Rear operations ensure freedom of
maneuver and continuity of operations. Rear operations are conducted
using the basic tenets of Army operations discussed in Chapter
Enemy forces may threaten rear areas
during operations. Their purpose is to seize and maintain the
initiative while degrading or eliminating a unit's flexibility
and capability to sustain close operations. Rear-area activities
are the most lucrative targets for enemy NBC use. Disruption of
logistical operations by the use of NBC weapons is an integral
part of enemy tactics. Attacking our sustainment nodes weakens
main battle area force effectiveness, places persistent chemicals
out of an enemy's immediate maneuver, and permits subsequent rapid
and deep penetrations to achieve their operational objectives.
To achieve these aims, threat activities in rear areas will target
key critical support and logistic facilities and units with NBC
and conventional weapons. These areas will include--
- Special weapon storage sites and
- Command and control facilities.
- Air defense artillery sites.
- Main supply routes.
Three levels of threat activity define
planning rear operations. These levels focus on the nature of
the friendly response required to defeat the threat.
- Level I threats are those that can
be defeated by base or base cluster self-defense measures. Examples
of a level I threat are--
- Enemy-controlled agent activities.
- Sabotage by enemy sympathizers.
- Terrorist activities.
- Level II threats are those that are
beyond base or base cluster self-defense capabilities and can
be defeated by response forces, normally MPs with supporting fires.
Examples of a level II threat are--
- Diversionary and sabotage operations conducted by unconventional/special forces.
- Raid, ambush, and recon operations conducted by small combat units.
- Special or Conventional warfare missions.
Both Threat level I and II forces
are capable of using CB weapons against rear-area units.
- Level III threats are those that
necessitate committing a tactical combat force. Examples of a
level III threat are--
- Heliborne operations helicopter-home operations.
- Airborne operations.
- Amphibious operations.
- Ground force operations (for example, mechanized unit linkup with smaller airborne and assault units).
- Infiltration operations.
These threat activities will not
occur in a specific order nor is there a necessary interrelationship
between levels. Rear areas may face one or all threat level activities
at one time. Additionally, some level I and level II threat activities
will likely begin well ahead of general hostilities.
In addition to introducing ground
forces into rear areas, enemy doctrine integrates tactical air
force and attack helicopter strikes; the delivery of long-range
artillery, missiles, and rockets; and radio electronic combat
into their deep operations planning.
The rear operations commander commands
and controls the planning and execution of rear operations. The
rear operations commander at division is the ADC-S; at corps,
the deputy corps commander; and at EAC, the theater army commander.
The theater army commander usually delegates coordinating responsibilities
for rear operations to the ASCC who in turn delegates to his ASG
commanders. The rear operations commander exercises his rear operations
responsibilities through the rear command post (CP) at corps and
division. At EAC, the TA, ASCC, and ASG commanders exercise their
responsibilities through their respective operations centers.
The three fundamentals of NBC defense
discussed in Chapter 4 must be integrated throughout all CS and
CSS operations in the rear area.
Contamination avoidance and control
are key to reducing the effects of the NBC battlefield. Since
rear-area activities make the most lucrative targets, they use
the passive measures of contamination avoidance before hostilities
commence to minimize the effects of NBC attacks. Once NBC weapons
have been used, units implement contamination control that encompasses
decisions to limit the spread of contamination and reduce
or eliminate its effect on sustained operations. Further, systems
warning, reporting, locating, and identifying NBC hazards are
emplaced to give indication of presence or absence of these hazards
and what type hazard is present in order to determine duration
and recognize symptoms.
Protection and decon measures must
be taken when NBC contamination is unavoidable. Individual soldiers
and units upgrade their MOPP level and seek collective protection
for rest and relief. Collective protection must be provided to
critical functions, such as operations cells and medical treatment
facilities. Decon operations reduce the immediate NBC hazards
and bring a unit back to some degree of mission effectiveness.
Decon also may allow troops to reduce their MOPP level and operate
in a contamination-free environment. Protection and decon need
to be integrated into all work and rest and relief activities.
The CSS cell of the rear CP plans
and directs sustainment operations throughout the rear area. Synchronization
of sustainment with the commander's concept of operation is critical
to the success of close and deep operations. Rear operations ensure
that sustainment is not degraded and do not limit the commander's
freedom of maneuver while maintaining continuity of operations
under NBC conditions. Task organization of chemical units supporting
rear operations should be tailored to IPB and vulnerability analyses
and keyed to each phase of the battle. The division chemical officer
provides advice on coordinating US and host nation assets at critical
times to maintain sustainment. NBC recon, decon, and smoke units,
controlled by a chemical battalion working with the rear CP operationscell, and tactical combat forces (TCFs) support sustainment throughout
To the degree possible, CSS facilities
are dispersed to minimize the effect of enemy NBC attacks. The
CSS cell at corps and below and the ASCC/ASG at EAC must anticipate,
plan, and coordinate the relocation of CSS units in the rear area
as situation changes.
Coordination with many organizations
is critical. Terrain management and response to NBC events influence
a broad range of logistical activities. Key operators include
transportation, supply, engineer, and military police. Coordination
with S3/G3s (higher, lower, and adjacent) is imperative to assess
the impact on present and future operations. Also, the rear CP
coordinates through the G5 for HNS for sustainment operations
in the rear area.
In the division and corps, the operations
cell of the rear CP is responsible for the rear-areas IPB. The
rear CP operations cell uses IPB products from the division, corps,
or TA it supports. Combined with information gained from transiting
units, it prepares intelligence updates and identifies likely
enemy targets and intentions. This estimate, along with information
on the current enemy situation, is disseminated to all units in
the rear area; it forms the basis for planning and conducting
the rear-area NBC defense operations.
One of the functions of the rear
CP operations cell is to gather and disseminate early warning
information regarding enemy air activities. It collects air threat
early warning information from the division, corps, and EAC air
defense early warning nets; Army airspace command and control
element at each echelon; Air Force tactical air control party
airlift element; and other Air Force control teams that may be
operating in the rear. Once the warning is received, the rear
CP operations cell immediately notifies the tactical combat force,
response forces, and all bases and base clusters in the rear area.
Each base and base cluster commander
integrates NBC defense considerations designed to detect, defeat,
and minimize the effects of enemy NBC attacks. He bases this integration
on the IPB provided by the rear CP, his own IPB, the current intelligence
situation, and an analysis of his unit(s) mission requirements.
To maximize unit mission accomplishment, defense plans must remain
flexible. This flexibility will allow for differing degrees of
preparation based on the probability of enemy activities. Base
cluster commanders will basically rely upon the NBC assets from
their cluster units.
Defense plans include analyses of
critical functions and priorities for NBC survivability actions.
NBC recon, decon, smoke, and flame operations are integrated for
base cluster defense plans. Obscurants may be used to improve
survivability during windows of increased vulnerability, such
as imminent air attacks, command post displacements, or critical
operations like fast refuel, ammunition transfers, or MSR repair.
Reconstitution sites, staging areas, or loading activities by
base clusters are more survivable and less detectable under obscurant
screens. Obscurant hazes and self-defense smoke use are best for
rear operations in order not to complicate mobility and coordination
of logistic actions. Some trade-offs need to be made between the
level of increased survivability with the logistical cost of sustaining
the smoke screens. Large-area smoke screens restrict enemy air-landing
zones and, along with deceptive screens, enhance rear-area missions.
These plans should also include--
- Use of observation posts/listening
posts and/or patrols.
- Assignment of defense sectors to
- Integration of available weapons
into the defense.
- Identification of unit response forces.
- Air, ground, and NBC attack alarm
- Obstacle planning.
- Area damage control.
- Internal air defense measures.
- Fire support planning.
Defense plans include MP units providing
area security and/or battlefield circulation control in the vicinity
of the base or base cluster. The rear operations cell integrates
those into the overall rear defense and the support plans. Defense
plans will be coordinated with adjacent bases and base clusters
to maximize mutual support and to prevent killing each other.
Flame is used to complement defense plans and restrict use of
Units operating in the base or base
cluster submit requests for NBC recon, decon, and smoke support
to the base or base cluster commander. Some bases and base clusters
may have chemical units located with them.
Base or base cluster commanders will
establish an operations center capable of maintaining 24-hour
communications with the rear operations cell for intelligence,
tactical information, and/or direction and with their parent organization
for unit mission guidance. Additionally, base or base cluster
commanders will establish communications with and have operational
control to direct defensive operations of other units occupying
terrain within their base or base cluster.
Large fixed sites, such as ports,
airfields, and railheads, require thorough base or base cluster
defense planning. These sites are likely to be pretargeted before
hostilities begin. See FM 3-4-1 or
FM 90-12 for fixed site planning
Mission-essential civilians should
to be identified so that they can be given NBC equipment, such
as MOPP gear, and trained to use it. Individual, such as forklift
operation, vehicle mechanics, and dispatchers, who are critical
to mission accomplishment are mission essential. Bases will normally
deny entry to non-mission-essential civilians during wartime.
However, the commander is responsible for ensuring NBC protection
of official civilian visitors to the base.
Units in the base or base cluster
submit their NBC reports to the base or base cluster operations
cell and to their parent unit simultaneously. They also warn adjacent
units within the base or base cluster. The base or base cluster
operation cell submits its NBC reports to its next higher headquarters
rear CP operations cell at corps or the rear CP at division. The
base or base cluster operation cell warns adjacent bases or base
clusters, host nation counterparts, cluster units, and sister
services. See Chapter 3 for discussion of the NBCWRS.
Area damage control (ADC) operations
facilitate the return of base or base clusters to mission capability
with effective planning, establishment of specific responsibilities,
and use of all available assets. ADC forces (organic or support)
focus on a rapid response to aid in a base or base cluster's recovery
following an attack. ADC measures are those taken before, during,
and after hostile action or natural disasters to reduce the probability
of damage, to minimize its effects, and to aid in the continuation
or reestablishment of normal operations (see FM 90-23 for the
list of these measures). The rear CP operations cell, along with
their associated NBCC, will designate the response to bases or
base clusters who require additional chemical support. Response
may include HNS. Once designated, ADC forces must coordinate with
supported bases or base clusters to assist in recovery. ADC resources
should not be expended for removing rubble and debris that have
no bearing on mission accomplishment.
The commander's concept and intent,
the rear-area IPB, and the rear CP operations cell operations
officer's priorities drive ADC force planning. ADC forces meld
this information into their own IPB and position themselves in
the area where they can beat provide timely support to threatened
The TA commander is responsible for ADC in the COMMZ and establishes overall priorities. The TA deputy chief of staff for operations sets and prioritizes overall ADC requirements relative to the TA's mission and capabilities. He establishes these priorities in coordination with the senior theater component commands, supported area commands, and supporting TA functional commands. The ASCC commanders and ASG commanders are responsible for planning ADC operations that use assets within their areas. They plan ADC operations through their respective rear CP operations cell. Senior commanders of bases and installations within the COMMZ coordinate requirements for ADC with the TA commander. At EAC, overall NBC fictions (comprising NBC defense, decon, and smoke) are normally the responsibility of the host nation. However, chemical units are available to all AASCS and ASGs to provide NBC defense, decon, and smoke support to all units in the ASCC area of responsibility. See FM 90-23 for further discussion of ADC operations.
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