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The Path to War - 1914

On 28 June 1914, Francis Ferdinand, the Austrian heir-apparent, together with his Consort, were murdered at Serajevo in Bosnia. While the assassins were Austro-Hungarian subjects they were Serbians; moreover, there seems to be little doubt that their action was due to Serbian propaganda and promoted by Serbian assistance. Here was a heaven-sent chance to break the strength of a State, which - backed by all the strength of Russia and pan- Slavism - blocked the Austro-German route to the AEgean, a necessary stage on the road to the Persian Gulf. Although a momentous conference was called by the Kaiser, 5 July, to see if his generals, his admirals, and his financiers were ready, and although heavy selling of certain foreign stocks by Berlin operators took place, 10-13 July, no official step was taken till 23 July, when Austria launched an ultimatum against Serbia, which, in the words of Sir Edward Grey, was "a more formidable document than any which he had ever seen before addressed by one State to another independent State." '

The moment was well chosen. Great Britain was in the throes of the struggle over the Irish Home Rule Bill. France was distracted over the notorious Caillaux trial, while reports of 13, 14 July disclosed serious weakness in the equipment of the army, which only accentuated a strong Socialistic sentiment against mounting expenses for armaments. At the same time, Russia was shaken by serious labor troubles manifested in the outbreak of strikes at St. Petersburg. The President and Premier of France were absent in Russia, and the Kaiser was cruising along the Norwegian coast. Thus his assertion may be true that he never saw the actual ultimatum to Serbia, though the responsibility of the German Government is all the greater, since, as they afterwards admitted in their own White Book, they " permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action toward Serbia." Clearly, as the British Government asserted, it was " the deliberate intention " of Austria, and of Germany who backed her, " to take both Serbia and Europe by surprise."

The Austrian Ultimatum

The Austrian ultimatum, or demarche, as they preferred to call it, embodied ten drastic demands and was to be answered within forty-eight hours. On 24 July Germany announced to the Powers her approval of the note. The Serbian reply, presented 25 July, agreed unqualifiedly to eight of the demands. The two others she was unable to agree to unreservedly; nevertheless, with the hope of adjusting peacefully even these two disputed points, Serbia declared her willingness to submit the decision to the Hague Tribunal or to the Great Powers. Although the Serbian reply was a fairly lengthy document, the Austrian Minister to Belgrade, scarcely more than thirty minutes after he received it, was seated in a train leaving the city. All the facts and indications go to support the assertion of the British Ambassador to Vienna " that the Austro- Hungarian note was so drawn as to make war inevitable, that their Government are fully resolved to have a war with Serbia." Austria had great provocation; but her demarche was couched in such a form as to make it impossible for Serbia to accept all its terms without reserve if she hoped to maintain her national independence and self-respect.

Sir Edward Grey's Attempts to Arbitrate

From the first, Sir Edward Grey strove valiantly to effect a settlement " simply and solely from the point of view of the peace of Europe." His aim was not " to localize the conflict," as the German White Book later asserted, but to prevent an Austrian attack on Serbia which would inevitably draw in Russia on the Serbian side, with the ghastly prospect of involving the whole of Europe in war. He had not hesitated to declare, with reference to the Serajevo tragedy, that " no crime has ever aroused deeper or more general horror throughout Europe; none has ever been less justified. Sympathy for Austria was universal. Both the Governments and the public opinion of Europe were ready to support her in any measures, however severe, which she might think it necessary to take for the punishment of the murderer and his accomplices "; moreover, 24 July, he urged Serbia " to express concern and regret " and " to give Austria the fullest satisfaction " if it was proved that Serbian officials were involved.

On the 25th, the day the Austrian note was answered, he proposed and urged that Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain arrange a conference to find some way out of the difficulty. France, Italy, and even Russia agreed, but Germany, while full of pacific assurances that she was doing her best to restrain her ally, refused to agree to this plan, on the ground that it would be forcing Austria into an arbitration which she had not sought. Naturally she had not! Germany failed to publish in the White Book her correspondence with Austria during these critical days; but evidence later disclosed makes it clear that she was backing Austria to the limit in the expected event that Serbia refused to agree to her impossible demands. Meantime, 28 July, Austria declared war on Serbia, and Russia, who had given Serbia promises of support, ordered a partial mobilization, 29 July; this was followed two days later, 31 July, by a general mobilization, only after Austria had bombarded the Serbian capital of Belgrade on the 30th. Thenceforth, Germany took the initiative. When Russia and France refused to accept her peremptory ultimatums, she declared war on the former, 1 August, and on the latter, 3 August, after German armies had already invaded Luxemburg and entered French territory.

The Question of Responsibility

Five years previously, in 1909, Germany by appearing behind Austria "in shining armor" had overawed Russia into allowing Austria to work her will in the Balkans. This time it was not to be. The guilt of Germany in provoking the crisis is pronounced in a scathing indictment by Prince Lichnowsky, her Ambassador to London, who, because of his laudable desire to promote good relations with Great Britain, had for some time been treated with scant consideration by his own Government. Here is what he says:

"As is evident from all official publications - and this is not refuted by our White Book, which, owing to the poverty of its contents and to its omissions, is a gravely self-accusing document -

"i. We encouraged Count Berchtold (Austrian Foreign Minister) to attack Serbia, although German interests were not involved (sict) and the danger of a world-war must have been known to us. Whether we were aware of the wording of the Ultimatum is completely immaterial.

"2. During the time between the 23d and 3oth July, 1914, when M. Sazonow (Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs) emphatically declared that he would not tolerate any. attack on Serbia, we rejected the British proposals of mediation, although Serbia, under Russian and British pressure, had accepted almost the whole of the Ultimatum, and although an agreement about the two points at issue could easily have been reached, and Count Berchtold was even prepared to content himself with the Serbian reply.

"3. On the 3oth July (31 July), when Count Berchtold wanted to come to terms, we sent an Ultimatum to Petrograd merely because of the Russian mobilization, although Austria had not been attacked; and on the 3ist July (i August) we declared war on Russia, although the Tsar pledged his word that he would not order a man to march as long as negotiations were proceeding - thus deliberately destroying the possibility of a peaceful settlement.

"In view of the above undeniable facts, it is no wonder that the whole of the civilized world, outside Germany, places the entire responsibility for the world-war upon our shoulders."

Great Britain Drawn into the War

Happily for Great Britain, both her duty and her interest impelled her to strive for peace to check Austro-German aggressions, and, if need be, to support France, Russia, and Belgium. She had made specific agreements with France in 1904 and with Russia in 1907, which apparently contemplated joint action in case of necessity, though she was free to decide what constituted a case of necessity. However, she was bound in honor to protect the French coast, since the French had withdrawn their whole fleet to the Mediterranean, leaving the British to concentrate in the Channel and North Sea. Furthermore, together with Prussia, Austria, France, and Russia, she had guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium in 1839. Austro-German domination of the Balkans might seriously menace her Eastern possessions, while German occupation of Belgium, in conjunction with her steadily increasing navy, might threaten the very existence of the British Isles. Finally, in the event of a European War, Great Britain would have to face the issue of standing by France and Russia or leaving them to be crushed, with the certain prospect of having to fight the victor alone in the near future.

Nevertheless, while Sir Edward Grey strove by every means in his power to bring about a peaceable adjustment, he steadfastly refused from the first to enter into any engagement binding his country to support Russia and France by force of arms. Such an assurance might have brought Germany to reason; but it would have been quite contrary to his pacific intentions. Moreover, he was a responsible Cabinet Minister, and it is almost certain that the Liberal party in the Commons, and public opinion outside, would never have supported a pledge to enter into war on what seemed to most a purely Balkan quarrel. Yet, by 29 July, he had reached the point of solemnly warning the German Ambassador in London " that there was no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved, but if the issue did become such as we thought British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once."

The same day, the Imperial Chancellor at Berlin offered, in return for British neutrality, " every assurance that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France." But, when questioned by the British Ambassador, he was unable to " give a similar undertaking " with regard to the French Colonies, or to guarantee that German forces might not be forced to enter Belgium. As a result, the British Government refused to bind themselves to neutrality on such terms. Honor and prudence both demanded that Great Britain keep her hands absolutely free to act if there was any possibility of crushing France or violating Belgium.

The Violation of Belgium

On 31 July, Sir Edward Grey sent definite inquiries both to France and Germany whether they were " prepared to engage to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violates it." France gave an unqualified promise at once. Officially, Germany would give no such assurances, though the well-disposed Lichnowsky sought to ascertain the intentions of the British Government in case guarantees were given regarding Belgium and the integrity of France and her colonies. On 2 August, Germany invaded Luxemburg and, two days later, sent an ultimatum to Belgium demanding " a free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening, in case of refusal, to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours." This outrageous proceeding caused the King of the Belgians to appeal to the King of Great Britain for " diplomatic intervention to safeguard the integrity of Belgium."

In response to King Albert's appeal, the British Government sent an ultimatum through their Ambassador at Berlin requesting that the German Government give a satisfactory assurance by twelve o'clock that night, 4 August, to respect the neutrality of Belgium. Otherwise the Ambassador was instructed to ask for his passports " and to say that his Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves."

His account of his final interview with von Bethmann-Hollweg that evening reveals one of the most dramatic and infamous incidents in history. "I found the Chancellor very agitated," he reports. "His Excellency at once began an harangue which lasted about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word - 'neutrality,' a word which in war time had so often been disregarded - 'just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her.' All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which . . . he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement and said that in the same way as he ... wished me to understand that, for strategical reasons, it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would .wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of 'life and death' for the honor of Great Britain that she should keep Iter solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future?"

Already, earlier in the same day, the Chancellor had made to the Reichstag the following blunt statement which speaks for itself: "We are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps are already on Belgian soil. Gentlemen, that is contrary to the dictates of international law. It is true that the French Government has declared at Brussels that France is willing to respect the neutrality of Belgium, so long as her opponent respects it. We knew however that France stood ready for invasion. France could wait but we could not wait. A French movement on our flank upon the lower Rhine might have been disastrous. So we were compelled to override the just protests of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. The wrong - / speak openly - that we are committing we will endeavor to make good as soon as our military goal has been reached. Anybody who is threatened, as we are threatened, and is fighting for his highest possessions, can only have one thought - how he is to hack his way through."

Maximilian Harden, editor of the Zukunft - who, previous to the War, was a most vociferous supporter of the German national policy, but who later came into conflict with the Government because of his outspoken criticism of their aims and methods - later expressed himself with even more refreshing candor: "Let us cease our wretched efforts to apologize for what Germany has done, and let us stop heaping contempt and insult upon the enemy. We have not plunged into this colossal adventure against our will, nor was it forced upon us by surprise. We wanted it, and we do not appear before the bar of Europe, because we do not recognize its jurisdiction in our case. Our might will make a new law in Europe. It is Germany who strikes. . . . Germany is carrying on this war because she wants more room in the world and larger markets for the products of her activity."

In the British diplomacy during the fateful twelve days which preceded Great Britain's ultimatum to Germany, it is very difficult to see what more Sir Edward Grey could have done to prevent the outbreak of war between Austro-Hungary and Serbia, which did inevitably, as he foresaw from the first, drag in other nations. He urged Serbia to moderation and even to submission; tried to induce the four Powers to mediate jointly at St. Petersburg and Vienna; he proposed a conference of the four Powers to prevent further complications; he did everything in his power to restrain Russia from immediate armed support of Serbia; he declined to join France and Russia in eventual military action; and even up to the violation of the neutrality of Belgium he still strove to avert the horror of war from Europe. Possibly an unequivocal statement that Great Britain would support Russia and France might have restrained Germany; but such a step, as the representative of the pacific Liberal party and as a responsible.