RECKLESS RUSSIAN ROCKET EXPORTS
A Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Policy Brief
Introduction
Whatever one might say about the vitality of U.S.-Russian security
cooperation, Russian missile proliferation is still an embarrassment.
In fact, not more than a week after the White House announced its
agreement with President Yelstin over what kinds of theater missile
defenses the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 allows,
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu protested Russia's transfer of the
means to make a 1,250 mile-range Russian-designed rocket to Iran.\1\
These missile exports, along with others to Armenia, Iraq, Syria,
China, India, and Brazil, all fly in the face of Moscow's repeated
pledges to the U.S. and others to adhere to the Missile Technology
Control Regime. More important, they track the Administration's
repeated failure to employ U.S. nonproliferation sanctions laws to
deter such behavior or to suspend U.S. government-sanctioned space
cooperation and satellite transfers to Moscow. If Congress takes its
laws and Russian missile proliferation seriously, it should act both to
eliminate existing loopholes that encourage Executive inaction and to
condition future U.S.-Russian space commerce on Russia living up to its
nonproliferation obligations.
Russia's Missile Nonproliferation Promises
Communist Russia first publicly pledged to uphold the objectives of
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in June of 1990. Five
months later, however, it was caught violating this pledge in sharing
missile production technology for development of an entire upper rocket
stage with India. This promoted imposition of U.S. missile
proliferation sanctions in May of 1992.\2\ Two years later, after
securing Moscow's pledge to stop lending India missile production
assistance, the Clinton Administration made the Russian Republic an
adherent to the MTCR late for purposes of U.S. law. In exchange for
nearly $1 billion in U.S. commercial and government-to-government space
cooperation through the year 2000, Russia claimed it had renegotiated
its space cooperation with India to exclude transfers that would
violate the MTCR. Finally, satisfied that Moscow had created an
effective legal system of export controls, the White House sponsored
Moscow's formal entry into the MTCR in 1995.
It's Proliferating Performance
Clearly, the White House has tried to give Moscow every positive
incentive not to help other nations acquire missiles. Yet, throughout
President Clinton's tenure, Russia has been caught exporting extremely
sensitive missile technology and hardware. Thus, just one month after
U.S. officials got Russia to agree to stop lending India missile
production assistance, Moscow was caught air-shipping North Korean SCUD
missile launchers and other components to Syria.\3\ This, in turn, was
followed a month later with Russia's transfer of its most advanced
missile technology to China. Under a 5-year defense cooperation
agreement with China, Russia sent solid rocket fuel technology, mobile
missile know-how, large liquid rocket engines, missile guidance and
multiple warhead hardware and technology and hundreds of Russian
missile experts to help the PRC develop its own version of Russia's
highly accurate, intercontinental SS-25 missile.\4\
Nor did Russia end its missile assistance to India. Having agreed
in July of 1993 to stop helping India build cryogenic rockets, Moscow
insisted that it needed until November of 1993 to renegotiate its
Indian contracts. Russia did this but, in addition, it sent New Delhi
blueprints (something MTCR clearly prohibits) along with at least four-
fifths of the related production technology to build the engines. Then,
six months after Russia's self-imposed November deadline, U.S.
contractors negotiating space launches with Salyut/Krunichev in Moscow
found the Russians working with six-foot high, high-fidelity mockup of
the Indian rocket that Russia was supposed to have cut off missile
production assistance to. According to the Russians, this detailed
model was being used to teach Indian scientists precisely how to launch
their rockets.\5\
Unfortunately, Russia's transfers of missile technology did not end
here. A year later, in late May of 1995, the White House waived missile
proliferation sanctions against Russia for helping Brazil with the
casings on a large rocket known as the VLS project. Administration
officials explained this missile misdeed away claiming that the
Russians agreed to this sale before it promised the United States not
to conduct such trade. After talking with the Brazilians, though, U.S.
officials learned that Russia had helped Brazil on many more components
than the rocket casings and that the cooperation had been going on for
some time.\6\
The next Russian missile misdeed to hit the press was its attempted
missile guidance shipments to Iraq, which Jordanian authorities
interdicted in November of 1995. Since Desert Storm, the U.N.
resolutions have prohibited all military trade with Iraq. Yet, on 10
November, 30 crates containing 115 Russian-made gyroscopes from
dismantled intercontinental-range missiles were air shipped from Russia
aboard an Royal Jordanian aircraft to Amman. These components were
destined for Karama, Iraq's missile development center. At first, the
Russians denied any involvement. Then, U.S. State Department officials
admitted that the Russians did ship the gyroscopes but claimed that the
shipment was ``aberrational,'' that, again, Russian authorities
``tried'' but could not find the Russian perpetrator of the sale.\7\
Iran and Armenia: Moscow's Latest Missile Customers
Perhaps the most frightening act of Russian rocket recklessness was
first reported in early February: It was caught selling Iran the means
to produce a SS-4, a 1,250 mile-range missile that could reach all of
Saudi Arabia and Israel.\8\ This missile can carry a 4,400 pound
warhead but is so inaccurate, it is only useful for delivering nuclear
or biological warheads.
U.S. officials learned of this deal only when General Amos Gilad,
director of research for Israeli military intelligence visited
Washington just days before Russian Prime Minister Vicktor Chernomyrdin
was to meet with Vice Present Gore February 6. The timing was hardly
accidental. The Israelis could have briefed their U.S. counterparts
privately at any time. Instead, they chose to wait until just before
the Gore-Chernomyrdin meeting in a fashion that the Administration
could not ignore. First, the Israeli delegation briefed the area desks
at State and Defense; then, the delegation briefed the various U.S.
intelligence agencies; and then the House and Senate intelligence
committee staffs. Finally, as news of their briefings leaked to the
press, the Vice President demanded a briefing.
Vice President Gore did, in fact, bring the SS-4 deal to Prime
Minister Chernomyrdin's attention. The Prime Minister, though, denied
that his government authorized the sale. He did admit that this deal
would violate Boris Yeltsin's 1994 pledge not to engage in further arms
sales to Iran. More important, the transfer presents a serious security
threat to the entire Middle East and is a clear violation of the MTCR.
Finally, there's Russia's recent sale of missiles to Armenia. In
this case, Russia sold eight Scud-B launchers with enough missiles--24
to 32--to ``complete demolish,'' (in the words of the Chairman of
Russia's Duma Defense Committee), Armenia's Azerbaijani foes in
Baku.\9\ Although these transfers continued as late as last year,
Russian officials claim that they were only able to confirm them early
this winter. Washington officials, meanwhile, privately are raising
doubts that any ``transfer'' technically took place. The Scud missile
systems, they note, after all, were on Armenian soil under Soviet
control prior to their actual sale.
What's to Be Done?
Under U.S. law, adherents and formal members of the MTCR cannot be
sanctioned for missile exports unless they allow the MTCR guidelines to
be violated and fail to make an earnest effort to prosecute the
perpetrators. The law also requires sanctions only when a proliferator
has acted ``knowingly.'' These provisions, in effect, have been used by
the Executive to serve as a blanket exemption for Russia from
sanctions.\10\ Thus, repeatedly, Administration officials have argued
that Russia did not authorize or ``know'' of the missile misdeeds
identified or that they have been unable to identify the perpetrators
or are in the mist of disciplining some lower-level official. This has
prompted justified calls for tightening up existing nonproliferation
sanctions laws.\11\ The Administration, instead, has focused on
diplomacy. Last fall, U.S. officials shared a detailed list of current
troublesome Russian missile transactions with Moscow officials in hopes
that they would stop these deals. So far, the Russians have admitted
nothing and it's unclear if they have stopped any of these deals.
Clearly, if we are serious about our security, we need to do
better. It's too late for the Executive to undo the harm Russian
missile proliferation has already done. But Congress can make sure
Russia has an interest in stopping future proliferation. In fact, the
U.S. has considerable leverage if it chooses to use it: Most of
Russia's cash-earning space launches are of U.S.-made satellites that
require U.S. export licenses. In addition, the U.S. continues to fund
much of Russia's participation in NASA projects. Together, these
activities are worth hundreds of millions of dollars annually in hard
currency to Russia's space industry. These space firms are the ones
whose technology is being sold and who are closest to those doing the
proliferating.
The pros and cons of tying future approval of U.S. export licenses
and funding of Russian participation to the absences of more missile
misdeeds are likely to be taken up in planned hearings of the Senate
Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security,
Proliferation and Federal Services. Such oversight comes none too soon.
The U.S. backed Russia's membership into the MTCR and offered it space
cooperation.because the White House claimed Moscow had finally
established a sound system missile technology export controls. If there
is no such system, we need to know. Certainly, the last thing we would
want is for U.S. space commerce and cooperation to subsidize more
missile proliferation.
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\1\ See Martin Sieff, ``Albright OKs Saddam's Ouster, Washington
Times, March 27, 1997, p. A13.
\2\ See Andrew Lawler, ``U.S. Sanctions Imposed; Indian Deal With
Russia Still On,'' Space News, May 18-24, 1992, p. 14.
\3\ See John P. Hannah, ``How Russia Still Abets Mideast Terror,''
The Wall Street Journal, September 15, 1993.
\4\ See John J. Fialka, The Wall Street Journal, October 14, 1993,
p. A12 and Martin Sief, The Washington Times, November 12, 1993, p.
A16.
\5\ See Vivek Raghuvanshi, ``Russia, India Discuss Cryogenic
Contract,'' Space News, November 15-28, 1993; ``Export Saga,'' Aviation
Week, October 25, 1993, p. 19; and House Committee on Science, Space
and Technology staff Memo to Congressman Sensenbrenner, ``Potential
Russian Violations of the Missile Technology Control Regime, August 1,
1994.
\6\ R. Jeffrey Smith, ``U.S. Waives Objection to Russian Missile
Technology Sale to Brazil,'' The Washington Post, June 8, 1995, p. A23.
\7\ See R. Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, December 15, 1995, p.
A30 and James Bruce, Jane's Defence Weekly, January 3, 1996, p. 3.
\8\ See Robin Wright, ``Russia Warned on Helping Iran Missile
Program,'' The Los Angeles Times, February 12, 1997 and Barbara Opal,
``Israelis Say Russia Aids Iran's Quest for Missiles,'' Defense News,
February 10-16, 1997, p. 1; and Bill Gertz, ``Russia Disregards Pledge
to Curb Iran Missile Output,'' The Washington Times, May 22, 1997, p.
A3.
\9\ See Nikolai Novichkov, ``Russia Details Illegal Deliveries to
Armenia,'' Jane's Defence Weekly, April 16, 1997 and Glen E. Howard,
``Oil and Missiles in the Caucasus,'' The Wall Street Journal, May 14,
1991, p. A22.
\10\ See Testimony of Henry Sokolski, ``America's Fight Against
Strategic Weapons Proliferation: Why and How We Can Do Better,'' Senate
Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Acquisitions and Technology,
March 27, 1966.
\11\ See, e.g., the initial findings of The Nonproliferation Policy
Reform Task Force, ``Nonproliferation Policy Reform: Enhancing the Role
of Congress'' (Washington, DC: The Nonproliferation Policy Education
Center, June 1996).
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RECKLESS RUSSIAN ROCKET EXPORTS
White House
Action Taken to
Russian Missile Enforce U.S.
Misdeed Administration Assessment Missile
Technology
Sanctions Law
Air ships North Korean Tel erector launcher units may NONE
SCUD launchers to have been mistaken by Russians
Syria (8/93) to be trucks
Sells China mobile, Russia made these transfers as NONE
multiple-war-head, an MTCR adherent and so is
high-accuracy solid legally exempt from US
and liquid missile sanctions. Acting against
technology to Beijing would jeopardize U.S.-
modernize its aging China relations
strategic rocket
forces (1993)
Russian rocket builder Shown evidence of Russia's NONE
says it's still continued missile assistance
lending India space to India and warned it could
launch integration jeopardize $100's of millions
tech (6/94) despite in U.S.-Russian space
MTCR and Russia's 7/ cooperation, White House tells
93 pledge not to give House Space Committee Chairman
India missile (9/94) CIA will ``look into
production assistance the matter''
Washington Post Waived U.S. missile sanctions NONE
reports Russia has against Brazil and Russia
been helping Brazil (citing US national security
build a large rocket interest), admitted both into
(6/8/95) the MTCR because of their
creation of a ``sound''
systems of nonproliferation
export controls
Ships intercontinental- Shipment of gyroscopes was an NONE
range ballistic ``aberrational'' action.
missile guidance sets Russian efforts to find who
to Iraq. Jordan was responsible are
interdicts ship- inconclusive
shipment (11/95)
Sells Iran 1,250-mile Administration official is NONE
range missile quoted in Los Angeles Times
production technology explaining that the transfer
(96-97) may have been ``beyond the
control of the government'' (2/
12/97)
Sells Armenia 8 Scud-B Administration officials claim NONE
missile launchers that there may have been no
with 24-32 missiles ``transfer'' since the Scud
(through late 1996) systems were in Armenia under
Soviet control prior to the
sale. Russian officials claim
that they were only able to
confirm these sales recently
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