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The Great War 1915

The year of 1915 was one of sore amazement to western Europe. In 1914 Germany had failed; her plan for conquering Europe by one swift blow had been met by a France more strong, a Britain more alert, a Russia more loyal, than she had reckoned on. But in 1915 the Allies' leaders misread and misjudged this Germany as completely as she had misjudged them, and with results almost equally disastrous. They seemed to think that Germany, having struck with her utmost force, had exhausted her forty years of preparation and was now helpless. They assumed that they had only to "carry on," only to continue the same effort as before, and soon she would be entreating mercy at their feet. Therein they underrated both the German power and the German temper.

The whole German people now gave themselves up to winning the War at any cost. To the mere military colossus of 1914 there succeeded in 1915 a national colossus far mightier, less brutal, but more patiently and sternly terrible. The German people as individuals almost ceased to exist. Every one was set to labor for the State, either in the army itself or in preparing its munitions. Family life became a minor matter, as did personal business. The little manikins no longer moved or thought or even dreamed as human beings; they were become mere cogs in the mighty war-machine which was to establish the German supremacy over Europe.

Circumstances caused the Germans, in the spring of 1915, to transfer their main offensive from the west to the east. Whereas their aim in 1914 had been to contain Russia and to crush France, their aim in 1915 was, as far as possible, to refrain from offensive operations on the western front, and, with relatively few men, to hold the line by means of elaborate trenches, protected by barbed wire entanglements and by a greatly superior equipment in heavy artillery, machine guns, trench mortars, and hand grenades. This would leave them comparatively free to concentrate against Russia, not only to relieve the pressure on Austria, but, as they hoped, to strike the Russians hard enough to force on them a separate and disadvantageous peace.

Indeed Germany cherished the further design of crushing Serbia, bringing Bulgaria and Greece into a panGerman alliance, and thus realizing her ambition of a Middle-Europe and a Middle-Asia which would extend from Berlin to the Persian Gulf. Although, by the German quiescence on the western front, the British were given fifteen more months to prepare, they and the French lost many men in a policy of " nibbling " or attrition, interspersed with a series of offensives which, although they aroused high hopes in their initial stages, regained little territory at great cost, though they achieved something in wearing down the enemy as well.

The lack of depth of the German defenses throughout the winter and spring of 1915 left the front line vulnerable to heavy artillery, which nearly resulted in a series of Allied breakthroughs. The concentration of the preponderance of German forces in the first line of defense enabled massed French and British artillery to strike throughout the shallow operational depth. However, the French inability to achieve surprise and neutralize dispersed artillery enabled the reinforcement and successful counterattack at the Battle of Perthes in February 1915. At the battle of Neuve Chappel in March, the British achieved surprise, which allowed them to extend into the depth of the German first line of defense. The British and French spring offenses in 1915 demonstrated the vulnerability of the rigid line defense to heavy artillery due to a lack of depth. The near breakthroughs of the French and British offensives created the catalyst towards greater operational depth to mitigate the danger of concentrated heavy artillery.

Shortly after Neuve Chapelle, Germany launched a cautious offensive of her own against Ypres. Here for the first time she tried that new and hideous weapon, poison gas. On April 22nd, she directed a deadly cloud of this against the point where the French and British trenches met. A French regiment facing the full strength of the gas was practically annihilated, hundreds of men perishing in awful torture. The British portion of the line was held by the Canadian troops; and these, encountering the poison less directly, were able to survive and even at last to beat back the German infantry assault that followed hard upon the gas. The whole War contained nothing more terrible than the launching of this new form of agonizing destruction, nor more splendid than the heroism with which it was met.

Soon afterward the Germans tried another similar device, the flame thrower, by which they hurled a stream of burning oil against their foes. The fire started conflagrations everywhere it fell. But against this also the Allied soldiers held firm, nor did the fire prove practical of employment in large quantities. Moreover, hasty inventions were contrived to meet the gas assaults. Thus defense soon reasserted itself as stronger than attack. The Western struggle was again at deadlock by the first of May.

Russian Reverses

Before many weeks, the Central Powers gained alarming successes in the East. On 1 May 1915, in the great battle of the Dunajec, the Russian advance in Galicia was decisively stopped, and by June the invaders were driven from the country. Then the Austro-German armies in the south were able to combine with German armies from the north and west against Russian Poland. On 4 August Warsaw fell, and the advent of winter found the Russians forced well back beyond their border. Woefully lacking supplies and equipment and with little enthusiasm for the old regime, they had fought manfully ; but, though they were to return for one more splendid offensive, suffering, treachery, and disintegration were at work that were to paralyze their efforts early in 1917.

Italy in the War

Already, in May, 1915, Italy had entered the war on the Allied side, an acquisition which brought many advantages, together with some complications. She contributed a fine navy, closed useful neutral ports to the enemy, and gave the Allies another Mediterranean base; also she protected southern France against an Austro-German attack and diverted the energies of Austria on the Italian frontier. At the same time she had nationalistic ambitions which awakened the apprehension of the Slavs under Hapsburg rule, rousing them to fight for a cause toward which they had hitherto been lukewarm, and ambitions, too, which crossed with those of Greece and embarrassed seriously the Allies in their dealings with the latter State. Valiantly as she hurried to the attack, Italy was able to accomplish little during the first year of the war: she was lacking in munitions, she had to undertake the almost superhuman task of driving her enemy from the passes of the Austrian Alps which projected into the plain of northern Italy and threatened her flank and rear, while she sought to make head against the Austrian forces dug in on the farther side of the Isonzo.

Gallipoli (1915-1916)

Meantime, the British had entered on an adventure in the Eastern Mediterranean which proved to be one of the most tragic miscarriages in the whole war, though it called forth imperishable manifestations of high-hearted courage and self-sacrifice. The aim was to force the Dardanelles, guarded on the north by the peninsula of Gallipoli, in order, among other things, to open the sea route to Russia and to prevent Rumania from supplying the Germans with grain and oil. A few obsolete ships might well have been risked in an effort to dash through the straits, though, as the event proved, success was impossible in view of the strong current, bearing destructive mines against the invader, and in view of the hidden fortifications equipped with powerful Krupp guns. When the surprise attack failed, the attempt should have been given up. The only other possibility would have been to refrain from disclosing the design until the land forces were ready to cooperate. The British did neither one thing nor the other.

In February and March, 1915, assisted by the French, they launched a naval attack, and with a loss of two ships, beside having two more put out of action, they scarcely managed to penetrate beyond the entrance to the straits. Against the protests of Marshals Joffre and French, Mr. Churchill - the British First Lord of the Admiralty - insisted on sending a land army to cooperate with the fleet, and the Secretary for War, Lord Kitchener, yielded. The Allied design having already been disclosed, the Gallipoli defenses were rapidly strengthened and supported by a Turkish force of 250,000 men, officered and trained by Germans and operating close to its base.

Not only did the Allies have to transport a part of their invading army and most of their supplies a thousand miles through submarine infested waters, but the landing places were protected by barbed wire, as far as the shallow water reached, and covered by gun fire, while farther inland the peninsula was a series of hills rising tier on tier. Moreover, the climatic conditions were dreadful - what with the withering rays of the summer sun, to say nothing of the searching winds of winter - and all water had to be shipped from the subsidiary bases of Lemnos and Egypt. The French contributed comparatively few to the expedition, chiefly Colonials, while the British used, first and last, upwards of 200,000 men, largely Anzacs (Australian and New Zealand Army Corps) training in Egypt.

The first landings were made 25 April, 1915, by the British on the toe of the peninsula and by the Anzacs at a point, farther up on the north side, which came to be known as Anzac Beach. The former were to march north and the latter east, but, in spite of the furious bravery of their assaults, they never advanced more than three miles and one mile respectively. In May, after the enemy submarines had destroyed three British battleships, the fleet with its supporting guns was withdrawn. Sickness, due to the terrible summer heat, swelled the total of the killed. The supreme effort came in August with a major attack, four miles north of Anzac, supported by lesser demonstrations aimed to distract the Turks farther south.

After a preliminary surprise the main advance was unfortunately delayed long enough to repulse ;t absolutely. Finally, in the late winter, the swoop of the Germans through Serbia made withdrawal from Gallipoli absolutely imperative, an undertaking which was achieved, in December and January, with rare skill and comparatively little further loss. All that can be said for this glorious but futile sacrifice was that it contained a large force of Turks during a critical period in the Russian campaign. Otherwise it was costly in many ways. It used up men and munitions which were sorely needed on the western front, it lowered the prestige of the Allies in the Balkans, determining the course of Bulgaria whose King was already bound to Germany, and alienated many former Allied supporters among the Greeks. For these reasons, and owing to the great losses, the ability to assist Serbia was greatly weakened.

The Serbian Tragedy (1915)

Twice before, the Serbians had repulsed Austrian attacks; now the Germans determined on her" conquest. This would mean control of the Balkans, which would facilitate the subjugation of Egypt and India, and help to realize the great German dream of mastery of central Europe and western Asia. Already, in September, the Serbians begged for permission to attack their old enemy Bulgaria and render her harmless before the anticipated German attack began, but the British and French Governments, nourishing the vain delusion that they could win over Bulgaria, refused. Early in October, after Mackensen, the victor of the Dunajec, with two armies had crossed the Danube, Ferdinand of Bulgaria, who had been deceiving the Allies with false assurances while his troops were mobilizing, finally threw off the mask. His armies struck at the Serbian flank and rear, and cut the Vienna-Salonika railroad on which the Serbians were solely dependent for supplies and an eventual line of retreat. Although an Allied army had landed at Salonika i October, it was too weak, and too uncertain of the intentions of the slippery Greek King Constantine, to render effectual assistance. The poor Serbians, suffering dreadfully from hunger and disease, were pushed steadily south and west by the combined Austro-Germans and Bulgarians. A fragment of the troops and peasantry managed to straggle across the Albanian mountains, and were shipped by the Italian navy to the island of Corfu. On 28 November, when the campaign ended, the Allies, except for the inadequate force at Salonika, had no longer a foothold in the Balkans.

The Campaign of 1915 on the Western Front

Meantime, while Germany was extending and consolidating her power in eastern Europe, the Allies were making small gains at a heavy cost on the western front, with the threefold design of breaking through if possible, of diverting pressure on the Russian front, and of wearing down the enemy forces by attrition. All the while, the British were working to increase, train, and equip their army. In the long run they accomplished marvels ; but it took them a good while to realize the necessity of conscription, and to produce artillery and high explosive shells in adequate quantities. Following local offensives undertaken by the French, the British launched, 10 March, an attack against Neuvc Chapelle, on a four-mile front southeast of Lille. In this attack, preceded by heavy drum fire, they cleared the German first line trenches and, to some extent, the second ; but, after gaining a mile of ground, they were repulsed, having sustained1 as well as having inflicted heavy casualties. The only drive of any consequence undertaken by the Germans on the western front, in 1915, was that resulting in the Second Battle of Ypres, which began 22 April. This battle will ever bear an evil memory, for it was here that the Germans violated international law and roused the fury of the Allies by first using poison gas - a crime which was to cause untold suffering to themselves as well as to their opponents. The French Colonials broke and fled with terror, leaving dangerously exposed the Canadians who were ranged next them. With rare fortitude the latter hung on, though it cost a third of their contingent. The struggle lasted five days; but the Germans, if such was their intention, failed to break through to Calais, though they at least succeeded in forestalling for a time the Allied offensive.

Champagne and Loos

The great Anglo-French effort of the year was launched in the autumn. According to the plans, Marshal French in Artois was to strike at Loos, north of Lens, while Foch was to move on Arras, a few miles south of the great coal mining center. In the Champagne area another French army under General Petain was to deliver a blow east of Rheims. Thus the German line, in the form of a great bulging salient, was to be pressed at three points. The British gained such a brilliant preliminary success that the Germans were prepared to evacuate Lens; but reserves were insufficient, the enemy counter-attacked and, in the end, Foch had to go to the assistance of his ally. It was in Champagne that the real break through was contemplated ; but, here again, high hopes were at first excited which time failed to realize.

The greatest difficulty was not in piercing the front, but really in progressing beyond it to a sufficient depth and with such rapidity that the decisive victory may be obtained, before the hostile strategic reserves come into the picture. In Champagne, the first German position was made up of three to five lines of trenches, laid out in a network 500 meters in depth. It was the assault on this position that the French artillery prepared. But, at a distance of 3 kilometers to the rear the Germans had organized a second position on the reverse slope. On this position the French artillery executed only a sketchy preparation; moreover, as it lacked howitzers, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to effectively place fire on the reverse slope.

The infantry attack at Champagne came on 22 September 1915. The infantry brilliantly captured the first position, then, intoxicated by its success, threw itself forward resolutely but thoughtlessly, and wrecked itself against the second. On the wings of the attack, the Germans held strongly. The French infantry therefore rolled up like a wave between two unbreakable pillars, contracted, narrowed its front to a point, and made a simple "pocket" in the hostile dispositions.

Both the British and the French had fought magnificently, they had gained some territory and had levied a heavy toll in lives, but they had been unable to divert the pressure from Russia and to save Serbia. Alone, the French were inferior in numbers and equipment to the Germans, and the latter calculated rightly that it would take months to train and equip Kitchener's million. The British Commander in the field was seriously handicapped by an inadequate staff of officers, by lack of high explosive shells and by the fact that men and material which might to some degree have helped him were diverted to Gallipoli. Nevertheless, it was felt that he was too slow to handle the vast and complex machine that was in the making; so, before the end of the year, he was sent to command the Home forces and Sir Douglas Haig replaced him as British Commander on the western front.