5.7 LAND USE
Under the no action alternative there would be no changes in land use in the
200 East and West Areas. These areas would continue to be used for waste
management activities and facilities. As a result, the no action alternative
would be compatible with existing and planned land uses.
There would be no visual impacts with the no action alternative. All existing
buildings and facilities are part of the existing environment and the visual
landscape.
5.5.8 CULTURAL RESOURCES
Cultural resources would be unaffected by the no action alternative.
5.5.9 ANTICIPATED HEALTH EFFECTS UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS
This section discusses the potential cause and magnitude of health effects
that are anticipated to occur under normal conditions as the result of
implementation of the no action alternative. These health effects may be the
result of direct exposure to ionizing radiation or inhalation of toxic and
radioactive materials. The various types of health effects that could occur
and the relationship between exposure and health effects are discussed in
Appendix E. This section evaluates health effects in terms of LCFs for
radiation exposures and in terms of ICR and systemic toxic effects for
chemical exposures. The no action alternative is described in Section 3.1.5
and briefly summarized here.
The no action alternative consists of the continued operation of the Tank
101-SY mixer pump, continued pumping of SWL in the 200 West Area, and
continued management of WAFW. The ECSTS would be used for cross-site transfer
of these wastes to the 200 East Area. This would require mixing of the TRU
sludge in Tank 102-SY with complexed SWL and could result in the dissolution
of the sludge. The impacts of the dissolution of this sludge have not been
determined beyond the fact that creation of additional TRU waste in the tank
farms would be inconsistent with DOE Order 5820.2A which provides for
minimizing the production of TRU waste. The ECSTS is near the end of its
design life. Of the six pipelines in the ECSTS, only one is currently usable.
One line remains to be pressure tested. The remaining four lines are believed
to be plugged. Considering its age and condition, the failure of the ECSTS
prior the end of the interim period is a distinct possibility.
Activities considered as normal conditions under the no action alternative
would include:
. Facility Construction
. Facility Operations
. Facility Decontamination and Decommissioning.
Each of these activities relevant to health effects is discussed in the
following sections.
5.5.9.1 Facility Construction
- There would be no construction activity under
the no action alternative.
5.5.9.2 Facility Operations
- Facility operations under the no action
alternative would include operation of the Tank 101-SY jet mixer pump, salt
well pumping activities, and cross-site transfer operations via the ECSTS.
These activities involve sampling and monitoring of waste and ventilation
systems, inspection and surveillance, and maintenance of equipment and
facilities.
Workers and members of the general public could be exposed to the following
emissions during these activities:
. Direct Radiation
. Airborne Emissions of Radioactive Material
. Airborne Emissions of Chemicals.
Estimated doses and resultant health effects for each of these exposures are
discussed in the following list.
. Direct Radiation - Workers performing routine operations, maintenance,
and surveillance would be exposed to direct radiation during mixer pump
operations, SWL pumping, and associated cross-site waste transfers.
These activities are essentially the same as those now performed by tank
farm workers.
Worker exposure records prior to construction of DSTs indicate that tank
farm workers had received an average annual dose of 630 mrem from direct
radiation exposure (DOE 1980). The DSTs are now the main focus of tank
farm operations and include many design features such as improved
shielding and remotely-operated and remotely-monitored systems. An
examination of more recent radiation exposure records of tank farm
workers indicates that the average annual individual dose has dropped to
14 mrem (DOE 1992b). Activities performed by these workers include SWL
pumping and inter-farm transfers.
Use of the ECSTS is not reflected in the more recent exposure records
and may result in a small increase in tank farm worker exposure. The
system is near the end of its design life and is expected to require
frequent inspection and maintenance. These activities would require
increased entry to contaminated areas. Considering the very low
existing exposure levels, no adverse health effects would be expected
from direct radiation exposure under the no action alternative.
. Airborne Emissions of Radioactive Material - Workers and members of the
general public could be exposed to airborne emissions from SSTs awaiting
final disposition during SWL pumping, or from the SY Tank Farm.
Airborne emissions of radioactive materials from the Hanford Site are
reported annually in several documents. Emissions from facilities
managed by WHC are reported in Environmental Releases for Calendar Year
1993 (WHC 1994h). These data along with data on emissions from
facilities at the Pacific Northwest Laboratory managed by Battelle
Memorial Institute are reported in Radionuclide Air Emission Report for
the Hanford Site, Calendar Year 1993 (DOE 1994a). This report also uses
meteorological data for the year being reported and the CAP-88PC
computer program (DOE 1992d) to estimate annual dose to the maximally
exposed individual. The Hanford Site Environmental Report for Calendar
Year 1993 (PNL 1994a) uses the same emission and meteorological data
together with the GENII computer program (PNL 1988a, PNL 1988b, PNL
1988c) to estimate annual dose to off-site individuals and the off-site
population.
Airborne emissions of radionuclides from the 200 East and West Areas
during 1993 are discussed in Section 4.3.2. Annual doses estimated from
these releases are summarized and compared to annual doses for all
airborne releases in Table 5-42.
Table 5-42
Estimated Annual Doses (mrem) for 1993 Airborne Emissions
from the 200 Areas
GENII a CAP-88PC b
Pathway
200 Areas All Areas 200 East 200 West All Areas
Externalc 2 x 10-6 3 x 10-4 NR NR NR
Inhalation 0.001 0.01 NR NR NR
Foodsd 6 x 10-4 8 x 10-4 NR NR NR
Total 0.0016 0.011 0.0012 0.0012 0.0063
aSource: PNL 1994a
bSource: DOE 1994a
cIncludes immersion and ground-deposited radionuclides.
dIndicates consumption of foodstuff contaminated by deposition of
airborne radionuclides.
NR = Not reported.
The CAP-88PC and GENII programs considered similar exposure pathways
(inhalation, immersion, direct radiation, ingestion of contaminated
foods) but use somewhat different parameter values, particularly for
biotic transfer and uptake and are therefore not expected to yield
identical results.
Airborne emissions from most tanks are filtered and discharged through
stacks equipped with flow monitors and samplers. A single stack may
serve a group of tanks or an entire tank farm. All Hanford Site stacks
emitting radionuclides are classified as major or minor stacks depending
on whether annual dose to the nearest residence would exceed 0.1 mrem if
stack effluents were released without any treatment. The stacks serving
some or all of the tanks in the AP, AY, AZ, C, AW, and AN tank farms in
the 200 East Area and in the SY and SX Tank Farms in the 200 West Area
are classified as major stacks (DOE 1994a). The remaining tanks and
tank farms either do not vent through stacks or are classified as minor
stacks. In 1993, emissions from major stacks in tanks farms accounted
for 1 percent (1.3 x 10-5 mrem) of total dose from all stack emissions
in the 200 East Area and 0.003 percent (3.1 x 10-8 mrem) of the total
dose from all stack emissions in the 200 West Area. The population dose
from all airborne emissions from the 200 Areas in 1993 was 0.17 person-
rem. These doses are considered to be representative of those that
would be associated with airborne emissions under the no action
alternative. Based on a nonoccupational risk factor of 5 x 10-4 LCFs
per person-rem, no adverse health effects are expected to occur in the
off-site population as the result of implementation of the no action
alternative.
. Airborne Emissions of Chemicals - Workers and members of the general
public could be exposed to airborne chemicals during SST salt well
pumping, management of West Area facility wastes, routine operations in
the SY Tank Farm including mitigation mixer pump operation.
Historically, airborne concentrations of chemicals were not routinely
monitored; however, an extensive monitoring program was initiated in
1992. In the first year of the program area monitoring was initiated in
the vicinity of SST tank farms. Only 78 of 2,956 measurements showed
organic vapors in excess of 2.0 ppm. In 1993 personal monitoring of
workers performing tasks in the tank farms was added and in 1994
monitoring of selected sources such as tank vents was initiated. The
results of personal monitoring of workers in the S, SX, SY tank farms
are summarized in Table 5-43, and compared to regulatory limits
established by the OSHA. The S and SX tank farms are of interest since
they still contain SWL. The SY Tank Farm is of interest since SWL and
other wastes are stored and staged in Tank 102-SY prior to cross-site
transfers. No monitored levels exceeded the OSHA limits and most are an
order of magnitude less. Based on these data, neither site workers nor
the public are at any risk from chemical emissions from these tanks
farms.
Table 5-43
Airborne Concentrations of Toxic Chemicals
in the Vicinity of the S, SX, and SY Tank Farms
OSHAa
8-Hr TWA
Chemical (ppm) Concentration Range
Ammonia 50 0.09 - 0.20 ppm
Hydrogen Cyanide 10 < 0.03 ppm
Pentane 600 0.08 - 16 ppb
Acetone 1,000 19 - 34 ppb
Carbon Disulfide 4 16 - 52 ppb
Hexane 50 0.12 - 0.6 ppb
Methyl Ethyl Ketone (2-Butanone) 200 0.12 - 0.30 ppb
2-Methyl Hexane N/A 0.48 - 5.9 ppb
1,1,1-Trichloroethane 350b 0.07 - 2.4 ppb
3-Methyl Hexane N/A 0.71 - 9.7 ppb
Carbon Tetrachloride 2 0.04 - 0.26 ppb
Benzene 1 0.11 - 9.2 ppb
Heptane 400 0.26 - 14.8 ppb
Butanol 50c 7.2 ppb
Methylcyclohexane 500 0.10 - 12.9 ppb
Toluene 100 0.10 - 23.9 ppb
Ethylbenzene 100 0.02 - 5.1 ppb
p-Xylene 100 0.10 - 18.8 ppb
o-Xylene 100 0.10 - 7.1 ppb
Source: Toxnet 1995
aOSHA regulatory limits for acceptable worker exposure, average over 8
hours.
bNational Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)
recommended 8-hr average exposure limit.
cNIOSH recommended ceiling, limit not to be exceeded.
N/A = Not Available.
5.5.9.3 Facility Decontamination and Decommissioning
- No new facilities
would be constructed under the no action alternative. The decontamination and
decommissioning of other facilities such as the existing DSTs and SSTs and the
ECSTS considered in this EIS and of TWRS facilities are to be addressed in
detail in a separate, future EIS.
5.5.10 HEALTH EFFECTS UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS
This section discusses the human health effects that could occur as the result
of potential accidents during the implementation of the no action alternative.
Initiating events, frequencies of occurrence, and quantities of respirable
hazardous materials released during a range of potential accidents are
discussed in detail in Appendix F. The types of health effects that can occur
and the relationship between exposure and health effects are discussed in
Appendix E. This section evaluates health effects in terms of LCFs for
radiation exposures. Health effects for exposures to chemicals during
accidents that involve exposure to both radioactive and toxic materials are
not specifically evaluated. A previous analysis (WHC 1994c) concluded that
radiological releases are limiting in these cases provided the release
duration is at least 2 minutes and 40 seconds. The minimum release duration
of combined radiological and chemical releases evaluated under the no action
alternative is 2 hours.
The accidents considered in Appendix F include scenarios both within and
beyond the design bases of the options and facilities comprising the no action
alternative. Terms used to categorize accidents and the corresponding
frequency ranges are summarized in Table 5-3. Based on frequencies of
occurrence and quantities of hazardous materials released, a subset of these
accidents was selected for evaluation of reasonably foreseeable health
effects.
Under the no action alternative the ECSTS would be used for interim transfer
of waste from the 200 West Area to the 200 East Area. The types and
quantities of waste that would be handled by the ECSTS are summarized in
Table 5-44. Detailed characterizations of the wastes listed in Table 5-44 are
provided in Appendix E. Accidents that could occur in the ECSTS are discussed
in the following section. To bound the probability of accidents under the no
action alternative, it is assumed that all wastes shown in Table 5-44 are
handled using the ECSTS. As a consequence of this assumption, complexed SWL
would be mixed with the TRU sludge in Tank 102-SY. This could result in
Table 5-44
Volumes of Tank Waste Transferred from the 200 West Area under the No
Action Alternative
Waste Typea Volume (kgal) b Systems Used
SWL
Complexed 575 ECSTS
Uncharacterized 1,221
Non-Complexed 2,426 ECSTS
Salt Well Total 4,222
WAFW 469 ECSTS
Grand Total 4,691
Source: Salt Well Volumes (WHC 1995a)
Salt Well Pumping Schedule (WHC 1994b)
102-SY Supernatant (WHC 1995c)
a1 kgal = 3,780 L
bTanks BX-111, T-111, and 106-C are excluded.
dissolution the sludge and an increase in the volume of TRU waste. Estimates
of the quantities of TRU nuclides that could dissolve are not available;
however, the radiological characteristics of WAFW are assumed in this EIS to
be the same as those of Tank 102-SY slurry. Since this slurry would contain
all of the TRU in Tank 102-SY, health effects for this waste should bound
those that could result from transfer of complexed SWL containing dissolved
TRU from Tank 102-SY.
Existing Cross-Site Transfer System - Transfer pipe breaks and pressurized
spray leaks could occur during operation of the ECSTS under the no action
alternative. Some of these events could result in releases to the soil column
or to the atmosphere while others would be largely confined within the ECSTS
encasement or diversion boxes (WHC 1989). These accidents are discussed in
detail in Appendix F, Section F.3.1. This section discusses health effects of
the more significant of these accidents and also addresses operational
failures of the ECSTS.
. Transfer Pipe Leaks - Transfer pipe breaks in the ECSTS could be caused
by excavations, earthquakes, or operational failures of welds or pipes.
Breaks caused by excavations or earthquakes could rupture both the
pipeline and its encasement and result in the result of waste to the
soil column and atmosphere.
An earthquake producing horizontal ground motion in excess of 0.05 g
would be expected to rupture both the ECSTS transfer lines and their
concrete encasement (WHC 1989) and is considered to be an unmitigated
accident. A mitigated case has not been analyzed. The frequency of a
0.05 g earthquake is estimated to be 6.7 x 10-3 /yr (Personal
communication, Farnsworth 1995). At 190 L/min (50 gpm), a total of
about 10 weeks would be required to transfer all the wastes shown in
Table 5-44. Taking into account failure to perform manual shutoff and
to perform material balance, the probability of a seismic rupture of the
ECSTS during this time is extremely unlikely (3.0 x 10-6). Applying the
event tree for the RCSTS excavation pipe break discussed in Section
5.1.10.2 to the ECSTS under the no action alternative yields a
probability of incredible (4.5 x 10-7) for the leak. The total
probability of an unmitigated ECSTS transfer pipe leak under the no
action alternative is extremely unlikely (3.4 x 10-6).
The consequences of the unmitigated ECSTS transfer pipe leak are shown
in Table 5-45. Based on a risk factor of 4 x 10-4 LCF/person-rem for
workers and 5 x 10-4 LCF/person-rem for the general public, no adverse
health effects would be expected for accidents involving SWL, WAFW, or
BSW. A 1:1 dilution is assumed for BSW to better reflect the low solids
content of the wastes that would actually be transferred. The ability
of the ECSTS to transport slurries is currently unknown.
Table 5-45
Estimated Health Effects from an ECSTS Unmitigated Transfer Pipe Break
under the No Action Alternative
Release Location Diversion Box 241-UX-151 (200 West Area)
Waste SWL WAFW BSW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 0:1 0:1 1:1
Probability Unlikely Unlikely Not Applicable
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.019 0.80 3.0
ICR 7 x 10-6 3 x 10-4 0.001
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.27 12 43
ICR 1 x 10-4 0.005 0.02
Collective Dose (person-rem) 1.8 76 280
LCF 7 x 10-4 0.03 0.1
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 4.1 x 10-4 0.017 0.064
ICR 2 x 10-7 9 x 10-6 3 x 10-5
Collective Dose (person-rem) 8.5 360 1,400
LCF 0.004 0.2 0.7
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 0.0013 0.055 0.20
ICR 6 x 10-7 3 x 10-5 1 x 10-4
Release Location Diversion Box 241-ER-151 (200 East Area)
Waste SWL WAFW BSW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 0:1 0:1 1:1
Probability Unlikely Unlikely Not Applicable
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.019 0.80 3.0
ICR 7 x 10-6 3 x 10-4 0.001
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.27 12 43
ICR 1 x 10-4 0.005 0.02
Collective Dose (person-rem) 4.1 180 650
LCF 0.002 0.07 0.3
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 5.0 x 10-4 0.021 0.079
ICR 2 x 10-7 1 x 10-5 4 x 10-5
Collective Dose (person-rem) 8.5 360 1,300
LCF 0.004 0.2 0.7
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 6.0 x 10-4 0.026 0.096
ICR 3 x 10-7 1 x 10-5 5 x 10-5
Operational pipe breaks in the ECSTS are not expected to result in loss
of secondary containment. If it is assumed for purposes of analysis
that the concrete encasement is currently intact, no release of waste to
the soil column or atmosphere would occur; however, thousands of gallons
of waste could be pumped into the encasement. Given the age and
perceived unreliability of the system, such an event could lead to a
decision to discontinue use of the ECSTS. The ECSTS SAR (WHC 1989)
considered these types of leaks but did not estimate their frequency.
Based on a failure rate of 1 x 10-10/hr-ft for stainless steel pipe and
applying an error factor of 30 to account for the aged condition of the
ECSTS (WHC 1995i) yields a failure frequency of 0.49/yr for a single 5.6
km (3.5-mi) length of ECSTS pipe. The probability of a failure during
the 10 weeks (0.178 yr) needed to transfer liquids under the no action
alternative is 8.7 x 10-2. The corresponding probability for a 10-km
(6.5-mi) length of RCSTS pipeline transferring the same volume is 1.8 x
10-3.
. Pressurized Spray Leaks - Spray leaks inside older diversion boxes,
valve pits, and pump pits are not uncommon events at the Hanford Site
and can have severe consequences if the spray is not confined within the
pit.
The probability of an unmitigated (unconfined) spray release from the
ECSTS diversion boxes during ECSTS usage under the no action alternative
is extremely unlikely with an estimated probability of 4.0 x 10-6. As
shown in Table 5-46, adverse health effects would be expected among the
nominally exposed uninvolved worker population (2 LCFs) and the
maximally exposed off-site population (7 LCFs) for accidents involving
WAFW. The probability of the accident while transferring WAFW is
incredible (4 x 10-7). Health effects of the same accident involving
BSW would be approximately four times higher. No adverse health effects
would be expected for ECSTS unmitigated spray releases involving SWL.
If the spray leak is mitigated by cover blocks being in place, the
probability of a spray release is anticipated (3.6 x 10-2); however, a
much smaller quantity of waste would be released. As indicated in
Table 5-47, doses to maximally exposed individuals and populations would
be very low and no observable health effects would be expected.
Table 5-46
Estimated Health Effects from an ECSTS Unmitigated Spray Release
under the No Action Alternative
Release Location Diversion Box 241-UX-151 (200 West Area)
Waste SWL WAFW BSW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 0:1 0:1 1:1
Probability Extremely Incredible Not Applicable
Unlikely
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.19 8.1 30
ICR 8 x 10-5 0.003 0.01
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 9.9 420 1,600
ICR 0.004 0.2 0.6
Collective Dose (person-rem) 57 2,400 9,000
LCF 0.02 1 4
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 0.018 0.77 2.8
ICR 9 x 10-6 4 x 10-4 0.001
Collective Dose (person-rem) 320 14,000 5.1 x 104
LCF 0.2 7 30
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 0.060 2.6 9.6
ICR 3 x 10-5 0.001 0.005
Release Location Diversion Box 241-ER-151 (200 East Area)
Waste SWL WAFW BSW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 0:1 0:1 1:1
Probability Extremely Incredible Not Applicable
Unlikely
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 0.19 8.1 30
ICR 8 x 10-5 0.003 0.01
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 9.9 420 1,600
ICR 0.004 0.2 0.6
Collective Dose (person-rem) 130 5,800 2.1 x 104
LCF 0.05 2 9
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 0.023 0.97 3.6
ICR 1 x 10-5 5 x 10-4 0.002
Collective Dose (person-rem) 320 14,000 5.1 x 104
LCF 0.2 7 30
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 0.028 1.2 4.4
ICR 1 x 10-5 6 x 10-4 0.002
Table 5-47
Estimated Health Effects from an ECSTS Mitigated Spray Release
under the No Action Alternative
Release Location Diversion Box 241-UX-151 (200 West Area)
Waste SWL WAFW BSW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 0:1 0:1 1:1
Probability Anticipated Unlikely Not Applicable
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 2.2 x 10-7 9.5 x 10-6 3.5 x 10-5
ICR < 10-7 < 10-7 < 10-7
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 1.2 x 10-5 5.0 x 10-4 0.0018
ICR < 10-7 2 x 10-7 7 x 10-7
Collective Dose (person-rem) 6.6 x 10-5 0.0029 0.011
LCF < 10-7 1 x 10-6 4 x 10-6
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 2.1 x 10-8 9.0 x 10-7 3.3 x 10-6
ICR < 10-7 < 10-7 < 10-7
Collective Dose (person-rem) 3.8 x 10-4 0.016 0.060
LCF 2 x 10-7 8 x 10-6 3 x 10-5
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 7.0 x 10-8 3.0 x 10-6 1.1 x 10-5
ICR < 10-7 < 10-7 < 10-7
Release Location Diversion Box 241-ER-151 (200 East Area)
Waste SWL WAFW BSW
Dilution (diluent:waste) 0:1 0:1 1:1
Probability Anticipated Unlikely Not Applicable
Receptor Involved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 2.2 x 10-7 9.5 x 10-6 3.5 x 10-5
ICR < 10-7 < 10-7 < 10-7
Receptor Uninvolved Workers
Individual Dose (rem) 1.2 x 10-5 5.0 x 10-4 0.0018
ICR < 10-7 2 x 10-7 1 x 10-7
Collective Dose (person-rem) 1.6 x 10-4 0.0067 0.025
LCF < 10-7 3 x 10-6 1 x 10-5
Receptor General Public - Existing Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 2.6 x 10-8 1.1 x 10-6 4.2 x 10-6
ICR < 10-7 < 10-7 < 10-7
Collective Dose (person-rem) 3.8 x 10-4 0.016 0.060
LCF 2 x 10-7 8 x 10-6 3 x 10-5
Receptor General Public - Potential Boundary
Individual Dose (rem) 3.2 x 10-8 1.4 x 10-6 5.1 x 10-6
ICR < 10-7 < 10-7 < 10-7
5.6 UNAVOIDABLE ADVERSE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
The construction and operation of any of the alternatives except the no action
alternative, could result in adverse impacts to the environment. While all
the alternatives evaluated in this EIS were formulated with engineering
controls and mitigative features to minimize impacts, some impacts would still
be unavoidable. This section identifies only adverse impacts that mitigation
could not reduce to minimal levels or avoid altogether and includes land use
and air quality.
Construction of the RCSTS under the preferred and new storage alternatives
would commit approximately 30 ha (74 acres) of land to pipeline installation.
Approximately 9 ha (23 acres) of the corridor would be sagebrush, cheatgrass
habitat which would experience long-term effects. Part of this area would be
revegetated following construction, but an estimated 25 percent would be
continuously disturbed for access and maintenance. The sagebrush communities
are expected to require decades to become established and reach maturity.
While mitigation measures would be established for revegetation in other parts
of the 200 Area Plateau, the immediate corridor would suffer adverse impacts.
As discussed in Section 5.1.4.3, the loggerhead shrike, the sagebrush lizard,
and the sage sparrow all require sagebrush habitat. While construction
activities would disrupt big sagebrush habitat in localized areas,
compensatory habitat restoration sites would be established as discussed in
Appendix D.
Construction of the NTF under the new storage alternative would require 20 ha
(50 acres) of land in addition to that committed for the RCSTS. The NTF sites
consist of sagebrush habitat at all three optional locations. After tank
construction, approximately one-third of this area probably could be
revegetated, but some of this area would likely be disturbed because of its
close proximity to actively used areas. Because all of the proposed NTF sites
would disturb 50 additional acres of sagebrush habitat, habitat restoration
would also be increased as discussed in Appendix D.
As discussed in Chapter 5, fugitive dust emissions would be expected from
proposed construction activities for the preferred, new storage, truck
transfer, and rail transfer alternatives. Construction activities would
include mitigation measures such as watering exposed areas, stabilizing spoil
piles with soil fixatives or vegetation. Although there would be dust
emissions, these measures are expected to keep dust concentrations below
regulatory standards.
5.7 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SHORT-TERM USE AND MAINTENANCE AND ENHANCEMENT OF LONG-TERM PRODUCTIVITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT
In accordance with NEPA and CEQ guidelines, this section discusses the
relationship between local short-term uses of the environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity.
The Federal government acquired the Hanford Site in 1943 for activities in
support of World War II and continued these activities for national defense
during the Cold War of the 1950s and thereafter. The storage of the waste
associated with these activities is a necessary component of these activities.
Due to the actions discussed within this EIS, more acres of land would be
committed to waste management for some alternatives (the number of acres
varies according to the alternative selected). However, all of this land
would be in the "Waste Management" zone of the "Exclusive Waste Management Use
Area" identified in the report of the Hanford Future Site Uses Working Group
(see Figure 6-2) (FSUWG 1992).
Although there would be an initial loss of mature sagebrush habitat for some
alternatives (the number of acres lost varies according to the alternative
selected), this vegetation would be replaced at a ratio of 3:1 - some
revegetation would be on the construction site and most on a compensation site
(see Figure 5-2).
The current Hanford Site mission is to clean up the site, provide scientific
and technological excellence to meet global needs, and partner in the economic
diversification of the region. Future plans for this portion of the Hanford
Site call for its continued use as an area dedicated primarily to waste
management activities over the next three decades.
Return of the Hanford Site to agricultural or other nonindustrial use may be
precluded by the presence of the existing structures, roads, utilities, and
the existing soil contamination problems. Because of the potential for, or
perception of, contamination, use of the land for agriculture might not be
appropriate. The 200 East and West Areas, as well as much of the surrounding
area, may be suitable for industrial use.
The Hanford Site has a low biological productivity (i.e., biomass production
is low compared to habitats with more moisture) as discussed in Section 4.
The land occupied under any of the alternatives combined with that already
developed would still occupy less than 6 percent of the total Hanford Site and
would not affect the biological productivity of the balance of the Hanford
Site. No agriculture is practiced on the Hanford Site because of its
restricted access status and availability of other land better suited for
growing crops and grazing livestock.
Other uses, such as for wildlife refuges, might be appropriate after
decommissioning is completed. Environmental remediation activities are
currently underway and are scheduled to continue over the next three decades.
Cleanup of the Hanford Site increases the options for future use of the
property.
5.8 IRREVERSIBLE AND IRRETRIEVABLE COMMITMENT OF RESOURCES
The irreversible and irretrievable commitment of natural and manmade resources
from constructing and operating the proposed action alternatives would
involve materials that could not be recovered or recycled, or that would be
consumed or reduced to unrecoverable forms. Some of these commitments would
be irretrievable because of the nature of the commitment (e.g., concrete and
capital costs) or the cost of reclamation (e.g., contaminated materials).
Construction and operation of the proposed alternatives would consume
irretrievable amounts of electricity, fuel, concrete, steel and other metals,
plastics, lumber, sand, gravel, water, and miscellaneous chemicals. The land
and associated habitat required for constructing the RCSTS, NTF, and load and
unload facilities would constitute at a minimum an interim commitment of land
for waste management. Future use of these tracts of land, while beyond the
scope of this EIS, could include restoring these areas for unrestricted use.
The irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources for the preferred
alternative would include materials, land use, and capital costs. Approxi-
mately 826,000 kg (911 tons) of steel would be required for the RCSTS under
the preferred and new storage alternatives. As stated in Section 5.1.4.2
approximately 30 ha (74 acres) would be required for constructing the RCSTS.
For the new storage alternative approximately 2,450 m3 (3,200 yds3) of
concrete and 1.03 million kg (1,139 tons) of steel would be needed for the
tanks. This would be an incremental addition to the materials required for
the RCSTS. The NTF would require an additional 20 ha (50 acres) of land.
The truck transfer alternative would require the construction of a load and
unload facility and the procurement of transport vehicles. The rail
alternative would require construction of a load and unload facility, and the
procurement of rail cars. The land required for the load and unload
facilities for either the truck or rail load and unload facilities is
estimated to be 1.6 ha (4 acres).
The alternatives proposed in this EIS are not considered resource intensive
and the resources required are not considered rare or unique. Furthermore
committing any of these resources would not cause a negative impact on the
availability of these resources.
5.9 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES
To assist in decision-making, this section compares the potential impacts of
the alternatives. This section summarizes the detailed impact analyses
described for each alternative in Sections 5.1 through 5.5.
As described in Section 3, each alternative consists of actions that would be
employed to address the purpose and need for:
. Removing SWL from older SSTs to reduce the likelihood of liquid waste
escaping into the environment
. Providing the ability to transfer tank waste via a compliant system
between the 200 West and 200 East Areas
. Providing adequate tank waste storage capacity for current and future
waste volumes
. Mitigating hydrogen gas generation in Tank 101-SY
Table 5-48 summarizes the actions which would be implemented by each
alternative to meet the purpose and need statement. Actions common to more
than one alternative include continued use of two existing systems, ECSTS and
the mixer pump in Tank 101-SY, and construction and operation of two new
systems, RCSTS, and a retrieval system in Tank 102-SY. The actions which are
common among alternatives are listed in Table 5-49. Some of the actions are
common to more than one alternative as shown in Table 5-49.
The environmental impacts that would result from the implementation of each
alternative are compared in Table 5-50. Generally, with the exception of
impacts associated with land disturbance, there would be no substantial
differences in mitigated environmental impacts among the alternatives.
Comparison of impacts among alternatives is provided in Section 5.9.1.
Comparison of the consequences of potential accidents among the alternatives
is provided in Section 5.9.2.
5.9.1 COMPARATIVE IMPACTS AMONG ALTERNATIVES
This section compares the environmental impacts among the alternatives using
the environmental topics discussed in Section 4.
Table 5-48
Comparison of Alternatives
Purpose and Need
Alternatives
Provide
Compliant Mitigate
Remove SWL to Reduce SST Cross-site Provide Hydrogen
Leaks Waste Adequate Generation
(Interim Stabilization) Transfer Waste in Tank
Capabilitya Storage 101-SY
Non-complexed Complexed
SWL SWL
Preferred Transfer Retrieve ECSTS/RCSTS Existing Continue
through Tank Tank 102-SY DSTs Mixer Pump
102-SY prior solids prior Operations
to solids to transfer
retrieval
Truck Transfer Bypass Bypass ECSTS/Truck Existing Continue
Tank 102-SY Tank 102-SY DSTs Mixer Pump
with Truck with Truck Operations
Rail Transfer Bypass Bypass ECSTS/Rail Existing Continue
Tank 102-SY Tank 102-SY DSTs Mixer Pump
with Rail with Rail Operations
New Storage Transfer Retrieve ECSTS/RCSTS New DSTs Retrieve
through Tank Tank 102-SY and Dilute
102-SY prior solids prior
to solids to transfer
retrieval
No Action Transfer Transfer ECSTSb Existing Continue
through Tank through Tank DSTs Mixer Pump
102-SY without 102-SY Operations
solids without
retrieval solids
retrieval
aOnly the preferred and new storage alternatives would meet Tri-Party
Agreement Milestone M-43-07 which requires the construction and operation of the RCSTS.
bThe ECSTS would not be compliant with applicable requirements.
Table 5-49
Summary of Actions by Alternative
Alternatives
Action
Truck Rail New No
Preferred Transfer Transfer Storage Action
Construct and operate RCSTS X X
Operate ECSTS Xa Xa Xa Xa X
Retrieve solids from Tank X X
102-SY
Continue Tank 101-SY mixer X X X X
pump operations
Retrieve and dilute Tank X
101-SY
Provide storage in existing X X X X
tanks
Construct NTF X
aECSTS used until replacement transfer capability operational
Table 5-50
Comparison of Potential Impacts
Alternatives
Potential
Impact Area
Preferred Truck Transfer Rail Transfer New Storage No Action
GEOLOGY This alternative would This alternative would This alternative would cause This alternative would cause This alternative would
cause no impacts. cause no impacts. no impacts. no impacts. cause no impacts.
SOILS This alternative would This alternative would This alternative would This alternative would This alternative would
disturb 30 ha for the disturb 2 ha for new load disturb 2 ha for new load disturb 30 ha for the RCSTS disturb no new area.
RCSTS. and unload facilities and and unload facilities and and 20 ha for the NTF.
new road spurs. new rail spurs.
SEISMOLOGY RCSTS design would Load and unload facility Load and unload facility ITRS and RCSTS design would This alternative would
incorporate current designs would incorporate designs would incorporate incorporate current continue to use tanks and
performance requirements current performance current performance performance requirements of ECSTS constructed to past
of 0.20 gravity for requirements of 0.20 requirements of 0.20 gravity 0.20 gravity for Safety performance requirements.
Safety Class 1 gravity for Safety Class 1 for Safety Class 1 Class 1. NTF would be
equipment. equipment. equipment. designed for 0.35 gravity. Tank 101-SY mixer pump
operations would continue
This alternative would This alternative would This alternative would This alternative would to use tanks constructed
continue to use tanks continue to use ECSTS continue to use ECSTS continue to use ECSTS to past performance
and ECSTS constructed to constructed to past constructed to past constructed to past requirements (0.2 to 0.25
past performance performance requirements performance requirements performance requirements gravity).
requirements until until load and unload until load and unload until RCSTS replaces ECSTS.
RCSTS replaces ECSTS. facilities are facilities are operational.
operational. Tank 101-SY mixer pump
Tank 101-SY mixer pump Tank 101-SY mixer pump operations would continue to
operations would Tank 101-SY mixer pump operations would continue to use tanks constructed to
continue to use tanks operations would continue use tanks constructed to past performance
constructed to past to use tanks constructed past performance requirements (0.2 to 0.25
performance requirements to past performance requirements (0.2 to 0.25 gravity).
(0.2 to 0.25 gravity). requirements (0.2 to 0.25 gravity).
gravity).
WATER This alternative has no This alternative has no This alternative has no This alternative has no This alternative has no
RESOURCES AND discharge of effluents. discharge of effluents. discharge of effluents. discharge of effluents. discharge of effluents.
HYDROLOGY
PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT
Construction RCSTS would generate Load and unload facility Load and unload facility RCSTS and NTF would generate This alternative would
dust; however, construction would construction would generate dust; however, mitigation is have no construction
mitigation is feasible. generate dust; however, dust; however, mitigation is feasible. activities; therefore, no
mitigation is feasible. feasible. construction impacts would
Release of contaminated Release of contaminated soil occur.
soil would be Release of contaminated Release of contaminated soil would be controlled.
controlled. soil would be controlled. would be controlled.
Normal Normal emissions would Normal emissions would not Normal emissions would not Normal emissions would not Normal emissions would not
Emissions not exceed worker or exceed worker or public exceed worker or public exceed worker or public exceed worker or public
public exposure limits. limits. limits. exposure limits. limits.
Sound Levels This alternative would This alternative would This alternative would cause This alternative would cause This alternative would
and Noise cause no impacts. cause no impacts. no impacts. no impacts. cause no impacts.
BIOLOGICAL AND This alternative would This alternative would This alternative would This alternative would This alternative would
ECOLOGICAL remove 9 ha of Priority remove no Priority Habitat remove no Priority Habitat remove 9 ha of Priority disturb no Priority
RESOURCES Habitat for proposed for load and unload for load and unload Habitat for proposed RCSTS Habitat.
RCSTS location and 8.5 facilities, or roadways. facilities or railways. location and 8.5 ha for
ha for optional RCSTS optional RCSTS location.
location.
This alternative would
remove 20 ha of Priority
Habitat for NTF.
POPULATION AND SOCIOECONOMICS
Construction RCSTS and Tank 102-SY Load and unload facility Load and unload facility new RCSTS, NTF, Tank 101-SY This alternative would
Retrieval System new new hire construction hire construction workforce ITRS, and Tank 102-SY cause no net change.
hire construction workforce of 25 would of 25 would cause no Retrieval System new hire
workforce of 60 would cause no impacts. impacts. construction workforce of
cause no impacts. 185 would cause no impacts.
Operations Operational workers Operational workers would Operational workers would Operational workers would Operational workers would
would come from existing come from existing Hanford come from existing Hanford come from existing Hanford come from existing Hanford
Hanford labor pool. This labor pool. This labor pool. This labor pool. This labor pool. This
alternative would alternative would provide alternative would provide no alternative would provide no alternative would provide
provide no net change. no net change. net change. net change. no net change.
TRANSPORTATION
Construction RCSTS construction work Load and unload facility Load and unload facility RCSTS construction work No additional traffic
force would not construction work force construction work force force would not impacts would occur.
significantly add to would not significantly would not significantly add significantly add to traffic
traffic congestion. add to traffic congestion. to traffic congestion. congestion.
NTF construction could add
to congestion, but
mitigation would be
accomplished through
scheduling or ride pools.
Operations This alternative would Intersite truck transfers Intersite rail transfers This alternative would have This alternative would
have no impacts. would impact routine would impact routine no impacts. have no impacts.
traffic. traffic.
LAND USE
Construction This alternative would This alternative would This alternative would This alternative would This alternative would
commit 30 ha to waste commit no additional land commit no additional land commit 30 ha to waste commit no additional land
management for the outside of the 200 East outside of the 200 East and management for the RCSTS and to waste management.
RCSTS. and West Areas to waste West Areas to waste 20 ha for the NTF.
management. management.
Operations This alternative would This alternative would This alternative would This alternative would This alternative would
conduct operational conduct operational conduct operational conduct operational conduct operational
activities consistent activities consistent with activities consistent with activities consistent with activities consistent with
with past, current, and past, current, and future past, current, and future past, current, and future past, current, and future
future uses. uses. uses. uses. uses.
CULTURAL This alternative would This alternative would This alternative would cause This alternative would cause This alternative would
RESOURCES cause no impacts to cause no impacts to known no impacts to known no impacts to known cause no impacts to known
known resources. resources. resources. resources. resources.
HEALTH EFFECTS UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS
Construction This alternative would Load and unload facilities Load and unload facilities NTF would be located in This alternative would
result in worker would be located in would be located in uncontaminated areas. require no new
exposure from: uncontaminated areas. uncontaminated areas. construction.
This alternative would
. RCSTS construction of Connections to existing Connections to existing result in worker exposure
26.3 person-rem, or lines and facilities would lines and facilities would from:
0.01 LCF. yield worker doses similar yield worker doses similar
to RCSTS of 26.3 person- to RCSTS of 26.3 person-rem, . RCSTS construction of
. Tank 102-SY Retrieval rem, or 0.01 LCF. or 0.01 LCF. 26.3 person-rem, or 0.01
System of 400 person- LCF
rem or 0.16 LCF.
. Tank 102-SY Retrieval
System of 400 person-rem
or 0.16 LCF.
. Tank 101-SY ITRS
construction of 170
person-rem, or 0.07 LCF.
Operations This alternative would This alternative would not This alternative would not This alternative would not This alternative would not
not change average tank change average tank farm change average tank farm change average tank farm change average tank farm
farm worker exposure of worker exposure of 14 worker exposure of 14 worker exposure of 14 worker exposure of 14
14 mrem/yr, 6 x 10-6 mrem/yr, 6 x 10-6 LCFs. mrem/yr, 6 x 10-6 LCFs. mrem/yr, 6 x 10-6 LCFs. mrem/yr, 6 x 10-6 LCFs.
LCFs.
Load and unload facility Load and unload facility
operations would add: operations would add 35
person-rem, 0.01 LCF.
. 344 person-rem for the
LR-56(H) truck, 0.14 Rail operator exposure would
LCF not exceed allowable dose
limits.
. 69 person-rem for 5,000
gal truck, 0.03 LCF
Truck driver exposure
would exceed allowable
dose limits without design
changes or administrative
controls.
1 ha = 2.47 acres
5.9.1.1 Geology, Seismology and Soils
- There are no significant geological
resources beneath the Hanford Site nor prime or unique soils at the surface.
Therefore, no alternative would significantly impact valuable geological or
soil resources.
Under each alternative, except the no action alternative, new facilities would
be designed to currently required seismic standards. The new tanks which
would be constructed under the new storage alternative would be designed to
meet seismic criteria for new DSTs which require the ability to withstand a
ground acceleration of 0.35 gravity. Non-storage facilities such as the ITRS,
RCSTS, and load and unload facilities would be constructed to a 0.20 g
requirement. Seismic design criteria applied to the construction of existing
DSTs and SSTs, and the ECSTS were less stringent than those for new DSTs.
Tank 101-SY was designed to withstand a ground acceleration from 0.2 to 0.25
g. Construction of new tanks, pipelines, and facilities under the preferred,
new storage, truck transfer, and rail transfer alternatives would result in a
negligible change in seismic risk relative to the no action alternative.
5.9.1.2 Water Resources and Hydrology
- There would be no operational
discharges of liquid effluents under any alternative. All alternatives would
reduce risk to vadose zone contamination or ground-water contamination from
SST leaks through continuation of the interim stabilization program. All
alternatives except the no action alternative would further reduce risks by
replacing the ECSTS which is over 40 years old and consists of single-wall
pipe in a concrete encasement. The preferred and new storage alternatives
would replace the ECSTS with the RCSTS. The truck transfer and rail transfer
alternatives would use surface vehicles instead of subsurface piping.
5.9.1.3 Physical Environment
- All alternatives except the no action would
involve new construction with the potential for dust emissions which would be
controlled by wetting or use of other soil fixatives. Because all alternative
would involve only the handling of existing waste and not the processing or
generation of new wastes, emission rates would generally remain the same as
existing conditions which are compliant with applicable requirements. Under
the new storage alternative which would construct the NTF, some reduction in
emissions from Tank 101-SY wastes would result from dilution and due to the
incorporation of advanced control technologies into NTF design.
Construction of facilities under any alternative would not result in noise
impacts offsite due to the distance to the site boundary. Protective
equipment would be issued as necessary to on-site individuals to minimize the
noise impact to workers.
5.9.1.4 Biological and Ecological Resources
- Construction activities under
the preferred and new storage alternatives would result in loss of Priority
Habitat for candidate endangered species. The preferred alternative would
remove 9 ha (23 acres) and the new storage alternative would remove 30 ha (73
acres).
Loss of habitat would be mitigated by reestablishment of habitat elsewhere on
the Hanford Site, to minimize the long-term impacts. The truck transfer, rail
transfer, and no action alternatives would not remove Priority Habitat.
5.9.1.5 Population and Socioeconomic Impacts
- Worker requirements for
construction under all alternatives would not be significant and would come
partially from existing workers. The operations workforce for all
alternatives would be drawn from the existing Hanford Site labor pool and
result in no net socioeconomic changes. No low-income or minority populations
would be adversely affected by any alternative.
5.9.1.6 Transportation
- New construction workers under the preferred, new
storage, truck transfer, and rail transfer alternatives could increase traffic
congestion. This congestion would be minor and could be mitigated by
scheduling, car pools or roadway upgrades. Operational workers for all
alternatives would be included in existing traffic loads.
The truck transfer and rail transfer alternatives would have the potential to
temporarily affect routine on-site traffic in the 200 East and West Areas as
traffic could be restricted during waste transfers. Truck transfers using the
LR56(H) could result in traffic disruptions several times per day. The
19,000 L (5,000-gal) truck or rail car would likely disrupt traffic only once
per day. The preferred, new storage, and no action alternatives using the
RCSTS and, or the ECSTS for cross-site transfers would not have this potential
for traffic impacts.
5.9.1.7 Land Use
- The preferred alternative would commit 30 ha (74 acres) of
additional land to waste management and the new storage alternative would
commit 50 ha (124 acres). This land would be committed for at least 30 years,
assuming the TWRS EIS remediation completion estimate of 2028. The truck
transfer, rail transfer, and no action alternatives would commit no new land
to waste management.
5.9.1.8 Cultural Resources
- There would be no impact on known cultural
resources within the areas used for any alternative. Areas proposed for
revegetation to restore lost habitat would be surveyed prior to use to
establish plans for avoidance of identified resources.
5.9.1.9 Anticipated Health Effects
- Contaminated materials could be
encountered during construction of the RCSTS and the Tank 102-SY retrieval
system under the preferred and new storage alternatives. However, worker dose
would be maintained within site standards and there would be no off-site
public exposure. These effects would not occur for the truck transfer, rail
transfer, and no action alternatives. No health effects are anticipated
during construction of the NTF under the new storage alternative since the NTF
would be located on an uncontaminated area.
There would be only minor differences among the alternatives in radiological
health effects for workers and the general public for normal operations. With
the exception of drivers of the truck transports, no alternative would cause
workers or the public to be exposed to unacceptable levels of radiological or
toxic constituents as a result of normal operations. The transport driver
under the truck alternative would receive an unacceptable exposure without
further modification in the truck design or the application of other
administrative controls.
5.9.2 ACCIDENT COMPARISON
Potential accidents and their consequences have been summarized by alternative
in Table 5-51.
Table 5-51
Comparison of Health Effects from Accidentsa Analyzed for Each Alternative
Latent Cancer Fatalities
Maximum
Potential Accidents Uninvolved Maximum Off-site
Alternative System and Probabilities Waste Worker Population Population
Preferred ECSTS Unmitigated transfer pipe break SWL 0.002 0.004
Truck Transfer "Unlikely" WAFW 0.07 0.2
Rail Transfer
New Storage
No Action
Unmitigated spray release SWL 0.05 0.2
"Extremely Unlikely" WAFW 2 7
Mitigated spray releaseb SWL < 10-7 2 x 10-7
"Anticipated" WAFW 3 x 10-6 8 x 10-6
Preferred RCSTS Unmitigated pipe break SWL 0.01 0.02
"Incredible" 102-SY/WAFW 0.5 0.7
New Storage (200 West)
Mitigated pipe break SWL 0.004 0.005
"Extremely Unlikely" 102-SY/WAFW 0.2 0.2
Mitigated spray release SWL 5 x 10-6 3 x 10-5
"Anticipated" 102-SY/WAFW 2 x 10-4 0.001
New Storage (200 East) RCSTS Unmitigated pipe break SWL 0.01 0.02
"Incredible" 102-SY/WAFW 0.5 0.7
101-SY 0.003 0.004
Mitigated pipe break SWL 0.004 0.005
"Extremely Unlikely" 102-SY/WAFW 0.2 0.2
101-SY 0.001 0.002
Mitigated spray release SWL 2 x 10-5 3 x 10-5
"Anticipated" 102-SY/WAFW 7 x 10-4 0.001
101-SY 4 x 10-6 7 x 10-6
Truck Transfer LR-56(H) In-transit breach SWL 1 x 10-4 2 x 10-4
"Unlikely" 102-SY/WAFW 0.006 0.009
5,000-gal tanker In-transit breach SWL 7 x 10-4 0.001
"Extremely Unlikely" 102-SY/WAFW 0.03 0.04
LR-56(H) Breach at load/unload facility SWL 0.01 0.008
"Unlikely" 102-SY/WAFW 0.4 0.3
5,000-gal tanker Breach at load/unload facility SWL 0.05 0.04
"Unlikely" 102-SY/WAFW 2 2
Rail Transfer 10,000-gal rail car In-transit breach SWL 0.001 0.002
"Extremely Unlikely" 102-SY/WAFW 0.06 0.09
10,000-gal rail car Breach at load/unload facility SWL 0.1 0.08
"Unlikely" 102-SY/WAFW 0.9 3
Truck Transfer or Load/unload Facility spill SWL 4 x 10-5 5 x 10-5
Rail Transfer facilities "Anticipated to Unlikely" 102-SY/WAFW 0.002 0.002
Preferred ITRS for Tank 102-SY Unmitigated spray release 102-SY 200 700
New Storage "Extremely Unlikely to Incredible"
(200 East or West)
Mitigated spray release 102-SY 1 x 10-5 5 x 10-5
"Anticipated to Unlikely"
Unmitigated transfer pipe break 102-SY 0.1 0.5
"Incredible"
Mitigated transfer pipe break 102-SY 0.02 0.1
"Unlikely"
Preferred PPSS for Tank 102-SY Unmitigated pipe break 102-SY 0.02 0.2
New Storage "Incredible"
(200 East or West)
Mitigated pipe break 102-SY 0.006 0.04
"Unlikely"
Unmitigated spray release 102-SY 100 500
"Extremely Unlikely to Incredible"
Mitigated spray release 102-SY 2 x 10-6 6 x 10-6
"Anticipated to Unlikely"
New Storage ITRS for Tank 101-SY Unmitigated spray release 101-SY 2 9
(200 East or West) "Extremely Unlikely to Incredible"
Mitigated spray release 101-SY 2 x 10-7 6 x 10-7
"Anticipated to Unlikely"
Unmitigated transfer pipe break 101-SY 0.001 0.007
"Incredible"
Mitigated transfer pipe break 101-SY 3 x 10-4 0.002
"Anticipated"
New Storage NTF Unmitigated spray release 101-SY 0.4 0.6
"Incredible to Not Reasonably
Foreseeable"
Mitigated spray release 101-SY 2 x 10-6 5 x 10-6
"Unlikely to Extremely Unlikely"
Beyond design basis leak 101-SY 0.003 0.007
"Extremely Unlikely to Not
Reasonably Foreseeable"
aAccident location with the greatest health effect are summarized in this table.
For wastes anticipated to be transferred cross-site during this interim
action, SWL, WAFW, and potentially Tank 101-SY and Tank 102-SY, accidents with
potential to cause adverse health effects to the uninvolved workers or the
off-site public include:
. Unmitigated spray releases from the ECSTS, ITRS, or PPSS for Tank 102-SY
and ITRS for Tank 101-SY
. Releases from a breach at the truck or rail load/unload facility.
An unmitigated spray release has the potential to occur under any alternative
including the no action, however, the probability of an unmitigated spray
release is extremely unlikely to incredible (10-5 to 10-7 per year) for the
ITRS and PPSS and extremely unlikely (10-5 to 10-6 per year) for the ECSTS.
A release from a load/unload facility under the truck transfer or rail
transfer alternatives would be unlikely (10-3 to 10-4 per year).
There are no anticipated (1 to 10-2 per year) accidents with potential to
significantly impact the uninvolved worker population or the off-site public,
under any alternative.
SECTION 5 REFERENCES
Brincken, Ed, Soil Conservation Service, Letter to Paul F.X. Dunigan, "Soil
Survey, Hanford Project in Benton County Washington" by B.F. Hajek, April 1994
DOE, 1995, Environmental Assessment Tank 241-C-106 Past-Practice Sluicing
Waste Retrieval, Hanford Site, Richland, WA, DOE/EA-0944, February 1995,
United States Department of Energy, Richland, WA
DOE, 1994a, Radionuclide Air Emission Report for the Hanford Site Calendar
Year 1993, DOE/RL-94-51, United States Department of Energy, Richland, WA
DOE, 1994b, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
Application for Approval to Construct Multi-Function Waste Tank Facility,
Environmental Services, Westinghouse Hanford Company, DOE/RL-94-92, Rev. 0,
UC-630, 721, United States Department of Energy, August 1994
DOE, 1992a, An Environmental Assessment for Proposed Pump Mixing Operations to
Mitigate Episodic Gas Releases in Tank 241-101-SY. Hanford Site, Richland,
Washington, DOE/EA/0803, U.S., July 1992, Department of Energy, Washington,
D.C.
DOE, 1992b, Environmental Assessment, Environmental Assessment for Proposed
Pump Mixing Operations to Mitigate Episodic Gas Releases in Tank 241-SY-101,
Hanford Site, Richland, Washington, DOE/EA-0803, U.S. Department of Energy,
Washington, D.C.
DOE, 1992c, Radionuclide Air Emissions Report for the Hanford Site, U.S. DOE
Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management, DOE/RL-93-36, U.S.
Department of Energy, Hanford Site, Richland, WA
DOE, 1992d, User's Guide for CAP88-PC, Version 1.0,402-B-92-001, U.S. DOE,
under Interagency Agreement DE-AIO1-90EH89071, U.S Environmental Protection
Agency, Office of Radiation Programs, Las Vegas, NV
DOE, 1991, Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the Siting, Construction,
and Operation of New Production Reactor Capacity, U.S. DOE, DOE/EIS-0144D,
U.S. DOE, Office of New Production Reactors, Vol. 2: sections 1-6, Vol. 3:
sections 7-12, Appendices A-C, U.S. Department of Energy
DOE, 1980, Final Environmental Impact Statement, Waste Management Operations,
Supplement to ERDA-1538, December 1975, DOE/EIS-0063, Double-Shell Tanks for
Defense High-Level Radioactive Waste Storage, U.S. Department of Energy,
Hanford Site, Richland, WA
WHC, 1995, Memo to Jill M. Light from Susan K. Farnworth, .05g Old Cross-Site
Line, August 21, 1995
FSUWG, 1992, Final Report, The Future For Hanford: Uses and Cleanup, Hanford
Future Site Uses Working Group, Drummond, Marshall E. et al., Richland, WA
Hewitt, Elton, 1995, DSI to Lucinda Borneman, re: Requested Vapor Monitoring
Information, August 8, 1995
Light, J.M., DSI to Perry Campbell and Tom Anderson, EIS Response, 94-JML-001,
June 1994
National Safety Council, 1994, Accident Facts, 1994 Edition
PNL, 1994, Hanford Site National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
Characterization, PNL-6415 Rev. 6, UC-600, Prepared for the U.S. Department of
Energy, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, WA
PNL, 1994a, Hanford Site Environmental Report for Calendar Year 1993, PNL-
9823, UC-602, June 1994, U.S. DOE, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, WA
PNL, 1994b, Pacific Northwest Laboratory prepared for the U.S. Department of
Energy, Aerosol and Vapor Source Term Produced During Double-Shell Tank Waste
Mobilization and Retrieval: Literature Review and Recommendations, DSTRTP-
CY94-003
PNL, 1993, Hanford Site Environmental Report for Calendar Year 1992,
Wooddruff, R.K. et al, PNL-8682, UC-602, Pacific Northwest Laboratories,
Richland, WA
PNL, 1988a, GENII - The Hanford Environmental Radiation Dosimetry Software
System, Napier, B. A., et al., Volume 1, Conceptual Representation, PNL-65684,
Pacific Northwest Laboratory Operated for the U.S. Department of Energy by
Battelle Memorial Institute
PNL, 1988b, GENII - The Hanford Environmental Radiation Dosimetry Software
System, Napier, B. A., et al., Volume 2, Users' Manual, PNL-65684, Pacific
Northwest Laboratory Operated for the U.S. Department of Energy by Battelle
Memorial Institute
PNL, 1988c, GENII - The Hanford Environmental Radiation Dosimetry Software
System, Napier, B. A., et al., Volume 3, Code Maintenance Manual, PNL-65684,
Pacific Northwest Laboratory Operated for the U.S. Department of Energy by
Battelle Memorial Institute
Rittman, P. D., 1994, Fugitive Dust Impacts From New Tank Farm Construction -
18 acres, HO-36, Paper
Toxnet, 1995, Hazardous Substance Data Bank, National Library of Medicine
Toxicological Data Network (TOXNET), Washington, D.C.
Trost, Ted, and Ed Epperson, Telephone conversations with Dames & Moore, May
11, 1995
Van Beek, 1995, Personal communication with John Van Beek, WHC, May 22, 1995
WHC, 1995a, WHC-SD-W236A-ES-012, Draft, Revision 0., Multi-Function Waste Tank
Facility Path Forward Engineering Analysis Technical Task 3.3, Single-Shell
Tank Liquid Contents, R.G. Brown, R.W. Mattichak, Westinghouse Hanford
Company, Richland, Washington.
WHC, 1995b, MWTF Path Forward Engineering Analysis Technical Task 3.8
Retrieval Sequence, WHC-SD-236A-ES-011, Revision 0., Paul J. Certa, Luanne S.
Williams, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, WA
WHC, 1995c, Waste Tank Summary Report for Month Ending January 31, 1995, WHC-
EP-0182-82, Prepared for U.S. DOE, Office of Environmental Restoration and
Waste Management, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, WA
WHC, 1995d, Human Reliability Analysis of Backhoe and Seismi Events Involving
The Cross-Site Transfer Line (Internal Memo, OM640-sel-95005), Westinghouse
Hanford Company, Richland, WA
WHC, 1995e, Cross-Site Transfer Systems Preliminary Safety Analysis Report,
WHC-SD-W058-PSAR-001, Rev. 1, Review Draft, Issued 6/6/95, Project W-058 by
R.J. Kidder. Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of
Environmental Restoration and Waste Management
WHC, 1995f, Safety Assessment, Initial Tank Retrieval Systems, Project W-211,
WHC-SD-W211-SAD-001, Rev. A, June 1, 1995 by R.J. Kidder
WHC, 1995g, Hanford SIS-FEIS Socioeconomics Table, Fax Transmission from Ed
Epperson, May 10, 1995
WHC, 1995h, Replacement of the Cross Site Transfer System Liquid Waste
Transport Alternatives Evaluation, Project W-058, WHC-SD-W058-TA-001, Revision
O., D.V.Vo, E.M. Epperson, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, WA
WHC, 1995i, Multi-Function Waste Tank Facility Path Forward Engineering
Analysis Technical Task 3.6, Estimate of Operations Risk in the 200 West Area,
WHC-SD-W236A-ES-014, Revision OA,G.A. Coles, Westinghouse Hanford Company,
Richland, WA
WHC, 1994a, Leach, D. S., 1994, Multi-Function Waste Tank Facility -
Preliminary Safety Analysis Report, WHC-SD-W236A-PSAR-001, Rev. A, Vol. II,
SEAC Review Issue Draft, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, WA
WHC, 1994b, Conceptual Design Report Initial Tank Retrieval Systems, WHC-SD-
W211-CDR-002, Rev.0 U.S. Department of Energy, Kaiser Engineers Hanford
Company, Richland, WA
WHC, 1994c, Toxic Chemical Considerations for Tank Farm Releases, WHC-SD-WM-
SARR-011, Rev 0, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, WA
WHC, 1994d, Preliminary Safety Evaluation for 241-C-106 Waste Retrieval,
Project W-320, J.C.Conner, WHC-SD-WM-PSE-010, Rev. 2. October 1994,
Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, WA.
WHC, 1994e, Tank Farm HLW Compositions and Atmospheric Dispersion Coefficients
for Use in ASA Consequence Assessments, WHC-SD-WM-SARR-016, Rev. by A.V.
Savino and B.E. Hey, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, WA
WHC, 1994f, Letter Report Tank Primary Ventilation Process Flow Diagram
Description, W236A-T2-TR18, prepared for Westinghouse Hanford Company,
Richland, WA by ICF Kaiser Hanford Company.
WHC, 1994g, Supplemental PSAR Analysis, WHC-SD-W236A-ANAL-002, August 1994,
Additional Analysis Related to the MWTF.
WHC, 1994h, Environmental Releases for Calendar Year 1993, WHC-EP-0527-3, UC-
630, U.S. DOE, Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management,
Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, WA
WHC, 1993a, Preliminary Safety Analysis Report, Replacement of the Cross-Site
Transfer System, Project 93L-EWW-058, WHC-SD-W058-PSAR-001, Rev. 0, Tank Farm
Safety Engineering, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, WA
WHC, 1993b, Preliminary Safety Evaluation for 101-SY Initial Tank Retrieval
System, Project W-211, Kidder, R. J., WHC-SD-W211-PSE-001, Rev. 0,
Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, WA
WHC, 1993c, Radionuclide and Chemical Inventories for the Double Shell Tanks,
Oscarson, E. E. and Tusler, L.A., WHC-SD-WM-TI-543, July 1993
WHC, 1993d, Pilot Plant Hot Test Facility Siting Study, WHC-SD-WM-TA-143,
Draft, Rev 0, Appendices A through N, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland,
WA
WHC, 1993e, SAR for Packaging Railroad Liquid Waste Tank Car, WHC-SD-RE-SAP-
013, Rev 5, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, WA
WHC, 1991a, SAR for the 204-AR Waste Unloading Facility, WHC-SD-WM-SAR-040,
Rev 0, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, WA
WHC, 1991b, Preliminary Safety Evaluation for the Replacement Cross-Site
Transfer System, Project W-058, WHC-SD-W058-PSE-001, Rev. 0, Vol. 1,
Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, WA
WHC, 1989, Operational Safety Analysis Report Cross-Country Waste Transfer
System, SD-WM-SAR-039, Rev 0, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, WA
WHC, 1988, Nonreactor Facility Safety Analysis Manual, Safety, Quality
Assurance and Security, WHC-CM-4-46, Level II, September 1988, Westinghouse
Hanford Company, Richland, WA
TABLE OF CONTENTS
5.6 UNAVOIDABLE ADVERSE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS 5-143
5.7 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SHORT-TERM USE AND MAINTENANCE AND ENHANCEMENT
OF LONG-TERM PRODUCTIVITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT 5-144
5.8 IRREVERSIBLE AND IRRETRIEVABLE COMMITMENT OF RESOURCES 5-145
5.9 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 5-146
5.9.1 COMPARATIVE IMPACTS AMONG ALTERNATIVES 5-147
5.9.1.1 Geology, Seismology and Soils 5-154
5.9.1.2 Water Resources and Hydrology 5-154
5.9.1.3 Physical Environment 5-154
5.9.1.4 Biological and Ecological Resources 5-155
5.9.1.5 Population and Socioeconomic Impacts 5-155
5.9.1.6 Transportation 5-155
5.9.1.7 Land Use 5-156
5.9.1.8 Cultural Resources 5-156
5.9.1.9 Anticipated Health Effects 5-156
5.9.2 ACCIDENT COMPARISON 5-156
SECTION 5 REFERENCES 5-160
5-48 Comparison of Alternatives 5-148
5-49 Summary of Actions by Alternative 5-149
5-50 Comparison of Potential Impacts 5-150
5-51 Comparison of Health Effects from Accidentsa Analyzed for Each
Alternative 5-157
SECTION 5 REFERENCES
Brincken, Ed, Franklin County Soil Survey, Letter to Paul F.X. Dunigan, "Soil
Survey, Hanford Project in Benton County Washington" by B.F. Hajek, April 1994
DOE, 1995, Environmental Assessment Tank 241-C-106 Past-Practice Sluicing
Waste Retrieval, Hanford Site, Richland, WA, DOE/EA-0944, February 1995,
United States Department of Energy, Richland, WA
DOE, 1994a, Radionuclide Air Emission Report for the Hanford Site Calendar
Year 1993, DOE/RL-94-51, United States Department of Energy, Richland, WA
DOE, 1994b, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
Application for Approval to Construct Multi-Function Waste Tank Facility,
Environmental Services, Westinghouse Hanford Company, DOE/RL-94-92, Rev. 0,
UC-630, 721, United States Department of Energy, August 1994
DOE, 1992a, An Environmental Assessment for Proposed Pump Mixing Operations to
Mitigate Episodic Gas Releases in Tank 241-101-SY. Hanford Site, Richland,
Washington, DOE/EA/0803, U.S., July 1992, Department of Energy, Washington,
D.C.
DOE, 1992b, Environmental Assessment, Environmental Assessment for Proposed
Pump Mixing Operations to Mitigate Episodic Gas Releases in Tank 241-SY-101,
Hanford Site, Richland, Washington, DOE/EA-0803, U.S. Department of Energy,
Washington, D.C.
DOE, 1992c, Radionuclide Air Emissions Report for the Hanford Site, U.S. DOE
Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management, DOE/RL-93-36, U.S.
Department of Energy, Hanford Site, Richland, WA
DOE, 1992d, User's Guide for CAP88-PC, Version 1.0,402-B-92-001, U.S. DOE,
under Interagency Agreement DE-AIO1-90EH89071, U.S Environmental Protection
Agency, Office of Radiation Programs, Las Vegas, NV
DOE, 1991, Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the Siting, Construction,
and Operation of New Production Reactor Capacity, U.S. DOE, DOE/EIS-0144D,
U.S. DOE, Office of New Production Reactors, Vol. 2: sections 1-6, Vol. 3:
sections 7-12, Appendices A-C, U.S. Department of Energy
DOE, 1980, Final Environmental Impact Statement, Waste Management Operations,
Supplement to ERDA-1538, December 1975, Double-Shell Tanks for Defense High-
Level Radioactive Waste Storage, U.S. Department of Energy, Hanford Site,
Richland, WA
WHC, 1995, Memo to Jill M. Light from Susan K. Farnworth, .05g Old Cross-Site
Line, August 21, 1995
FSUWG, 1992, Final Report, The Future For Hanford: Uses and Cleanup, Hanford
Future Site Uses Working Group, Drummond, Marshall E. et al., Richland, WA
Hewitt, Elton, 1995, DSI to Lucinda Borneman, re: Requested Vapor Monitoring
Information, August 8, 1995
Light, J.M., DSI to Perry Campbell and Tom Anderson, EIS Response, 94-JML-001,
June 1994
National Safety Council, 1994, Accident Facts, 1994 Edition
PNL, 1994, Hanford Site National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
Characterization, PNL-6415 Rev. 6, UC-600, Prepared for the U.S. Department of
Energy under Contract DE-AC06-76RLO 1830, Pacific Northwest Laboratory,
Richland, WA
PNL, 1994a, Hanford Site Environmental Report for Calendar Year 1993, PNL-
9823, UC-602, June 1994, U.S. DOE, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, WA
PNL, 1994b, Pacific Northwest Laboratory prepared for the U.S. Department of
Energy, Aerosol and Vapor Source Term Produced During Double-Shell Tank Waste
Mobilization and Retrieval: Literature Review and Recommendations, DSTRTP-
CY94-003
PNL, 1993, Hanford Site Environmental Report for Calendar Year 1992,
Wooddruff, R.K. et al, PNL-8682, UC-602, Pacific Northwest Laboratories,
Richland, WA
PNL, 1988a, GENII - The Hanford Environmental Radiation Dosimetry Software
System, Napier, B. A., et al., Volume 1, Conceptual Representation, PNL-65684,
Pacific Northwest Laboratory Operated for the U.S. Department of Energy by
Battelle Memorial Institute
PNL, 1988b, GENII - The Hanford Environmental Radiation Dosimetry Software
System, Napier, B. A., et al., Volume 2, Users' Manual, PNL-65684, Pacific
Northwest Laboratory Operated for the U.S. Department of Energy by Battelle
Memorial Institute
PNL, 1988c, GENII - The Hanford Environmental Radiation Dosimetry Software
System, Napier, B. A., et al., Volume 3, Code Maintenance Manual, PNL-65684,
Pacific Northwest Laboratory Operated for the U.S. Department of Energy by
Battelle Memorial Institute
Rittman, P. D., 1994, Fugitive Dust Impacts From New Tank Farm Construction -
18 acres, HO-36, Paper
Toxnet, 1995, Hazardous Substance Data Bank, National Library of Medicine
Toxicological Data Network (TOXNET), Washington, D.C.
Trost, Ted, and Ed Epperson, Telephone conversations with Dames & Moore, May
11, 1995
Van Beek, 1995, Personal communication with John Van Beek, WHC, May 22, 1995
WHC, 1995a, WHC-SD-W236A-ES-012, Draft, Revision 0., Multi-Function Waste Tank
Facility Path Forward Engineering Analysis Technical Task 3.3, Single-Shell
Tank Liquid Contents, R.G. Brown, R.W. Mattichak, Westinghouse Hanford
Company, Richland, Washington.
WHC, 1995b, MWTF Path Forward Engineering Analysis Technical Task 3.8
Retrieval Sequence, WHC-SD-236A-ES-011, Revision 0., Paul J. Certa, Luanne S.
Williams, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, WA
WHC, 1995c, Waste Tank Summary Report for Month Ending January 31, 1995, WHC-
EP-0182-82, Prepared for U.S. DOE, Office of Environmental Restoration and
Waste Management, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, WA
WHC, 1995d, Human Reliability Analysis of Backhoe and Seismi Events Involving
The Cross-Site Transfer Line (Internal Memo, OM640-sel-95005), Westinghouse
Hanford Company, Richland, WA
WHC, 1995e, Cross-Site Transfer Systems Preliminary Safety Analysis Report,
WHC-SD-W058-PSAR-001, Rev. 1, Review Draft, Issued 6/6/95, Project W-058 by
R.J. Kidder. Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of
Environmental Restoration and Waste Management
WHC, 1995f, Safety Assessment, Initial Tank Retrieval Systems, Project W-211,
WHC-SD-W211-SAD-001, Rev. A, June 1, 1995 by R.J. Kidder
WHC, 1995g, Hanford SIS-FEIS Socioeconomics Table, Fax Transmission from Ed
Epperson, May 10, 1995
WHC, 1995h, Replacement of the Cross Site Transfer System Liquid Waste
Transport Alternatives Evaluation, Project W-058, WHC-SD-W058-TA-001, Revision
O., D.V.Vo, E.M. Epperson, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, WA
WHC, 1995i, Multi-Function Waste Tank Facility Path Forward Engineering
Analysis Technical Task 3.6, Estimate of Operations Risk in the 200 West Area,
WHC-SD-W236A-ES-014, Revision OA,G.A. Coles, Westinghouse Hanford Company,
Richland, WA
WHC, 1994a, Leach, D. S., 1994, Multi-Function Waste Tank Facility -
Preliminary Safety Analysis Report, WHC-SD-W236A-PSAR-001, Rev. A, Vol. II,
SEAC Review Issue Draft, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, WA
WHC, 1994b, Conceptual Design Report Initial Tank Retrieval Systems, WHC-SD-
W211-CDR-002, Rev.0 DE-AC06-93-RL12359 U.S. Department of Energy, Kaiser
Engineers Hanford Company, Richland, WA
WHC, 1994c, Toxic Chemical Considerations for Tank Farm Releases, WHC-SD-WM-
SARR-011, Rev 0, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, WA
WHC, 1994d, Preliminary Safety Evaluation for 241-C-106 Waste Retrieval,
Project W-320, J.C.Conner, WHC-SD-WM-PSE-010, Rev. 2. October 1994,
Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, WA.
WHC, 1994e, Tank Farm HLW Compositions and Atmospheric Dispersion Coefficients
for Use in ASA Consequence Assessments, WHC-SD-WM-SARR-016, Rev. by A.V.
Savino and B.E. Hey, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, WA
WHC, 1994f, Letter Report Tank Primary Ventilation Process Flow Diagram
Description, W236A-T2-TR18, prepared for Westinghouse Hanford Company,
Richland, WA by ICF Kaiser Hanford Company.
WHC, 1994g, Supplemental PSAR Analysis, WHC-SD-W236A-ANAL-002, August 1994,
Additional Analysis Related to the MWTF.
WHC, 1994h, Environmental Releases for Calendar Year 1993, WHC-EP-0527-3, UC-
630, U.S. DOE, Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management, DOE-
AC06-87RL10930, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, WA
WHC, 1993a, Preliminary Safety Analysis Report, Replacement of the Cross-Site
Transfer System, Project 93L-EWW-058, WHC-SD-W058-PSAR-001, Rev. 0, Tank Farm
Safety Engineering, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, WA
WHC, 1993b, Preliminary Safety Evaluation for 101-SY Initial Tank Retrieval
System, Project W-211, Kidder, R. J., WHC-SD-W211-PSE-001, Rev. 0,
Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, WA
WHC, 1993c, Radionuclide and Chemical Inventories for the Double Shell Tanks,
Oscarson, E. E. and Tusler, L.A., WHC-SD-WM-TI-543, July 1993
WHC, 1993d, Pilot Plant Hot Test Facility Siting Study, WHC-SD-WM-TA-143,
Draft, Rev 0, Appendices A through N, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland,
WA
WHC, 1993e, SAR for Packaging Railroad Liquid Waste Tank Car, WHC-SD-RE-SAP-
013, Rev 5, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, WA
WHC, 1991a, SAR for the 204-AR Waste Unloading Facility, WHC-SD-WM-SAR-040,
Rev 0, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, WA
WHC, 1991b, Preliminary Safety Evaluation for the Replacement Cross-Site
Transfer System, Project W-058, WHC-SD-W058-PSE-001, Rev. 0, Vol. 1,
Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, WA
WHC, 1989, Operational Safety Analysis Report Cross-Country Waste Transfer
System, SD-WM-SAR-039, Rev 0, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, WA
WHC, 1988, Nonreactor Facility Safety Analysis Manual, Safety, Quality
Assurance and Security, WHC-CM-4-46, Level II, September 1988, Westinghouse
Hanford Company, Richland, WA
Accident Frequency Descriptions and Categories
Volumes of Tank Waste Transferred from the 200 West Area
under the Preferred Alternative
Estimated Health Effects from a RCSTS Unmitigated Transfer Pipe Break
under the Preferred Alternative
Estimated Health Effects from a RCSTS Mitigated Transfer Pipe Break
under the Preferred Alternative
Estimated Health Effects from a RCSTS Mitigated Spray Release
under the Preferred Alternative
Estimated Health Effects from ITRS Pipe Breaks
under the Preferred Alternative
Estimated Health Effects from ITRS Spray Releases
under the Preferred Alternative
Estimated Health Effects from PPSS Pipe Breaks under the Preferred Alternative
Estimated Health Effects from PPSS Spray Releases
under the Preferred Alternative
Effects of Truck Transfer Supporting Actions on Employment
Estimated Worker Exposure during Vehicle Surveys
under the Truck Transfer Alternative
Volumes of Tank Waste Transferred from the 200 West Area under the Truck
Transfer Alternative
Estimated Health Effects from In-Transit Breach of a LR-56(H) Tanker
under the Truck Transfer Alternative
Estimated Health Effects from In-Transit Breach of a 19,000-L (5,000-Gal)
Tanker under the Truck Transfer Alternative
Estimated Health Effects from a HLW Spill in the Load and Unload Facilities
under the Truck Transfer Alternative
Estimated Health Effects from Seismic Breach of LR-56(H) at the Load and
Unload Facilities under the Truck Transfer Alternative
Estimated Health Effects from Seismic Breach of 19,000-L (5,000-Gal) Tanker at
the Load and Unload Facilities under the Truck Transfer Alternative
Effects of Rail Transfer Supporting Actions on Employment
Estimated Worker Exposure during Vehicle Surveys
under the Rail Transfer Alternative
Volumes of Tank Waste Transferred from the 200 West Area under the Rail
Transfer Alternative
Estimated Health Effects from In-Transit Breach of a 38,000-L (10,000-Gal)
Rail Tanker under the Rail Transfer Alternative
Estimated Health Effects from Seismic Breach of 38,000-L (10,000-Gal) Rail
Tanker at the Load and Unload Facilities under the Rail Transfer Alternative
Air Concentrations from RCSTS and NTF Construction Dust Emissions
Maximum 24-Hour and Annual Ground Level Concentrations for Emissions from Two DSTs
Effects of New Storage Alternative on Employment
Radionuclide Emissions from the NTF
Estimated Annual Inhalation Dose from Airborne Emissions from the NTF
Chemical Emissions from the NTF
Volumes of Tank Waste Transferred Under the New Storage Alternative
Estimated Health Effects from a NTF Unmitigated Spray Releases
under the New Storage Alternative
Estimated Health Effects from a NTF Mitigated Spray Releases
under the New Storage Alternative
Estimated Health Effects from a NTF Beyond Design Basis Tank Leak
under the New Storage Alternative
Estimated Health Effects from a RCSTS Unmitigated Transfer Pipe Break
under the New Storage Alternative
Estimated Health Effects from a RCSTS Mitigated Transfer Pipe Break
under the New Storage Alternative
Estimated Health Effects from a RCSTS Mitigated Spray Release
under the New Storage Alternative
Estimated Health Effects from ITRS Unmitigated Pipe Breaks
under the New Storage Alternative
Estimated Health Effects from ITRS Mitigated Pipe Breaks
under the New Storage Alternative
Estimated Health Effects from an ITRS Unmitigated Spray Release
under the New Storage Alternative
Estimated Health Effects from an ITRS Mitigated Spray Release
under the New Storage Alternative
Estimated Annual Doses (mrem) for 1993 Airborne Emissions
from the 200 Areas
Airborne Concentrations of Toxic Chemicals
in the Vicinity of the S, SX, and SY Tank Farms
Volumes of Tank Waste Transferred from the 200 West Area under the No Action Alternative
Estimated Health Effects from an ECSTS Unmitigated Transfer Pipe Break
under the No Action Alternative
Estimated Health Effects from an ECSTS Unmitigated Spray Release
under the No Action Alternative
Estimated Health Effects from an ECSTS Mitigated Spray Release
under the No Action Alternative
Comparison of Alternatives
Purpose and Need
Summary of Actions by Alternative
Comparison of Potential Impacts
Comparison of Health Effects from Accidentsa Analyzed for Each Alternative
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
