Battle management under NBC
conditions consists of actions that provide US forces with an
operational and tactical advantage over their adversaries. Battle
management requires direct involvement of the chemical leader
or staff officer, who integrates chemical operational elements
into the commander's concept of the operation. These elements
- Battlefield assessment and
- NBC warning and reporting.
- NBC recon, decon, and smoke
- Nuclear employment operations.
- Flame operations.
Chemical leaders or advisors
ensure proper chemical planning measures are incorporated into
appropriate staff estimates. They ensure the flow of NBC information
supports the current and future battle planning process. Battle
management requires effective working relationships with the primary
staff and special staff elements such as the air defense, fire
support, engineer, aviation, and air liaison officers.
Battle management at theater
strategic and operational levels provide theater and operational-level
commanders information on the enemy's tempo of operations under
NBC conditions. It provides a "near-real time" picture
of enemy NBC capabilities. This information allows commanders
to adjust their plans based on NBC hazards and friendly opportunities
for nuclear operations.
Battle management at the tactical level
of war enables the tactical commander to continue effective battle
operations under NBC conditions. It also provides a "near-real
time" portrayal of enemy NBC capabilities at brigade, division,
and corps levels. It specifically helps units and soldiers avoid
enemy NBC attacks and limit contamination. It allows rapid dissemination
of information on required protective measures. It provides early
warning of NBC attack to units and soldiers. It helps commanders
obtain the chemical assets they need to accomplish their missions.
Battle management is equally
important for combat, CS, and CSS units. It may call for chemical
specific actions, such as planning for a thorough decon contingency
mission. Alternatively it may involve actions that are not specifically
chemical in nature. These actions could include monitoring a subordinate
unit's status or passing intelligence information. Chemical unit
commanders and chemical advisors at every level conduct battle
Chemical brigades, battalions,
and companies have expertise and sources of NBC information beyond
those of a nonchemical unit. So they have many opportunities to
influence battle management under NBC conditions. Chemical units
occupy a special role in battle management. The chemical unit
commanders work closely with the maneuver commander and S3/G3
on NBC requirements. They position chemical assets to support
the maneuver commander's concept of operations. Chemical units
gather information about a wide area of the battlefield. They
feed information on NBC hazards into the S3/G3. They help verify
enemy first-use of agents. Chemical unit functions are described
in Chapter 7 of this manual.
Mission accomplishment under
NBC conditions requires "near-real time" collection
and dissemination of NBC information. Units are authorized chemical
officers and NCOs to facilitate operations under NBC conditions.
As part of the responsibilities (see Appendix B of this manual)
the chemical officer or NCO--
- Assesses friendly vulnerability.
- Receives, collates, and transmits
- Recommends the use of assigned
or attached chemical units.
- Provides support for nuclear
Before the battle, commanders
give their concept of the operation to their coordinating staff
officers. The chemical staff officer works closely with the coordinating
staff as they prepare staff estimates based on the commander's
guidance. As soon as the first operation order (OPORD) is published
and the battle progresses, commanders and their staffs continually
plan and/or improve the current, and future phases of the battle.
The chemical advisor coordinates with the following staff officers
on NBC defense, smoke, and flame issues.
The Sl/G1-AG and chemical
staff assess the probability and impact of NBC-related casualties.
They also need to assess shortfalls of NBC military occupational
specialties (MOSS) and NBC personnel readiness issues. This is
especially critical when a majority of our NBC forces are Reserve
Component, arriving in theater at various times, and spread over
echelon above corps (EAC), corps support command (COSCOM), and
divisional units. The S1/Gl-AG and medical officer ensure field
medical support is available and prepared for an NBC attack. They
advise the commander on the medical effects of NBC weapons, treatment
and protection available. The medical officer provides recommendations
on associated environmental concerns, such as heat stress in MOPP.
The chemical staff checks with the S1/G1-AG on the impact of NBC
casualties on the unit throughout all phases of operations. The
S1/G1 also monitors the OEG of units in coordination with the
chemical officer and surgeon.
Intelligence Officer (S2/G2)
The chemical staff works with
the S2/G2 on weather and terrain data. They assess whether environmental
factors are conducive to enemy use of NBC weapons or friendly
use of nuclear weapons. The S2/G2 information requirements include
enemy situation and ability to use NBC weapons. The chemical staff
aggressively supports the S2/G2 in the development of PIR. He
assists in the IPB process for all phases of operations, determining
and/or evaluating enemy capabilities, types of agents, types of
obscurants and sensors, protective posture, line-of-sight influences
on direct fire, and friendly vulnerabilities to enemy strengths.
The S2/G2 also provides information on enemy vulnerability to
friendly operations (for example, smoke and obscurants).
Operations Officer (S3/G3)
The chemical staff recommends
proper MOPP guidance, troop safety criteria, and OEG. They also
recommend priorities for limited NBC defense resources to the
S3/G3 through all phases of operations. The chemical staff supports
the battle managers (S3/G3) in several ways. They recommend task
organizations for chemical units, coordinates smoke, decon, and
NBC recon with chemical units, and provide guidance on flame operations.
Further, the chemical staff
advises the commander on the impact of NBC-related attacks on
the current, and future concept of operations. They also provide
input to the maneuver commander reference nuclear target analysis,
hazard predictions, vulnerability analysis, control of chemical
units, mitigating techniques, and recommending priorities for
actions such as decon or NBC recon support or chemical defense
equipment (CDE) resupply. The chemical staff recommends to the
S3/G3 decon and smoke support assets required for vulnerable rear
area targets. These targets include MSRs, maintenance, and supply
Logistics Officer (S4/G4)
The chemical staff must coordinate
with the S4/G4 concerning MOPP gear, decontaminants, and resupply
requirements throughout all phases of operations. The S4/G4 and
chemical staff officer must know the rate and extent of the unit's
decon capability. They also must plan to decontaminate contaminated
supplies or equipment. In addition, the chemical staff officer
keeps the S4/G4 abreast of any reported NBC contamination to MSRs,
critical supply and maintenance facilities that affect unit sustainability.
He also advises the S4/G4 on ways to limit the need for decon
of supplies, which includes the use of disposable protective wraps
Civil Affairs Officer
(G5), Public Affairs Officer (PAO)
The chemical staff works with
the G5 on estimating the impact of NBC events on the civilian
population in the unit's operational area. Psychological operations
are also considered when estimating the impact of NBC events.
Mass population movements impact mission accomplishment. The chemical
staff and the FSCOORD coordinate with the G5 when planning targets
for nuclear weapons to avoid collateral damage to civilian population
centers, if possible. The G5 advises on appropriate preclusion
overlays to assist in target analysis. The chemical staff coordinates
with the G5 for integration of host nation assets into decon operations,
such as field expedient decon equipment and supplies (steam cleaners
and bleach), fire trucks, and wash racks. They also consider the
integration of field expedient NBC protective shelters, such as
existing buildings in local population centers. The chemical staff
and the medical officer coordinate with the G5 for availability
of host nation hospitals for the treatment of NBC casualties.
The chemical staff works with
the PAO to inform the local civilian community of safety precautions
or evacuation routes. The chemical staff also provides the PAO
with information concerning the effects of enemy use of WMD. Information,
as approved by the Unified Command PAO, is used to educate US
and international populations on the effects of such weapons and
the facts surrounding their use. The information is also used
to keep soldiers aware of the types of NBC weapons used.
The chemical staff works with
the engineer staff to identify NBC obstacles and plan for the
use of smoke and obscurants at river crossings sites and obstacle
breaching. The chemical staff coordinates engineer support for
NBC decon and survivability operations. Smoke, obscurants, and
flame weapons are considered necessary to form or reinforce the
unit's obstacle plan.
Fire Support Officer (FSO)
The chemical staff works with
the fire support officer on the effects of friendly nuclear attacks.
The FSO and chemical staff work together to nominate nuclear targets,
conduct target analysis, and provide recommendations to the commander
on use. At the battalion/brigade level the chemical staff and
FSO also work together to plan the use of obscurants and riot
Air Liaison Officer (ALO)
The chemical staff works with
the air liaison officer to provide information, as needed, on
obscurant use and NBC defense protection measures for supporting
Air Force personnel. The chemical staff also provides needed information
to the ALO on chemical downwind hazards. In coordination with
logistics personnel, the ALO and chemical staff assist with immediate
airlift requirements for needed stocks such as chemical defense
equipment. The chemical staff also coordinates with the ALO on
use of friendly nuclear strikes.
Air Defense Artillery
The chemical staff and ADA
officer coordinate to exchange information on smoke use, NBC defense,
and chemical downwind hazards from enemy NBC attack. ADA units
can also provide needed data for NBC reports as part of the system
of designated observers.
chemical staff and aviation officer coordinate to exchange information
on smoke planning and execution, NBC defense, and chemical downwind
hazards. NBC survey requirements are also closely coordinated.
Coordination, as needed, is also provided to logistics personnel
on aerial resupply of critically needed supplies.
The chemical staff and provost
marshal coordinate and exchange needed information on NBC defense,
especially needed data on NBC identification, detection, and warning.
Timely information exchange on NBC defense is especially important
for battlefield circulation control. Traffic control points should
be well informed on the location of any contamination.
NBC vulnerability analysis
is an important part of battlefield assessment and risk analysis.
Commanders, with staff input, assess their units' vulnerability
to NBC attacks and obscurant use. Commanders determine the protection
of the units versus the enemy's capability to use WMD. They estimate
the likely impact of NBC attacks, and based on the concept of
the operation, determine methods of reducing any impact to allow
mission accomplishment. A separate vulnerability y analysis is
made for a nuclear, biological, and chemical attack because of
the specific nature of each type of use. For a nuclear attack
commanders consider the size and location of units and sensitivity
of equipment. For a biological or chemical attack, they consider
the protection available and the type and the amount of agent
Commanders reduce vulnerability
to NBC weapons through the use of active and passive measures.
(Active measures are those taken to find and destroy either the
munitions or the delivery systems; passive measures are those
taken to avoid or reduce the effects of NBC weapons. )
Commanders assess their units'
and the enemy's vulnerability when operating in an obscured environment.
This analysis requires an understanding of Threat smoke capabilities
and what types of obscurants will degrade friendly target acquisition
and guidance systems. In addition, commanders determine enemy
vulnerabilities to friendly obscurants. They base this determination
on what the friendly spectral obscurant capability is and what
systems it will defeat.
Based on the commander's PIR,
the S2/G2 directs the collection, evaluation, and production of
intelligence for identifying and targeting enemy NBC weapons and
Targets are identified which
contribute to the success of the enemy's battle plans, and the
most effective attack asset is used. The intelligence cycle estimates
enemy capabilities, courses of action, and locations of the enemy's
various units. These estimates form the basis for identifying
high-value targets and predicting enemy intentions. A target analyst
reviews probable enemy courses of actions (allows the start of
preliminary targeting). The target and intelligence analysts estimate
a correlation between an expected event within the geographical
location and the time the event is expected to take place. Target
analysis for nuclear weapons is a continuous process. The focus
of nuclear planning, at any level, is command guidance. Amplifying
guidance, as well as changes and modifications to the original
guidance, may be generated by the staffs and commanders when required
by the changing battlefield situation. com mand guidance for targets
using nuclear weapons includes intent, casualties desired, amount
and duration of contamination, and degree of assurance required.
An integral part of battle
management is an NBC warning and reporting system (NBCWRS). This
system provides commanders information on NBC hazards that could
profoundly affect their concept of operations. The NBCWRS is used
to rapidly report an NBC attack. These reports are transmitted
to higher, subordinate, and adjacent headquarters. They inform
these headquarters of predicted and actual contamination within
their area of operations. Each report has a specific purpose and
uses standard codes to shorten and simplify the reporting process.
See Figure 3-1 for a brief explanation of the formats and letter
codes for the six standard reports (NBC 1 through 6). A detailed
explanation appears in FM 3-3 and 3-3-1.
The process of reporting NBC
data involves units at every echelon. These units must establish
controls on handling NBC information. Without such controls too
much raw data may flood the communications system. Uncontrolled
NBC message traffic may overload communications and disrupt tactical
NBCWRS management is effected
by the information available and personnel available to collect
it. Information maybe immediate without detail, such as the first
report by an observer of an NBC attack. Information obtained by
monitoring, surveying, and reconnoitering provides location, type,
and strength (radiation) of the hazard.
Observer reports (NBC 1) provide
initial information about the attack and is the most widely used.
This information allows the NBC center (NBCC) (EAC, corps, or
division) to predict the location of nuclear and chemical hazard
contamination. This prediction (NBC 3 report) is only an estimate
of where the hazard area will be. The unit standing operating
procedure (SOP) should designate primary and alternate units for
observing and reporting nuclear attacks. Different observers may
be designated as the battlefield situation changes. The designated
observer system provides the essential data for hazard location
predictions and nuclear damage assessment. The NBCC specifies
the precedence of the report and the primary and alternate means
of communication. Observers are selected to provide total coverage.
This coverage requires ground and aerial observers (see FM 3-3-1
for more information on ground and aerial observers). All units
are required to record their observations concerning nuclear strikes
in the prescribed format. Nondesignated units do not send reports
unless specifically requested by the NBCC to do so.
The NBCC requires feedback from units to determine the exact location of contamination. It makes this determination from monitoring, surveying, and reconnoitering (NBC 4) reports. Initial monitoring reports, providing location of contamination, are forwarded to the NBCC. If additional information is needed, the NBCC recommends a unit (because of its location or capability) be tasked to obtain it.
Collecting NBC information
is a joint effort between units and the NBCC. The NBCC plans for
and directs collection efforts, in coordination with the intelligence
community, while units collect this information.
Collected NBC data are evaluated
and used as battlefield intelligence. The NBCC is the primary
evaluation center. Units and intermediate headquarters use raw
data to do quick, simplified evaluations. These results should
be used until the detailed evaluations arrive from the NBCC.
Critical NBC reports (observers'
initial report) usually flow through command channels. However,
there are exceptions--
- When the NBCC requests survey
information, the unit doing the survey may report its data to
the NBCC. This reporting is done during ground or aerial surveys.
- Attached units, operational
control (OPCON) units, or units that provide area support report
information to the supported headquarters.
The method of transmitting
information depends on the tactical situation and mission of the
unit. NBC reports normally pass through the operations net. Wire
transmission is an alternate means. The NBCC should evaluate all
possible methods of communications and recommend those that best
serve the purpose.
See FM 3-3-1 for further information on techniques and procedures. Units affected by a friendly nuclear strike must be warned whenever possible. Warnings must be encoded or sent via secure means to avoid warning the enemy. A warning may be sent in the clear only if there is no time for the enemy to react.
There are several ways to
speed the warning. SOPs establish general procedures for passing
a friendly nuclear attack warning and reaction to it.
Operation plans (OPLANS) can
add more specific instructions about a particular operation, such
as code words for a preplanned attack.
While a nuclear attack is
being planned, a warning order may be given to alert troops in
an affected area. They should remain alert for a follow-up message
that will cancel, confirm, or alter the warning. All of these
(SOPs, OPLANs, and warning orders) allow commanders to react or
hold a warning until the last moment to achieve surprise.
Friendly forces who may be
affected by a strike should receive a warning. Sometimes this
warning is not possible. While good SOPs help, commanders must
weigh the effects of the strike on their own personnel versus
the effects on an unwarned enemy. When low-yield weapons are employed
in dynamic situations, operational requirements may dictate some
relaxation of the warning requirement.
Target analysis determines
probable effectiveness of the weapon. Troops in the open and in
aircraft are particularly vulnerable; they should be warned. Blast
overpressure can destroy light aircraft, and dazzle effects from
a nuclear blast can temporarily blind a pilot. Warning should
go to any troops or aircraft in, or likely to maneuver through,
the fallout hazard area.
Deciding when to warn friendly
personnel and units is similar to deciding who gets warned. Early
warning gives friendly forces time to prepare. It may also cause
the enemy to launch a preemptive strike against us. Commanders
must weigh the factors and give the warning at the optimum time.
Commanders must ensure an attack will not interfere with the operations
of adjacent commands. They must ensure the attack is a coordinate
effort, with conflicts resolved by higher headquarters. Early
warning is extremely critical for special operations forces (SOF)
elements deployed deep in the enemy's rear area. SOF normally
are foot mobile and usually use special communications procedures
often with fixed contact times at 24-hour intervals or more. As
soon as a nuclear strike is contemplated that may affect deployed
SOF elements, it is imperative that their controlling headquarters
(Theater Special Operations Command) be notified. SOF units deployed
forward of the forward line of own troops (FLOT) must rely only
on early warning and avoidance for protection.
The commander who orders the
attack must issue the warning. For example, the division commander
ordering the attack issues the warning even if corps assets are
used. The G3 has staff responsibility for issuing warnings for
friendly attacks. The corps or division army airspace command
and control element (A2C2E) is responsible for alerting aviation
All nuclear attack warning
messages are transmitted by the fastest means available; they
are not transmitted in the clear unless troop safety makes it
essential. All messages, including cancellations, must be authenticated
according to signal operation instructions (SOIs). A false message
given by the enemy over our nets could seriously disrupt our operations.
Each warned headquarters notifies
subordinate headquarters that might be affected.
Nuclear attack warnings do
not pass below battalion level. Instead, companies receive specific
instructions. These instructions must be kept brief by using SOIs
and procedures written into unit SOPs. They must include code
words indicating an attack and a brief prearranged message or
brevity code to take specific actions, such as move or go into
a protective posture. The SOP should include time limits for these
actions and the expected time of attack.
All unit SOPs should include
specific methods for passing warnings. These SOPs should include
procedures for preattack, attack, and postattack actions.
Unit SOPs should also include
specific methods for canceling warnings. Units previously warned
are notified by the fastest secure means available. The notification
gives lines Alfa and Delta from the nuclear warning message followed
by the word "Canceled" (see FM 3-3-1).
Chemical units can provide
NBC recon, decon, and smoke support at all levels.
Chemical units are employed
based on the concept of operations. Synchronized NBC recon, decon,
and smoke operations begin with planning, preparation, and teamwork.
Chemical staff sections (EAC,
corps, and division) play an important part in the use of chemical
units. These staffs are involved in recommending mission priorities
and task organization of supporting chemical units, and planning
logistical requirements for chemical unit support.
Units evaluate the need for
external NBC unit support (recon, decon, and smoke) before submitting
requests. The chemical staff provide recommendations to the S3/G3
on possible NBC recon, decon, and smoke operations. Evaluation
requests or recommendations become mission requests. They are
coordinated with the S2/G2, S4/G4, and chemical unit commander
for all chemical unit missions. Requests coordinated with the
FSCOORD, staff weather officer (SWO), ALO, ADA, and engineers
for smoke support missions. Chemical units are task organized
to provide full use of available assets.
Once chemical unit support
is arranged, use is based on the combat power multiplier contribution
and synchronization with maneuver.
EAC, corps, and division chemical
staff sections constitute the technical and planning chain of
command for chemical units. The chemical battalion commander and
his staff are the tactical chain of command for these chemical
units. Chemical staffs are responsible for advising or recommending
to the EAC, corps, and division commander and/or G3 concerning
- What the chemical mission
priorities should be.
- How the chemical unit should
be task organized.
- What the support, logistical
requirements, and priorities are for the chemical unit.
EAC, corps, or division chemical
unit assets are normally employed on a direct support (DS) or
general support (GS) basis. The basis depends on-
- Commander's intent.
- Staff recommendations.
- Major subordinate unit mission
- Higher headquarters directives.
The primary objective in using nuclear weapons is to end war on terms acceptable to us and our allies.
Nuclear weapons should be
integrated with other forms of fire support in a combined arms,
joint service approach. Conventional and nuclear weapons must
be thoroughly integrated--
- To alter the course of the
battle positively and persuasively.
- To preclude the enemy's achieving
- To ensure the success of the
attack by US, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or allied
EACs allocate nuclear weapons
to major maneuver commanders- normally corps commanders. Allocation
is for a specified purpose, period of time, or phase of an operation.
Depending on the concept of operations, these commanders may further
delegate employment authority to subordinate commanders.
The use of nuclear weapons
in battle to achieve US political goals depends on political and
strategic decisions made by civilian authority at national and
NATO levels. Regardless of political motives, the military perspective
should always be to integrate nuclear fires into the units' plans
and support the scheme of maneuver and the campaign. See JP 3-12,
FM 100-30 and FM 101-31-1 for more information and discussion
of nuclear use and target analysis.
The principle of retaliatory
response is to control escalation. US forces select retaliatory
targets to discourage further enemy use. They maintain the capability
for additional strikes if enemy use escalates.
Keys to controlling escalation
are rapid verification of enemy first use of NBC agents and rapid
processing of requests for weapons release. Verification of first
use will be a politically sensitive issue. The enemy will use
disinformation programs to conceal use. The United States must
present its evidence in such a manner as to leave no doubt of
enemy use. In a combined theater host nation corroboration of
enemy use of chemical weapons greatly enhances the verification
Commanders should make full
use of public affairs assets (the only authorized channel of communication
to the American public) to inform the American public of enemy
NBC warfare operations. PAO and other channels of communication
(PSYOPs, US Information Agency) will be used to inform host nation,
third nation populaces, and other target audiences of enemy NBC
operations, as appropriate. Such information should be presented
in print, photographic, and electronic news media and directed
at both internal and external audiences.
No universal standard for verification exists. It will depend on the extent and type of enemy attacks and on whether these attacks have sufficient impact on our forces to require a retaliatory response. Limited enemy chemical strikes will require more stringent verification efforts. This is because there will be less evidence to collect. Data will be collected and evaluated to provide critical input to the decision on a retaliatory response. Evidence to support verification is submitted before our retaliatory response. Additionally, we assess whether the enemy continues to use its CB weapons so we can determine when we should terminate our retaliatory response(s).
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