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The Great War 1917

In 1917 Russia's withdrawal from the Entente enabled Germany to divert its Eastern Army Corps westward from the Niemen and Vistula to the Aisne and the Somme and to hurl more than 1,500,000 reinforcements against the Allies. Through the war's first two years, it had been German (and Allied) doctrinal practice to defend every meter of front by concentrating infantry in a system of forward trenches. This prevented any enemy incursion into the German defensive zone, but inevitably resulted in heavy losses to defending troops due to Allied artillery fire.

Germany was locked in a war of attrition against an Allied coalition whose combined resources exceeded those of the Central Powers. The German command team of Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and General Erich Ludendorff hoped to break the strategic deadlock by a major offensive effort on the Russian Front in 1917. This required that they economize Germany's strength on the Western Front in France and Belgium, holding casualties there to a minimum while repelling expected Allied offensives without major reinforcements. In order to accomplish this, they sanctioned a strategic withdrawal in certain sectors to newly-prepared defensive positions. This "Hindenburg Line" shortened the front, and more cleverly exploited the defensive advantages of terrain than the "high water mark" positions previously held. This withdrawal was a-major departure from prevailing defensive philosophy, which hitherto had measured success in the trench war solely on the basis of seizing and holding terrain.

In effect, Ludendorff adopted a new policy that emphasized the husbanding of German manpower over the blind retention of ground - a strategic philosophy whose tactical analogue was an elastic defense-in-depth. In order to complement his strategic designs, Ludendorff directed the implementation of the Elastic Defense doctrine. This new doctrine supported the overall strategic goal of minimizing German casualties, and also better corresponded to the tactical realities of attack and defense in trench warfare than previous methods had done. The simple concept of the Elastic Defense was to exhaust Allied offensive energies in a deep system of fortified trenches. By fighting the defensive battle within as well as forward of the German defensive zone, the Germans could exploit the inherent limitations and vulnerabilities of the attacker while conserving their own forces.

By the end of the winter lull in action, when Allied soldiers went over the top in the first Allied major offensives of 1917, they faced a German Army that in only seven months, despite severe economic and manpower constraints, was organized, trained, equipped, and led according to new defensive principles.

Previous concern with the inviolability of the front line had caused the Germans to strengthen that part of the battlefield within range of Allied artillery and where the Allies applied their maximum power to achieve a penetration, that is, on the forward edge. The range of artillery and the fields of artillery observation favored the Allied concentration of artillery on the German forward edge. With the new German doctrine, the Allied concentration of firepower was on a forward edge held by relatively few German troops. German strength no longer directly confronted Allied strength. As the Allied attack advanced, its relative power would deteriorate as the distance from its artillery support increased because the attack outran its inflexible communications system and eventually exceeded the range of its supporting artillery.

The British 1917 offensive on the western front began in March, on the sector from Arras to Soissons. Although the French still held from two thirds to three- quarters of the line, fully half the enemy forces were concentrated against the British, who were steadily assuming more and more of the burden which had pressed so heavily on the French from the Marne to Verdun. Partly because his old positions had been dangerously dented by the Somme attack of 1916 and partly to frustrate the formidable Anglo-French drive which he anticipated, von Hindenburg, the new German Commander in the West, fell back behind his exposed salients to a carefully prepared system of defenses known as the "Hindenburg Line." Although von Hindenburg had become the German popular idol because of his achievements against the Russians, the opinion soon came to prevail among the initiated that his successes were largely due to von Ludendorff, who became his Quartermaster-General.

In spite of the Allied aircraft and other devices for obtaining intelligence, he was able to withdraw successfully along a sixty-mile front, ruthlessly destroying as he went, and leaving in his wake a devastated shell-pitted country, guarded by a comparatively few men with machine guns. When, in April, the Germans had reached their new positions they took a determined stand, with a strong concentration of artillery between Lens and St. Quentin. Then the British and the French, in an alternating series of brilliant but costly attacks, struck at the northern and southern hinges of the enemy defense. The British, in the so-called Battle of Arras, made considerable headway, the Canadians with magnificent heroism captured Vimy Ridge, an important position commanding Lens, and by June had practically surrounded this great coal center of northern France. The battle of the Aisne 07 April 1917 was a lively reaction from the slowness of the Battle of the Somme. The French Command expected a rupturing attack of one or two days' duration, then an exploitation of unlimited duration. Although in denser mass than in the previous offensives, the artillery was insufficient in quantity, because it was planned to execute the preparation simultaneously on several successive positions to a depth at times attaining 14 kilometers! Thus the objectives were too numerous for the cannon in line and for the ammunition provided. "Their eyes were too big" said artillerists everywhere. Moreover there was neither strategic nor tactical surprise. The preparation which began the 7th of April and was to last five days, was prolonged until the 16th because of bad weather. The French, by one brilliant stroke, captured 17,000 prisoners and 75 guns; but the toll of death among their men so appalled the Government that they called off the offensive and replaced General Nivelle by General Petain. A short time thereafter began the dangerous demoralization of the French infantry.

The action of the French greatly embarrassed the plans of Marshal Haig, who had to keep on without their support. Then he struck another blow farther north, where he achieved a spectacular success, 7 June, 1917, by blowing up the Messines salient in the German line south of Ypres. While this stroke was preparing for nearly two years and 1,000,000 pounds of explosives were used, the tactical results were less than they might have been, owing to unfortunate delays and the advent of bad weather.

The United States Enters the War (6 April, 1917)

The Germans, who had declared unrestricted submarine warfare 1 February, 1917, were creating havoc with the Allied shipping; but the step had the advantage of bringing into the War (6 April) the United States with her vast potential resources in men, money, and material which were to contribute to turn the scale before the end of another year; meanwhile, British successes in Mesopotamia and Palestine tended, in some degree, to counterbalance the unfavorable situation in Europe.

In order to combat the demoralization of the infantry, and to continue the instruction of the army, the Commander-in-Chief, General Petain, ordered some less difficult attacks predicated on strict economy of infantry. These were the Battles of Flanders (31st of July, 1917), Verdun (20th of August), la Malmaison (23d of October). All presented the same characteristics and were patterned on the slow but sure progress of the Battle of the Somme, but the amount of artillery engaged was two or three times as great, and consumed six to seven times as much ammunition. The total ammunition brought up for the battle was about 100,000 tons. Before the beginning of the preparation, it took thirty six days to provide the initial supply of ammunition.

Now the maximum daily output of the industry was, for the entire army, about 230,000 75 mm. shell (say 1,600 tons) and 50,000 155 mm. shell (say 2,250 tons). The cost of the Battle of la Malmaison was about 500 million francs, say 40 to 50 million per running kilometer of front to be taken. All that in order to conquer some ten kilometers of front, two or three kilometers in depth.

From these statements some impossibilities appear: the richest country, possessing the most powerful industries, and most abundantly furnished with strategic raw materials (which demands the freedom of the seas), would be incapable of feeding with silver, cannon, and ammunition, a battle of this type, if it were to be threatened on a wide front and had to fight to the bitter end. The limited objective attacks of the second half of 1917 showed the main weakness of the methods used during the three years of stabilization, by magnifying the contrast between the immensity of the effort and the mediocrity of the result.

Tanks Mature

The next major offensive with the use of tanks took place in April 1917 near Arras. The British command diligently, scrupulously, repeated all the mistakes made earlier, without missing a single one. Again, too few tanks were allocated for the operation, they were again divided between infantry divisions, again the advance was too slow and again failed to develop initial success, the “anti-tank” moorland was again chosen.

But the operation under Cambrai in November 1917, Western historians magnificently dubbed the "birth of a tank war." Moreover, some even proclaimed the "dawn of a new era." In November, Marshal Haig sought to create a diversion by a splendid attack on the western front at Cambrai, where the Tanks were used to great effect, in place of a preliminary bombardment. Tanks of a larger size had first been employed, though not with such conspicuous success, in the first battle of the Somme. Haig made a splendid gain of five miles ; but, before he could secure his exposed salient, the Germans replied by a surprise counter-attack, took back a portion of the ground they had yielded, and prisoners and guns about equal to the number they had lost.

The Collapse of Russia (1917)

Unfortunately, the Allied strategy which had contemplated a simultaneous advance on three fronts - the western, the eastern, and the Italian -- was most gravely thrown out of gear by the outbreak of a revolution in Russia, resulting in the overthrow of the old regime and the deposition of the Tsar in March. Huge amounts of supplies had been sent through Archangel and Vladivostok, and it was hoped that the Russian army would open the spring campaign more fully equipped than ever before; but the rank and file were exhausted and discouraged by treachery in high places, and they were worked on by German propagandists. The Constitutional Democrats, who strove to fulfill their obligations to the Allies, were overthrown, and M. Kerensky, a moderate Socialist who succeeded to a brief tenure of power, was unable to cope with the situation. After he had gone too far in relaxing the bonds of discipline, he made a vain effort to start a new offensive, and in July even went to Galicia to inspire the troops in person. However, Soviets or councils of workmen, peasants, and soldiers were growing steadily stronger and falling more and more under the influence of the Bolshevists or extremists.

Early in November, 1917, the Kerensky Government was overthrown in Russia and the Bolsheviki came into power. They at once proposed a general armistice and called upon all the belligerents to enter into peace negotiations. The Central Powers accepted the invitation, and early in December negotiations began at Brest- Litovsk. The Russian peace proposals were: the evacuation of occupied territories, self- determination for nationalities not hitherto independent, no war indemnities or economic boycotts, and the settlement of colonial questions in accordance with the above principles. The Austrian minister, Count Czernin, replied for the Central Powers, accepting more of the Russian program than had been expected, but rejecting the principle of a free plebiscite for national groups not hitherto independent, and conditioning the whole on the acceptance by the Allies of the offer of general peace. The conference called on the Allies for an answer by January 4. No direct reply was made to this demand, but the Russian proposals had made a profound impression on the laboring classes in all countries, and both Lloyd George and President Wilson felt called on to define more clearly the war aims of the Allies.

The Russian army degenerated into a debating society; ranks and such little discipline as remained were abolished, and, under Lenine and Trotsky, the two figures who succeeded Kerensky, an armistice was concluded with Germany in December, to be followed, early in the following year, by a disastrous separate peace.

The Italian Disaster

In the autumn, the Allies had to endure another calamity. By the autumn of 1917, Italian Commander in Chief Luigi Cadorna’s strategy of successive offensives near the Isonzo River in northern Italy—11 Italian attacks since May 1915 preceded the Austrian assault at Caporetto—had cost the Italians heavy casualties for an advance of less than seven miles, only one third of the way towards their preliminary objective, the city of Trieste on the Adriatic Sea. Despite this, the wave of Italian attacks had also taken a serious toll on Austro-Hungarian resources in the region. Indeed, in the wake of the Eleventh Battle of the Isonzo in August 1917, Austria’s positions around the city of Gorizia were dangerously close to collapse. As a result, the German Supreme Command, led by Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff, determined with their Austrian counterpart, Arz von Straussenberg, to launch a combined operation against the Italians, intended for mid-September.

In preparation for the offensive, Germany transported seven divisions of troops to reinforce the Austrians on the upper banks of the Isonzo. Cadorna, learning by aerial reconnaissance of the Austro-German movements, pushed back his own army’s scheduled September offensive to prepare a defensive position for the scheduled attacks that month. Unfavorable weather, however, pushed back the plans, and by the time Germany and Austria-Hungary were ready to attack, they were able to catch the Italians by surprise. On October 24, after a brief, effective artillery bombardment, the German and Austrian infantry moved ahead against the damaged Italian lines, using grenades and flamethrowers to exploit their advantage and achieve a quick and decisive breakthrough. By the end of the day, they had advanced an impressive 25 kilometers.

The Italian line along the Isonzo was pierced at Caporetto, their armies were forced to retreat and lost the gains of two and a half years, as well as a terrific number of men and guns. However, they finally pulled themselves together behind the Piave river north of Venice, where they held their ground with marvelous heroism, assisted ultimately by British and French contingents who came to their assistance.

At the end of 1917, Italian Forces were fighting a defensive battle in order to stop the Austrian exploitation of the Caporetto battle. A defensive line was prepared and stubbornly held along the Piave River, which became the Sacred River of Italy a few months later. While the Italian Army was fighting for its survival, eleven Allied Divisions (five British and six French) gathered in the area between Mantova, Brescia, and Verona, ready to support the fight if necessary.

Because the Allied Forces feared the possibility of a complete success by the Austrian Armed Forces on the Italian Front, this deployment was made with a sense of urgency. Losing to the Austrians could have jeopardized the entire Allied effort by allowing large numbers of Central Powers troops to move onto the Western Front. After Italy’s defeat at the Battle of Caporetto, II Corps’ deployment outside of Italy’s national borders came at a crucible moment in the country’s military history. Italy had to man, sustain, and employ forces on both the Western and Italian Fronts.