Soviet Space Cooperation
Soviet Attitude Toward International Cooperation in Space *
SPACE COOPERATION: AN IMPERATIVE IN THE PRESENT
ERA
COMMITMENTS IN ACCORD
AN EXPANDING UNIVERSE FOR SPACE ACTIVITIES
SOVIET-AMERICAN BILATERAL SPACE COOPERATION
TRENDS IN SPACE RELATIONS
CONTINUING SOVIET PROGRESS IN SPACE
* Prepared by Joseph G. Whelan, Senior Specialist in International Affairs, Senior Specialists Division, CRS.
In reviewing the period 1976-80, certain trends were discernible in Soviet-American space relations, and the most significant was the continuing Soviet progress in space in contrast to an apparent lagging U.S. effort. NASA officials persistently emphasized this trend in congressional hearings. (16) Department of Defense (DOD) witnesses routinely stressed the "aggressive" nature and the accelerated pace of the Soviets in space, particularly in their military programs. (17) American space specialists corroborated these judgments. Rumored development of a Soviet space shuttle to rival the U.S. Shuttle was cited as an example of continuing Soviet progress in space. (18) And the Soviets themselves gave the clear impression in their utterances that their programs were making the expected progress. (19)
RETRENCHMENT IN U.S. SPACE ACTIVITIES
Retrenchment in U.S. space activities after the conclusion of the Apollo program was a second major trend during this period. A lull seemed to set in as attention focused on developing the Space Shuttle. Little attention was apparently given to the central question: Where was the United States going in space? Not until the much-delayed Shuttle was launched in 1981 did public awareness of progress in the U.S. space program surge forward, giving a boost to then potentialities of space cooperation. (20) Cutbacks in space were sharp- sharply criticized in this period, most recently those proposed by the incoming Reagan administration. 21
Reflective of concern in some American quarters for retrench ment and its impact on public opinion was the appraisal in an edi torial by The Christian Science Monitor of January 17, 1978 on the occasion of continuing Soviet successes with the docking of Soyuz 27 to Salyut 6. "The Soviet effort ought to give the United States pause," it said, and asked: "Is it in danger once again of falling behind the Russians in so important a scientific field?" "The Soviet are devoting far more of their resources to this effort than are Americans," warned the Monitor, adding: "The present lackadaisi cal public attitude toward space projects should not lull Congress into believing Americans can rest indefinitely on past achieve ments." 22
This mood of concern for retrenchment seemed to prevail up to the eve of the launching of the Space Shuttle, Columbia, in the spring of 1981. As Columbia sat perched on the pad in Cape Canav eral waiting to be launched into orbit, a NASA spokesman ex pressed the hope that "it would give us a lift and bring our sup porters out of the woodwork." (23)
COMPETITION AND COOPERATION IN SPACE
Acceleration of Soviet activities in space and retrenchment by the United States tended to encourage a renewed awareness among some interested Americans of their rivalry with the Soviet Union in space. Yet, this tendency was counterbalanced with another; namely, an inclination on both sides toward cooperation. Competi tion and cooperation in space was thus the third major trend in this period under review. 24
The competitive side of the relationship was stressed in policy statements by NASA officials who consistently emphasized the im portance of maintaining space leadership; 25 in assessments by DOD officials underscoring Soviet progress (and thus threat to the United States) in their military space programs, notably develop ment of the ASAT system; 26 and in the opening of U.S. space rela tions with Soviet Russia's foe, the People's Republic of China. The cooperative side was expressed in the restatement of commitments to space cooperation by both sides and made manifest by the visible evidence examined below in this section, particularly the signing of formal agreements on space cooperation and the carrying out of cooperative programs.
AFGHANISTAN AND THE DOWNTURN IN RELATIONS
The final trend apparent in this review of 5 years of space cooperation was the downturn in relations brought on by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the adverse effects of this aggressive action on space cooperation. The human rights issue, so prominently featured in the Carter administration and directed largely against the Soviets, had created strains in political relations. This issue was tangentially connected with space cooperation through scientific exchanges. The opening of space relations with China and
particularly the granting of de jure recognition and the establishing of formal diplomatic relations also had a negative impact. But it was the invasion of Afghanistan, a "watershed event," that caused a sudden and precipitous downturn in U.S. relations with Moscow. Space cooperation suffered as a consequence, and relations, now 2 years after the invasion, have yet to be restored to their previous state of reasonable normalcy.
PLANS FOR FOLLOW-ON OF ASTP
ASTP, THE HIGHPOINT IN SPACE COOPERATION
In retrospect, the Apollo-Soyuz test project (ASTP) of July 1975 was the highpoint in the brief history of Soviet-American space cooperation. (27) By all accounts, ASTP was a landmark in Soviet-American space cooperation, as U.S. Astronaut Vance D. Brand, a crewman aboard Apollo, put it; (28) a "major cooperative achievement," according to Dr. Malcolm R. Currie, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense; 29 and in Frutkin's estimation, a "complete success from the point of view of an international cooperative effort." (30) For Soviet space specialists, ASTP "has been and remains," as Mikhail Chernyshov of the Soviet Novosti Press Agency said in a retrospective glance, "an example of the fruitful quest for the spheres of the joint effort, for what unites rather than disunites mankind." (31) John F. Yardley, NASA's Associate Administrator for Space Flight, took full measure of ASTP's achievements, politically and scientifically, in these few words:
* * * all the joint operations were very beneficial in learning how to work with another country. The experiments were very successful, and we were able to, in our small way, improve relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. (32 )
ASTP was thus a great achievement and so was considered by both sides. Success required the most intimate forms of technical and political cooperation; this was done; and the result was to score a big plus for space cooperation. Detente in Soviet-American relations made ASTP possible, and ASTP's success gave detente another push forward. The task facing space planners in the post-ASTP period was how to capitalize on this favorable environment in order to broaden and deepen space cooperation.
FUTURE DIRECTION OF COOPERATION: A FIRST STEP
Space officials did not delay for long the task of plotting the future course of cooperation. Speaking for NASA, Frutkin noted that future cooperation with the Soviets was "very much on our minds" during 1975. NASA had contemplated the definition of a follow-on project to ASTP before that program itself had been completed. But the Soviets had other thoughts. They wanted to complete that project first before committing to a follow-on. NASA did succeed in discussing the matter "quite frankly with them" in May 1975 and, as Frutkin said, "did find a strong feeling, sharing ours, that the dynamics of this cooperation should be preserved." (33)
Informal discussions on what forms of cooperation might be undertaken in the post-ASTP period progressed well during 1976 and culminated in talks at NASA headquarters in October 1976. At that meeting the conferees established a "meeting of minds that studies should be undertaken to structure cooperative activities, as Frutkin reported, in the following areas:
(1) Studies of the joint operation of the Shuttle/Soyuz/Salyut spacecraft for scien tific and applications objectives of merit to be agreed, such as identifying and monitoring atmospheric pollution constituents. This program would be designed to benefit from the flexibility of the Shuttle and the longer stay-time of Salyut.
(2) Studies of the objectives that would be served by a space platform and of the feasibility of developing such a space platform bilaterally or multilaterally.
The next step was to reduce this "meeting of minds" to an agreement that would establish appropriate study groups for these specific areas and set schedules and milestones for their work. The study groups were expected to report back their recommendations for review before any commitment to programs or expenditures would be made. (34)
Apart from considerations on this specific program, the direction of cooperation moved along lines already set down in the agreement of 1972; namely, delivery of Soviet lunar samples; mutual briefings on Venera 9 and 10 and Viking landers on Mars; U.S. participation in the Soviet experiments aboard their biological satellite; continuation of the joint project for remote sensing of crops and vegetation; and tests to cross-calibrate NASA and Soviet meteorological rockets. (35)
A specific direction for future cooperation in the post-ASTP period was laid out in the Soviet-American agreement on space cooperation of May 1977. Why such an agreement should be concluded, particularly with respect to plans for a Shuttle/Salyut mission, was perhaps best expressed by Academician B. N. Petrov, chairman of the Interkosmos Council, who described such pooling of efforts as "a logical continuation of the successful 'Soyuz' and 'Apollo' flight." (36) Frutkin was similarly optimistic about building a cooperative arrangement based upon capabilities developed in ASTP. (37)
FORMAL SOVIET-AMERICAN SPACE AGREEMENTS, May 1977
AGREEMENT BETWEEN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND NASA, MAY 11, 1977
Soviet-American space agreements were concluded in May 1977 that established the basis for space cooperation in the post-ASTP period. Discussions were held in Washington during October 19-22, 1976 between delegations headed by Soviet Academician Petrov and Deputy Administrator of NASA Dr. Allan M. Lovelace. The agreement was signed on May 11, 1977. It established the conditions for the Shuttle/Salyut joint manned spaceflight program. (38)
By the terms of this agreement (for text, see appendix II), the Soviet Academy of Sciences and NASA agreed to study the "Objectives, Feasibility and Means of Accomplishing Joint Experimental Flights of a Long-Duration Station of the Salyut-Type and a Reusable 'Shuttle' Spacecraft (Salyut-Shuttle Program)." The long orbital staytime of Salyut and the unique capabilities of the Shuttle, notably its ability to ferry people and large quantities of supplies in a reusable craft, "commend their use for joint scientific and applied experiments and for further development of means for rendezvous and docking of spacecraft and stations of both nations. . . ."
Two joint working groups were established: One for basic and applied scientific experiments, the other for operations. The agreement scheduled the activity of the joint working groups in two phases and directed them to proceed on the assumption that the first flight would take place in 1981, though the final date would be set during the mission as it progressed. Both sides also agreed to establish a joint working group of specialists "for preliminary consideration of the feasibility of developing an International Space Platform on a bilateral or multilateral basis in the future." No commitments were made beyond this stipulation. (39)
SOVIET-AMERICAN SPACE AGREEMENT, MAY 24, 1977
On May 18, 1977 in Geneva, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance signed an agreement on space cooperation. The agreement was to enter into force on May 24, 1977 and remain in force for 5 years. (For text, see appendix II).
The agreement contained the following stipulations:
The parties pledged to continue cooperation in a wide range of activities in space science and space applications, such as meteorology and the exploration of near Earth space, the Moon and planets; and particularly to fulfill the requirements of the NASA-Soviet Academy of Sciences agreement of January 21, 1971, as periodically renewed; they agreed to cooperate through such mechanisms as mutual exchange of information and delegations, meetings of scientists and specialists, and in other ways agreed upon, including the setting up of joint working groups to carry out specific cooperative programs; they agreed to "take all necessary measures" to further cooperation in manned spaceflight and to achieve scientific and practical objectives, including joint flights of compatible docking and rendezvous systems derived from the ASTP experiment and as prescribed in the NASA-Soviet Academy of Sciences agreement of May 11, 1977; and finally, they agreed to encourage efforts to resolve problems of international law on the peaceful use of space with a view to strengthening the legal order in space and developing international space law. (40)
This agreement established the basis for Soviet-American space cooperation through the early 1980's. It was a very important political instrument because it insured continuity in Soviet-American space relations.
SOVIET RESPONSE TO AGREEMENT
Predictably, the Soviets acclaimed the new space agreement as evidence of the value of detente and of space exploration for peaceful purposes in the service of mankind.
New Times, the Soviet foreign policy weekly with a global circulation, published the text of the agreement for the benefit of its readers. (41)
In a retrospective glance, Academician Mstislav Keldysh, head of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, described the near decade of Soviet-American space cooperation as "fruitful," and then summarized the new agreement approvingly. (42)
Academician Petrov summarized the agreement in a Pravda interview, and recalling the success of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of space in Interkosmos, expressed the hope that "the new agreement will mean even greater progress in this direction." (43)
On the 2d anniversary of ASTP in July 1977, Soviet Cosmonaut Valeriy Kubasov, a participant in the mission, acclaimed the new agreement as a "logical continuation" of the Soyuz-Apollo flight. Americans as well as Soviet citizens saw in ASTP, he said, "the manifestation of good will of the two countries and the beginning of great cooperation of nations in space." (44)
Soviet scholars also wrote enthusiastically about the new space agreement. (45)
EPILOGUE: SHUTTLE/SALYUT HELD IN ABEYANCE
Plans under discussion
Planning for a joint Shuttle/Salyut mission went forward very quickly. (46) During November 14-17, 1977, Soviet and American space officials conferred in Moscow to discuss the potentialities of a cooperative Shuttle/Salyut program. (47) Scientific and technical discussions were carried on by two working groups, the experimental group and the operational group. Both groups considered both the feasibility and the means for carrying out a joint Shuttle/Salyut experimental program. The Soviet participants transmitted 11 concept proposals to the U.S. side for further consideration. The operations group identified three basic assumptions for planning the joint project. Three possible operating modes, or a combination of these, for conducting experiments using the Shuttle/Salyut were identified. (48)
Both sides agreed that the joint working groups would meet in the United States in April 1978 to continue planning. Additional meetings were expected: In July 1978, to discuss the selection of a possible experimental program and division of labor between both sides; and in October 1978, to decide on recommendations for a program of scientific experiments and to reach a conclusion on the scientific merits and technical feasibility of such a program. (49)
Perhaps the American approach to the Shuttle/Salyut project was best summed up by Dr. Noel W. Hinners, NASA's Associate Administrator for Space Science, when testifying before the House Science and Technology Committee on February 2, 1978, he said:
Now, as to Soviet cooperation, it is useful to inform the committee where we stand on the Shuttle/Salyut discussions.
You have read about this in the press. We are investigating with the Soviets a potential program of cooperation, using to our mutual advantage, the great weight carrying capability of the Shuttle and its capability to revisit and supply and the long-duration staytime of the Soviet Salyut space station.
They have a station in Earth orbit now that may be capable of lasting IVs years to i years. We have nothing on the horizon approximating that staytime duration in space.
Potentially, there is an area of mutual benefit here, utilizing the lone staytime and using our ability to resupply for a joint program.
We have stated, categorically, that any potential joint program must be based on a sound science and technology base. A joint study is underway the first phase of which will probably culminate next October. That phase is to look at the areas of mutual scientific interest, to develop candidate science programs and to determine whether or not there is, indeed, mutual benefit and mutual contribution on both sides. We are looking to a program approximating a 50-50 split of resources Only then would we make recommendations to the NASA Administrator or the Soviet Academy as to whether there is a useful program.
I am looking on the science as competitive with the other activity we have planned for space science. For me to be convinced there is a good program requires that the science proposed be competitive with what we are now considering our free flyer and Spacelab missions. (50)
Plans for a Shuttle/Salyut project were thus in gestation. The project made sense: Each side had something to contribute, and something to gain. The characteristics of each spacecraft complemented the other. The idea had a sound scientific and technological basis. The Soviets were anxious to undertake this mission, but NASA was proceeding carefully as Hinners' statement suggests, to insure that such a mission would bestow solid benefits in science and space applications. (51)
Momentum arrested
But international politics intruded in 1978-79 to arrest the momentum toward final agreement on the Shuttle/Salyut mission. The human rights issue had already created severe strains in political relations by 1978. These strains were further aggravated by favorable developments in U.S. relations with China. On January 1, 1979, the United States and China established formal diplomatic relations. Annoyed by this further evidence of the United States playing the China card," the Soviet Union responded by delaying momentarily the conclusion of the SALT II agreement. But final U.S. approval of the agreement, after the formal signing in June 1979, became doubtful with the publication of official evidence purporting to show the presence of a Soviet brigade in Cuba. Critics of SALT effectively used this report to quicken traditional American distrust of the Soviet Union, particularly with respect to its aims in Cuba.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 dashed all hopes for Senate approval of SALT, at least for some time. In the aftermath Soviet-American relations deteriorated sharply. To show its displeasure the United States shelved the SALT agreement (though along with the Soviets, the United States pledged to abide by both SALT I and II agreements) and took other punitive measures against Moscow. Space relations, with some exceptions, were to suffer accordingly.
Thus Dr. Frosch had little good news to report in his appearance before the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee on February 21, 1979. He reminded the committee of the space agreement of 1977 that provided for the creation of two joint working groups. It was anticipated, he said, that these groups would meet during 1978 to study jointly the feasibility of a Shuttle/Salyut mission. But in Frosch's words, the United States decided to carry out a further detailed interagency review of the matter and, therefore, requested a postponement of these meetings. To date no further United States-U.S.S.R. meetings on the subject have been held." The next step, he continued, would be for "the United States to decide whether it wishes to carry out a joint study with the Soviets and, if so, what experiments would be considered for a joint mission." This was the status of the project as of February 1979: It was "undergoing an interagency review' and at that time no commitment had been made to go beyond this point. (52)
Little has apparently changed in the status of the Shuttle/Salyut project since then. On February 6, 1980, Dr. Frosch told the Senate committee considering NASA's authorization that discussions of the working groups "have been in abeyance for something over a year and a half." He described the status of the groups as being "simply at a state where we were in between activities.' NASA authorities had given some thought to holding a meeting of one of the groups in October (presumably October 1979), but nothing was formally scheduled. As Frosch explained, "we will be conferring with the State Department with regard to what the national policy view will be and what we ought to do next." (53)
Senator J. James Exon described the state of relations as one of an "arms-length arrangement that we'll more or less continue." Frosch gave assurances that some activities, such as search and rescue operations, would not be affected by this "arms-length arrangement." But he added: "The direct scientific activities may be affected but not immediately, since there was no immediate action to be taken anyway." (54)
The Soviets took a realistic view of the lack of progress in the Shuttle/Salyut project. In explaining the obstacles to progress, Cosmonaut Alexei Leonov, commander of the Soyuz crew participating in ASTP, cited first the delays in the shuttle program that advanced liftoff from 1979 to 1981. And then he explained the second obstacle:
Another thing troubling us is that, as a result of recent developments on the international scene, the 1977 agreement, though legally not cancelled, is practically no longer being carried out. This cannot but tell on our scientific ties. (55)
The promise of the space agreements of May 1977 was thus not realized, at least that part of the agreement dealing with joint ventures in manned spaceflight. For notwithstanding the collapse of expectations for a Shuttle/Salyut mission, forms of cooperation were carried toward in other areas of space science and space applications.
References:
A. SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS: 1976-80, SUPPORTING VEHICLES AND LAUNCH VEHICLES, POLITICAL GOALS AND PURPOSES, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN SPACE, ADMINISTRATION, RE-SOURCE BURDEN, FUTURE OUTLOOK PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF HON. BOB PACKWOOD, Chairman, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, UNITED STATES SENATE, Part 1, Dec. 1982.
16. On Jan. 26, 1976, Dr. George M. Low, Deputy Administrator of NASA, compared Soviet and American space activities in testimony before the House Science and Technology Committee and made this observation: "Looking in any area, except for the manned lunar landings, which we accomplished and they have not yet done, there is a great deal of comparability. There is a very active effort in the Soviet space program and I think we will see an increase and a continuing active effort, particularly in manned space flights, during the time when we have none until the Shuttle flies. ( U.S. Congress. Committee on Science and Technology. 1977 NASA Authorization, Hearing. 94th Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, vol. 3, p. 33.)
Dr. Alan M. Lovelace, Deputy Administrator of NASA, told the same committee on Feb. 6, 1979: "The Soviet Union continues a very vigorous manned program and as I would remind you, they established in 1978 the record for a manned presence in space of 180 days." (House Science and Technology Committee, Hearings, 1980 NASA Authorization, vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 553.)
17. On Mar. 11, 1975, Dr. Malcolm M. Currie, Director of Defense Research and Engineering in DOD, told the Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee: "In recent years, the Soviet Union has maintained an aggressive space program with its major emphasis on support of military operations. While definitive numerical comparisons of their expenditures with our own are difficult to make, we believe that the resources which the Soviets have put into their military space programs over the past 3 years are much greater than our own commitments." ( U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1976 and the Transitional Period. Hearings. 94th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975, pt. 1, p. 475.)
On Mar. 15, 1979, Dr. Willian J. Perry, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, DOD, said: "The Soviet space program continues to be more military in character than that of the United States. There are gradually expanding civilian applications with participation in scientific satellite payloads by other nations and manned spaceflight in Soviet spacecraft by nations of other Communist bloc countries. However, these civilian and scientifically oriented flights are overshadowed numerically by the commitment to military objectives. Their massive military program is producing steady gains in reliability, sophistication, and operational capability." ( U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1980. Hearings. 96th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government printing Office, 1979, pt. 3, p. 1715.)
18. "Dr. Sheldon wrote: "The Soviet space program continues at a very high level, though 1977 fell one short of the number of successful flights conducted the year before. Both years represent the highest space activity of any country in any year." (Sheldon, Charles S. II. Soviet Space Activities in 1977. Air Force Magazine, vol. 61, March 1978: 77.)
Craig Covault , space editor of Aviation Week & Space Technology, made the following comment that was quoted by James E. Oberg, an American authority on Soviet space programs: "Explosive expansion of Soviet space program activity over the past several years, especially in the manned area, has been possible because the Russians have been providing their program with real funding increases of 3-5 percent per year, a sharp contrast to the U.S. congressional and presidential attitude toward the U.S. program since the end of the Apollo project. . . ." (Quoted in, Oberg, James E. Red Star in Orbit: Where the Russian Space Program Is Going. The Christian Science Monitor, July 13, 1981, p. 14.) The central theme in the Covault article was the Soviet development of a 12-man 220,000 Ib. military-scientific space station.
Dr. Perry of DOD informed the Senate: "Based on open literature, human source reports and Soviet activities over the past years, we believe the Soviets are [deleted] a Reusable Space System (RSS). [Deleted]" (Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, Hearings, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1980, pt. 3, p. 1710.)
In a projection of future Soviet space activity, Aviation Week speculated that, "Soviet flight of a manned reusable winged space vehicle by about 1985 will provide the Russians with a high-launch-rate manned capability at less expense, although the new Soviet spacecraft will have no-where near the capability of the U.S. space shuttle." (Soviets Increasing Space Activities. Aviation Week & Space Technology, vol. 112, Mar. 3, 1-980, p. 83.)
More optimistic, and ominous (mistakenly so, as it turned out) was the appraisal that, "The undercurrents of Soviet-American space rivalry even suggest a possibility that the Soviets will launch their space shuttle shortly before the United States does, to reemphasize Soviet space leadership." (Forbrich, Carl A., Jr. Lt. Col. The Soviet Space Shuttle Program. Air University Review, vol. 31, May-June 1980:55-62.)
As recently as June 1981, a press report from Moscow, based on the judgments of Western space experts there, indicated that Soviet Kosmos 1267 that docked with Salyut 6 on the 19 th represented an advance toward the development of a Soviet shuttle, perhaps a winged craft similar to the U.S. shuttle or a prototype module" that would conform to already announced Soviet plans to piece together large, long-living orbital complexes in space. (The Christian Science Monitor, June 22, 1981, p. 3.)
19. Academician Petrov made the following statement on future goals in Soviet space programs at a meeting commemorating the 20th anniversary of the launching of the first Sputnik: 'Looking into the future, one can say that automatic devices in space, satellites and automatic stations will carry out more and more complex research of space near the earth, of the relationship between the sun and the Earth, the moon and the planets of the solar system, and will penetrate further and further into the reaches of the universe. Launches of biological satellites, both in the interest of working on fundamental problems of space biology and to resolve issues connected with preparation for long manned space flights, will continue. Orbiting stations will carry out long flights, receiving transportation vessels with crews of cosmonauts and unpiloted craft for delivery of cargo and supplementing reserves of fuel and life-support systems." (Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 1405 GMT, Oct. 11, 1977, in FBIS 82.) Some of these activities were actually carried out in the next few years.
20. NASA fully appreciated the potentialities of the Shuttle for space cooperation. During the 27th Congress of the International Astronautical Federation in October 1976, Dr. James C. Fletcher, NASA Administrator, noted that the first model of the Shuttle had rolled out in California just a month before. Clearly anticipating its international appeal, Fletcher said: "... I want to emphasize that the Shuttle is the work of many nations, and will provide opportunities for space participation for all the nations of the world. . . . We have already received flight requests from 12 countries to conduct 58 experiments. . . ." (The 27th IAF Congress, Anaheim, U.S.A.: Shuttle Shock Registers. Astronautics & Aeronautics, vol. 14, December 1976:50.)
21. In an analysis of cutbacks in the Carter administration's budget on space, Robert C. Cowen, science writer of The Christian Science Monitor, began: "After 20 years of space achievement, the once-affluent National Aeronautics and Space Administration is preoccupied with cutbacks and wondering where its future lies." According to Raymond A. Kline, Associate NASA Admin istrator for management, the era of "taking it out of fat and overhead" was over and that NASA managers would now have to cut into authorized programs, reduce support services, and even look at ways to cut back mission-oriented research. In short, NASA was marking time, as Cowen said, "trying to stay viable while the Carter administration finishes making up its mind where it wants to go in space." (Cowen, Robert C., Once-Affluent NASA Feels Strapped, Unsure of Aims. The Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 2, 1978, p. 1.)
Dr. Fletcher responded tactfully to congressional inquiries about the impact of budgetary cut backs: "NASA is optmistic about the future of space flight and, as noted in my statement, we are continuing studies of potential future space flight missions and the development of new technologies, but due to fiscal constraints, the Advanced Programs area has not been allowed to develop as we would like." (House Science and Technology Committee, Hearings, 1978 NASA Authorization, 1977, vol. 3, p. 83.)
Senator Harrison H. Schmitt (R-N. Mex.) complained to Dr. Frosch in Senate committee hear ings: "There is no commitment to the future of space in this country. There is a commitment to complete the Space Shuttle; beyond that, there is no commitment. I don't see one of any signifi cance compared to the opportunties, compared to what other nations and other societies are going to be doing. . . . What it amounts to is that the major competitor we have on this planet, that is the Soviet Union, is extraordinarily interested in their future in space, and I see no comparable interest in the administration of the United States." (Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, Hearings, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1980, 1979, pt. 2, pp. 927-928.)
Proposed cuts in the space budget by the Reagan administration generated sharp criticism in Western Europe. So serious was the matter that the European Space Agency formally protested the proposed cuts to the State Department, and France threatened to cease cooperating with the United States in international space missions. The cutbacks radically affected space programs in Western Europe that depended on U.S. cooperation. Jacques Blamont, chief scientist of the ESA, said: "We see this as a reverse trend of what used to be the case. The Russians now appear as a promoter of international cooperation, the Americans ... as a demoter of cooperation." (O'Toole, Thomas. Proposed U.S. Space Budget Cuts Vex Allies. The Washington Post, Mar. 20, 1981, p. A8.)
22. Factories in the Sky—Is the United States Falling Behind? (Editorial.) The Christian Sci ence Monitor, Jan 17, 1978, p. 24.
23. Van Slambrouck, Paul. Can U.S. Space Program Lift Off with Shuttle? The Christian Sci ence Monitor, Feb. 18, 1981, p. 6. For a similar expression of concern and urgency, see Dennis Overbye. It's Time to Halt America's Retreat from Space. The Washington Star, Feb. 16, 1981.
That the American public did support the U.S. space effort was revealed in an Associated Press-NBC poll taken on Aug. 10 and 11, after the successful flight of Columbia. Sixty percent of those polled thought the United States was not spending enough or was spending about the cor rect amount of money on its space program, and 66 percent believed that the Shuttle program was a good investment; 49 percent said the emphasis should be placed primarily on national defense, while 32 percent favored scientific exploration, 10 percent cited both and 9 percent were not sure. (The New York Times, Aug. 19, 1981, p. A20.)
24 Mr. Kenneth S. Pedersen, Director, International Affairs, Office of External Relations,
NASA, well expressed this combination of competition and cooperation in space when he said:
"Looking ahead, I find that the one theme that is constantly recurring is that of international
cooperation and competition and how these two forces play against one another. ... we are
seeing a maturing of foreign space capabilities and we are seeing a widespread international
recognition of the benefits of space activity." Turning to the other major space power, he stated
that the Soviet Union "will continue to present challenges to U.S. leadership and possible opportunities for cooperation. I have already briefly touched on the cooperation that we have had
with them, primarily in the scientific area. The extent to which the U.S.S.R. becomes a competi
tor in the world space market will depend largely upon their own policies." Pedersen seemed to
be referring to competition in the larger international sense than just between the Soviet Union
and the United States. (Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, Hearings,
NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1981, 1980, pt. 3, p. 1653.)
25 From examining the NASA authorization hearings for 1976-80, it is clear that on the U.S. side space leadership is a very important goal. Much of the questioning was centered around the idea of competition and leadership. Almost as a matter of routine NASA officials categorically stated U.S. policy of maintaining leadership in space, particularly in science and technology. For example, in Senate hearings Dr. Fletcher said: "I would sound one note of caution . . .: the United States is not alone in exploring and exploiting the space environment. To retain our leadership in science, technology, and applications, to maintain our national security, and to develop the full potentials of space in the face of determined competition will call for our very best national efforts." According to Fletcher, "The importance of our retaining leadership in science and technology cannot be overemphasized, for science and technology represent, in my judgment, the cornerstone of our economic well-being." (U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1978. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space. 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office. 1977, pt. 2, p. 764.) For institutional emphasis on the importance of leadership in space, science, and technology, see, U.S. General Accounting Office. U.S. Must Spend More to Maintain Lead in Space Technology. Washington, Jan. 31, 1980, in, U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1981. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space. 96th Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980, pt. 3, pp. 1310-1315.
26 Dr. Perry gave this word of caution in Senate hearings that was fairly consistent with his
predecessor's. Dr. Currie: "The Soviet space program is under military control and is dominantly military in character. An unequivocal priority is given to the use of space for the purpose of
strengthening the Soviet armed forces. The Soviets are attempting to compete—in a military
sense—in space. The U.S.S.R. has invested significant resources in development and deployment
of systems for force support." (U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation. NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1979. Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Science, Technology, and Space. 95th Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1978, pt. 3, p. 997.)
27. For a review of the project, see Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee, Soviet Space Programs, 1971-75, pp. 100-120. See also. House Science and Technology Committee, Hearings, 1977 NASA Authorization, 1975, vol. 1, pt. 1, pp. 820-825 and pp. 847-850.
28. Moscow Tass in English, 2020 GMT, July 14, 1977, in FBIS Daily Report: Soviet Union, vol. 3, July 15, 1977, p. B5.
29. U S. Congress. Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1977. Hearings. 94th Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, pt. 3, p. 2076. Currie continued: ". . . we learned very much technically from the Apollo-Soyuz experiment, so the achievement for us would have to be in terms of national cooperation, larger national purposes."
30. House Science and Technology Committee, Hearings, 1977 NASA Authorization, 1976, vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 646. Frutkin continued: "Here we were working with a country whose interest in the world doesn't always square with our own, a country which is often not the easiest one to work" with, but nevertheless, very far-reaching commitments were made for this project and all were completed satisfactorily." For further commentary by Frutkin on the value of ASTP, see vol. 1, pt. 3 of these hearings, pp. 298-299 and 302-303.
31. Chemyshov, Mikhail. Russian Report: International Cooperation in Outer Space: Two Approaches, Two Strategies. Space World, vol. Q-10-202, Oct. 1980:17.
32. "Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee, Hearings, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1977 1976, pt. 2, p. 994. Yardley stated: "The primary objectives of the program were met , including rendezvous, docking, crew transfer, and control center and crew interaction. In addition, all of the secondary objectives of the experiments were completed, as well as the major objectives of the experiments." (p. 1021)
33. House Science and Technology Committee, Hearings, 1977 NASA Authorization, 1976, vol. 1, pt. 2, pp. 648-649.
34. Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, Hearings, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1978, 1977, pt. 2, p. 815.
35. Ibid.
36. Moscow Pravda in Russian, May 27, 1977, p. 4, in FBIS Daily Report: Soviet Union, vol. 3, June 7, 1977, pp. B3-B4.
37. There is every reason to believe," he told a House committee, "that what we will do here is build on the capabilities developed in Apollo-Soyuz and look to applying it in future programs involving the Shuttle and the Salyut, or whatever system the Soviets are flying in that time period." (House Science and Technology Committee, Hearings, NASA Authorization Hearings Fiscal Year 1977, 1976, vol. 1, pp. 649-650.)
38. Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, Hearings, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1979, 1978, pt. 3, pp. 933-935.
39. Ibid., pp. 934-935.
40. Ibid., pp. 933-934.
41. New Times ( Moscow), No. 22, May 1977:32.
42. Moscow Tass in English, 1522 GMT, May 24, 1977, in FBIS Daily Report: Soviet Union, vol. 3, May 26, 1977, vol. 3, pp. B3-B4.
43. Moscow Pravda in Russian, May 27, 1977, in FBIS Daily Report: Soviet Union, vol. 3, June 7 1977:B3-B4
44. Moscow Tass in English, 1241 GMT, July 13, 1977, in FBIS Daily Report: Soviet Union vol. 3, July 14,1977, p. B9. -' i~
45. See, for example, G. S. Khozin. New Space Exploration Agreement. U.S.A.: Economics, Politics, Ideology, No. 8, September 1977, JPRS 69794, Sept. 15, 1977: 61-67. Referring to the economic value of the agreement, Khozin wrote: "In this connection, it would be difficult to overestimate the significance of the new Soviet-American agreement on cooperation in space exploration: the united efforts of specialists from both countries in space research and utilization will aid in preventing duplication in several fields and will raise the profitability level of space technology (p. 65). For a discussion in the legal context, see, Y. Kolosov, D. Sc. (Law). Space and International Law. International Affairs ( Moscow), No. 8, August 1977: 54-61.
46. For commentary on preliminary discussions prior to reaching the May agreement, see Frutkin s testimony in, House Science and Technology Committee, Hearings, 1978 NASA Authorization, 1977, vol. 1, pt. 3, pp. 58 and 90. See also the response to an inquiry on the mission in vol. 3, p.214.
47. This account of the meeting is based on Dr. Noel W. Hinners' testimony and report to the House Science and Technology Committee on Feb. 2, 1978. See, House Science and Technology Committee, Hearings, 1979 NASA Authorization, 1978, vol. 1, pt. 2, pp. 1415-1416. Dr. Hinners was the Associate Adminstrator for Space Science in NASA
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid., p. 1416. For other commentaries and reports by Hinners, see. Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, Hearings, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1979 1978, pt. 1, pp. 117, 289-290, 369-370, and 474-480.
50. House Science and Technology Committee, Hearings, 1979 NASA Authorization, 1978, vol. 1, pt. 3, pp. 1561-1562. For comments on progress in the Shuttle/Salyut program by Mr. Norman Terrell Director of International Affairs of NASA, see, Senate Commerce, Science and transportation Committee, Hearings, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1979, 1978 pt 3 pp. 935-936 and 951.
51. New Designs spur soviet space Activity. Aviation Week & Space Technology, vol. 108, Mar. 13, 1978: 77.
52. Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, Hearings, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1980, 1979, pt. 2, p. 934. The feeling of inconclusiveness in carrying out the space agreement was conveyed in the response of Mr. Norman Terrell, Director of International Affairs, NASA, when asked to comment on the possibility of cooperation in the development of large-scale power facilities in space. He replied: "I don t think we are at this point yet in our cooperation. There is a provision in the May 1977, Academy-NASA agreement for the possibility of looking together at joint space station efforts." Terrell emphasized that, "There has been no direction toward implementing it by either side. Our own internal thinking on that subject is not at a point that we could fruitfully get into anything with the Soviets. Apparently, they are in the same position." (Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, Hearings, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1979, 1978, pt. 3, p. 944.) For other commentaries on the status of Soviet-American space relations in the context of the 1977 agreement, see, U.S. and Russia Consider Shuttle/Salyut Flight. Flight International, vol. 113, Apr. 1, 1978: 939, and Eduard A. Kanstantin. The Salyut 6 Mission: Soviet Rehearsal for a Permanent Space Station? Interavia, vol. 33, November 1978:1081.
53. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transporation, Hearings, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1981, 1980, pt. 2, p. 1055.
54. Ibid., p. 1055.
55. Yenyutina, Lyudmila. Space: July 17, 1975, an interview with Alexei Leonov. Soviet Life, No. 9, September 1980: 43.
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