Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments
Bureau of Verification and Compliance
U.S. Department of State
Washington, DC
August 30, 2005
IV. ADHERENCE TO AGREEMENTS
A. POLICYEffective progress by the international community in achieving key arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament goals requires parties to comply fully with the obligations and commitments they have undertaken. Compliance with agreements or commitments freely negotiated or undertaken by parties is a fundamental cornerstone of U.S. national security policy and a bedrock norm of international relations. The rigorous U.S. approach to compliance is deeply rooted in our own legal system and fundamental principles and values. To that end, the United States is committed to adhering to the same high standard of compliance that it requires of others. In order to provide policymakers with information they need to fulfill their responsibilities, this Report identifies not only countries that we assess to be violating their obligations or commitments, but also those about which the United States has developed concerns about potential noncompliance. Every effort is made clearly to distinguish such cases, but it is important to raise both types of issues for attention.
B. U.S. ORGANIZATIONS AND PROGRAMS TO EVALUATE AND ENSURE TREATY COMPLIANCE
Our deep-seated legal tradition, a commitment to U.S. agreements that enhance our security and that of our allies and friends, and the transparency and accountability that result from our open and democratic society, create powerful incentives to comply with agreements to control nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, and other dangerous technologies. Legal and institutional procedures to ensure compliance have been established, and specialized compliance-related organs set up within the U.S. Government by law and by longstanding policy; they reflect the seriousness with which these obligations are taken and they reinforce these underlying policies and principles. Department of Defense (DoD) compliance review groups, for instance, oversee and manage DoD compliance with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and related commitments. The Verification and Compliance Analysis Working Group (VCAWG), an interagency organization, oversees and manages analysis of compliance of other nations with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and related commitments. In addition, the VCAWG participates actively in the preparation of this annual report detailing the assessment of both the United States' and other nations' adherence to obligations undertaken in arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements, and related commitments. Moreover, an interagency review is conducted in appropriate cases, including when other Treaty Parties officially raise questions regarding U.S. implementation of its obligations. In addition, federal law mandates the existence, within the U.S. State Department, of the Bureau of Verification and Compliance; this bureau is devoted by law to detecting and assessing noncompliance with such agreements and commitments. U.S. law also mandates the production of this report on compliance with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments, the compliance findings of which are discussed and debated extensively within the U.S. interagency community and then forwarded to Congress by the Secretary of State on behalf of the President. Finally, Congress - which has long shown a keen interest in compliance matters - performs oversight functions through committee hearings, budget allocations, and a variety of formal and informal investigative means pursuant to its powers as a coordinate branch of the U.S. federal system.
C. IMPORTANCE OF TREATY AND COMMITMENT ENFORCEMENT
The United States uses its assessments of a country's compliance with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments as guides to policymaking. Such agreements and commitments cannot serve their purpose of increasing U.S. and international security if countries do not fulfill their obligations or pledges. Verification, compliance assessment, and enforcement are sometimes seen as separate and separable activities, but they are not: all three elements are interrelated, and none can have real value without the others. Compliance enforcement is an essential component of the process. Only by making violators face consequences for their violations can they be expected to take compliance seriously, and only by making violators face such consequences will other would-be violators be deterred. Indeed, without taking steps to bring such compliance pressure to bear, or to counter the threats posed by noncompliance, there would be little point in trying to detect noncompliance in the first place. The United States works vigorously not just to detect noncompliance but also to induce violators to return to compliance. Because all participating states have a similar security interest in ensuring compliance, we urge other countries to do the same.
Though the most immediate responsibilities for compliance enforcement will vary depending upon the nature of the agreement or commitment in question, all responsible members of the international community share a common security interest in ensuring that parties to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments comply with their undertakings. A wide range of tools is available for compliance enforcement purposes, including diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions. The United States supports effective compliance enforcement, and, in furtherance of this goal, seeks to build international coalitions to exert effective compliance pressures upon violators - either to induce a return to compliance or to thwart or degrade the advantages the violator may seek to obtain from its noncompliance. The United States also is prepared to employ unilateral measures when necessary and appropriate to address such noncompliance.
1. NONCOMPLIANCE CHALLENGES AND REQUIRED RESPONSES
Two themes emerged over the past two years as this Report was prepared and updated - first, that serious compliance challenges exist, but also that countries can make the strategic decision to come into compliance, particularly if other parties work to seek such a strategic commitment.
There has been a serious failure by two NPT Parties to comply with the core nonproliferation undertakings of Articles II and III of the Treaty. The United States and other like-minded states have been struggling with one such case for more than a decade. North Korea has violated these Articles by its continued development of plutonium weapons and pursuit of uranium ones, and it has refused thus far to make the strategic decision to accept the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear program. Another case of Article II and III violations has thrust itself upon the attention of the international community as more and more of Iran's secret nuclear weapons programs have been exposed to public view. Such cases illustrate the challenge of persuading committed violators to reverse their violations and enforcing full adherence to and compliance with the NPT's core nonproliferation obligations. Other international arms control and nonproliferation regimes or commitments face their own sets of compliance challenges.
On the other hand, the world has observed the emergence of a few remarkable compliance success stories. Most significant is Libya's historic announcement, on December 19, 2003, to renounce its pursuit of WMD and long-range missiles and its implementation of that commitment. Similarly, Albania's actions to declare newly discovered chemical weapons, obtain an extension to its CW destruction deadlines, and work transparently and cooperatively to ensure the security and elimination of these chemical weapons stocks set a positive precedent for CWC compliance and deserve to be commended.
2. ENFORCING COMPLIANCE
Even if violations are detected early and are quickly understood as such, an arms control, nonproliferation or disarmament regime can still be in peril if its members are unable or unwilling to address them as compliance challenges. Detection is only part of what is needed: violations must have consequences. National governments play a critical role both in deterring and detecting violations, and in taking resolute action - individually and collectively - to enforce compliance and hold violators accountable for their actions. Verification only works when these elements act together to deter, detect, and remedy noncompliance.
D. U.S. COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION, AND DISARMAMENT ARGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS
1. U.S. INSTITUTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL ORGANIZATION FOR ENSURING COMPLIANCE
There are three major programs within the U.S. executive branch that operate to ensure that U.S. plans and programs remain consistent with U.S. international obligations. These procedures include internal Department of Defense (DoD) controls, Department of Energy (DOE) procedures and controls, and separate evaluations produced by the Department of State. These procedures operate in parallel, and in addition, to congressional oversight.
In 1972, by direction of the President, the DoD established a process to ensure that all DoD programs comply with U.S. international obligations. Under this compliance process (established with the SALT I agreements), key offices in DoD are responsible for overseeing DoD compliance with all U.S. arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament commitments. DoD components ensure that their implementing program offices adhere to DoD compliance directives and seek guidance from the offices charged with oversight responsibility. Interagency reviews are also conducted in appropriate cases, such as when other Treaty Parties formally raise questions regarding U.S. implementation of its arms control obligations.
2. TREATY COMPLIANCE
The United States is in compliance with all its obligations under arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements, and continues to make every effort to comply scrupulously. Because of the breadth and intrusiveness of most arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament regimes and their extensive notification and data exchange requirements, the United States has on occasion committed some errors in meeting our treaty obligations. When our Treaty Partners have raised compliance questions regarding U.S. implementation activities, the United States has carefully reviewed the matter to determine whether its actions were in compliance with its treaty obligations. When an error has been made, the United States has acknowledged this fact to our Treaty Partners and taken steps to correct the problem.
3. ISSUES RAISED BY OTHER TREATY PARTIES CONCERNING U.S. COMPLIANCE
a. THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) TREATY
The Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) required the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, their launchers and associated support equipment and permanently banned the possession, production, and flight-testing of such missiles. The United States and the Soviet Union completed the elimination of all declared INF-prohibited systems in 1991. Inspection rights under the Treaty ceased at midnight on May 31, 2001.
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, all 12 former Soviet republics became Parties to the Treaty. The United States, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine are the active participants in the Special Verification Commission (SVC), the implementing body for the INF Treaty.
Russia has expressed INF compliance concerns related to certain procedures used during past inspections in the United States, and to the treaty status of specific missiles and a silo test launcher. With regard to each of these concerns, the United States has determined that it is in full compliance with the INF Treaty. U.S. officials have addressed these concerns in great detail in the SVC, through diplomatic channels, and meetings at the political level, explaining why U.S. actions are fully consistent with the Treaty.
b. THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (START)
The entry into force of the START Treaty on December 5, 1994, ushered in a verification regime of unprecedented complexity and intrusiveness. In addition to verification by national technical means, data notifications, missile flight test telemetry exchanges, and other cooperative measures, the Treaty provides for 12 types of on-site inspections and exhibitions, as well as continuous on-site monitoring activities at specified facilities. As required, the Parties have exchanged updated START Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) data on a semiannual basis and continued to exercise their right to conduct on-site inspections. During 2002 and 2003, the United States hosted 30 such on-site inspections each year at U.S. facilities.
As might be expected under a verification regime with the breadth and intrusiveness of START, a number of compliance questions have been raised by our Treaty Partners. These questions primarily concern procedural issues related to inspections, flight tests of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and telemetry, as well as a few substantive disagreements with U.S. equipping and positioning of its heavy bombers and the nature of certain intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers. A number of these issues have been resolved in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) and through diplomatic channels, while others have been under active discussion since 1995.
With regard to each of these concerns, the United States has determined that it is in full compliance with the START Treaty. U.S. officials have addressed these concerns in great detail in the JCIC, through diplomatic channels, and meetings at the political level, explaining why U.S. actions are fully consistent with the Treaty.
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