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Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments

Bureau of Verification and Compliance
U.S. Department of State
Washington, DC
August 30, 2005

V. COMPLIANCE BY SUCCESSORS TO TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BILATERALLY WITH THE SOVIET UNION

A. THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) TREATY

The Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) was signed by U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev on December 8, 1987, and entered into force on June 1, 1988. Elimination of all declared missiles and launchers under the Treaty was completed in 1991.

The Treaty is of unlimited duration, and bans the possession, production, and flight testing of intermediate- and shorter-range missile systems. The Treaty required the complete elimination of all the approximately 800 U.S. and approximately 1,800 former Soviet ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, as well as their launchers and associated support equipment and structures. All such items were eliminated by May 28, 1991.

The United States has identified no INF Treaty compliance issues with its Treaty Partners as of this report. The United States will continue to verify compliance with the INF Treaty through NTM for the duration of the Treaty.

UPDATE ON SS-23 MISSILES

In 1990, the United States discovered that the Soviet Union had transferred a number of SS-23 shorter-range missiles to the former German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. While this transfer did not violate the INF Treaty since it occurred prior to Treaty signature, the United States had serious compliance concerns regarding this issue. The nations whose military forces held the SS-23 missiles were not INF Parties, and thus were never legally obligated under the Treaty. As a matter of policy, the United States has sought the destruction of these missiles in order to fulfill the objectives of the INF Treaty.

Germany and the Czech Republic destroyed their SS-23 missiles and associated support equipment during the 1990s.

The Slovak Republic, which gained possession of a number of SS-23 missiles following the "Velvet Divorce" with Czechoslovakia, agreed to destroy its missiles with financial assistance provided by the Department of State's Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF). On October 27, 2000, a team of U.S. observers confirmed that the Slovak Republic had completed the destruction of its SS-23 missiles and associated support equipment.

Bulgaria announced its intention in December 2001 to destroy its SS-23 missiles by October 2002. The United States offered to provide technical and financial assistance under the NDF, which Bulgaria accepted. The destruction of Bulgaria's SS-23 missiles began in July 2002. On January 16, 2004, a team of U.S. observers confirmed that Bulgaria had completed the destruction of its SS-23 missiles and associated support equipment. This issue has now been resolved.

B. THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (START)

Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine are in compliance with the START strategic offensive arms (SOA) central limits. Both the United States and Russia met the START seven-year reduction final ceilings of 1,600 delivery vehicles and 6,000 attributed warheads by the December 4, 2001, deadline. By December 2001, these four Former Soviet Union (FSU) successor states had reduced their aggregate forces to 1,136 deployed launchers, 5,518 deployed warheads, and 4,894 deployed ballistic missile warheads, as defined by Article II of the Treaty, and all strategic weapons had been removed or eliminated from the territories of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Additionally, START required the four FSU successor states to eliminate at least 154 heavy ICBM (SS-18)silo launchers by December 2001. In the original MOU, dated September 1, 1990, the Soviet Union declared 308 SS-18 heavy ICBM silo launchers. As of November 30, 2001, a total of 158 SS-18 silo launchers had been eliminated - 104 in Kazakhstan and 54 in Russia - leaving a total of 150 deployed heavy ICBMs.

The United States raised six new compliance issues during the period of this report. The United States considers four of these to have been closed. However, several previous - often long-standing - compliance issues remain unresolved. A number of these issues, some of which originated as early as the first year of Treaty implementation, highlight the different interpretations of the Parties about how to implement the complex inspection and verification provisions of the START Treaty.

ICBM ISSUES

Inability to Confirm during Reentry Vehicle Inspections (RVOSIs) that the Number of Attributed ICBM Warheads Has Not Been Exceeded. During RVOSIs of deployed Russian ICBMs, U.S. inspectors have been hampered, in some cases, from ascertaining whether the missile had a front section, or that the front section contained no more reentry vehicles (RVs) than the number of warheads attributed to a missile of the declared type under the Treaty.

The purpose of an RVOSI, as set forth in paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, is to confirm that a ballistic missile contains no more RVs than the number of warheads attributed to a missile of that type. The RVOSI procedures are referenced in paragraph 16 of Section IX of the Inspection Protocol and contained in Annex 3 to the Inspection Protocol. Paragraph 11 of Annex 3 allows the inspected Party to cover RVs. Inspectors have a right to view these covers and to measure hard covers prior to their placement on the RVs. The covers are then installed on the RVs before the inspectors view the front section. Under the Treaty, such covers must not hamper inspectors in ascertaining that the front section contains no more RVs than the number of warheads attributed to a missile of that type. Russian RV covers, in some instances, are too large; consequently, they fail to meet this requirement.

During certain RVOSIs, Russia did not demonstrate to the satisfaction of the U.S. inspection team that additional covered objects located on the front section, and declared by Russia not to be RVs, were not RVs. Although START does not differentiate between nuclear and non-nuclear RVs, Russia's willingness to use radiation detection equipment (RDE) during such RVOSIs to establish that the extra objects were not nuclear has been useful for resolving some, but not all, U.S. concerns.

FINDING. Russian RV covers, and their method of emplacement, have in some cases hampered U.S. inspectors from ascertaining that the front section of the missiles contains no more RVs than the number of warheads attributed to a missile of that type under the Treaty. Russian cooperation in the use of RDE and other measures has been helpful in addressing some, but not all, of the difficulties encountered by U.S. inspectors.

Russian Road-Mobile Launchers' "Break-in." Russia has failed to declare certain road-mobile launchers of ICBMs when they first leave their production facility, as required by the Treaty. Russia has moved some of these launchers to an undeclared "break-in" area located over 60 miles from the production facility without declaring that they have left the production facility and are accountable under the Treaty.

Pursuant to paragraph 6(b) of Article III of the Treaty, a mobile launcher of ICBMs becomes subject to the Treaty limitations when it first leaves a production facility. Not later than five days following the first exit of such a newly produced non-deployed road-mobile launcher, and its entry into Treaty accountability, Section I of the Notification Protocol requires the Party producing the new Treaty-accountable item to provide a notification of this change in data. Except for transits, Parties are proscribed from locating non-deployed mobile launchers outside the boundaries of the START-declared facilities identified in sub-paragraph 9(b) of Article IV of the Treaty.

FINDING. Russia continues to violate START provisions relevant to these obligations.

Deployed SS-25 Road-Mobile Launchers Based Outside Their Designated Restricted Areas. Russia based some deployed SS-25 road-mobile launchers outside their declared restricted areas (RAs) at two road-mobile ICBM bases while these RAs were under construction. The United States and Russia concluded a temporary, interim policy arrangement regarding the conduct of inspections and cooperative measures at the facilities where the launchers were housed during the period of construction. This arrangement permitted U.S. inspectors to conduct data update inspections and RVOSIs that they had not previously been able to perform, and allowed Russia to cooperate fully with providing cooperative measures access for the launchers that were previously unavailable. All of these road-mobile ICBMs and their launchers have since been transferred from their bases, and their declared RAs have been eliminated as START facilities.

FINDING. Notwithstanding the interim policy arrangement, Russia's practice of locating deployed SS-25 road-mobile launchers outside their declared RAs for long periods of time constituted basing in a manner that violated the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 9 of Article VI of the Treaty. This practice has ceased and the United States considers this issue closed.

Denial of the Right to Measure Certain Deployed ICBM Launch Canisters on Mobile Launchers. U.S. inspectors have been prevented from exercising the Treaty right to measure certain ICBM launch canisters on mobile launchers, both deployed and non-deployed, that are encountered during data update inspections to confirm data regarding the type of item of inspection. Russia, for instance, has prevented U.S. inspectors from measuring launch canisters for SS-24 ICBMs contained in rail-mobile launchers that are located within the boundaries of an inspection site. Similar concerns have arisen with regard to launch canisters for SS-25 and SS-27 mobile ICBMs located on road-mobile launchers. With regard to launch canisters for these latter types, Russia and the United States have agreed upon a policy arrangement to address this issue, though it has not yet been implemented for the SS-27 ICBM.

Subparagraph 20(a) of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol identifies ICBM launch canisters as one of the items of inspection for data update inspections. In accordance with the procedures in Annex 1 to the Inspection Protocol, inspectors have the right to confirm the number and, if applicable, the types of items of inspection that are specified for the facility to be inspected and declared for the inspection site, and the right to confirm the absence of any other item of inspection at the inspection site. Pursuant to paragraph 6 of Annex 1, inspectors may view and measure the dimensions of a launch canister declared to contain an item of inspection to confirm it is of the declared type.

FINDING. Russia prevented U.S. inspectors from exercising their Treaty right to measure launch canisters for SS-24 ICBMs contained in rail-mobile launchers that are located within the boundaries of an inspection site, in contravention of paragraphs 1 and 6 of Annex 1 to the Inspection Protocol. With regard to launch canisters for SS-25 and SS-27 ICBMs located on road-mobile launchers, the Parties have agreed upon a policy arrangement to address this issue, but it has not yet been implemented for the SS-27 ICBM.

TELEMETRY ISSUES

As part of the START verification regime, the Parties are obligated to notify each other of missile flight tests and to exchange telemetry tapes, tape summaries, interpretive data, and acceleration profiles for each flight test of a START-accountable ICBM or SLBM. The United States has raised several concerns regarding Russia's failure to provide all Treaty-required telemetry materials for some START-accountable flight tests in violation of paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article X of the Treaty, and paragraph 1 of Section I and paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol.

FINDING. Russia has in some instances failed to comply with Treaty requirements regarding the provision of telemetry information on missile flight testing pursuant to Article X of the START Treaty and Sections I and II of the Telemetry Protocol.