Soviet Space Cooperation
Soviet Attitude Toward International Cooperation in Space *
* Prepared by Joseph G. Whelan, Senior Specialist in International Affairs, Senior Specialists Division, CRS.
SPACE COOPERATION: AN IMPERATIVE IN THE PRESENT
ERA
COMMITMENTS IN ACCORD
AN EXPANDING UNIVERSE FOR SPACE ACTIVITIES
COOPERATION IN PLANETARY ACTIVITIES
CONFERENCE ON COSMOCHEMISTRY OF PLANETS AND MOON, JUNE 1974
An exception to the general pall that hung over space relations during the period under review was Soviet-American cooperation in planetary activities. In this case, Soviet and American scientists had something to build on. During the heyday of detente, nearly 40 American and 75 Soviet scientists exchanged ideas in a 4-day conference held in Moscow during June 1974. The subject of the conference was the cosmochemistry of the planets and the Moon. Dr. Hinners termed this "an excellent conference" in which a great deal of information and ideas was exchanged. Rewarding personal contacts took place among the scientists, preprints were circulated, and "cross-pollination" occurred among scientists of different disciplines. Many of the participants had carefully prepared extensive review papers which, in Hinners' words, "summarized and synthesized a great deal of existing and recent results instead of merely presenting new data." (56) The general theme of the conference was comparative planetology and the desirability of studying other planets to increase an understanding of the Earth, its formation, chemistry, mineral distribution, and the evolution of its atmosphere and hydrosphere. (57)
In brief, this conference seemed to be a model for space cooperation. As Hinners reported: "Many of the American scientists felt that the sharing of data and theories at the conference was a step toward improved cooperation in space science between the United States and the U.S.S.R. in a kind of scientific detente." (58)
VENERA 9 AND 10, 1975
The same spirit of accommodation was carried into the Venera 9 and 10 missions. Both were launched on June 8 and June 14, 1975, respectively. Venera 9 soft-landed on the surface of Venus on October 22, Venera 10 on October 25. Information about the atmosphere of Venus and the first pictures of the Venusian surface were relayed back to Earth. This achievement was remarkable, and the Venera findings surprising. (59)
The United States had plans underway to probe Venus in 1978 with its Pioneer Venus. American specialists were, therefore, especially interested in getting as many details as possible about the Soviet mission, particularly information on the angles of entry into its atmosphere. (60) In November 1975, a month after the landings, Dr. Hinners requested in writing a briefing from the Soviets before the end of the year. It was important to make adjustments in the American program should the Soviet experience suggest that changes be made. No formal response came from the Russians. (61)
But in the following months information began to appear in space journals. And the Russians promised to give a detailed account of their findings at the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) meeting scheduled for Philadelphia in June. (62)
At the Venera session in Philadelphia the Soviets did come forth with information on the Venera mission in the form of a report by Mikhail Marov (ostensibly written by Academician Keldysh) and in private meetings with NASA scientists. Computer enhanced photographs of the surface were shown, and NASA was promised copies. (63)
The Soviets fulfilled this promise; they did pass on the pictures to NASA. Hinners described them as "good pictures of the surface, which have some surprises." For NASA this new data was very important: It gave them confidence, Hinners said, "confidence that
the basic engineering models of the Venus atmosphere are correct." (64)
Yet the Soviets were not quite so forthcoming with information as might be apparent here. When probed on this matter, Dr. Hinners responded, attributing Soviet failure to cooperate sometimes to technical deficiencies rather than to any hostile intent:
They transmitted almost immediately very high quality negatives of the pictures which they took. We will have a meeting with them—the date is not set—to look at the information from the entries themselves. It takes longer than we would desire, frankly. We would like to get that as soon as possible. But their time scale for data reduction is extremely long. They just do not seem to have the basic computer capability to do rapid data reduction and get the engineering data analysis as fast as we do.
"It is frustrating," Hinners exclaimed. But, he assured the committee, "We have no reason to suspect that we won't get it, but it is not as timely as we would like." (65)
Whatever the degree of frustration, the fact remains that the Soviets did cooperate: They briefed U.S. space scientists on their Venera 9 and 10 missions, and in reciprocation NASA officials briefed their scientists on the preliminary results of the Viking landers on Mars. (66-69)
VENERA 11 AND 12; PIONEER 1 AND 2, 1978
Successful Venus missions
Another opportunity for cooperation came in 1978 with the opening of the Venus launch window. The Soviet Union and the United States had planned coinciding missions with their respective spacecraft, Venera 11 and 12, and Pioneer Venus 1 and 2.
Venera 11 and 12 were launched in September; both soft-landed on Venus in December. Pioneer Venus 1 and 2 were launched in May and August, respectively; both entered the Venusian atmosphere in December.
The American missions were judged a success, but the imaging systems on the Soviet probes failed, although they did return some data. (70)
U.S. hopes for cooperation
Dr. Hinners was hopeful that the Soviets would join in some form of cooperation at least in sharing scientific findings. He respected the Soviet planetary program, and in his public statements always spoke highly of it, referring to it once as "excellent." A strong advocate of space cooperation, he believed, in this case as in other areas of the space sciences that "information and data exchange, as well as coordination in the conduct of some experiments, can be mutually beneficial." (71) In 1976, Hinners had found out about the planned Soviet Venus probe set for 1978. He proposed a meeting in November 1977, as he said, "to coordinate our Venus program, and to look at the possibilities of an experiment exchange where we would fly experiments possibly on one of their spacecraft and vice versa; to try to do that very thing." (72)
But the Soviets, always reluctant to discuss their future programs, delayed momentarily.73 And while NASA officials were "somewhat frustrated," in Hinners' words, with Soviet resistance to the many American proposals to set up cooperative programs in the planetary area, meetings were eventually to be held and a cooperative program agreed upon.
Agreement on cooperation in Venus missions
Informal discussions took place initially in Moscow during November 14-17, 1977, to consider ways to improve planetary cooperation. Reporting on this meeting to the Congress on February 2, 1978, Dr. Hinners expanded on the following three areas needing improvement:
No. 1 was the discussion of future plans. It is imperative that we understand what their objectives are. As an example, in terms of the 1983 Venus opportunity, where we may propose the imaging radar, we do know that the Soviets are working on a joint mission with the French to have a balloon in the Venus atmosphere that is complementary, but we had not heard about it directly. We heard about that initially through newspapers and third parties. It's essential for us on a bilateral basis to be privy to some of their thinking. Not that we'd pin them down to it, but so that we understand in what direction we are both heading and so that we avoid unnecessary duplication of activity on either side.
A second step we would like to see is what we can do on joint planning. This is cooperative but not with hands on each other's spacecraft. Isn't there a way we can phase the arrival time of our individual missions to take maximum advantage of the simultaneous collection of information? I believe that will occur.
The third item which I think will occur after we make progress on the first two, would be looking at the potential of joint experiments with us putting a U.S. experiment on a Soviet spacecraft and vice versa. In life science, it has worked very well. We have put experiments on their Kosmos series and the biological series. I am anticipating that we will have a meeting this April to follow up and discuss in a formal working group session, primarily the Venus exploration——(74)
The meeting of the United States/U.S.S.R. Working Group on Near Earth Space, the Moon and the Planets did not take place in April as proposed but rather in June at Innsbruck, Austria. The group discussed the Venus 1978 missions, possible Venus 1983-84 missions, and important future lunar and planetary science objectives. Both sides exchanged information on the Venus 1978 missions and agreed to exchange further data obtained as they proceeded. The purpose: To enhance the scientific value of the missions for both sides. (75) A protocol was signed to this effect.
Thus Dr. Hinners could tell the Congress on September 26, 1978, when Venera 11 and 12 and Pioneer Venus 1 and 2 were speeding toward Venus: "We do therefore have a coordinated view of the Venus missions going on now. ... we will be exchanging scientific data from both of our missions and we are looking toward cooperative data analysis and possible experiments on the missions (SL76-2170)." (76)
Planetary cooperation on stream
Apparently, in-flight cooperation during the Venus 1978 missions was satisfactory; perhaps not so extensive as some space officials had hoped, but still useful nonetheless. (77) Exchanges of information did take place, for example, to help American scientists establish their trajectory patterns. (78) Also, the spacecraft of both sides—and there were a total of 10 involved, 2 landers, 5 atmospheric probes, two flyby vehicles and an orbiter—made simultaneous measurements of the solar winds, or atomic particles streaming from the Sun, for later comparisons of its characteristics at different points in interplanetary space. (79)
More extensive exchanges of information were to take place in the meetings of the United States/U.S.S.R. Working Group on Near Earth Space, the Moon and the Planets during 1979 and 1980. By all published accounts of NASA officials, the Soviets were forth-coming in exchanging information, and on a continuing basis. Moreover, they discussed plans for a possible U.S. Venus Orbiting Imaging Radar (VOIR) mission and a potential Soviet-French Venus probe with deployable balloon, scheduled for 1983 and 1984 respectively. The purpose was to explore ways of making future Venus missions more complementary arid effective. (80)
Further discussions on cooperation in exploring Venus continued into 1980, notwithstanding the breakdown in political relations brought on by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union plans to land robot spacecraft on Venus in the next 5 years, using new U.S. radar maps of the cloud-enveloping planet to select the landing sites. Mr. Harold Masursky, planetary scientist at the U.S. Geological Survey, conferred with scientists of the Vernadsky Geochemical Institute in Moscow, advising them on landing areas of potentially the highest scientific interest based on the latest U.S. maps of Venus. Masursky, who came away with many details of the Soviet mission, explained the benefits of this form of cooperation, stressing the element of complementarity:
We do orbiters at Venus and they do landers, and so cooperation is mutually beneficial. We know roughly what the surface looks like from our radar surveys and they will land there and tell us what the chemistry of that surface is like. (81)
OTHER AREAS OF PLANETARY COOPERATION
Exchange of lunar samples
While Venus took center stage in Soviet-American planetary cooperation, there were, nonetheless, other areas, important also, that attracted attention. One such area was the exchange of lunar samples that under the terms of a special agreement provided each side with unique materials for scientific study, the yield of the U.S. Apollo and Soviet Luna programs.
Studies of the Soviet Luna 16 and Luna 20 samples continued into the period under review, providing information about areas of the Moon not visited by Apollo. An agreement was reached between NASA and the Soviet Academy of Sciences in August 1976 to include in the exchange several samples of the lunar soil cores obtained by Luna 24 from Mare Crisium, also an area of the Moon not visited by Apollo. Samples were exchanged in December 1976 and March 1977. (82) The last exchange took place in March 1979. (83) Luna 24 had been the most successful Soviet automatic lunar lander, having succeeded in drilling to a depth of 2 meters and in returning this sample core to Earth. (84)
Aside from the political value in furthering the principle of Soviet-American space cooperation, this exchange of lunar samples provided both sides with invaluable materials for scientific study on the origin of the Moon, its geology and raw materials. In brief, the exchange expanded the range of human knowledge about the Moon and the planetary system. (85)
Miscellany of planetary cooperation
Less significant was the miscellany of planetary cooperative efforts either contemplated, proposed, requested or attempted. The following list suggests the range of such efforts:
Dr. Fleteher, February 1977: "When it was believed that the lunar orbit of Luna 15 might pose problems for the Apollo 11 mission, NASA requested and received from the Soviet Union the coordinates of the Luna 15 orbit." (86)
Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 13, 1978: "In addition to this cooperative planetary program [that is, with respect to Venus], NASA and Soviet officials are discussing ways of cooperating more fully to prevent duplication of each country's planetary programs. The Soviets recently have requested U.S. lunar maps to aid in new Soviet mission targeting." (87)
On the eve of the COSPAR meeting in Innsbruck, Austria during June 1978, American space officials intended to confer with the Soviet delegation on a possible joint mission using the Soviet lunar polar orbiter. The Soviet lunar spacecraft was expected to fly no earlier than 1981. The United States hoped to place instruments on the craft that had been on Apollo 15, 16, and 17 to measure the radioactivity in the lunar crust and identify mineral distribution around that portion of the Moon being explored. These instruments, since refined, would be expected to perform the same function. About 20 percent of the Moon had been mapped by the three Apollo missions. A joint Soviet-American mission in lunar polar orbit would map the remaining 80 percent. Most of the expense would be borne by the Soviets; only the scientific instruments would be provided by the United States. NASA had failed to start its own lunar polar orbiter mission for want of funds and approval by the President.(88)
Soviet and American space officials have a procedure for requesting radio silence of satellites during a designated space flight to prevent loss of transmission. When Pioneer 11 was flying toward Saturn's moon, Titan, in September 1979, NASA asked the Soviets to keep three of their satellites in radio silence during the 4 hours on September 1 and 2 when Pioneer would be transmitting. The Soviets obliged and silenced Kosmos 1024, 1109, and 1122 during the crucial hours on those dates. Soviet broadcasting was resumed on September 4 because no further request for silence came from NASA. But NASA had erred; officials had failed to notify the Soviets of the flight's continuation, with the result that important data was partially lost and the remainder garbled because of accidental interference. According to a NASA explanation reported in the press:
The Soviets have been highly cooperative in avoiding such interference at critical times and ceased communication with three of their satellites, including the one in question, during requested periods on Saturday and Sunday. NASA officials indicate that they have no doubt that the Soviets would have avoided the conflict on Monday, if they had been asked. However, the impact of the potential interference was not recognized in time to make an additional request to the Soviets. (89)
Presumably in January 1979, the Committee on Planetary and Lunar Exploration of the National Research Council, a constituent part of the National Academy of Sciences, published a report entitled, "Strategy for Exploration of the Inner Planets (SEIP)." The purpose of the report was to help govern the planning of planetary missions through 1987. It urged particularly that formal negotiations be undertaken with the Soviets to explore the possibility of coordinated lunar missions. In brief, the report rejected token Soviet cooperation and called for a full partnership in planetary exploration. Among the committee's recommendations were the following, as summarized in the source:
Establishment of active, open working relationships between Soviet and American scientists.
Mutual identification of important scientific goals.
Early reciprocal communications between the United States and the Soviet Union on specific current and planned planetary scientific objectives.
Establishment of concurrent commitments by both nations to achieve goals in selected areas of mutual interest utilizing the agreed-upon scientific objectives.
Coordination of missions to a planet with full disclosure of mission planning and objectives in order to maximize the scientific contributions of both nations.
Establishment of true cooperation between both nations through a reciprocal arrangement that would allow the incorporation of significant experiments by both parties on the same spacecraft.
Timely communication and exchange of information both during and after completion of a mission.
The initial Soviet response to the SEIP report encouraged optimism among U.S. scientists. Tass issued a straightforward account of the recommendations, including a discussion of possible benefits. (90)
A MEASURE OF OPTIMISM
From the American perspective, these SEIP recommendations do not appear to have been excessive; but in reality they were overoptimistic, given the stress in political relations by the end of the 1970's. Nonetheless, cooperation in planetary areas has proved to be fruitful and moderately satisfying for both sides. And even this small measure of success deserves emphasis, particularly in a relationship that, despite periods of tension and aggravation, has in fact come a long way.
References:
A. SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS: 1976-80, SUPPORTING VEHICLES AND LAUNCH VEHICLES, POLITICAL GOALS AND PURPOSES, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN SPACE, ADMINISTRATION, RE-SOURCE BURDEN, FUTURE OUTLOOK PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF HON. BOB PACKWOOD, Chairman, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, UNITED STATES SENATE, Part 1, Dec. 1982.
56. For a full report on the conference, see Hinners' testimony in, Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee, Hearings, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1976 and the Transitional Period, 1975, pt. l, p. 336.
57. Hinners testimony, Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee, Hearings, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1976, 1975, pt. 2, p. 438.
58. Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciencies Committee, Hearings, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1976 and the Transitional Period, 1975, pt. 1, p. 336.
59. " Smith, Marcia S. U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreement for Cooperation in Space. In, U.S. Congress. House Committee on International Relations. Technology Transfer and Scientific Cooperation Between the United States and the Soviet Union: A Review. Prepared for the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977, pp. 117-118. (Committee print.)
60. Ibid. On the matter of complementarity of programs, Hinners noted: The Pioneer Venus program "complements what the Russians have done with their highly successful Venera 9 and 10 missions. They focused on obtaining surface data on Venus. We are not taking pictures and measurements on the actual surface, but are concentrating on the atmospheric profile and on the orbital science." (House Science and Technology Committee, Hearings, 1977 NASA Authorization, 1976, vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 502.) In his formal statement, Dr. Hinners explained: "Veneras 9 and 10 are following an expected U.S.S.R. course of emphasis on surface investigations. The Soviets are steadily increasing their useful stay times on the surface of Venus and are extending the scope of their surface studies. This provides an excellent complementary fit with U.S. investigations of the atmosphere and remote radar studies of the surface. The data expected from our Pioneer Venus spacecraft, added to the Venera data, should significantly advance our knowledge of Earth's closest planetary neighbor." (Ibid., vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 519.)
61. Hinners testimony. House Science and Technology Committee, 1978 NASA Authorization, 1977, vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 181.
62. House International Relations Committee, Technology Transfer and Scientific Cooperation between the United States and Soviet Union, p. 118.
63. Ibid.
64. House Science and Technology Committee, Hearings, 1977 NASA Authorization, 1976, vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 502.
65. Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee, Hearings, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1977, 1976, pt. 2, p. 1130. For further explanations, particularly on the value of data from the Russians on Venera 9 and 10, see Hinners testimony of November 1975 in, House Science and Technology Committee. Hearings, 1977 NASA Authorization, 1976, vol. 1, pt 1, p. 583. Hinners said that the Soviets "did a beautiful job. There is no doubt about it. The surface photographs are very good, and most of us did not at all expect to see what they have showed." He noted that he hoped to get the information before the end of the year so that "we can feed that into the Pioneer Venus." According to Hinners, "this meeting is time critical." His statement reflected a sense of urgency on the U.S. side, apparently not quite appreciated by the Soviets for technical reasons or those which they alone could answer for.
66-69. Statement of Frutkin, Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, Hearings, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1978, pt. 2, p. 815.
70. Sheldon, United States and Soviet Progress in Space, 1980, p. 73.
71. House Science and Technology Committee, Hearings, 1979 NASA Authorization, 1978, vol. 1, pt. 2, p.1430.
72. Ibid., vol. l,pt. l,p.60.
73. Ibid., p. 33.
74. House Science and Technology Committee, Hearings, 1979 NASA Authorization, vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 1574. In testimony on Mar. 8, 1978, Terrell explained U.S. expectations with respect to cooperation in planetary probes. When asked if NASA was planning its planetary explorations in conjunction with the Soviet Union, he responded:
"No. We feel a complete and earlier exchange of information about the two sides' planetary programs would give each side an opportunity to plan its program in light of what the other side tended to do to achieve some degree of complementarity’s, if you will, between the two programs. Now we don't believe that we have had that kind of exchange. That was the point of the report I gave to you, that we want to get together with the Soviets and see what possibilities there are for getting a little bit earlier information, a little bit more complete information.
"We will do no joint planning at this stage. I think we are some distance from joint planning. Now we are interested in doing our individual national planning on the basis of a fuller understanding of what the other side may be intending to do. This could, of course, lead in the future to possibilities for joint planning, but that is not what is intended at this time." (Senate Commerce Science, and Transportation Committee, Hearings, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1979, pt. 3, p. 936.)
75. Highlights of 1978 NASA Activities, Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, Hearings, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1980, pt. 2, p. 852.
76 House Science and Technology Committee, Hearings, 1980 NASA Authorization, 1978, vol. 1, pt. 1, pp.357-358.
77. Some of the skepticism was apparent in remarks by unnamed U.S. scientists at the time of the mission. Western scientists complained about the quality of data from Soviet missions. The results from Soviet probes were often released late and without adequate explanation as to how the data was obtained. "I've never seen any Soviet figures I could believe," said one U.S. scientist. Another U.S. scientist attributed the problem chiefly to the Soviet system itself that made an ongoing cooperative relationship among scientists and researchers difficult. (Waldrop, Mitch. U.S., U.S.S.R. Probes Begin Study of Venus. Chemical & Engineering News, vol. 56, Dec. 4, 1978:
78. See the comments by Lawrence Colin of NASA's Ames Research Center. He was the Pioneer Venus project scientist, and Ames the control center for the mission. "We have set up what we hope will be a very fruitful cooperative scheme with the Russians," he said. Part of the cooperative planning involved using U.S. orbiter experiments in conjunction with the Soviet spacecraft when the latter arrived at Venus. "We hope . . . when their probes enter, to turn on our associated orbiter experiments and be able to take complementary data . . . when their probes and flybys are going by," Colin said. "Obviously, our probes should be long gone by then so it’s up to our orbiter to provide correlative data." (O'Lone, Richard G. U.S., Soviets Cooperate in Exploration of Venus. Aviation Week & Space Technology, vol. 109, Dec. 4, 1978:23-24.)
79. Large, Arlen J. Venus Data Could Lead to a Rethinking of Theories on Foundation of the Planets. The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 11, 1978, p. 14.
80. Highlights of 1979 Activities: Year of the Planets. In, Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, Hearings, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1981, 1980 pt. 2, p. 818; statement by Frosch, House Science and Technology Committee, Hearings, 1980, NASA Authorization, 1979, vol. 1, pt. 2, pp. 540-541. For a commentary on the meetings of the working group and plans for further cooperation in Venus missions, see, the response to questions by NASA's Office of Space Science, in House Science and Technology Committee, Hearings, 1980 NASA Authorization, 1979, vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 678. The stage of Soviet-American cooperation in exploring Venus at this point was explained by Dr. Hinners in hearings before the House Science and Technology Committee on Feb. 14, 1979. Hinners referred to the "excellent program" the Soviets have for planetary exploration, particularly of Venus. He noted the flow of information coming both ways on the 1978 Venus missions. "The next step which might consist of Hying experiments on each other s space craft," he continued, "is the one to pursue. They are, jointly with the French, planning a 1983 balloon mission, using the Soviet entry vehicle, they will drop on a French-supplied balloon which would float in the atmosphere of Venus and make some investigations. When we talked about VOIR, we discussed the possibility of maybe doing some joint experiments. We have to reexamine how much sense that makes. We are at that level. We are not yet at the level of a joint program in the same sense that we run productively with the European space Agency. To do that kind of a program requires an extremely free interchange of scientists and ideas and a look into the engineering capabilities much more than we have seen any indication that the Soviets are willing to show." (House Science and Technology Committee, Hearings, 1980 NASA Authorization, 1979, vol. 1, pt. 3, pp. 1525-1526.) VOIR has since been indefinitely postponed, and the 1984 Soviet Venus mission has been restructured to include Halley intercept, bumping the balloon.
81. Wilford, John Noble, Soviet Union Plans 4 Missions to Venus. The New York Times, Nov. 23, 1980, p. 18.
82. Statement of Hinners, Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, Hearings, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1978, 1977, pt. 2, p. 1214, and House Science and Technology Committee, Hearings, 1979 NASA Authorization, 1978, vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 1438
83. Response to questions addressed to Dr. Thomas A. Mutch, NASA Associate Administrator m U.S. Congress. House Committee on Science and Technology. 1981 NASA Authorization Hearings before the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications. 96th Cong., 2d sess, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980, vol. 4, p. 1461.
84. Sheldon, United States and Soviet Progress in Space, 1980, p. 59.
85. For reports and commentaries on the value of these exchanges, see, statement of Hinners, Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, Hearings, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1979, 1978, pt. 1, p. 392; for comments on the importance of the Apollo and Luna programs in providing "a rich source of lunar raw materials inventory data," see. Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, Hearings, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1978, 1977, pt. 3, p. 1516.
86. Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, Hearings, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1978, pt. 2, p. 799.
87. Aviation Week & Space Technology, vol. 108, Mar. 13, 1978: 77.
88. O'Toole, Thomas. U.S. Seeks Role in Soviet Moon Flight. The Washington Post, May 29, 1978, p. A2.
89. Wilford, John Noble. NASA's Failure to Alert Russians Caused Loss of Saturn Moon Data. The New York Times, Sept. 5, 1979, pp. A21 and A22; The Washington Post, Sept. 5, 1979, p. A10; and O'Toole, Thomas. "Lost" Transmission from Saturn May Be in the Computer. The Washington Post, Sept. 7, 1979, p. A6.
90. Covault, Craig. U.S./Soviet Venus, Moon Flights Urged. Aviation Week & Space Technology, vol.110, Jan.15, 1979:17-20.
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