• Military Menu                       

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Industry
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• WMD
• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

The Great War - 1916

By 1916 both sides of the front line met in a gloomy mood. It had become quite clear that the military leadership had finally lost control over the course of military operations. The war had become a kind of thing in itself, not paying attention to the miserable efforts of some humans, even if their uniforms were decorated with golden buttonholes and a scattering of various-sized stars. Solid lines of trenches and barbed wire stretched for thousands of kilometers, and all attempts to break through these defensive positions by previous means were meaningless.

By the end of 1915 the Germans were in a very strong position. While maintaining a practical deadlock on the western front, they had achieved a series of striking successes in the east. They had forced the Russians out of Poland and Galicia and were in occupation of a wide strip of Russian territory, they had put Serbia out of the fighting, and had brought Bulgaria in on their side, while the Greek Government was giving them covert aid, and the British, after a costly failure, were on the point of evacuating Gallipoli.

Verdun - 1916

Having the eastern situation well in hand, the German High Command now turned to the west again, and, as the leading feature of their campaign in 1916, planned a mighty blow at Verdun - the key of the French defenses on the German frontier - with the design of crushing France before the British could attain their full military strength. The event proved, however, that they had absolutely miscalculated the magnificent resisting power of the French, who, though nearly overwhelmed at first by the deadly thrust designed to "bleed them white" which began 21 February, 1916, had valiantly realized before the close of autumn their rallying cry - "They shall not pass." Also, the enemy had failed to take into account the ability of the British to launch a truly formidable offensive, to say nothing of the fighting capacity of the Italians and the capability of poor exhausted Russia to undertake one more redoubtable effort.

After the victory of the Marne, Brigadier-General Henri Philippe Pétain was promoted to the generalship of a division, and from then on his name is known as that of one of the most brilliant generals of the entire French army. During the offensive of May 1915, he commanded an entire army corps, and on the gth of May that same army corps, in one day, in one dash, carried off every one of the German organizations at Carency, Albain, and St. Nazaire, capturing ten thousand prisoners and taking thirty cannon. In September he participated in the Champagne offensive; this time he was in command of an entire army; he, in fact, prepared the offensive, and his preparation was a masterly piece of work. On the first day, when he learned that the waves of his infantrymen had gained four kilometres in depthwhich at that time was considered enormous—and, contrary to the opinion of the entire staff, he said: “All right, but nothing has been accomplished and everything will have to be done over again.”

The German general staff, confident of its mastery on the eastern front, determined upon a crushing blow at France before Great Britain's newly trained armies could take the field. The spot chosen was Verdun. In a long letter to Kaiser Wilhelm II, Erich von Falkenhayn, who commanded the German Army, argued, "Within our reach, behind the French sector of the Western Front there are objectives for the retention of which the French General Staff would be compelled to throw in every man they have. If they do so the forces of France will bleed to death." Verdun, the last redoubt to fall to the Prussian invaders in 1870, was a sacred city. For the French, losing the city would be an insuperable defeat the symbolism of which could be fatal. The Crown Prince was put in command under the guidance of strong advisers. An unheard-of number of guns was concentrated upon the French trenches which defended the slopes of the Verdun plateau. A quarter of a million Germans were massed for the attack. On Feb. 21, 1916, the storm broke. A torrent of shells poured upon the French positions, blotting out the first and second lines of defense. Then through the heavy fog the famous German “shock troops” advanced to the charge. The French who had survived that hail of metal fought stubbornly and went down. Moving forward with caution and mechanical regularity, the Germans took line after line. In four days they had advanced four miles, reaching the first of the outlying forts which encircled Verdun.

When the great German attack on Verdun opened, General Pétain was placed in command of the armies defending the historic fortress, in succession to General Balfourier. He arrived at Verdun on the fourth day of the battle; four miles of ground had been lost, and with it gun positions which made the task of the defense almost impossible.

Pétain pledged, “They shall not pass!” The German assault on the two miles of the Douaumont front reached a pitch of unprecedented violence. It was the culmination of the German effort, the last blow before which the fortress was to crumble. The Kaiser was watching through his glasses and victory was already taken for granted. That same night tidings were flashed to Berlin that Douaumont, the key of the last defense line of Verdun, was in German hands. The next morning, 26 February 1916, Pétain launched the counter-attack and drove the invaders back.

Pétain was able to make good on his promise, in part because of his logistics innovations. Petain ordered a railroad to be built along with a road to supply the men at the front, and his solution of the problem of reinforcements and supplies by means of a ‘millwheel’ or constant system of replacement was impressive, involving nearly half the entire French Army. France was allowed to draw its breath, even if the situation remained critical. Pétain held Verdun, and emerged as the vaunted “Victor of Verdun.”

From February to December 1916, an area smaller than Manhattan was subjected without let-up to the most intensive artillery bombardment ever experienced. A French doctor described the battlefield as a place where "one eats, one drinks beside the dead, one sleeps in the midst of the dying, one laughs, and one sings in the company of corpses."

In April 1916 Pétain was appointed to one of the three group commands, the central Secteur, from Soissons to Verdun, while General Nivelle continued the defense of Verdun. Pétain had been relieved of direct command by Joffre, who desired a more offensive-minded commander and was perturbed by Pétain's constant requests for more troops. Petain was exhibiting the first symptoms of the defeatism that would eventually consume him.

By July 1 the battle there had virtually come to an end, and the German General Staff was compelled to turn its attention to the north, where the British were launching their first great drive on the Somme River. The effort to take Verdun cost the Germans about 300,000 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and all they gained were two demolished forts and the ruins of a few surrounding villages. On the other hand, the effect of the successful defense of this historic city on the spirit of the French and British was of immense and immediate value. They felt that Germany had delivered the hardest blow it was capable of, and that this best was not good enough to win.

The First Battle of the Somme (1916)

The Battle of the Somme saw the first major action of Britain's New Army – the volunteers who had responded to Lord Kitchener's 1914 call for recruits. After 18 months of deadlock in the trenches on the Western Front, the Allies wanted to achieve a decisive victory. In 1915, a plan was finalised for a joint British and French offensive the following year. However, the German attack against the French at Verdun meant that the British were forced to take the lead.

As the Battle of Verdun continued in its mutual attrition, the French command requested that the British relieve some of the pressure on the fortress by attacking at another point on the line. The chosen point was the River Somme. The battle was to begin on 1 July 1916.

The British Commander, Sir Douglas Haig, offered in the spring to hasten his contemplated attack along the river Somme ; but since that would play the German game of forcing the Allies into another premature offensive, the French High Command insisted that he wait till he was ready. Accordingly, in the early months of the year, the British rendered aid chiefly by taking over more of the line. At length, 01 July, 1916, began the First Battle of the Somme, so called because it was followed in 1917 and again in 1918, by further bloody conflicts in this stricken district.

The British undertook the major thrust north of Amiens, and had to face the main concentration of the Germans, while the French, still mainly occupied at Verdun, cooperated in a fine but subordinate offensive by way of diversion farther south. The chief purposes aimed at were to relieve Verdun, to assist the Italians and the Russians, and to use up the active forces of the enemy.

The battle was preceded by a 7 day bombardment. More than 1.6 million shells were fired, capped by the explosion of two enormous tunnel mines. Two hundred thousand tons of explosives went off under the German lines, tearing huge gaps in the trenches. In general, the defenses remained intact, while the ground between the forces became a broken morass of shell holes which quickly turned into a swamp; the bombardment had destroyed the centuries-old drainage system that kept the low-lying land dry.

The preparatory bombardment destroyed surprise, but not the German defenses. To the surprise of the attackers, most of the Germans were not only still alive, but they also maintained effective, cohesive fighting units. Moreover, the massive bombardment failed a critical task, which had been to destroy barbed wire entanglements. As the final barrage lifted, the Germans set up their machine guns in the still existing prepared positions. The British came over the top in parade formation. The British bravely advanced, although the soldiers fell not as individuals, but by regiments. Their commander, General Sir Henry Rawlinson, proposed ending the attack. His superior, General Sir Douglas Haig, decided to keep his promise to the French.

On 15 September, tanks were used for the first time with some success, but they did not bring a breakthrough any closer.

This offensive went forward like a machine, heavily, slowly. It was dependent on the road and the 60cm railroad. It was necessary to reestablish across the torn-up terrain a minimum of communications, to carry forward the heavy artillery still armed almost entirely (8/9th) with rather old and immobile materiel designed 40 years previously for siege warfare, to reconstitute stocks of ammunition, to organize transportation, etc., and these operations took weeks. During this time, the enemy made good his losses, reinforced himself, organized, and finally presented to the attack, fortifications as resistant as before. The problem of the offensive therefore was always revived in the same form, without the initial success having facilitated later success.

The price was beyond belief. By the end of the first day, the British had suffered 60,000 casualties, including 19,000 killed in action, retaking a piece of land 1.5 kilometers by 3 kilometers. By the time the entire operation had ended, four and one half months later, the British had lost 420,000, the French 195,000, and the Germans, 650,000 men.

The battle of the Somme consisted of charging straight into the prepared positions of a competent enemy. Strategically, operationally, and tactically it typified the bankruptcy of military conceptual thought that made World War I a slaughterhouse. The technology available was as conducive to mobile warfare with low casualties as it was to static warfare. The problem was military concepts—doctrine.

Other than the mutual slaughter, the primary result was a slight reduction in the pressure on Verdun. Despite the death toll, the attack continued. The best of Britain’s army died for a gain of about eight miles.

This was the first appearance in force of the new citizen army; for the scanty remnants of the "Old Contemptibles" who survived the campaign of 1914 had been wiped out at Neuve Chapelle and Loos. It was a fiery ordeal for untried men and untried officers, and appalling numbers were sacrificed against a huge and wonderfully equipped war machine, which the enemy for years had been employing all the resources of science to construct. Upwards of 3,000,000 troops were engaged on both sides: of the casualties, amounting to 1,000,000, the flower of the young manhood of the British Empire contributed a heavy toll, and they had gained little more than seven miles on a twelve-mile front when the approach of bad weather in November brought the fighting to a close.

Nevertheless, they had served their apprenticeship, they had been fashioned into veterans and had proved to the Germans that henceforth, in man power and equipment, they were a force to be reckoned with. They had relieved Verdun, and they had seized the initiative on the western front which they were to retain for over a year, they had inflicted heavy losses and captured many guns and prisoners. They had shown the Germans, too, that their permanent trenches were no longer wholly to be depended upon and forced them, like the French at Verdun, to take to shallow trenches, shell craters and pill boxes. Finally, by their persistent hammering they rendered the German positions so untenable that they were forced to undertake a so-called " strategic retreat" of many miles, early in the spring of 1917.

The Somme experience had shown that large elaborate positions had disadvantages under heavy artillery fire. The trenches were necessary for daily living, but once detected they were lathered with preparatory fire and barrages. Deep dugouts in forward areas were also impractical, for soldiers remained in them too long after the enemy barrage lifted and were often captured.

The Allied attack on the Somme in 1916 proved to the German General Headquarters, that a rigid line of defence was no longer possible because the Allies now had enough guns and munitions to destroy any kind of defensive organization. Therefore, in December, 1916, "Rules for the conduct of defensive battles" were issued. These prescribed an active and elastic defence method. These rules were of great value to both sides in the latter part of the war.

The Italian, Russian and Rumanian Campaigns (1916)

Much handicapped by lack of guns and munitions, the Italians were able, nevertheless, not only to halt an Austrian attack in the region of the eastern Alps but even to secure a commanding through dangerously exposed position along the river Isonzo, northwest of Trieste. They were greatly aided by a splendid Russian offensive along a three hundred mile front, the rapid progress of which during the first few weeks was later grievously dashed. The Russians, with hopelessly inadequate equipment and transportation facilities and sadly hampered by a Government honeycombed with pro-German traitors, were soon stopped and forced back by the Austrians, stiffened by German reenforcements.

Their brief help to the Allies had been rendered at a terrible cost, and hungry, suffering, and discouraged they were ripe for a Revolution which broke out early in 1917. Another disastrous setback for the Allies was the catastrophe that overtook the Rumanians. Entering the war 27 August, 1916, their untried armies fell victim to their own rashness, to the impotence of the Western Powers, to delusive assurances of the Russians, and to the energetic strategy of the Germans. Almost annihilated by heavy casualties, a fragment of the Rumanian army succeeded in escaping into Russian territory, leaving their country with its rich supplies of grain and oil to the enemy.

Three Russian divisions arrived too late to help them; also, the Allied army in Salonika, who, assisted by a few re-equipped Serbians, had been pushed into Serbia and captured Monastir, 19 November, were unable to effect a diversion. Venizelos, the pro-Ally Greek statesman, had set up a revolutionary government in Salonika; but King Constantine was still in the saddle, and the Entente army was too weak and too fearful of his intentions to risk going too far north.

The Peace Drive (1916)

The Central Powers had met with serious reverses during the year, though they were far from being so exhausted as the Allies supposed. Having little more to fear from Russia, Germany, far better informed on the situation than the Entente Powers, now determined to take steps to secure the great Empire which she had been building up in the east. Hence the so-called "peace offer" that she made on 12 December, 1916, which was, in substance, a proposal for a conference for an exchange of views. Her design was to set the Powers by the ears, to strengthen herself with her own people and to win over the majority in the United States, as well as the sentimentalists and defeatists in France and Great Britain, by throwing upon her opponents the responsibility for continuing the War.

However, moral indignation and the realization of the German menace was strong enough among the Allied Governments and the bulk of their peoples to repudiate the thought of a negotiated peace, and to continue fighting until they were in a position to insist on such terms as would secure from Germany at least a partial compensation for the havoc she had wrought, and would offer reasonable guarantees for future security.

The Tank is Born

Lieutenant Colonel Corps Royal Engineers Ernest Dunlop Swinton. He proposed the use of an armored American agricultural tractor "Holt" as a means of transportation over rough terrain. In the end, his proposal also got on the table to Winston Churchill, and he wrote a memorandum to the Prime Minister on January 5, 1915, warning that the Germans could be the first to build armored vehicles. However, the army command, led by Defense Minister Lord Kitchener, fiercely resisted. Churchill decided to do everything himself, especially since this development of events fully corresponded to his stormy temper. In February 1915, he created the “Committee on Land Ships”, which began work, receiving 70,000 pounds from the Admiralty funds.

Tests were held February 2, 1916 in the presence of representatives of the Cabinet of Ministers, the Admiralty and the Supreme Command Headquarters. Most of the observers were impressed, especially by representatives of the Headquarters. King George V witnessed tests on February 8th. The king was so shocked that he even personally congratulated the driver. On February 12, the initial order for 100 tanks was increased to 150 vehicles.

August 13, 1916 the first division of British tanks went to France. Crews sailed from Southampton, and the tanks themselves - from Avonmouth, as there were no cranes in Southampton capable of loading them into transport. By rail, the tanks were delivered to the front. For the purpose of the same disguise, the division was called "Heavy section of the machine-gun corps."

The morning of September 15, 1916 was beautiful, although a thin layer of fog spread above the ground. It was on this morning in the area of ??the French villages Fleur and Courcelet that a historical attack took place, changing the nature of the war. To the front line were delivered 49 tanks. Due to breakdowns and accidents, only 32 moved to the attack. he British press went into ecstasy, calling the tanks "mechanical monsters" and in every way extolling them. The tanks were considered a vehicle to accompany the infantry. The tank solved only tactical tasks, not daring to rise to the operational level. Nobody could predict the brilliant future of this combat vehicle.