PREPARED STATEMENT
ROBERT EINHORN,
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR NONPROLIFERATION,
BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY
AFFAIRS,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify before the
Subcommittee on the challenges and opportunities we face in obtaining
Russia's cooperation in the nonproliferation field. Preventing the
proliferation of dangerous weapons and technologies is among the
highest priorities of our foreign policy. Russia by virtue of the
weapons of mass destruction and other military and technological
capabilities it inherited from the Soviet Union as well as its own
international stature will be a key factor in the success of worldwide
nonproliferation efforts. My objective today is to provide you with a
snapshot of where we stand with Russia on these issues.
We have made progress with the Russians over the past four years on
our nonproliferation agenda. Russia recognizes that preventing the
spread of destabilizing arms and technologies can protect Russian
security interests. Russia is a strong supporter of the global
nonproliferation regime, and has worked constructively with us to
reduce the proliferation dangers credited by the collapse of the Soviet
Union. At the same time, the exigencies of a monetized, largely
privatized economy which no longer operates on the basis of command
resource allocations have underscored the importance of foreign sales.
Moreover, the uncertain and evolving nature of state controls in Russia
has increased opportunities for some ``grey markets'' sales. These
factors have at times contributed to serious U.S. concerns about
Russian exports of arms and sensitive technologies to third countries.
On the positive side, Russia has been a supporter of, and often a
key player in the global nonproliferation regimes.
Russia strongly supported indefinite extension of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and a recent agreement to give real
teeth to IAEA safeguards, significantly expanding their reach to
include access to information and locations that could be related to
clandestine nuclear programs.
Russian assistance was critical to securing the adherence
of Ukraine, Kazakstan and Belarus to the NPT as non-nuclear weapons
states and in moving all nuclear weapons from these states to Russia.
As a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, it
continues to abide by the Council's embargo on the sale of arms to Iraq
and Libya, and supports UNSCOM and IAEA efforts to uncover Saddam
Hussein's weapons of mass destruction and prevent the regeneration of
those capabilities.
Russia is a founding member of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group that coordinates international export controls on nuclear
equipment, materials and technologies. Russia has also supported
measures for strengthening NSG controls, most important, the adoption
of a policy requiring full-scope safeguards as a condition for nuclear
supply and establishment of a dual-use control regime.
In 1993. Russia agreed to forgo the transfer of certain
rocket technology to India and to abide by the Guidelines of the
Missile Technology Control Regime. In August 1995, it was admitted to
the MTCR.
Also in 1995, Russia agreed not to enter into and new
arms contracts with Iran and to conclude existing contracts within a
few years. In connection with becoming a founding member of the
Wassenaar Arrangement--a multilateral regime committed to increasing
transparency and responsibility in connection with transfers of arms
and dual-use goods and technologies.
President Yeltsin in Helsinki reaffirmed Russia's commitment to
ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Russian parliament has
indicated that it will ratify the Convention, most likely sometime in
the fall. In addition, Russia has recently enacted a law which provides
the legal basis for the destruction of its chemical weapons stockpile
and seems to be on a path which will eventually result in the
destruction of the 40,000 tons of chemical munitions it acknowledges it
holds.
Russia signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty last
fall, has stopped producing fissile material for nuclear weapons and
has joined the U.S. in calling for negotiation of a Fissile Material
Cut-off Treaty in Geneva.
Russia ratified the Biological Weapons Convention in
1975. President Yeltsin, however, has acknowledged the existence of a
decades-old, offensive biological warfare research program. He issued a
decree on April 11, 1992 prohibiting any illegal biological weapons
activity in Russia. Though we do not doubt his sincerity, we continue
to be concerned that the offensive BW program has not been entirely
eliminated.
Russia has also taken important steps to address the proliferation
risks posed by the large stockpile of nuclear weapons and fissile
materials it inherited from the Soviet Union, in many cases working
jointly, with the United States.
Highly enriched uranium from dismantled Russian nuclear
weapons is being converted into commercial reactor fuel for use in U.S.
nuclear power plants. Hundreds of weapons worth of uranium have already
been transferred from Russia to the United States.
With U.S. support Russia has expanded the program to
improve security at facilities where fissile material is located to now
over 40 sites. Hundreds of tons of weapons-usable nuclear material are
now subjected to substantially upgraded security.
With critical U.S. financial assistance, Russia is
constructing a modern facility at Mayak for the safe, secure storage of
fissile materials released from the dismantlement of nuclear weapons.
Russia has committed to disposing permanently of its
surplus weapons plutonium, and is working with the U.S. and France to
develop technologies for converting plutonium weapons components into a
form suitable for final disposition and international verification.
Russia has furthermore ceased use of newly-produced
plutonium for weapons purposes. The U.S. and Russia are negotiating a
cooperative arrangement to convert Moscow's plutonium production
reactors so they no longer produce weapons-grade material.
Russia is working trilaterally with the U.S. and the IAEA
to develop means of verifying that weapons-origin and other relevant
fissile materials declared excess to defense need are not returned to
nuclear weapons programs.
Russian law enforcement officials and scientists are
working with their American counterparts to share information on
illicit nuclear trafficking and improve laboratory analysis of nuclear
materials seized from smugglers.
Through the International Science and Technology Centers
and the Initiative for Proliferation Prevention, more than thirteen
thousand former weapons scientists, the majority Russian, are engaged
in peaceful scientific projects that reduce the risk they will be lured
away by money from rogue or terrorist states.
As it transforms its economy, Russia recognizes the need to
establish an export control system comparable to those of other major
industrial countries. It has committed to doing so in several
international settings, has enacted the necessary legislation, and has
set up the necessary internal mechanisms, including improved border
controls and customs surveillance aimed at restricting unauthorized
transfers of equipment and technology related to weapons of mass
destruction. The U.S. and others are helping Russia in this effort.
There are still major challenges ahead, however, particularly in view
of the economic pressures facing Russian industry and the
responsibilities placed on new, untested Russian institutions charged
with implementing export controls.
At times, however, Russia has demonstrated an unwillingness to
forgo profitable transactions for the sake of nonproliferation. After
the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russian market share of defense
exports dropped precipitously, primarily because Russia could no longer
afford to sell defense-related equipment at below market prices. Russia
is actively seeking to replace those markets with clients willing and
able to pay hard currency. In addition, Russian firms, sometimes
operating with little or inadequate oversight from Moscow, are targeted
by states seeking to circumvent the more restrictive export policies of
the U.S. and Western Europe. We can expect Russian exporters to
continue to pursue aggressively market share and hard currency through
arms and technology.
While economic incentives are the principal reason for the export
of sensitive goods and technologies. Russia can see the political value
such sales bring in firming up ties with regional powers such as China,
India and Iran.
We have followed carefully the recent expansion of Russian trade in
arms and proliferation-sensitive technologies with a variety of
recipients. In the case of the growing relationship between Russia and
China, which has become Russia's number one customer for conventional
weapons and military technology, the questions raised are not directly
proliferation-related because China already possesses the relevant
capabilities. Moreover, we do not question the right of either party to
engage in legitimate defense cooperation. Instead, we believe it is
important to focus on the implications of such cooperation for the
stability of the Asia-Pacific region, a concern we have raised, and
will continue to raise, on a case-by-case basis with the parties
involved whenever we believe it to be warranted.
Our proliferation-related concerns with Russian exports have
applied largely to Russia's nuclear and missile cooperation with
certain states, primarily Iran. Russia maintains that it confines its
cooperation with Iran to areas that are not of proliferation concern
and do not threaten others. We have raised with Russia reports that
call into question these assurances.
We remain opposed to Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran, and
have pressed Russian leaders at the highest levels to refrain from any
such cooperation. Russia began construction of the first reactor at the
Bushehr complex in 1995. While we remain opposed to the project, we
have seen indications that Moscow has limited the scope and pace of its
nuclear cooperation with Iran. President Yeltsin has stated that Russia
will not provide nuclear technologies to Iran that are directly useful
militarily including a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility.
Russian leaders have also assured us that they would not supply Iran
with a heavy water-moderated nuclear reactor. Such reactors raise
particularly serious proliferation concerns because of their potential
for plutonium production. We will continue to monitor this closely and
will press Russian authorities on any reports we receive of cooperation
between Russia and Iran in the nuclear field.
We are especially concerned about reports of cooperation by Russian
entities with Iran on long-range ballistic missiles. We take these
reports very seriously. Iran's acquisition of a long-range missile
delivery capability, coupled with its continued pursuit of nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, would pose a grave
threat to U.S. forces and friends in the region, and to regional
stability generally. Transfers would also be inconsistent with Russia's
commitments to the MTCR, and could raise serious issues under U.S.
sanctions laws. We do not believe that Russia has transferred any long-
ranged missiles to Iran. But Iran is now not giving priority to
importing complete missiles. Rather it is actively seeking various
types of technical assistance and cooperation that would enable it to
produce its own long-range missiles indigenously. It is reports of such
technical interactions between Iran and Russian entities that concern
us. We have raised such reports with Russia at the highest levels,
including during President Clinton's recent meeting with President
Yeltsin in Helsinki. The Russian leadership has told us that it does
not support assistance to Iran's ballistic missile program. While we
appreciate such assurances, we remain disturbed by the discrepancy
between them and what reportedly is occurring. Given the far-reaching
implications of this matter, we will continue to pursue it at the
highest levels.
We are also concerned by reports that Russian entities may intend
to transfer surface-to-air missiles to Iran. President Yeltsin pledged
in 1994 that Russia would not enter into any new arms contracts with
Iran and would conclude existing contracts within a few years. In 1995,
Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin made formal that
commitment.
At the time that the agreement with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin was
reached, Russia informed us that one Kilo-class submarine was expected
to be delivered to Iran, and that other old contracts including those
for tanks, would be fulfilled. Prior to concluding the 1995 agreement
we made certain that the contracts in the pipeline that would be
concluded within a few years did not involve any new weapons systems,
and would not alter the regional balance or compromise the ability of
the U.S. and our allies to protect our mutual interests. Any transfers
to Iran of advanced anti-aircraft missile systems would be inconsistent
with the 1995 agreement. We raised this issue with Russia in March at
the Helsinki Summit, and President Yeltsin reaffirmed his commitment to
the 1995 agreement. The U.S. has not determined that Russia has
transferred to Iran any advanced missiles, although we continue to
monitor this carefully.
In conclusion. Mr. Chairman, Russia has, for the most part, been a
strong partner in the effort to prevent proliferation, as reflected in
the constructive approach Moscow has taken on the international regimes
as well as in the responsible manner with which it has dealt with the
challenge of securing the fissile and other sensitive materials on its
territory. The difficulties we have encountered have been in the area
of questionable sales to certain countries of proliferation concern,
particularly Iran.
We believe the United States and Russia have a strongly shared
security interest in preventing the spread of weapons of mass
destruction and other sensitive goods and technologies. But Russia's
ability and determination to pursue its commitment to nonproliferation
may sometimes be eroded by a combination of powerful economic
pressures, the evolving relationship between central governmental
authorities and an increasingly privatized and export-dependent
industrial sector, and a relatively new, understaffed, and still-
unproven system of export controls.
Improved Russian economic performance and institutional reform will
help alleviate these problems--but basic changes will not be achieved
overnight. In the meantime, the Russian Government must take effective
steps to ensure a more accountable and conscientious approach to export
control. And it should better appreciate the risks of engaging in even
seemingly benign cooperation with determined proliferators such as
Iran.
Encouraging Russia to adopt a more effective and responsible
approach to cooperation with third countries will remain one of the
Administration's highest nonproliferation priorities. We will continue
to press our case at the highest levels, making clear that cooperation
on nonproliferation matters is an essential element of the strong
bilateral relationship both sides seek. Pursuing our nonproliferation
agenda with Russia will involve both incentives and disincentives,
including the implementation of our sanctions laws, whenever
applicable. However, the use of certain ``sticks,'' such as cutting off
or curtailing our assistance programs to Russia, would only be
counterproductive. Not only would they be unlikely to achieve our
nonproliferation goals: they would also undercut key programs to
promote democratization and market reform, as well as to ensure that
the process of disarmament takes place in as safe, secure, and
accountable a manner as possible.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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