Soviet Space Cooperation
Soviet Attitude Toward International Cooperation in Space *
* Prepared by Joseph G. Whelan, Senior Specialist in International Affairs, Senior Specialists Division, CRS.
SPACE COOPERATION: AN IMPERATIVE IN THE PRESENT
ERA
COMMITMENTS IN ACCORD
AN EXPANDING UNIVERSE FOR SPACE ACTIVITIES
COOPERATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
THE SOVIETS AND MULTILATERAL COOPERATION
The Soviets are committed to multilateral cooperation as well as bilateral cooperation.71 This commitment, evident in a practical way from the above record, is evident also in published declarations.
Academician Fyodorov made this comprehensive statement of Soviet policy on space cooperation:
International cooperation in all of these areas of outer space exploration and exploitation is gaining in scope and intensity. Its basic forms, as in other sciences, are exchange of research findings, cooperation in theoretical and laboratory research and, finally, joint space experimentation. It should be underlined at this point that space vehicle design, launching and operating require vast resources, and therefore cooperation in this area can yield the highest dividends. (72)
Sevastyanov and Ursul put it this way:
Under present-day conditions, the most effective exploration of outer space and utilization of the achievements of cosmonautics are possible only through an extensive development of international cooperation and concerted effort by all the countries of the world. As is known, space exploration requires considerable allocations. Quite often many costly space projects are beyond the means of individual states and demand the cooperation of a number of countries. Since the flight trajectories of space vehicles pass over the territory of various countries, the need arises for such flights to be regulated by international law. All this determines the international character of space activities.
The view has already been expressed in Soviet literature that in the near future major space projects will be carried out within the framework of the international division of labour. Any interested country could take part in the fulfillment of such projects and on the same equal footing share the results obtained with other countries. (73)
Yet the Soviet approach to multilateral cooperation suffers from certain constraints, and the most important is military domination of the Soviet space program. No distinction is made between the military and civilian aspects of the program. And as DOD spokesmen persistently remind their listeners in congressional hearings, the military run, indeed dominate, the Soviet space program. This organizational arrangement severely restricts access by other nations. Moreover, the Soviet penchant toward secrecy and their traditional distrust of foreigners—both characteristics derived from excessive concern for security—fortify the institutional prejudices, skewing it against a free-and-easy, close-in type of cooperation. The Soviet practice of maintaining complete control over flying experiments of other nations aboard their spacecraft reflects this uneasiness and acts as a constraint to cooperation. Other constraints are visible in such areas as space communications where the transmission of information can be highly politicized and where the principle of "freedom of information" is viewed from conflicting perspectives. (74)
Yet, there are forms of multilateral cooperation that do not require a close-in interrelationship. Such is the case in space meteorology. (75) And even in cases of flying experiments aboard Soviet spacecraft, as in Kosmos 936. American scientists acknowledged that absolute Soviet control over operations did not rule out a fruitful arrangement.
Forms of multilateral cooperation are, therefore, possible and under certain circumstances can flourish.
SOVIET COOPERATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS: A BRIEF COMMENTARY
In no institution has the Soviet commitment to space cooperation been more consistently reflected, particularly in the past decade, than in the United Nations. (76) Perhaps, Academician Fyodorov best summed up the Soviet perception of the growing role of the United Nations in international space relations when he wrote:
The rapid development of a vast range of practical applications of space technology and a host of controversial technical and legal issues arising in the process demand, in our view, an enhancement of the coordinating role of the U.N. in this field. (77)
The Soviets have been major actors in the United Nations, and as a leading space power they have played a major role in the work of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Their role, at least in a quantitative sense, is reflected in the vast range of problems, listed by Kosolov, that have been on the committee's agenda:
The United Nations and, more particularly, the General Assembly's Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space constitute the major international forum for coordinating the political and legal aspects of international cooperation in the exploration of outer space. Among the questions on the Committee's agenda are: the elaboration of principles governing the use by states of artificial Earth satellites for direct television broadcasting (DBS); remote sensing of the Earth by satellites, including activities relating to the monitoring of pollution of the environment; the preparation of a draft treaty on the Moon; the definition of outer space and space activities; the staging of a second U.N. conference on the peaceful exploration and use of outer space; the use of space transport vehicles; and the technical aspects and appropriate safety measures relating to the use of nuclear power sources in outer space.
Even this incomplete list of problems shows that the Committee faces big and complex tasks, which cannot be tackled in isolation from an entire set of present-day international issues. The success achieved in resolving these dramatic problems will be largely instrumental in the furtherance of international cooperation in the use of outer space. (78)
The Soviets have prided themselves on the part that they have played in managing, but not necessarily resolving, these problems. This pride was visible in the opening paragraph of a speech by Professor A. S. Pyradov, Soviet representative at the 24th session of the COPUOS, on June 22, 1981 when he said:
Since the establishment of our Committee in 1959 enormous progress has been made by the space science throughout the world. During that period the Committee has fulfilled great and useful work on the organization of international co-operation in the exploration and peaceful uses of outer space and celestial bodies. The Committee actively participated in creation of the international space law, which has become one of the major branches of contemporary general international law. It can be stated that the conquest of space is being fulfilled within the strict legal frame work, that makes it possible for the achievement of the space science to be enjoyed for the benefit of all states, the whole of mankind. (79)
Pyradov gave textual support for Soviet resolve to "achieve further progress" in promoting international space cooperation by quoting from Brezhnev's report to the 26th Party Congress in February 1981:
Life requires fruitful co-operation of all the countries for solving the peaceful, constructive tasks facing every nation and all humanity. . . . there already exists a valid basis for the further extension of practical peaceful co-operation among states. And the need for it is increasingly apparent. It is enough to mention such problems, for example, as discovery and use of new sources of energy, provision of food for the world's growing population, preservation of all the riches of Nature and Earth and exploration of outer space and the depth of the World Ocean. (80)
For the Soviets, this affirmation of the principle of international cooperation, as Professor Pyradov said, demonstrates that cooperation in space is "one of the promising directions of the progress ... of humanity." (81)
The United Nations, therefore, has been a major arena for the Soviets in pursuit of their political goals in space. On some issues, such as the Moon Treaty and direct satellite broadcasting, sharp differences have arisen; for the adversarial spirit that has permeated East-West relations has not appreciably diminished in the search for the peaceful uses of space. But on the other hand achievements have been made in recent years that probably never would have been contemplated early in the Space Age. (82)
SOVIET COOPERATION WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
COSPAR
The Soviet Union carries on multilateral cooperation on space-related matters within international organizations other than those such as COPUOS and the WMO that are associated with the United Nations. Prominent among them are COSPAR, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), and the IAF.
COSPAR, an affiliate of the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), was established in October 1958 to continue the work of the International Geophysical Year (IGY). According to its charter directive, COSPAR's primary task is to,
Provide the world scientific community with means whereby it may exploit the possibilities of satellites and space probes of all kinds for scientific purposes, and exchange the resulting data on a cooperative basis. (83)
Concerned only with basic research, not technological problems such as rocket propulsion or guidance and control systems, COSPAR is a catalyst for developing scientific goals to be achieved in space. It neither initiates nor approves individual investigations, and its objective is to maintain communication links within the international scientific community and encourage scientific cooperation in space research without regard to politics. Thirty-four countries and 12 scientific unions constitute the membership of COSPAR. (84)
The Soviet Union, along with its Interkosmos allies, is a member of COSPAR. The frequency of references in this study to COSPAR suggests in a general way active Soviet participation. (85)
The ITU
The ITU, formed in 1932 and affiliated with the United Nations, is an important international agency particularly in the present era of expanding space communications. It is important because of its responsibility for allocating the radio frequency spectrum. The Soviet Union and the United States use about 50 percent of the world's broadcasting spectrum. Pressure from the less developed countries (LDC's) for greater access to the already crowded spectrum suggests not only a long-term international problem but also the necessity, indeed the inevitability, of extensive Soviet international cooperation at international conferences empowered to reassign radio frequencies. (86)
Thomas A. Hart, Jr., vice president of the National Institute for Communications and Education and a specialist on the legal aspects of communications, suggests the dimension of this problem when he wrote in a review of the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979:
The communications gap between the advanced and developing nations results not only from limited spectrum resources, but also from a lack of money and trained telecommunications personnel to plan, implement, and operate communications systems. Fearful that the gap will widen even faster with the introduction of new technologies, particularly satellite broadcasting, emerging nations are calling for increased technical assistance and procedures to assure them 'equitable access' to the frequency spectrum and the geostationary orbit. (87)
The issue of the radio spectrum extends beyond strictly telecommunications to the much larger Third World concern for the management and dissemination of information. In staking out its claim to a larger role in international communications, the Third World has called for the establishment of what it calls the "New World Information Order" which has become the rallying point for its case against what it terms the Western monopoly over the dissemination of international information. The Soviet Union which has well defined political goals in the Third World has sought to exploit this issue, to the detriment of the United States and the West.
The combination of this issue with the specific task of managing the communications radio spectrum suggests the enormity and complexity of this problem and emphasizes the point being made here; namely, that the Soviet Union will be a major participant in future international discussions on the communications issue and that solutions are imperative, requiring cooperation. (88)
The IAF
The IAF, founded in 1950, is a nongovernmental, scientific, nonprofit organization of national societies and institutions that are interested in rocketry,
astronautics, and in the peaceful uses of outer space. (89) It meets in Congress annually to exchange views and information on space—"the most important reason for having an IAF, according to James J. Harford, executive secretary of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. The Soviet Union is an active member of the IAF. Soviet space authorities, like Academician Leonid Sedov, have been top ranking officials. In the 1978 meeting at Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, Sedov was elected vice president for the 22d consecutive year. (90)
Fairly comprehensive reports on IAF congresses by Harford have been published routinely in the journal, Aeronautics & Astronautics.91 A review of the reports on the 29th Congress at Dubrovnik and the 30th in Munich give some indication of the extent of Soviet participation. While it would be difficult to generalize from these reports, still they contain both critical and favorable commentaries on Soviet and East European participation. (92)
The presence and performance of the cosmonauts seemed to win approval, but his was not the case in other areas of space.
Speaking generally of the Dubrovnik Congress, Harford quoted James Martin of Martin Marietta, the former Viking Project director in NASA. The point at issue was the weak Soviet contributions to the two sessions on unmanned solar system exploration. "As usual, Martin said, "the U.S.S.R. presented no data or information on their spacecraft, even though they have two probes en route to Venus. ... "A large group of U.S.S.R. participants," he continued, did listen carefully to other papers, took notes, and tape-recorded some sessions." Harford concluded:
In short, the mostly take and little give of the Soviets was as evident in Dubrovnik as last year in Prague, and before that in Anaheim, Lisbon, Amsterdam, and even their own Baku in 1973. (93)
At the Munich Congress there were a few good Russian papers, Harford noted, but most of the top technical performers were not present. Harford gave this critical assessment:
The buzzing of the cosmonauts raised hopes that the Soviet technical program, in contrast to that publicity tour de force, would be more substantive than last year's poor showing in Dubrovnik. Alas, it was even worse this time Although there were 61 Soviet papers listed in the program, at least 16 were scratched (this reporter tracked virtually every session, having been accused of unsupported criticism of last year's Soviet performance). And with the entire Soviet delegation consisting of 26 people, many surrogate authors droned others' papers. (94)
Harford acknowledged, however, that there were "a few very good Russian papers" delivered at the Congress. (95)
Though it is not possible to strike a balance even on the basis of Harford's reports of the Dubrovnik and Munich Congresses, still the point being made here is simply that the Soviets do participate in the IAF, notwithstanding the shortcomings in their performances that do not always measure up to the expectations of Western observers. At Dubrovnik, the Soviets had, for example, 71 delegates (the U.S. 89; Yugoslavia 115; France 97; West Germany 89; Italy 22; U.K. 17; Japan 15; and the Netherlands 20). Thirty countries were represented in all, in addition to the United Nations. (96) Moreover, interaction does occur not only among the assembled delegates but with members of COSPAR and the United Nations. (97) And such interaction can be a positive sign of the Soviet willingness to cooperate in space, though that cooperation would probably be restricted to limits that they themselves define or would be otherwise agreeable to them.
SPACE COOPERATION: SOME GENERALIZATIONS
COMMITMENT TO COOPERATION
Soviet space cooperation during 1976-80 suggests generalizations consistent with those recorded in the previous study: The Soviets are committed to and maintain a positive attitude toward space cooperation. (98) The record of bilateral and multilateral cooperation, however uneven, supports this judgment.
Success on the magnitude of the ASTP mission was not matched in Soviet-American space relations, but some progress was made in establishing a basis for future space cooperation. Despite increased tensions in political relations, satisfying forms of cooperation, as in the case of Kosmos 936 and 1129, did take place; others were planned.99 In space cooperation with their East European allies and other Communist states, along with France and India, the Soviets registered many successes. And while the flavor of politics and propaganda more often than not permeated their purposes and performance, still the fact remains that they had made both scientific and political achievements.
In brief, the Soviets value space cooperation at least on a selective basis.
FACTORS FAVORABLE TO SPACE COOPERATION
Politics determine the degree of space cooperation: In times of easing tensions, it flourishes; in times of stress, it languishes. Agreement had been reached and planning underway for Soviet-American cooperation in the post-ASTP period. The downturn in political relations through 1977 and 1978, caused by the human rights issue, the establishment of U.S. diplomatic relations with China, and delays in concluding SALT II and accelerated by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, closed down virtually all programs in bilateral space cooperation. Space relations followed political relations into a deep freeze.
Yet under certain conditions space cooperation is imperative, whatever the state of political relations. Interdependence, a bond of mutual self-interest among nations and a dominant tendency in the modern world, imposes this necessity. Hence cooperation in the WMO and ITU has the virtue of necessity. The U.S. decision to continue the SARSAT experiment with the Soviets was based on similar necessity, self-interest. And the conquest of space itself is beyond the powers of any one nation: Some division of labor, as the Soviets have said, is needed and that occurs in a mode of international cooperation.
The economics of space exploration also encourage space cooperation. This is the rationale for the Soviet belief in a division of labor in space. With rising costs in an era of expanding horizons in space, economic factors enter in to counsel sharing the burden. Economics was the underlying motive for the flight of U.S. life science experiments aboard the Soviet biosatellites—space exploration at a "cut-rate," as one observer said. And the same applies to the Third World: India, a developing country with very limited resources, built its space program "on a shoe string" through space cooperation with the major space powers.
The appeal of space to the Third World provides another stimulus to cooperation. Space applications have progressed with the advance of space exploration. Landsat, SITE, and GARP have become symbols, attracting the attention of the Third World with their message of what space can do for them. India has become the pacesetter for the Third World, and through cooperation it has proved the value of space applications to the needs of development.
Politics provides another incentive for space cooperation. As an instrument of political influence, space cooperation has proven its worth. In the heyday of detente both Soviet and American leaders strongly supported space cooperation as one of many means for solidifying the new relationship. Far-reaching agreements on space cooperation along with SALT I were signed at the Nixon-Brezhnev summit in May 1972, generally regarded as opening the era of detente.
Soviet cooperative programs with its East European allies, France, and India were partly based upon political principle: With Eastern Europe, to accelerate bloc integration; with France, to encourage division in the West; and with India, to advance its Third World policy.
American cooperative programs have also had their political ingredient: With Moscow, to solidify detente; with the Third World, to spread its influence; and with China, to play off Beijing against Moscow. The same can be said for France and India who "worked both sides of the street" in space cooperation with the United States and the Soviet Union to advance their policy of independence and diversity.
The objective in all cases, admitting such certain altruistic motives as advancing the cause of science and humanity, was to expand political influence. Space cooperation is not likely, therefore, to lose its appeal as a useful mechanism in international politics.
Finally, space cooperation allows lesser nations to participate in one of the most dramatic undertakings of the 20th century, space exploration. Through cooperation these nations are able to benefit not only from the practical applications of space but from the prestige to be accrued from identification with a great space power. So long as space exploration holds this appeal it will no doubt provide an important incentive to cooperation.
DETERRENTS TO SPACE COOPERATION
Deterrents to space cooperation can be formidable. Foremost among them is a hardening of political relations, a point well demonstrated in this study. Militarization of space is also a barrier to cooperation. Development of an ASAT system by both sides and Soviet criticism of the military aspects of the Space Shuttle, for example, appear to have contributed to those larger transcending political factors in adversely affecting Soviet-American space relations.
Excessive competition, particularly on the scale of the 1960's, works against the spirit of cooperation. Awareness of the inequity of scientific exchanges including those in the field of space science has drawn criticism from the American scientific community. This belief tends to reduce the appeal of cooperation.
And finally, cutbacks in space programs can have a detrimental effect on cooperation. Reductions in the NASA budget by the Reagan administration resulted in a retrenchment of U.S. cooperation in Western Europe. Similarly, growing problems in an already hard-pressed Soviet economy could bring on retrenchment in their space programs and accordingly impact upon space cooperation. (Conversely, it could be argued that retrenchment by both could lead to more cooperation in order to achieve goals at less cost.)
FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR SPACE COOPERATION
A single dominating generalization emerges from this review of Soviet space cooperation: The Soviets are in space to stay and space cooperation is an essential and continuing part of their space policy. Bilateral cooperative programs with France and India are on stream; multilateral cooperation through the United Nations and other international organizations have long become established realities. In brief, a certain permanency has set in, institutionalizing the Soviet role in space and insuring favorable prospects for space cooperation in the future.
Whether Soviet-American space relations will improve depends upon conditions at the political level. Detente has proved to be perishable, and whether a satisfactory ongoing relationship can be established, one in which space cooperation can flourish, remains an open question. Serious foreign policy problems, particularly in arms control, continue to plague the relationship. Taking into account the international realities of 1980 and 1981 and the seemingly diminishing American commitment to space exploration, it is difficult to find much encouragement for seeing better times ahead, at least in the short term. (100)
Yet, space cooperation, as a fixed principle in contemporary international life, has intrinsic value of its own. Rooted in the scientific-technological revolution, it deals with issues generated by this revolution, providing the means for composing differences and satisfying vital interests in an area common to the concerns of all nations. In an interdependent world, cooperation is a tool serving the interests of all. It has a future, whatever the state of Soviet-American relations, but a future whose full potentialities can only be realized in a climate of reasonable peace and harmony.
References:
A. SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS: 1976-80, SUPPORTING VEHICLES AND LAUNCH VEHICLES, POLITICAL GOALS AND PURPOSES, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN SPACE, ADMINISTRATION, RE-SOURCE BURDEN, FUTURE OUTLOOK PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF HON. BOB PACKWOOD, Chairman, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, UNITED STATES SENATE, Part 1, Dec. 1982.
71. For an earlier discussion of this aspect of Soviet space activities, see, Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee, Soviet Space Programs, 1971-75, pp. 127-128.
72. Fyodorov, Use of Outer Space and Interests of Nations, p. 14.
73. Sevastyanov and Ursul, Cosmonautics and Social Development, pp. 76-77.
74. For a statement on the Soviet view with respect to television broadcasting via satellite, see, Kolosov, Space and International Law, pp. 60-61.
75. See Fyodorov's explanation in, Use of Outer Space and Interests of Nations, pp. 15-16.
76. For more detailed coverage of space activities relating to the United Nations, see, House Science and Technology Committee, World-Wide Space Activities, 1977, ch. 7, Internati onal Issues Concerning Space Cooperation, and appendix A, International Space Agreements. See also, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. 96th Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980, pts. 1, 2, and 4 (committee print).
77. Fyodorov, Use of Outer Space and Interests of Nations, p. 18.
78. Kolosov, Y., Legal and Political Aspects of Space Exploration. International Affairs ( Moscow), vol. 3, March 1979:86.
79. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Mission to the United Nations. Press Release No. 82, June 24, 1981, p. 1. The writer is grateful to Mrs. Eilene Galloway, the noted American authority on space law, for sending along this speech on the occasion of attending the 24th session of COPUOS.
80. Ibid., p. 2.
81. Ibid.
82. Some of the landmark achievements were: The Outer Space Treaty of 1967; the Astronaut Rescue and Return Agreement of 1968; the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects of 1973; the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched Into Outer Space of 1976. (House Science and Technology Committee, World-Wide Space Activities, 1977, pp. 561-562.); and the Moon Treaty was opened for signature on Dec. 18, 1979.
83. House Science and Technology Committee, World-Wide Space Activities, 1977, p. 555.
84. Ibid., p. 556.
85. Ibid., pp. 92 and 555. Fyodorov, for example, made this general reference to COSPAR: "Cooperation in space research is governed by a variety of bilateral and multilateral agreements and coordinated by special international scientific associations, including such important ones as the Committee on Space Research and the International Astronautical Federation." (Fyodorov Use of Outer Space and Interests of Nations, p. 15.)
86. Hart, Thomas A., Jr. A Review of WARC-79 and Its Implications for the Development of Satellite Communications Services. Communications and Law, vol. 2, Spring 1980:22-24.
87. Ibid., p. 24. Dr. William Schneider, Associate Administrator for Space Tracking and Data Systems, NASA, underscored the importance of the General World Administrative Radio Conference when he testified: "The most far-reaching event in communications was the recently concluded General World Administrative Radio Conference." According to Schneider, "It is fair to state, I believe, that the results of this conference will impact every person on Earth for the next 20 years in one way or another. It is also fair to state that the degree of impact is directly related to technology level." (Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, Hearings, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1981, 1980, pt. 2, p. 1246. For a more detailed statement by Dr. Schneider, see p. 1264.)The ems issue ASA of
88. According to FCC Foreign Affairs Chief I. Kalmann Schaefer, "there are 21 major international radio conferences scheduled over the next 6 years. One of the conferences, a 1984 meeting designed to play for outer space communications service, will impact seriously on the communications service and will be offered in the late 1980's. (Ibid., pp. 37-38.)
For a discussion of the Third World's "New World Information Order", see, Engel, Victoria L. Freedom of Information in the Third World: Soviet Perspectives and Initiative in UNESCO. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Aug. 7, 1981, 22 p. (Multilith: Report No. 81-160 §). Miss Engel concluded her study with this observation:
"The Soviet Union could gain certain objectives in the Third World through a successful campaign for international sanction of regulation of the mass media. But the success of Soviet backed plans for control of the media is by no means assured. Discussions and debate on the New World Information Order and the recommendations of the MacBride Commission Report will continue to take place within a number of UNESCO meetings, including the meetings of the Intergovernmental Council on the IPDC. The results of this debate and attention will be considered during the 1983 regular session of the UNESCO General Conference. It is possible that by pursuing aid to Third World media and by emphasizing unified opposition to government regulation of the press, as they did at Talloires, free press advocates can counter efforts within UNESCO to control the international flow of information. For the present, any substantive compromise between the West and the Soviet Union on this issue would seem to be highly unlikely.”
89. House Science and Technology Committee, World-Wide Space Activities, 1977, pp. 558-559.
90. Harford James J. 29th IAF Congress, Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia: A Rush of Space Programs. Aeronauts & Astronautics, vol 17, January 1979: 57. On this occasion Sedov wanted to defer to another Soviet colleague, but "the General Assembly elected him by acclamation," according to Harford s report. Eberhard Hollax, an East German, was also elected to the Bureau as a vice president.
91. Harford wrote about the Dubrovnik meeting: "Voluminous notes compiled by a 27-person team of AIAA members (see box) covering the 36 sessions and more than 300 papers plus numerous committee and business meetings, give us reports of progress, but also plenty of disappointment.” (Ibid., p. 56.)
92. The quotation in the Preceding footnote continued with this example of what was meant by plenty of disappointment : ". . . the reentry session was thin and half the Russian authors not there; bioastronautics sessions, usually interesting at IAF, not up to standard, and three of its seven papers were not given, including the Soviet paper on cabin toxic gas contaminants, and a U.S. paper on the Shuttle extravehicular mobility unit." On the other hand, Harford reported H. J. Fischer gave an excellent slide and film illustrated report on the East German program. …….He said they had been working with the Soviet Union since 1967, with their scientists and engineers getting their education in the Soviet Union. It was impressive to note the high technology m the East German effort, including computerized printed circuits and sophist caiea ground equipment (p. 63.).
93. Harford, 29th IAF Congress, Dubrovnik, pp. 56-57.
94. Harford, James J. 30th International Astronautical Federation Congress, Munich, September 16-22: Cosmopolitan Space in a Transitional Mood. Astronautics & Aeronautics, vol. 17, November 1979: 45.
95. Ibid., p. 46.
96. Harford, 29th IAF Congress, Dubrovnik, p. 64.
97. Jean Francois Denisse, President of COSPAR, posed an "interesting challenge to the IAF General Assembly," Harford reported. Denisse described the restructuring of COSPAR and announced plans to meet every 2 years, starting in 1980, rather than annually. He suggested that there may be opportunities for cosponsored conferences between COSPAR and IAF. COSPAR was scheduled to meet in India in 1979 and Hungary in 1980. Academician Petrov followed Denisse immediately with the suggestion that after 1980 the IAF consider alternating its Congresses with COSPAR and in the intervening period conduct smaller symposia. Petrov asked that the IAF Bureau consider that issue very seriously. (Ibid. p. 65).
Harford's report contained an extensive commentary on the role of Lubos Perek, the U.N. representative at the IAF Congresses. Among other things, Perek thanked the IAF on behalf of the United Nations for its study on the detection and monitoring of pollution through satellites. He also expressed the hope that the IAF would play an important role in preparing for the Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space being planned by the United Nations for the period 1981-83. (Ibid., p. 64.)
98. See, Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee, Soviet Space Programs, 1971-75, pp. 129-133.
99. Given the diversity and complexity of Soviet-American space cooperation, it would be difficult to evaluate precisely the degree to which the United States has profited scientifically and technologically from these arrangements. This report reveals certain instances where the United States had benefited. This issue did not arise in the literature reviewed. However, the issue was vigorously debated at the time of the ASTP mission in 1975. Qualified space specialists argued that in this instance the United States was giving more than it was receiving. For a discussion of both points of view, see, Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee, Soviet Space Programs, 1971-75, pp. 114-120.
100 With respect to the cutbacks in space, The Christian Science Monitor of Nov. 16, 1981 (p.24) restated its concern in an editorial entitled, "Space: The Larger Outreach," acclaiming the second voyage of the Columbia Space Shuttle. The Monitor argued that along with putting astronauts into Earth orbit to perform useful tests, "the larger outreach in continued exploration of our solar system should not be neglected. This provides the knowledge on which the next generation's space achievements will be based, as well as giving us a valuable new perspective on our planet Earth today." "Yet, even as two new Soviet probes are speeding toward the planet Venus," the editorial continued, "the United States' space science program is being forced into dangerous decline by shortsighted budget cuts." These cuts "go beyond fiscal prudence," it said, at a time when Federal spending must be cut back. And the editorial warned, "They seem to presage a stifling of U.S. scientific space exploration." The Monitor reported "talk within the administration" of terminating the Voyager spacecraft program "before it can give humanity its first close look at the Planet Uranus—and of scrapping the Deep Space Tracking Network of ground stations that make communication with distant spacecraft possible." The Monitor noted the "great effort" and "great expense" the United States had expended in building up a capacity for scientific space exploration "that is as magnificent and as valuable as the manned spaceflight capacity the shuttle represents." And it issued this warning in conclusion: "To throw this away for short-range budgetary reasons or for lack of vision on the part of some members of President Reagan's administration would be a foolish waste."
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
