S. Hrg. 105-237
PROLIFERATION: RUSSIAN CASE STUDIES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,
PROLIFERATION, AND FEDERAL SERVICES
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 5, 1997
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
41-418cc WASHINGTON : 1997
_______________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee, Chairman
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine JOHN GLENN, Ohio
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas CARL LEVIN, Michigan
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
DON NICKLES, Oklahoma RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BOB SMITH, New Hampshire MAX CLELAND, Georgia
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
Hannah S. Sistare, Staff Director and Counsel
Leonard Weiss, Minority Staff Director
Michal Sue Prosser, Chief Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION AND FEDERAL
SERVICES
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi, Chairman
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine CARL LEVIN, Michigan
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
DON NICKLES, Oklahoma RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BOB SMITH, New Hampshire MAX CLELAND, Georgia
Mitchel B. Kugler, Staff Director
Linda Gustitus, Minority Staff Director
Julie Sander, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
------
Opening statements:
Page
Senator Cochran.............................................. 1
Senator Levin................................................ 2
WITNESSES
Thursday, June 5, 1997
Robert Einhorn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Nonproliferation, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs,
Department of State............................................ 4
William C. Potter, Director, Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
Monterey Institute of International Studies.................... 18
Richard H. Speier, Independent Consultant........................ 28
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Einhorn, Robert:
Testimony.................................................... 4
Prepared Statement........................................... 7
Potter, William C.:
Testimony.................................................... 18
Prepared Statement........................................... 24
Speier, Richard H.:
Testimony.................................................... 28
Prepared Statement........................................... 36
PROLIFERATION: RUSSIAN CASE STUDIES
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 5, 1997
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on International Security,
Proliferation, and Federal Services,
of the Committee on Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in
room SD-342 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Cochran and Levin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN
Senator Cochran. The meeting of our Subcommittee will come
to order. We appreciate the attendance of our witnesses today
at this hearing which we are going to have today on the subject
of Proliferation: Russian Case Studies, one in a series of
hearing that we have been having looking into the issues
involving proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
particularly nuclear weapons.
In April, we had a hearing looking at the question of
Chinese actions which we consider very serious in terms of
their involvement in selling technologies, complete weapons
systems, and generally being at the center of a world-wide web
of proliferation, selling nuclear, biological and chemical
weapons technology as well as ballistic and cruise missiles to
other nations.
Russia is also a key supplier of weapons of mass
destruction technology and advanced conventional weapons to
countries of concern to the United States.
Moscow is in the process of constructing a nuclear reactor
in Iran, and has reached agreement in principle to sell up to
three additional reactors to Tehran. Russia has also agreed to
sell two nuclear reactors to India, and press reports have
surfaced on sales of ballistic missile technology to Iran and
Iraq.
While some of the specific Russian activities are
classified, many of the details are available in the open
press, and it is upon those open sources that we have relied
exclusively in preparing for today's hearing.
Russia's sales of weapons of mass destruction technology
and advanced conventional arms take place in the context of
severe economic and political stress in Russia. We know that
workers are paid months late, or not at all. Crime is a very
serious problem. There are severe housing shortages.
So the combination of hunger, draft evasion, poor training,
and aging equipment all plague the Russian military, which
remains one of the world's largest. Russia's premier defense
facilities have not been immune to disruptions.
Recent press reports indicate strategic missile facilities
have suffered repeated power cut-offs in recent months because
electric bills were not paid. During late 1996, thieves
reportedly disrupted communication to operational strategic
rocket forces units on numerous occasion by mining copper and
other metals from communications cables.
In addition, late last year, the director of a prestigious
Russian nuclear laboratory became so distraught over the dire
conditions at his facility that he committed suicide.
Despite the danger posed by transfers of sensitive million
technology, Russia's cash starved nuclear and defense
industries continue to pursue sales to rogue nations like Iran.
It is unclear how much control central government officials
have over these sales.
Senior Russian officials have approved some deals, but
Moscow appears unwilling or unable to halt other sales.
At today's hearing, we will explore how our government has
approached the problem, as well as whether the approach is
effective. We will also explore Moscow's record of adherence to
its international nonproliferation commitments, and what
incentives and disincentives the United States should use to
moderate Russia's proliferant behavior.
Our witnesses today are well suited to address these
issues. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation Bob
Einhorn at the Department of State is with us. He will be
followed by a panel consisting of Dr. William Potter, director
of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey
Institute for International Studies who will discuss nuclear
proliferation; and Dr. Richard Speier, an independent
consultant and expert on the subject of Russian ballistic
missile proliferation.
Secretary Einhorn, we appreciate very much your attendance,
and before recognizing you though, I am going to yield to my
good friend and colleague from Michigan, the distinguished
Ranking Democrat on the Subcommittee, Carl Levin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join you
in welcoming our witnesses today on the very important topic of
Russian proliferation. And I want to commend you again for this
series of very important and significant hearings, Mr.
Chairman.
I only wish that after I give these few remarks that I be
able to remain, but I am unable to now, and so we will be
following this hearing very, very carefully, however, because
of the importance of this subject.
Ever since the collapse of the former Soviet Union, we have
faced a very serious challenge in preventing the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons
and their materials and chemical weapons. With great foresight,
our former colleague, Senator Nunn, and Senator Lugar created
the cooperative threat reduction program in 1991.
This program, which is commonly referred to as the Nunn-
Lugar program, has made a significant difference in reducing
the risk to the United States from the potential proliferation
of former Soviet nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and
materials.
The Nunn-Lugar cooperate threat reduction program has
permitted the complete de-nuclearization of three former Soviet
republics, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan, which emerged with
the inheritance of thousands of former Soviet nuclear weapons
on their territory.
It has permitted the elimination of thousands of warheads
and hundreds of missiles and their launchers. That means that
those weapons cannot threaten us again, and that is a tangible
and direct benefit to our security.
The Nunn-Lugar program continues to reduce the threat to
our country, but there remains much more to be done. I believe
there are additional areas for cooperative threat reduction
with Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union,
and I would note that at least one of our witnesses has some
specific suggestions for how to expand that program to address
additional proliferation threats.
I hope that all of our witnesses will address the question
of whether the Nunn-Lugar program can be improved or expanded
to help reduce the most immediate and dangerous threats to the
United States, and if so, how.
Clearly, though, the Nunn-Lugar program cannot address all
the proliferation problems that we face with respect to Russia,
and this hearing is going to examine some of the other issues.
But we are working on a bilateral basis with Russia on
proliferation issues, and we have had some important successes,
as well as some notable challenges and problems. We need to
understand the situation to determine what else we should and
can do to improve it.
We should be trying to find out what works, and what will
help.
One of the problems that we face with respect to Russia and
proliferation, as I believe our witnesses have either said or
would agree, is that Russia appears not to be capable of fully
knowing of or controlling proliferant behavior.
This seems due in part to the inexperience of the new
governing systems in Russia and of the economic incentives for
public and private entities to earn cash in a financially dire
situation.
Lawlessness and disorder seem to be too prevalent there.
That means that sometimes the Russian government may not know
about or be able to effectively prevent proliferant behavior,
which is all the more reason to improve the situation as we're
trying to do.
Russia needs to improve its ability and desire to root out
and prevent proliferation. That may mean at times finding
incentives for responsible behavior and disincentives for
irresponsible behavior, whether at the government of private
sector level.
And it also means that we should help encourage reform and
democracy in Russia. But finally, it means being careful to
avoid actions that will worsen the situation and threaten the
security of this Nation.
So, Mr. Chairman, again I commend you for your initiative
here and look forward to these hearings.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Senator.
Secretary Einhorn, thank you again for being here. You may
proceed.
TESTIMONY OF ROBERT EINHORN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR NONPROLIFERATION, BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY
AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Einhorn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity
to testify before the Subcommittee on the administration's
nonproliferation agenda with Russia. And with your permission,
I will submit my prepared testimony for the record and proceed
with some brief opening remarks.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much. It will be included
in full.
Mr. Einhorn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Given the weapons of
mass destruction and other sensitive technologies it inherited
from the Soviet Union as well as its own international stature,
Russia is clearly a key player in international efforts to
prevent proliferation.
Its cooperation is indispensable. Its failure to cooperate
potentially very harmful.
Frankly, Russia's recent nonproliferation record is mixed.
It shares with us a strong security interest in preventing the
spread of weapons of mass destruction and other destabilizing
technologies.
But the current situation in Russia, including powerful
pressures to export, the evolving relationship between central
governmental authorities and an increasingly privatized
industrial sector, and a relatively new and unproven export
control system has led to questionable exports in cooperation
with some countries of proliferation, particularly Iran.
On the positive side, Russia has been a supporter and key
player in global nonproliferation regimes. For example, it
strongly favored indefinite extension of the NPT, and the
recent strengthening of the IAEA safeguard system to detect
clandestine nuclear activities.
It was a founding member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group,
and of the Wassenaar Arrangement, and it joined the Missile
Technology Control Regime in 1995. It has supported UNSCOM and
IAEA efforts in Iraq. It signed the CTBT, the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty, last fall.
And while it has not yet ratified the Chemical Weapons
Convention, its parliament says it will do so probably this
fall, and has passed its chemical weapons destruction bill.
Russia has also showed responsibility in cooperating with
us to address the proliferation risks posed by the large stocks
of nuclear weapons and fissile materials it inherited from the
Soviet Union. Senator Levin has just mentioned a number of
these efforts under the Nunn-Lugar program, just a few minutes
ago.
Under these programs, hundreds of bombs worth of Russian
highly enriched uranium have been converted into fuel for U.S.
nuclear power plants. With U.S. assistance, hundreds of tons of
weapons usable material are now subject to upgraded security
measures at over 40 Russian sites.
The U.S. is helping build a storage facility at Mayak that
will safely and securely house fissile materials from about
12,500 dismantled Russian nuclear weapons. Russia is working
trilaterally with the U.S. and IAEA to develop means of
verifying that fissile materials declared excess to defense
needs are not returned to nuclear weapons programs.
U.S. and Russian law enforcement officials and scientists
are coordinating their efforts to deal with the problem of
nuclear smuggling. And through the International Science and
Technology Centers, over 13,000 former weapons scientists are
engaged in peaceful scientific projects that reduce the risk of
their being lured away by proliferators.
The difficulties we have had with Russia in the
nonproliferation area have been in the area of exports to
foreign countries. Russia recognizes the need to establish a
strong export control system and has taken important steps in
that direction with some U.S. assistance.
But Russian export controls are new, and clearly they need
further strengthening. And this still rudimentary control
system is being severely tested by Russian exporters
aggressively seeking to pursue market share and earn hard
currency.
Our concerns have applied largely to Russia's cooperation
with Iran. We remain opposed to Russia's project to build a
nuclear power reactor in Iran. Indeed, we're opposed to any
nuclear cooperation with Iran.
We've raised our concerns forcefully and persistently, and
at the highest levels, and we believe that Moscow has limited
the scope and pace of its planned cooperation. For example,
Russia's leadership has ruled out the transfer of a gas
centrifuge enrichment facility, heavy water moderated nuclear
reactors, and other technologies that are directly useful
militarily.
Nonetheless, we will watch this carefully, and press for
further curtailment.
We are especially concerned about reports of cooperation by
Russian entities with Iran on long range ballistic missiles. We
take these reports very seriously. Iran's acquisition of a long
range missile delivery capability, coupled with its continued
pursuit of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction, would pose a grave threat to U.S. forces and
friends, and to regional stability in general.
We do not believe that Russia has transferred any long
range missiles to Iran, but Iran is now not giving priority to
importing complete missiles. Rather, it is actively seeking
various types of technical assistance and cooperation that
would enable it to produce its own long range missiles
indigenously.
We have raised this matter with Russia at the highest
levels, including during President Clinton's recent meeting
with President Yeltsin in Helsinki.
The Russian leadership has told us that it does not
support assistance to Iran's ballistic missile program. While
we appreciate such assurances, we remain disturbed by the
discrepancy between them and what reportedly is occurring.
Given the far reaching implications of this issue, we will
continue to pursue it at the highest levels.
We are also concerned by reports that Russian entities may
intend to transfer surface to air missiles to Iran. President
Yeltsin pledged in 1994 that Russia would not enter into any
new arms contracts with Iran, and would conclude existing
contracts within a few years.
In 1995, Vice President Gore and Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin formalized that commitment. Any transfers to Iran
of advanced anti-aircraft missile systems would be inconsistent
with that agreement.
We raised this issue with Russia in March at the Helsinki
summit, and President Yeltsin reaffirmed his commitment to the
1995 agreement. The U.S. has not determined that Russia has
transferred to Iran any advanced missiles, although we continue
to monitor this very carefully.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we believe the United States
and Russia have a strongly shared security interest in
preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and other
sensitive goods and technologies. But Russia's ability and
determination to pursue its commitment to nonproliferation may
sometimes be eroded by a combination of power economic
incentives to pursue foreign markets, the evolving nature of
state controls in Russia, and Russia's relatively new,
understaffed, and still unproven system of export controls.
Improved Russian economic performance and institutional
reform will help alleviate these problems. But basic changes
will not be achieved overnight.
In the meantime, the Russian government must take effective
steps to insure a more accountable and conscientious approach
to export control, and it should better appreciate the risks of
engaging in even seemingly benign cooperation with determined
proliferators, such as Iran.
Encouraging Russia to adopt a more effective and
responsible approach to cooperation with third countries will
remain one of the administration's highest nonproliferation
priorities.
We will continue to press our case at the highest levels.
Pursuing our nonproliferation agenda with Russia will involve
both incentives and disincentives, including the implementation
of U.S. sanctions laws whenever applicable.
However, the use of certain sticks, such as cutting off or
curtailing our assistance programs to Russia, would only be
counterproductive. Not only would they be unlikely to achieve
our nonproliferation goals, they would also undercut key
programs to promote democracy and market reform, as well as to
insure that the process of disarmament takes place in a safe,
secure and accountable a manner as possible.
And, Mr. Chairman, if I could just return to a little old
business for a few moments regarding Chinese export behavior,
because we discussed this the last time I was before the
Subcommittee. And at that time I noted that the administration
was concerned by reports of Chinese entities exporting to Iran
chemical precursors, chemical production equipment and
technology.
And I indicated at that time that we were actively
considering these reports in light of U.S. sanctions laws.
Since that time, and I am sure you are aware of this, Mr.
Chairman, on May 21 the United States imposed trade sanctions
under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare
Elimination Act against five Chinese individuals, two Chinese
companies, and one Hong Kong company for knowingly and
materially contributing to Iran's chemical weapons program.
I just wanted to update you and the Subcommittee on that
development. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Einhorn follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. EINHORN
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much for you testimony and
your assistance to our committee's inquiry. I was particularly
happy that you brought up the subject of the Chinese action,
the action taken by our government in response to those sales.
And immediately when I read the story I wondered whether
there was any connection between that action and the hearings
that we had held. Could you tell us whether we contributed to
that?
Mr. Einhorn. Well, I think, Mr. Chairman, the concern
expressed by you and members of the Subcommittee was shared by
us. We were all looking at similar facts, and I think we came
to similar conclusions.
Senator Cochran. I notice that the Chinese reaction was not
unexpected in that they protested and disagreed with your
conclusions that there was any government knowledge or
participation or culpability at all in the exports. Have you
developed any further facts since that public reaction from the
Chinese government?
Mr. Einhorn. No, we have not, Mr. Chairman. We hope to
pursue this issue further with the Chinese government. we see
the imposition of sanctions not simply in punitive terms. We
see this action as a means of encouraging China to take firm
steps to prevent these Chinese entities from engaging in such
activity in the future.
We hope to have the opportunity to work with the Chinese
government to try to persuade them that it's in their interest
to pursue such steps.
Senator Cochran. In that connection, with Russia and the
situation that you mentioned, you called our attention to and
reminded us that Russia has joined the Missile Technology
Control Regime in 1995, and one of the criteria for MTCR
eligibility is establishing export controls, or a structure to
maintain control over what is and is not being sold to
potential proliferators.
I know you mentioned that Russia's export control system is
still young and there are immature structures and controls in
Russia now. Is that one of the reasons why you think there have
been exports of material, weapons material, technology,
equipment to Iran that could be used in ways that seem to be
violative of the provision of the Missile Control Technology
Regime?
Mr. Einhorn. I think perhaps there are a number of
explanations, Mr. Chairman, but I think one of them clearly is
that Russia's export control system is to this day inadequate
to the task of controlling Russian firms adequately, especially
in this area of missile technology.
Senator Cochran. You mentioned Iran, and you mentioned in
your statement a trading relationship in weapons that has
developed between Russia and China. Are there other countries
as well where Russia has to your knowledge been involved in
selling either missile technology or systems or weapons of mass
destruction or ingredients of them, elements of them that would
concern us?
Mr. Einhorn. Well, I could say--you mentioned weapons of
mass destruction. I genuinely believe, and I think it is the
administration's shared judgment, that Russia is not interested
in seeing other countries acquiring weapons of mass
destruction.
Russians know that their security is not strengthened by
the acquisition of these very destabilizing capabilities. So I
think they have been quite careful in not providing weapons of
mass destruction, chemical weapons, nuclear weapons and so
forth.
Where we have had disagreements with the Russian Federation
is on the transfer of certain technologies, and we have
differed on the contribution of that cooperation to sensitive
weapons programs.
The Bushehr reactor is a case in point. Here, the Russians
agree to sell a thousand megawatt power reactor to Iran. They
point out correctly that this reactor would be under safeguards
of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and believe, the
Russians, that there is little or no risk of this reactor
project contributing to an Iranian nuclear weapons capability.
We assess the situation differently. In our view, this is a
large reactor project. It will involve hundreds of Russians
being in Iran, hundreds of Iranians or more being in Moscow,
being trained. And this large scale kind of project can provide
a kind of commercial cover for a number of activities that we
would not like to see--perhaps much more sensitive activities
than pursuing this power reactor project.
It also will inevitably provide additional training and
expertise in the nuclear field for Iranian technicians. In our
view, given Iran's intention to acquire nuclear weapons we do
not want to see them move up the nuclear learning curve at all,
and we believe this project would contribute to moving them up
that curve.
I think the Russians assess the situation somewhat
differently. They believe that the expertise acquired in the
course of this project would not be critical, or even important
in contributing to Iran's aspirations to acquire nuclear
weapons.
Senator Cochran. I asked whether or not there were other
countries where trading relationships existed, either with
government firms or entities that would be subject to control
and direction by the Russian government, or should be, in order
to comply with the MTCR.
Are there any such instances that you could tell us about?
Mr. Einhorn. Well, there is an aggressive effort by Russian
export organizations to find foreign markets for a variety of
goods and technologies, arms as well as other kinds of
sensitive technologies. Russia has looked to China as a market
for arms sales.
China is now the biggest purchaser of Russian arms. Russia
is China's biggest supplier of conventional arms.
Now, there is nothing wrong per se with international arms
trade, with the effort to provide for legitimate defense
requirements. And in the case of Russia-China trade, we are not
talking really about a proliferation concern, because after
all, China is a have country. It possesses these weapons of
mass destruction capabilities.
What is sometimes a basis for concern is when such transfer
relationship involves items that might cause instability in a
particular regional context--in this case, the Asia-Pacific
region. And so we monitor this kind of trade relationship and
on a case by case basis we raise our concerns with the parties
involved.
So China is clearly a country that has an active trading
relationship with Russia.
Also, India has been a traditional market for Russian
goods. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union India was a
major trading partner, and in the last few years Russia has
been actively marketing its goods, including arms, in India.
You made reference earlier in your opening statement to an
attempt by Russia to sell two power reactors to India. We have
opposed that sale. We have opposed it, frankly, less because we
think that the transfer would contribute materially to India's
nuclear weapons program than we think that the transfer would
be inconsistent with Russia's commitments as a member of the
Nuclear Suppliers Group.
As a member of the so-called NSG, Russia has committed not
to engage in nuclear cooperation with countries that do not
have IAEA safeguards on all of their nuclear activities. India,
of course, does not have safeguards on all of its nuclear
activities.
There is a provision in that commitment that says pre-
existing deals can go forward. Russia is attempting to
grandfather an old 1988 U.S.S.R.-India, government to
government agreement under that provision. In our view, this is
not legitimately grandfathered.
In 1988 there was no specific contract, no financial
arrangements concluded. There are still no financial
arrangements concluded. So we tell the Russians that this was
not the kind of deal, pre-existing deal, that can be
grandfathered, and that it should not go forward with this sale
of two power reactors to India.
So even though the transfer itself probably does not
involve substantial proliferation risks, because we doubt that
the Indians, who have their own access to unsafeguarded
plutonium, would actually divert plutonium from the safeguarded
reactors, we nonetheless have urged Russia not to go forward.
But there are also other cooperative arrangements between
Russia and India. And I believe you mentioned in your opening
presentation Iraq.
Senator Cochran. Yes.
Mr. Einhorn. On Iraq, we believe that the Russian
government scrupulously adheres to the current embargo against
Iraq. There is a very comprehensive sanctions regime that is
applied by the U.N. Special Commission and the IAEA against
Iraq to prevent Iraq from regenerating its sensitive
capabilities.
We believe that the Russians have not, at the governmental
level, sought to circumvent that embargo, those sanctions.
Senator Cochran. Let me ask you about a specific incident,
though, that occurred in November of 1995. I am told that
Jordan intercepted a shipment of guidance components for long
range inter-continental ballistic missiles destined for Iraq at
the Amman airport.
And you were asked about this at a committee meeting over
on the House side, the National Security Committee on June 26th
of last year, and you said we have no indication that the
Russian government sanctioned this.
Would this not be violative of the U.N. embargo, the U.N.
Security Council embargo on Iraq following the Gulf War, and
would it not also be a violation of the MTCR by Russia?
Mr. Einhorn. You are correct, Mr. Chairman. Those
gyroscopes, those guidance components that were found by UNSCOM
should not have been sent to Iraq. This was clearly a violation
of the embargo. The question is who is responsible for this
violation.
Nothing since the testimony that you cited has changed our
conclusion that this was not an act by the Russian government,
not a conscientious act. These were very sensitive pieces of
equipment as you pointed out. They are guidance components for
fairly long range strategic missile systems.
So it's a very serious matter, and we still have not
received a full report from the Russians on their investigation
of how this happened. But what we do know of it leads us to the
conclusion that this was a kind of black market action, a
renegade action, and not the conscientious decision of Moscow.
Senator Cochran. Are you satisfied that the Russians are
undertaking a serious investigation to get to the bottom of
this, and to find out who was responsible?
Mr. Einhorn. We have no way to judge how thorough and
conscientious the Russian investigation has been. I think by
now they are overdue in reporting on the results of their
investigation to UNSCOM, and we also would very much like to
hear the results of that investigation and we have recently
asked the Russians about it.
Senator Cochran. Is there any provision in the MCTR or any
of the other agreements that we have that would permit some
other independent inquiry into this, to get to the bottom of
it?
Or does the sovereignty--the relationship of the Russian
government to its own citizens and business activities and
other entities prohibit anybody else from looking into it?
Mr. Einhorn. Well, you are right, Mr. Chairman. The MTCR is
a kind of voluntary, informal sort of regime. There is no
enforcement authority. The closest we have in this case is the
U.N. itself, and the U.N. Special Commission. And I am not
privy to discussions that the UNSCOM chairman has had with
senior officials in the Russian government about this case, but
I think that is where the enforcement authority comes in.
Because, after all, the U.N. Special Commission is
implementing the will of the Security Council and its
Resolution 687 on Iraq. I think that is where UNSCOM should be
pursuing this strongly with the Russian government.
Senator Cochran. And when you say UNSCOM, you are talking
about the U.N. Special Commission? That's the acronym for that?
Mr. Einhorn. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. And that is the group that includes us?
The U.S. is a member of that commission, right? We have a
representative at that commission, do we not?
Mr. Einhorn. Well, the chairman is in effect an employee of
the Security Council. He is currently, unless they have
switched over, a Swede named Rolf Ekeus. The next one will be
an Australian named Richard Butler.
But these individuals are functioning as kind of
international civil servants. The deputy chairman of UNSCOM
happens to be an American.
Senator Cochran. Are you satisfied with the progress that
the U.N. Special Commission is making in cases like this to try
to find out what the facts are when you suspect that there has
been a violation of this regime?
Should we try to do something that would provide another
alternative if UNSCOM is not doing the job of getting all the
facts out that you think should be brought out?
Mr. Einhorn. Mr. Chairman, I think UNSCOM has done a heroic
job in pursuing the will of the Security Council with Iraq. I
think special praise needs to go to Rolf Ekeus for very
courageous action in pressing the Iraqi regime.
He has been under some personal threat and risk and has
basically ignored that risk in pursuing his mandate from the
Security Council. He has been tenacious, and the whole U.N.
Special Commission has been tenacious.
Where the fault lies is with Iraq and Saddam Hussein. They
simply have not been prepared to cooperate fully, as they are
obliged to do by the U.N. Security Council. Even today, after
many inspections, many interrogations, it is the considered
view of the U.N. Special Commission that Iraq continues to
conceal an operational missile capability.
We believe, our own people believe, and UNSCOM also
believes that Saddam is hiding some number of Scuds, and UNSCOM
also believes that the Iraqis may well be hiding warheads
containing chemical and or biological munitions for those Scud
missiles.
So UNSCOM really deserves tremendous credit in continuing
to go at the Iraqis on this. But Iraq deserves full
responsibility for not making a full accounting.
Senator Cochran. Has there been any contribution to the
investigation that Russia is conducting by the UNSCOM staff or
the regime that they manage at the U.N. Security Council?
Mr. Einhorn. I am not aware of any, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Is there any evidence that Russia has
prosecuted anybody or cited anybody or taken anybody to task in
any way at all for this sale of these guidance components to
Iraq--or the attempted sale to Iraq?
Mr. Einhorn. I am not aware that they have taken any action
against perpetrators of this act, but I am pretty confident
that UNSCOM has not found additional cases of such smuggling of
proscribed equipment from Russia to Iraq since then.
Senator Cochran. Do you know what our administration is
doing, whether any other departments of our government are
involved in any activity that would contribute to the cessation
of that kind of smuggling, or to the identification and
prosecution of those who are responsible for violating the
embargo that the U.N. Security Council has imposed on Iraq?
Mr. Einhorn. Well, the U.S. Government has made a major
effort to support the U.N. Special Commission and the IAEA. In
the division of labor, the IAEA action team has responsibility
for detecting elements of Iraq's former nuclear weapons
program.
We give strong support. We provide information, we provide
material support for those efforts, to ferret out any evidence
of proscribed activities or material. So it is a major priority
in the nonproliferation field for us.
Senator Cochran. There was another event that Vice
President Gore discussed with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin when
he was here in February. At least this was reported in the Los
Angeles Times, where we had information that Russia had
transferred SS-4 missile technology, including instructions on
how to build the missile and components, to Iran.
And Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, according to this article,
denied that Moscow had authorized the sale, but acknowledged
that the action would violate Russia's pledge not to initiate
new arms sale to Iran.
Do you believe that sale was sanctioned by the Russia
government or was it an illicit or illegal transfer?
Mr. Einhorn. Mr. Chairman, as I mentioned in my remarks and
in my prepared statement, we take such reports of Russian
entities assisting Iran's long range missile program very, very
seriously.
We follow up all of these reports, and naturally we have
our own intelligence information about such activities. We have
pressed the Russian leadership at the highest levels. And, as I
mentioned, we have been told that it is not Russia's policy to
assist Iran's long range missile programs.
But the problem is this: there is a disconnect between
those reassurances, which we welcome, and what we believe is
actually occurring. There is a disconnect.
We have raised this with the Russians. We have provided
them information available to us to demonstrate that we know
what we are talking about, and we have urged them to
investigate seriously and to prevent any activity that would be
inconsistent with what they state is their own national policy.
Senator Cochran. Have we made any specific suggestion about
how Russia could imposes a stricter export control regime over
sensitive technology like this, or ballistic missile component
parts and technologies like this? Are we trying to assist them
in figuring out how to do a better job, if they say that is
what their goal is?
We are assisting them in dismantling nuclear weapons that
had been targeted at us, and this is all well and good, but is
there any kind of technical assistance program in the form of a
structure or a regime, a control regime, that would do a better
job dealing with these kinds of problems?
Mr. Einhorn. Mr. Chairman, we have under the Nunn-Lugar
program made funds available for export control assistance to
Russia, and we have sought to interest the Russian government
in a very serious technical exchange aimed at strengthening
their capabilities in this area.
And there has been some cooperation, but it has not gone
very far, not because of a reticence on our part, but for a
variety of reasons I think the Russian government is reluctant
for us to be too closely engaged with them in this effort.
I think there is a certain resentment, the perception that
we are throwing our weight around, that they see this as kind
of condescending on our part. And in part they may be
embarrassed a bit at the rudimentary nature of their own export
controls, and reluctant to expose that fully to us.
For whatever set of reasons, they have been less willing
than we have to engage in the kind of cooperation you suggest,
which we fully support.
Senator Cochran. You talked about Russian nuclear
cooperation with India. Reports of missile deployments near the
Pakistani-India border have been widely reported, and it occurs
to me that given Russia's past history of transactions with
India, weapons sales, generally, but in the nuclear program
particularly, and China's closer relationship with Pakistan on
the other hand, and the question about whether China has
contributed to the development of nuclear weapons program in
Pakistan, are we on the verge of a conflict here that could
involve a Russia-India partnership competing with a Chinese-
Pakistani partnership? Do we have on our hands a nuclear
weapons proliferation activity that could be destabilizing and
contribute to an increase in tensions in that part of the world
such that our security interests are at risk?
Mr. Einhorn. Mr. Chairman, we share your concern about the
prospects for nuclear and missile competition in south Asia. I
think the world has evolved quite a bit since the days when
there was a very tight alignment between the outside countries
and the states of south Asia.
I think China, even, is seeking to improve its relations
with India and to adopt a more even-handed policy toward the
two states of the subcontinent. Also, Russia, while it does
have an arms transfer relationship with India, and a good
relationship with India, is also seeking to broaden its
relations.
So I do not see the danger that outside powers will be
drawn into any kind of conflict, but we are concerned that
programs that are proceeding on both sides of the Indo-Pak
border could lead to a destabilizing competition there.
One of the most promising developments we have seen in a
long, long time has been a resumption in recent months of a
high level political dialogue between leaders of India and
Pakistan. There has been a recent meeting in Male in the
Maldives.
A few months ago the Pakistani prime minister, Nuar Sharif,
and the Indian prime minister, Mr. Gujural, had a positive
meeting. And we're looking forward to additional steps toward
reconciliation between the two countries.
We hope that these reports about missile activities will
not have the effect of disrupting what is the most promising
trend we have seen in a long, long time.
Senator Cochran. That is encouraging to hear. Let me ask
you one other related question on that subject. Russia and
other members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 1992 agreed not
to sell nuclear technology or nuclear materials that could be
used to develop nuclear weapons to any state which had not
accepted full scope IAEA safeguards.
The sale by Russia of the two nuclear reactors to India,
which you mentioned, seems to violate that commitment. Does it,
in your opinion, and has the administration attempted to
develop a consensus among the other suppliers who make up this
group about whether to do anything about it?
Mr. Einhorn. As I mentioned earlier, Mr Chairman, we do not
believe that Russia can legitimately regard this deal as
grandfathered under the terms of this----
Senator Cochran. I know that. But what are we going to do
about it?
Mr. Einhorn. Well, what we have done is raise this issue
directly with the Russian government on a number of occasions
as well as raise it with other partners in the Nuclear
Suppliers Group, and suggest that they raise it with the
Russians to express their disapproval.
We have found no one, by the way, willing to support
Russia's interpretation of the grandfather provision of the
full scope safeguards commitment, and a number of our partners
have approached the Russians directly on it.
If there is a saving grace in this story, it is that
prospects actually for consummating this nuclear deal may be
small. The Indian government may not be prepared ultimately to
devote the very substantial resources to purchasing two large
power reactors from Russia.
And so even though both Russia and India take a very
defensive, nationalistic approach whenever challenged about the
deal, I think the actual likelihood of this deal materializing
is rather small.
Senator Cochran. Let me simply wind up by saying that I am
very pleased to hear you bring up the action that was taken by
our administration with regard to the Chinese transfers of
ingredients for chemical weapons by these Chinese exporters.
I am hopeful that we will see in the future some
determination about the identity of those in Russia who have
been doing things that are just as dangerous to the rest of the
world as what we see happening in China so that we can then
impose sanctions, if not against the government, which you
chose not to do in the case of China, then directly against the
firms, thereby saying that we would not permit the purchase of
any material or services or goods from these firms.
I think that is the nature of the sanction that our
government has imposed, specifically targeted to those
businesses and those individuals. It seems to me that that's
what we ought to be doing a better job of with regard to
Russian proliferation activities and smuggling from Russia of
prohibited weapons grade material, technologies into Iran or
into Iraq--and specifically Iraq, in violation of the U.N.
sanctions.
Do you expect that we will be able to get enough
information to be able to do something like that, and would you
be able to tell the Committee that that would be the hope and
the goal of this administration, to pursue sanctions and to
pursue them in an aggressive way?
Mr. Einhorn. Mr. Chairman, I can assure the Subcommittee
that we will pursue very vigorously all information we have
that Russian entities are acting in a way that is inconsistent
with Russia's obligations.
We have done that. We will continue to do that. We will
continue to press the Russians to investigate, and where
applicable, we will apply our laws.
We have imposed sanctions on Russian entities on a number
of previous occasions, and that is a tool available to us. But
we need to get the facts, and we are pressing very hard on
Russian authorities to try to get the facts.
Senator Cochran. I appreciate your testimony and your being
here, and your willingness to help us as we try to deal with
this, and try to decide whether or not the laws that we have on
the books are sufficient to protect our security interests in
this proliferation area.
Thank you very much, Secretary Einhorn.
Mr. Einhorn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Our next witnesses are Dr. William Potter
and Richard Speier, who will testify on Russia and missile
proliferation.
We appreciate very much your being here, and we want you to
proceed with your presentation to the Committee. I want to
first call on Dr. Potter, and then Dr. Speier.
We have copies of your prepared testimony which we will
have printed in the record in full, and we would encourage you
to make whatever summary comments you think would be helpful to
our understanding of these issues.
Dr. Potter, we will start with you. You may proceed.
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM C. POTTER, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR
NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, MONTEREY INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES
Mr. Potter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to
address this Committee on the very important issue of the post-
Soviet nuclear proliferation challenge.
This is the fifth time in the past 6 years that I have
prepared testimony on this theme for Congress, and as in the
past there remain more proliferation dangers than I can review
in the time allotted to me.
As you are aware, the main technology barrier to nuclear
weapons proliferation, both for state actors and for
subnational terrorists organizations, has been the difficulty
of obtaining weapons usable fissile material.
I do not think there is any doubt that this barrier has
been eroded as a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the increased vulnerability to diversion of the
successor states' vast inventory of nuclear weapons and
inadequately safeguarded stocks of highly enriched uranium and
plutonium.
I believe that the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program has made a major difference in containing many
proliferation risks in the region. Having said that, however, I
believe that other serious dangers do remain and are deeply
rooted in the very different economic, political and social
conditions in the former Soviet Union.
As such, I believe they are unlikely to be resolved until
considerably more progress is made in stabilizing the economy
and in restoring public trust in governmental institutions, law
and social justice.
Unfortunately, I doubt if these changes will occur quickly,
and as a consequence, I believe that the United States will
continue to face a variety of nuclear threats from the former
Soviet Union for the foreseeable future.
Given the time constraints before us, I think rather than
enumerate the many remaining proliferation challenges that one
could identify, I would rather focus on several of those which
are less obvious and have received less attention. I will then
identify a number of specific steps that the U.S. Government
might take to mitigate the risks that I have identified.
The first challenge that I would like to highlight, and one
that I don't believe has received adequate attention, is the
risk posed by the presence of nuclear material outside of
Russia.
In November of 1994 it was widely assumed that with the
successful conclusion of Project Sapphire the United States had
removed the last substantial quantity of highly enriched
uranium from Kazakstan. That now is known not to be the case.
Rather, in late 1995, Kazakstan notified the IAEA that some
205 kilograms of highly enriched uranium remained at its
nuclear research site in Semipalatinsk. Although the weapons
useable portion of that batch of material finally was removed
to Russia this past fall, the unanticipated discovery of a
cache of hundreds of kilograms of weapons useable material is,
I believe, a useful reminder that we probably can expect to
find further undeclared quantities of highly enriched uranium
in the non-Russian successor states.
Likely locations include Georgia, Kazakstan, Uzbekistan,
Belarus, Ukraine and Latvia, all of which either have or had
research reactors fueled with highly enriched uranium.
The second challenge, I believe, is for us to anticipate
future cases of illicit nuclear trafficking. Although the West
has generally been very lucky regrading nuclear leakage from
the former Soviet Union, despite rather sensationalist
headlines to the contrary, I don't think that we can count on
that situation persisting.
In my prepared testimony, I identify four confirmed cases
in which more than minuscule quantities of highly enriched
uranium and plutonium have been exported from the former Soviet
Union, another three cases in which HEU or plutonium were
diverted from Russian nuclear facilities, but were seized prior
to export, and an additional four cases of diversion or export
that were of proliferation concern but for which we do not have
quite as much hard evidence.
Rather than go over those points, I simply refer interested
parties to the appendices of my prepared paper. But I would
like to draw just one or two conclusions from those cases.
Perhaps most striking about the proliferation--significant
cases involving seizures of material is that much of the
material appears to have been fresh fuel for naval propulsion
reactors. It's also the case that most of the suppliers of this
material appear to have been insiders working at nuclear
research institutes, or naval bases, or having previously
worked as such facilities.
Now, if the good news is that there have been relatively
few cases, I think we also have to be concerned about several
caveats, one being how confident should we be that we have
simply not detected other cases that have transpired; and,
second, I think we have to be concerned about the lesson from
the missile area that may be applicable in the nuclear realm--
and here I am referring to the case that you already raised
with Secretary Einhorn where the U.N. Special Commission on
Iraq clearly has evidence which indicates that strategic
gyroscopes from dismantled Russian SLBMs were shipped to Iraq.
I would also add as a concern similar indications that
there may be Ukrainian-Iraqi missile contacts and contracts. In
addition, I would point to what I believe are disturbing and
continuing largely unregulated trade by the post-Soviet States
in nuclear related dual use materials, such as zirconium and
beryllium.
These activities in an environment of nuclear material
plenty but nuclear worker poverty caution against attaching too
much importance to the apparent lull in reported seizures of
proliferation significant material in Europe.
I would also like to call attention to the challenge that
we face in the sphere of nuclear terrorism. To date, little
U.S. nonproliferation assistance to the ex-U.S.S.R. has been
directed specifically to reducing terrorist threats at NIS
nuclear facilities.
These threats pertain not only to the seizure of nuclear
material, but also to attacks on or sabotage of civilian
nuclear power plants and spent fuel storage sites. I would like
to emphasize that these are not hypothetical threats.
In 1992, for example, an employee of the Ignalina nuclear
power plant in Lithuania planted a virus in the plant's
computer system that could have led to a major accident. The
same plant, in November of 1994, received two bomb threats, one
of which involved organized crime, and led to the shutdown of
the facility.
More recently, a disenchanted employee of the Severodvinsk
submarine facility, whose salary had not been paid, threatened
to blow up a shop containing two nuclear reactors.
Although Russia has taken some steps to heighten security
at civilian nuclear plants, particularly in the wake of the
conflict in Chechnya, most civilian nuclear facilities remain
deficient in such basic defensive elements as intact perimeter
fences, more than token armed guards, vehicle barriers,
surveillance cameras, metal detectors at entrances and control
cages.
Unfortunately, these gaps in perimeter defense are
compounded by an approach to the terrorist threat that is
fixated on Chechens. As the assistant director of a major
Russian nuclear research center told me not long ago, there is
little concern about perimeter defense against terrorists
since, ``Chechens look different than us, and would be
recognized before they could get close to the site.''
Even if they were recognized, it's problematic if much
force could be marshalled quickly at the scene. Indeed, I would
argue, and I don't say this facetiously, heavy fire power is
much more visible at most banks, night clubs and fur stores in
the former Soviet Union than at many nuclear facilities.
And I say that having visited seven or eight such nuclear
sites in the former Soviet Union.
If security of fissile material is suspect at nuclear
facilities in the former Soviet Union it's even more vulnerable
in transport. These are problems that in part are due to the
generic difficulty of safeguarding nuclear material or warheads
compounded by the frequency with which fissile material is
moved, both between facilities in Russia and also within
facilities.
At one nuclear facility that I visited last year near
Moscow, for example, it was apparent that all transportation to
and from that site involving fissile material was accomplished
with a single truck, one which would appear to be an inviting
target for a terrorist or criminal group.
Safeguarding transport of fissile material within many
large nuclear complexes in Russia also is a serious problem
given the frequency with which the material is moved about, in
some instances on uncovered or unescorted hand carts. The
weapons that I observed happened to be black rather than red,
but I think the image was nevertheless telling.
As troubling for nonproliferation efforts as nuclear
smuggling are indications that in recent years Russia and the
other post-Soviet States have pursued imprudent state-
sanctioned exports of nuclear technology equipment and nuclear
related dual-use commodities.
You have already noted the difficulties associated with
Russian contracts to provide nuclear assistance to Iran, to
assist in the development of China's nuclear program, and also
to build two 1000 megawatt power reactors in southern India.
I share your concern particularly with the Indian deal
because I believe if it is implemented, it definitely would be
at odds with Russia's full scope safeguard commitments. Perhaps
in the question and answer period I can provide a little more
detail which would suggest how Russia in fact has revised its
own internal nuclear export regulations to take account of this
Indian export generated grandfather clause. Initially their
regulation did not have this caveat in place.
High level political commitment to export controls also has
been slow to materialize in Ukraine and the Baltic States,
which only recently began to develop meaningful export control
procedures and expertise. There have been a number of cases
involving these states, for example, in which sensitive, dual-
use nuclear items were either exported in violation of
establish export control procedures, or due to the absence of
such regulations.
Unfortunately, from the standpoint of nonproliferation,
improving export controls remains a low priority, not only for
Russia, but for most, if not all, of the post-Soviet States.
Finally, with respect to my short list of proliferation
challenges, is the need to enhance the security of sub-
strategic nuclear weapons in Russia. It is typically assumed in
the West that notwithstanding shortcomings in the civilian
nuclear sector, that physical security is high in the military
domain.
Although it may be higher in the military realm than at
most civilian sites, I would argue that the situation is not
good, and in fact is apt to deteriorate further before it gets
better. Most vulnerable to theft are older sub-strategic
nuclear weapons that are relatively small in size and lack
permissive action links to protect unauthorized use.
The security of sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Russia
today is compromised by a number of things, including the lack
of adequate storage facilities to handle the influx of
warheads, by the continuing turmoil, and economic hardship, and
general malaise within the armed forces.
I am particularly concerned about the vulnerability of
theft of these sub-strategic systems by disgruntled past or
present Russian Special Operations (Spetsnaz) soldiers who were
trained to use atomic demolition weapons, and may have special
knowledge or even access to nuclear weapons storage depots.
Tactical weapons for aircraft pose particular risks since they
are not kept at better guarded central storage sites.
The problem of sub-strategic nuclear weapons is magnified
by Russia's growing reliance on nuclear arms as its
conventional forces deteriorate. I think this dependency is
reflected in Russia's abandonment in 1993 of its no first use
nuclear policy, and in the open discussion among prominent
Russian military and defense industry figures of the need to
develop a new generation of nuclear munitions for tactical and
battlefield use.
The dangers in this shift of emphasis are compounded
because of Moscow's reliance on a launch-on-warning nuclear
strategy and by the deterioration of Russia's early warning
system, large portions of which existed in other post-Soviet
States.
Having identified some of the problems, let me turn briefly
to some steps that might be taken to reduce those difficulties.
First, I believe the United States should seek to reduce the
quantity of fissile material which must be protected and the
number of sites where fissile material is stored.
As part of a program of consolidation and elimination, I
would recommend that the U.S. should undertake to negotiate the
purchase of all highly enriched uranium known to reside at
research facilities in the non-Russian successor states.
Given the relatively small, but nevertheless significant,
quantities of weapons useable material at sites in Belarus,
Georgia, Kazakstan, Latvia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, that I
calculate to be slightly under 200 kilograms of highly enriched
uranium, a uranium buy up approach to the non-Russian republics
represents, I believe, a low cost, high return nonproliferation
strategy.
To the extent that HEU is actually being used by research
facilities, the United States also should provide the small
amount of money needed to convert the research reactor to run
on low enriched uranium.
Parenthetically, I might note the principal obstacle to
this HEU purchase plan is not resistance on the part of the
successor states, but rather is the difficulty of gaining
inter-agency agreement in the United States. This difficulty is
a direct product of the inter-agency battles that were waged
during the ultimately successful operation of Project Sapphire.
My second recommendation is to expand CTR cooperation in
the area of reactor security. Nuclear power plants in the
Soviet Union were not designed to confront current terrorist
threats which could lead to catastrophic accidents with global
consequences.
More attention should be given under the Nunn-Lugar program
to enhanced reactor security as a part of a large effort to
strengthen international and national nuclear safeguards. At a
minimum, current physical protection efforts need to be
coordinated with work to upgrade the safety and security of the
four dozen nuclear power reactors currently operating in five
post-Soviet States.
My third recommendation is to pursue negotiated constraints
on sub-strategic nuclear weapons. As you know, nuclear weapons
of a non-strategic variety have not figured prominently in the
arms control and disarmament agenda since the important Bush
and Gorbachev initiatives in the fall of 1991. It is precisely
this category of nuclear weapons that poses the greatest risk
in terms of vulnerability to theft, and/or unauthorized use. A
number of steps need to be taken, including the codification in
a legally binding treaty of the 1991 Bush-Gorbachev
declarations on the withdrawal of sub-strategic weapons.
Finally, more attention must be given to sustaining those
important nonproliferation initiatives that already have been
begun in the former Soviet Union.
I believe it is vital to U.S. national security to continue
to support the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. It is now
time, however, to confront the problem of sustainability and
the issue of facilitating the rational transfer of
responsibility for physical protection and material control
activities from the United States to the NIS and especially to
Russia.
A step in the right direction, I believe, is the recently
established safeguards training center in Obninsk, Russia which
will reinforce indigenous physical protection efforts by
educating a new generation of specialists who will serve as
both practitioners and instructors. Much more, however, needs
to be done to create incentives in the post-Soviet States to
foster indigenous safeguards efforts and to sustain those
activities once they have begun.
Unfortunately, an influx of money alone will not solve that
problem. A sustained educational effort is required to change
attitudes and to instill a new nonproliferation and safeguards
philosophy or culture. This is a task, I believe, for which
non-governmental organizations are particularly well suited to
perform.
Let me conclude, therefore, by calling for much closer
cooperation between the U.S. Government and the non-
governmental community in the provision of such educational
assistance and in the pursuit of mutual nonproliferation
objectives.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Potter follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. POTTER
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Dr. Potter.
When I was introducing our witnesses as I opened the
session today, I did not mention that Dr. Speier had been in
the administration and helped develop our missile technology
control regime, participated in monitoring that, and is an
expert in nuclear nonproliferation issues as well, having
served in the government until 1994 when he retired and became
an independent consultant.
We appreciate very much your participation in our hearing
today. You may proceed.
TESTIMONY OF RICHARD H. SPEIER, INDEPENDENT CONSULTANT
Mr. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to
testify on recent Russian actions affecting missile
proliferation. In addition to my full statement which you have
put into the record, Mr. Chairman, with your permission I will
submit a recent policy brief distributed in the last week by
the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center that gives an
independent view on the same matters that I will be discussing.
Senator Cochran. That's good to have, and we appreciate it.
It will be included in the record. Thank you.
[The information of Mr. Speier follows:]
RECKLESS RUSSIAN ROCKET EXPORTS
Mr. Speier. Mr. Chairman, we are fortunate to be living in
a time of world peace, but what kind of a peace is it? Ambrose
Bierce, the great American cynic, defined peace as ``a period
of cheating between two periods of fighting.''
Mr. Chairman, there is a system of international rules and
procedures called the Missile Technology Control Regime. The
purpose of the MTCR is to limit the proliferation of missiles
capable of delivering mass destruction weapons. Twenty-nine
nations are now formal members of the MTCR. They include
Russia.
But it appears that there is some cheating going on. Is
Russia cheating? If so, what should we do about it? I shall
address these questions by first summarizing the key rules of
the MTCR, then recent Russian actions, and then implications
for policy.
The MTCR is a non-treaty arrangement that has been in
effect for 10 years. To understand its key rules, I must ask
you, Mr. Chairman, to understand one phrase of MTCR jargon--
Category One systems.
Category One systems are unmanned delivery vehicles that
can send a 500 kilogram payload to a range of 300 kilometers.
Category One systems are rockets and unmanned air vehicles,
such as cruise missiles, but of any kind--civilian or military,
as long as they meet the 500 kilogram, 300 kilometer
parameters.
Category One systems also include technology, production
equipment and certain major components. Category One systems
include Scud missiles, as well as those of greater capability.
Category One systems are the target of the MCTR's rules for
export restraint.
Given this bit of jargon, the MTCR has three key rules.
First, there is a strong presumption to deny exports of
Category One systems, regardless of purpose. On the rare
occasions when they are exported, the supplier government, and
not just the recipient, must take responsibility for ensuring
end use.
Second, there is a strong presumption to deny exports of
any missile intended for the delivery of mass destruction
weapons regardless of its range of payload. This denial rule
extends to every item controlled by the MTCR, as long as that
item is intended for the delivery of nuclear, biological or
chemical weapons.
And, third, there is a flat prohibition against exporting
complete production facilities, or complete production
technology, for Category One systems. In a nonproliferation
regime, it makes no sense to create new suppliers of the most
sensitive items.
The United States, since late 1990, has supplemented these
rules with legislated sanctions against foreign actions that
contribute to the proliferation of Category One systems.
These sanctions have encouraged export restraint by some
governments, but by law the sanctions do not apply to transfers
approved by any of the governments of the 29 members of the
MTCR.
Given these rules of the MTCR, I shall now summarize
relevant actions by Russia, starting in 1993, the year that
Russia formerly agreed to abide by the guidelines of the MTCR.
Nineteen hundred ninety three--Russia was faced with U.S.
sanctions for the export of Category One rocket engines and
their production technology to India.
So it made a deal with the U.S. Russia agreed in July, 1993
to halt the transfer of the technology, and to abide by the
rules of the MTCR without yet becoming a full member of the
regime. In return, the U.S. agreed to make Russia a space
station partner, and to allow U.S. satellites to be launched by
Russian rockets.
But Russian transfer of rocket engine technology continued
to go to India, although it was supposed to have ceased. It
continued for another 6 weeks, until all aspects of the
agreement were formally in place, resulting in the transfers
being 60 to 80 percent completed.
1994--there are no public reports of Russian Category One
exports in that year. But the U.S. Government is concerned
about Russian activities involving China, India, Iran, Libya,
North Korea and Syria.
So the U.S. refuses to approve full Russian membership in
the MTCR. The criteria for MTCR membership, as you yourself
mentioned, Mr. Chairman, include the ability to control
missile-related exports, and the actual cessation of actions
inconsistent with the MTCR.
1995--the U.S. catches Russia aiding Brazil in the
development of a Category One space launch vehicle, but the
U.S. waives the imposition of sanctions. Instead, the U.S.
agrees to support full Russian membership in the MTCR,
presumably because Russia has met the criteria for membership.
In August 1995, Russia becomes a full member. One month
later, in September, a Russian lieutenant general states
publicly that if NATO expands eastward, Russia will export
nuclear and missile items to Algeria, India, Iran and Iraq.
Two months after that, in November, the missile guidance
systems that we have already discussed, salvaged from missiles
with ranges of thousands of kilometers, are transferred from
Russia to Iraq.
U.S. officials, as we've just heard, say that this transfer
may not have been authorized by the Russian government, but we
are still waiting for the results of an investigation.
1996--in January, well connected Russians renew the threat
to link U.S. behavior to Russian restraint in missile exports.
In February, some 6 months after Russia has joined the MTCR, an
official of the Russia Duma Defense Committee states that if
NATO expands eastward, Russia will export missiles to China and
India.
By February, Russian firms are concluding contracts to help
Iran produce ballistic missiles. In May, the U.S. protests to
Russia and Ukraine over talks to supply China with SS-18 ICBM
technology.
During this year, some unspecified entity in Russia makes
an illegal export--so called by the chairman of the Duma
Defense Committee--of eight Scud launchers and 24 to 32 Scud
missiles to Armenia.
Mr. Chairman, it is one thing to talk about loose nukes,
where individuals may attempt to steal small quantities of
plutonium in their coat pockets. But it is quite another thing
to envision loose Scuds, where dozens of complete missiles and
their launchers are illegally spirited out of Russian control.
Nineteen hundred ninety seven--Israeli officials report
that Russia is helping Iran to produce SS-4 type missiles, and
to test an SS-4 rocket engine. SS-4s have a range on the order
of 2,000 kilometers, and transfers of their production
technology are banned by the MTCR.
Moreover, SS-4s can only be effective with mass destruction
payloads.
Israel also reports that Russia is willing to stop these
transfers if Israel will enter an economic deal with Russia. In
spite of this quid pro quo offer, a senior U.S. source
speculates that the transfer may be beyond the control of the
Russian government.
U.S. officials say, however, there is even stronger
intelligence on other Russian Category One transfers to Iran,
specifically transfers of Scud missile production technology,
which are also banned by the MTCR.
Mr. Chairman, if these reports are substantially accurate,
Russia has exported Category One missiles and has exported
missile items intended for the delivery of mass destruction
weapons, in spite of the MTCR's strong presumption to deny such
exports.
Russia may have exported complete Category One production
technology to Iran, in spite of the MTCR's flat prohibition
against doing so. Russia is either incapable of controlling
such exports, or is unwilling to control them, or both, in
spite of such capability and willingness being key criteria for
membership in the MTCR, and key elements of the 1993 U.S.-
Russian agreement for space cooperation.
The policy implications are four fold.
One, space cooperation. Because Russia has violated the
1993 bargain, the U.S. is no longer obligated to keep Russia as
a space station partner or to allow Russian launches of Western
satellites.
Two, MTCR membership. Because Russia has failed to fulfill
key criteria for MTCR membership, continued Russian membership
is no longer in the interest of the regime. The regime has no
procedures for expelling a member, but it may be appropriate
for Russia itself to leave the regime until it is capable of
and willing to abide by its rules.
Three, sanctions. Because Russia is a member of the MTCR,
current U.S. law largely exempts it from missile related
sanctions. But Congress may want to consider whether such
sanctions are necessary to change the cost-benefit calculus of
Russian exports.
One way to apply sanctions would be to require Presidential
certification of Russian behavior consistent with the MTCR.
Such certification could be a prerequisite for the continuation
of space cooperation with Russia or other trade in MTCR-
controlled items between the U.S. and Russia.
And, four, intelligence. Because a key assumption of
National Intelligence Estimate 95-19 was that Russia would not
egregiously violate the MTCR, the conclusion of that NIE, that
North America would not face missile threats from additional
nations before the year 2010, needs to be reassessed.
The NIE described exports from countries such as Russia as
a ``wild card,'' and the independent panel reviewing the NIE
criticized the assumption of Russian compliance. The fact is
that the Russian behavior I have described blows the NIE
assumptions to smithereens.
Mr. Chairman, the U.S. and Russia have a great many common
interests. Moreover, the Russian Federation is not a monolith.
For these reasons it is important to target U.S. actions
against those Russian entities benefitting from missile
proliferation. It is important not to link other, completely
separate elements of our relationship to missile
nonproliferation issues.
But having said this, we are faced with 4 years of reports
of Russian missile proliferation. We cannot afford to tolerate
cheating against basic rules of international security. We need
remedial action.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Speier follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD H. SPEIER
Senator Cochran. Thank you. Dr. Speier for your interesting
testimony and for your suggestions about the possible steps
that we can take to do something more effective about getting
compliance with the obligations under the MTCR.
Let me ask Dr. Potter a couple of questions in connection
with the testimony that he gave us about the security issue.
Dr. Potter, you focused on that, and the problem of having
weapons grade nuclear material available in such a widespread
region outside the Soviet Union. You named five or six
different nation-states now, including Latvia, I think, where
this material is now located.
Is the list that you give us an effort to identify areas
where these nuclear materials can be easily stolen or at risk
of being stolen? Or is this just a list of those places where
nuclear material is available, but has a varying degree of
security surrounding it?
Are these all high risk in terms of secured areas or not? I
want to be sure I understood what you were telling us.
Mr. Potter. I think the first point to make is that it
clearly is the case that the overwhelming bulk of weapons
useable material is located in Russia. But having said that, it
is also the case that there is a significant quantity that
resides outside of Russia.
My point is that if I were a would be proliferator, would I
necessarily go to the place where there was the most material,
or would I turn to the place or places where the material was
most accessible. I think in part the answer is the latter, and
I can identify then some specific places where the material
outside of Russia is not adequately safeguarded.
The U.S. Government has been concerned for some time about
a small quantity of weapons useable nuclear material in Tblisi,
Georgia. We have had discussions with the Georgian government
and with the Russian government about how to get that material
out of the country, but to date, without any demonstrable
effect.
Unfortunately, there is also material that is weapons
useable in other states that I mentioned--Belarus, Kazakstan,
Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Latvia. The vulnerability of that
material varies from country to country.
My basic thesis is that rather than continuing to invest a
large amount of money in trying to make secure those limited
number of facilities where there are discrete amounts of
material known to be present, it makes more sense to remove
that material as a nonproliferation measure.
My calculation is that there is about 191 kilograms--let's
say slightly under 200 kilograms of material that is known to
exists in these states. My center has had discussions with the
directors of some of these nuclear facilities who are quite
prepared to see that material taken from them if they are
compensated in some fashion for the material.
They are also quite prepared to see the reactors modified
to run on low-enriched uranium which would not constitute a
significant proliferation threat.
So I think while this will not solve the problem at large,
namely with respect to Russian material, it may help us to
reduce the proliferation threats that nevertheless are real,
and, I would argue, to date have not received sufficient
attention.
Senator Cochran. One of the reasons, we are told, that some
of these rogue states are slow in their ability to develop
nuclear weapons capability is the difficulty and the cost of
producing the fissile material.
Iran is embarking, it seems to be, it's reported by many--
upon a planned effort to build nuclear weapons.
Would not they get nuclear weapons quicker if they were
able to steal or purchase fissile material from Russian
facilities, or other facilities that are unsecured outside of
Russia, which you talk about? Could they successfully obtain
fissile material in this way, do you think?
Mr. Potter. I think your question really directs attention
to the great problem caused by the inadequate state of security
of nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union, the fact that
there is such a tremendous quantity of material in the post-
Soviet States.
I can respond specifically to the efforts that I am aware
of involving Iran, and at least one of the post-Soviet States,
namely, Kazakstan. We do know, and the U.S. Government to the
best of my knowledge is well acquainted with, Iranian interests
in nuclear material that was located in Kazakstan, at least
since 1993.
Some of this information is related to the so-called
Project Sapphire, the successful effort to take out some 600
kilograms of HEU from the Ulba Metallurgy Plant in Ust-
Kamenogorsk, Kazakstan.
One of the things that Americans who were involved in
Project Sapphire discerned was that in a room next to the room
holding the highly enriched uranium in Ust-Kamenogorsk were a
number of canisters that had Tehran addresses on them.
I have been told that the American Government believes that
these canisters were filled with the dual use nuclear related
material beryllium which was produced in great quantities at
Ust-Kamenogorsk. This example suggests that there was at least
contact between the Iranian government and this Kazakstan
nuclear facility which had a large quantity of highly enriched
uranium.
It's also known that Iran was very much interested in the
Aktau nuclear power facility, which is on the Caspian Sea,
across from Iran. That as early as 1993, the Iranian government
was interested in establishing a consulate at Aktau where the
fast breeder reactor is located.
This is significant, among other things, because
approximately one ton of plutonium exists on site at this fast
breeder reactor facility. And what is significant about this,
in addition to the quantity, is that the material is in low
irradiated form, that is, it doesn't have the radiation barrier
that is typical in most spent fuel.
There has been assistance provided by the U.S. Government
to try to safeguard this material, but it's also the case that
there is a major Iranian presence at this particular port
facility. In fact, there is cooperation proceeding between Iran
and Kazakstan to develop a harbor in Aktau.
So, these would be at least two examples in which it
appears as if Iran has sought to establish contact in locations
of the former Soviet Union where nuclear material was present.
It would suggest the possibility of their acquiring material,
although I have no information that they have been successful
in actually acquiring any material that would be of use from
the standpoint of the development of a nuclear weapon.
Senator Cochran. There has been a report in the Washington
Times that Iran is using its civilian nuclear power program as
a cover for acquiring technology and expertise that is
necessary to enable it to build nuclear weapons.
And also we are told in the same report, this was in 1994,
that Iran was about eight to 10 years away from fulfilling that
objective, but that the timetable could be shortened with
foreign assistance.
I assume that foreign assistance is the kind of assistance
that would include Russia's sale of a reactor and working with
technicians and scientists in Iran to develop an alleged
civilian nuclear power program in Iran.
Do you agree with that assessment, or do you have the
background to tell us, in your opinion, whether you think that
is on target with what the facts are, and whether or not the
sale and participation by Russia in the Iran nuclear power
program has weapons proliferation consequences?
Is this a violation of the NPT, for example, in your view,
and what should we be doing to try to insure compliance with
NPT?
Mr. Potter. I think the issue of whether or not the
Russian-Iranian nuclear deal constitutes a violation of the NPT
turns upon the belief on the part of the Russian government
that Iran is in fact intent upon pursuing a nuclear weapons
program.
If, in fact, the Russian government does not believe that
Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program, then as a member in
so-called ``good standing'' with the NPT, with international
safeguards in place, there is nothing that legally precludes
Russian provision of nuclear assistance to Iran.
In fact, some would argue that under Article IV of the NPT,
a state has some obligation to provide nuclear assistance if a
party is in fact in good standing under the NPT.
I think the problem though is not so much the provision of
power reactors that would use low enriched uranium, but rather
is the assistance that Iran will get, and, in fact, is getting
with respect to building a nuclear infrastructure. We are
talking about personnel training, particularly training that is
taking place in Russia.
Unfortunately one might note that to some extent Russia
here is carrying on where the U.S. left off in the training of
Iranian nuclear specialists.
I think that what is important for the U.S. to do to try to
redress this problem is to pursue a two-track policy. On the
one hand we need to continue to try to persuade Russia to stop
nuclear cooperation with Iran, not because it is necessarily
illegal, but because it's imprudent. It doesn't serve Russia's
interests. It does not serve the international community's
interests.
We also have to persuade Russia to require much more
transparency over the different nuclear activities with which
it's associated in Iran, and to try to create more stringent
safeguards in that country.
We also have to insist upon the return of the spent fuel to
Russia that will be generated by these nuclear reactors. It
would be very dangerous for the spent fuel to remain on site
where it could be reprocessed by Iran.
We need to encourage Russia to require Iran to accept more
stringent IAEA safeguards, such as the so-called 93 plus 2
safeguards agreement, which includes environmental sampling
which would make it much more difficult for Iran to utilize it
civilian nuclear program for covert weapons purposes.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much. Let me turn to Dr.
Speier, and ask a few questions about the MTCR. You pointed out
that Russia had not really lived up to its MTCR commitments.
I was going to ask you if, based on your knowledge of the
things that have been done by Russia in terms of selling and
transferring missile technology to Iran and Iraq, do you think
this is solid evidence that would justify our inviting them to
withdraw--which was one of your four suggestions--from MTCR?
What would that really accomplish, though? Isn't it better
to have Russia under the tent and working with them, possibly
being influenced by consensus among other nations, as well as
the U.S., to change or modify its behavior, rather than to
undergo the possible public embarrassment or humiliation or
whatever would be attendant to being expelled, in effect--even
though you say there's no way to expel a member, though asking
them to withdraw is sort of the same thing.
In other words, I am questioning whether or not that might
be an effective way to obtain a change or modification in
behavior. It seems to me that a more productive way of dealing
with that would be to try to get at the facts more, and
conclusively identify who is really actively involved in these
violations.
Is it the Russian government itself condoning what they
know to be prohibited behavior under the MTCR, and if it is,
should we do something to show our displeasure? Cancelling
space station cooperation, not allowing them to send up our
satellites on their vehicles, space vehicles, for example?
What is your reaction to that?
Mr. Speier. Those are very good questions, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, with respect to my certainty of the transfers
that I have reported on, as my full statement attempts to make
clear, I have been drawing exclusively on information in the
public domain.
And I understand that this Subcommittee will have the
opportunity to have a briefing from the appropriate members of
the intelligence community.
Senator Cochran. That is correct. We do intend to have that
session as well.
Mr. Speier. And I defer to whatever facts they have agreed
on.
With respect to your very prescient question about the best
way to influence Russia, whether it is really better to ask
them out of the MTCR, or to keep them in there, there are a
number of advantages to MTCR membership that unfortunately
provide opportunities for mischief making.
A member is a part of very extensive and very sensitive
information exchanges among the other members that suggest
opportunities to exploit--to exploit the market that no one
else is attempting to enter.
Membership also gives one a right of veto over changes in
the regime. Membership, according to the practices of some
members, and the proposals, some proposals that are actually in
Congress right now, membership entitles one to greater access
to missile technology.
And finally, membership, as I mentioned, protects the
member from the imposition of U.S. sanctions.
Now, the question is, given the apparent inability or
unwillingness of Russia to enforce the regime, do we want
Russia to have these advantages? Is there much that Russia
could be doing in the way of missile trade that she isn't
already doing?
Those are some of the questions that I believe one would
ask in addressing the issue of membership.
Senator Cochran. You mentioned the transfer of Scud
missiles and launchers from Russia to Armenia--I think you did.
Mr. Speier. Yes.
Senator Cochran. This was back in 1994 to 1996, and there
is an indication that a former defense minister--well, the Wall
Street Journal reported this--Minister Grachev approved the
sale or transfer of more than a billion dollars worth of
conventional arms to Armenia from 1994 to 1996, including 32
Scud-B ballistic missiles and eight associated launchers. This
was all in the Wall Street Journal.
That transfer seems to have clearly violated Moscow's
commitment to abide by the guidelines of the MTCR as well. The
question that this raises, along with the other reports, the
Washington Times report that we talked about, to Iran, is it
plausible that the Russian government, given all these facts,
itself was not aware of these activities?
That is almost conclusive evidence that in order to comply
with the provisions of U.S. law, our government would be
obligated to impose some kind of sanctions against Russia.
Is there no sanction provision at all associated with the
obligations of the MTCR?
Mr. Speier. First of all, with respect to the transfer from
Russia to Armenia of the Scud missiles, according to the actual
statement of the chairman of the Duma Defense Committee, that
transfer took place in 1996, at the tail end of this 1994-1996
period, took place in 1996, months after the Russians had
formally joined the MTCR.
Could the Russian government have been unaware of this
transfer? That is the assertion of the chairman of the Duma
Defense Committee, that it was an illegal transfer.
Is the U.S. obligated to impose sanctions, or does it have
the authority to impose sanctions? There is one case in which
one can impose missile related sanctions on an MTCR member. And
that is if the transfer was not authorized by the member
government and if the member government takes no steps to
prosecute the entities that did make the transfer.
So if the Russian government sits on its hands in the case
of a transfer like the one to Armenia, or a transfer like the
one of the guidance systems to Iraq, then one could impose
sanctions under existing law. There is that authority.
Senator Cochran. What is your reaction to the exchange that
I had with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State about doing
a more aggressive job of investigating to get to the bottom of
who is responsible, what entities are involved in transferring
these prohibited weapons and elements of weapons to Iraq and
Iran, so that we can target some sanctions as we have done in
the case with China, now, as an example of our seriousness, and
the fact that we consider these very serious violations of the
MTCR, and we are not going to tolerate this kind of action by
Russian businesses, individuals, or the government?
What other options do we have for doing a better job of
getting the facts, or causing Russia to do a better job of
getting the facts?
Mr. Speier. Mr. Chairman, I think what we are talking about
is the question of the cost/benefit calculus of these exports.
If there is a penalty to making these exports, then they are
less likely to be made than if they get a free ride.
Unfortunately, the recent record of the application of
missile related sanctions that are authorized by our law has
not been very strong. For the first 2 years of the law, from
the end of 1990 to the end of 1992, missile related sanctions
were imposed five times in 2 years.
In the next 4 years, they have only been imposed twice, in
4 years. One of those sanctions was a no-brainer against a
transfer between North Korea and Iran. The other sanction was
against China in 1993, and within a few months of the
imposition of that sanction, 90 percent of the force of it was
withdrawn by a Commerce Department interpretation that the
sanctions did not apply to U.S. satellites launched on Chinese
launch vehicles.
So we really have not been too active in missile related
sanctions in recent years. If we were, we might see a different
behavior on the part of these exporters.
I think certainly if we make it clear that the 1993
bargain, where Russia would abide by the MTCR in return for
space station and launch cooperation, if we make it clear that
we take that very seriously and that it is in jeopardy as a
result of this kind of behavior, there will be a great premium
on the Russian aerospace firms and entities to avoid these
kinds of exports.
Senator Cochran. I got the impression from the former
witness that there are a lot more smuggling activities going on
between Russia and Iraq than have been publicly reported up to
this point.
We know about the guidance components that were intercepted
in Amman, Jordan, that were being shipped from Russia to Iraq,
in violation of the United Nations Security Council sanctions.
And we know that Russia is saying that it is investigating
that, but we have had no report on the results of that
investigation. It seems to me, and I am not an expert on what
kind of authority this UNSCOM group has, but it seems to me
that in order to make it an effective enforcer of U.N.
sanctions that there has to be some investigative arm, there
has to be some way to deal with the challenge that we face now.
If you know smuggling is going on, you can go on site, the
IAEA can go on site and do inspections to see if safeguards are
being adhered to and the like. But isn't there something
missing here?
What are the other options available to us? Should we try
to force some change in the enforcement regime under the U.N.
Security Council's authority?
Mr. Speier. Mr. Chairman, first of all, with respect to the
question of whether there is more smuggling going on than this
one incident in November of 1995, I think we should remember
that the absence of evidence does not mean evidence of absence.
We may not know about everything that is going on. But more
than that, there have been reports of Russian experts going
where they should not be going, and helping countries develop
missiles.
Part of the MTCR controls are to stop this. But I have been
told by a Russian official recently that perhaps these are
retired Russian missile experts who are making their own
decisions to do this.
So the transfer of technology can go on apace without one
finding guidance equipment at the bottom of the Tigris River.
But more than that, you've twice raised the very important
question of investigations, and how should we pursue them.
I think first of all, the Subcommittee should see what the
intelligence community already knows, and make its judgment
about their ability to conduct investigations. The problem may
be either the lack of investigations or the lack of action to
follow up those investigations.
I think certainly the actions in the form of sanctions have
trailed off in recent years.
Senator Cochran. That seems to be an option that you are
suggesting, or intimating, that we ought to press the
administration to consider. Is that an accurate impression that
I have gotten from what you are saying?
Mr. Speier. Investigations? Or----
Senator Cochran. Sanctions.
Mr. Speier. Sanctions?
Senator Cochran. Yes.
Mr. Speier. To the extent that there is authority under
existing law, absolutely. We have got to make it clear there--
in Senator Glenn's words, we must take the profit out of
proliferation. Right now, it is a big money maker to do this.
If you impose the right kinds of sanctions, it's a big
money loser.
Senator Cochran. I would like to hear your reaction to a
recent article in Foreign Affairs written by Michael Mandelbaum
on the subject of U.S. relations with Russia and China.
He says this: ``While difficult, the Russian-Chinese
policies to which the United States objects, are not impossible
to change. If an issue is important enough, the governments in
Moscow and Beijing can impose their will.
``Irritants in American relations with Russia and China
persist not only because the administrative capacity of each
government is limited, but also because the issues at stake are
not important enough for either government to muster the
political capital and incur the costs necessary to remove
them.''
Now, he is, I think, telling us that we have got to make it
more politically attractive and economically attractive for
Beijing and Moscow to take action. And that is my impression.
Dr. Potter, what do you get from that? Do you agree with
Michael Mandelbaum?
Mr. Potter. I do agree, although I guess I would add
another dimension to the problem here and this is where I
probably disagree with my good friend, Dick Speier, about the
wisdom of trying to induce Russia to leave the MTCR.
I am very much concerned about the need to provide
incentives to develop larger nonproliferation constituencies in
problem countries, whether those countries be Russia, China,
India, Pakistan--you pick your favorite country of concern.
And I think that one probably does not assist the process
of developing these constituencies by removing countries from
international nonproliferation regimes. On the contrary, by
engaging them in international regimes, you create offices, you
provide budgets, you attract individuals who develop a vested
interest in various nonproliferation activities.
I think there is not an adequate constituency in Russia or
the post-Soviet States. There is an even smaller constituency
in China.
Unfortunately, these constituencies are not likely to
develop very quickly. I am not suggesting that this is the only
approach that one has to take, but I think that one needs to be
cognizant of this fact, and wherever possible when we can
engage a country, it is useful to do so.
I would argue, for example, that even though there are a
number of the post-Soviet States that are not directly involved
in the export of nuclear material, a number of them are
transshippers. We should try to bring those countries into the
Nuclear Suppliers Group, because it would focus more government
attention on important nonproliferation issues.
While we both need to think about better ways to increase
incentives and to provide disincentives, one also needs to
think about the long term issue. And related to that is the key
question of trying to deal with defense conversion in the
former Soviet Union.
Unfortunately, as long as there is a strong economic
incentive to sell basically anything to anyone for the right
price, regardless of the development of export controls, we are
not really going to be able to get a handle on the problem.
This is why we need to focus first and foremost on shoring up
the nuclear material and the missile technology at the source.
I think export controls is important, but it's going to be
much more difficult to try to capture that material once it
leaves the source. So this is where I would invest my greatest
effort.
Senator Cochran. Dr. Speier.
Mr. Speier. I partially agree with Dr. Potter. First of
all, with respect to the Mandelbaum statement, the statement as
I heard you read it, Mr. Chairman, argues that we can influence
the Russian and Chinese governments if we put enough priority
on it.
But it's not clear that the problem in missile
proliferation is just with the Russian government. The problem
may be that it is so profitable for these Russian aerospace
entities and military entities to make these exports that they
either attempt to influence the government to approve the
exports, or they make them outside of the government's control.
What appropriate sanctions can do, such as putting the
space station cooperation and the launch cooperation into
jeopardy, what they can do is threaten to pull all the profit
out of these deals, and, indeed, to make them very costly.
And the same for other sanctions that we might impose. So
it's not a question of acting on--the people have very good
will in what is certainly a minimal central government in
Moscow.
There are other elements of the system that need to see the
right combination of costs and benefits, and I think this is
perhaps where Dr. Potter's comments and mine overlap.
As far as regime membership, the Missile Control Technology
Regime, and, indeed a nonproliferation regime in general should
not be viewed as a birthday party where everybody gets to come.
There should be some serious requirements for ability and
willingness to contribute to the cause of nonproliferation if
one is going to be in that regime.
And it's very questionable whether Russia right now
qualifies.
Senator Cochran. This has been an excellent discussion of
some of the issues and the problems that we face in trying to
do a better job of influencing the conduct of nation-states to
try to hold down the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
That's the goal that we have in holding these hearings, to
better understand the challenges and what some of the options
are for government policies that will be more successful in
dealing with the challenge.
We also want to announce that our next hearing will be on
the subject of proliferation and U.S. export controls, and we
will hold that hearing next Wednesday, June 11, at 9:30 a.m.
Until then, this Subcommittee will stand in recess.
[Whereupon, 4:10 p.m. the Subcommittee stood in recess, to
reconvene, Wednesday, June 11 at 9:30 a.m.]
(all)
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