Sudan - 4th Civil War - Path to War
Under the Bashir regime, general elections for president and the National Assembly were scheduled to be held every five years. Under the Political Agreement and the constitutional declaration signed in 2019, elections were Page 20scheduled to be held in 2022, but the October 2020 signing of the Juba Peace Agreement and amendment to the constitutional framework postponed elections until 39 months after the signing, delaying planned elections until early 2024.
As the sticky matter of the RSF’s integration heated up in the weeks before the fighting, it could have been that al-Burhan felt more secure in his position than he was. Possibly Sudanese Armed Forces Commander General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s lack of action was to avoid the clashes between SAF and RSF that emerged in April 2023. The urban setting of Khartoum poses a problem for both the RSF and SAF due to their combat histories and specialisations. The SAF was not known for being highly mobile on the ground, or even being precise with respect to their air force. The RSF, on the other hand, never had the same training as the army in defending fixed positions, holding territory, or sustaining attacks.
Al-Burhan and his allies seized control of the government on October 25, 2021. Burhan usurped the authority of a civilian-led transitional government formed in 2019 following a popular revolution that brought the 30-year regime of President Omar al-Bashir to an end. The 2021 takeover not only removed Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok from his position and sent him into house arrest but resulted in the detention of several senior officials, the dissolution of the cabinet, and the declaration of a state of emergency. Burhan suspended implementation of articles of the country’s provisional constitutional declaration, adopted in August 2019, and instituted a military-controlled Sovereign Council to oversee governmental functions.
Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: unlawful or arbitrary killings; cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by the government; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; political prisoners or detainees; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; serious abuses in a conflict, including killings, abductions, physical abuse or punishment, and unlawful recruitment or use of child soldiers; serious restrictions on free expression and media, including threats of violence and acts of violence against journalists, censorship, and enforcement of criminal libel and slander laws; serious restrictions on internet freedom; substantial interference with the freedom of association, including overly restrictive laws on the organization, funding, or operation of nongovernmental and civil society organizations; serious government corruption; lack of investigation of and accountability for gender-based violence, including domestic and intimate partner violence, sexual violence, child, early and forced marriage, female genital mutilation/cutting, and conflict-related sexual violence; laws criminalizing lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex persons; and existence of the worst forms of child labor.
Large-scale protracted displacement continued to be a severe problem in Darfur and the Two Areas. Countrywide, there were more than 3.7 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) as of July 2022. The OCHA reported that more than 200,000 individuals were displaced during 2022 due to intercommunal violence and other armed conflict, particularly in Darfur and Blue Nile, as well as due to clashes in West and South Kordofan and Eastern Sudan States.
In October 2020 leaders of the civilian-led transitional government [CLTG] and several armed opposition groups signed the Juba Peace Agreement, intended to end nearly two decades of conflict in the country’s war-torn regions of Darfur and the Two Areas; however, implementation remained slow and uneven throughout the year. Violence increased around the country with sudden flareups of intercommunal fighting throughout the year, especially in Darfur, Blue Nile, Kassala, and Kordofan States. Before the military takeover, the CLTG took strong steps towards reckoning with the crimes perpetrated by the Bashir regime as well as addressing contemporary abuses. After the military takeover, these efforts largely ceased.
The Sovereign Council comprised Burhan, Rapid Support Forces Commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (aka “Hemedti”), three other general officers, and three signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement. The agreement was ratified in October 2020 to give new impetus to wide-ranging goals, including with respect to security, governance and transitional justice, and the appointment of signatories to senior government positions. The military government issued a decree in December 2021 to expand the arrest, search, and seizure powers of the country’s security forces, which upended the constitutional declaration’s prohibition against arbitrary arrest and detention.
Until October 2021, the Ministry of Interior held the primary responsibility for internal security. The Ministry of Interior had oversight of police agencies, the Ministry of Defense, and the General Intelligence Service. Ministry of Interior police agencies include the security police, special forces police, traffic police, and the combat-trained Central Reserve Police. Various elements of these police units were present throughout the country. The Ministry of Defense had a mandate to oversee all elements of the security services, including the Sudanese Armed Forces, Rapid Support Forces, Border Guards, and defense and military intelligence units; these forces are also charged with protecting sensitive government buildings and sites. On July 3, the first cohort of 2,000 soldiers of the Joint Security-Keeping Force graduated from Sudanese Armed Forces-organized training with a mandate to protect civilians in Darfur, consistent with the Juba Peace Agreement.
Civilian protesters continued demonstrating during the year against the military takeover, demanding full civilian rule. Security forces responded to some of these demonstrations with violence. In response to the October 2021 military takeover, prodemocracy civilian actors continued to organize demonstrations and strikes in Khartoum and across the country condemning the military’s actions and calling for full civilian rule. Resistance committees in Khartoum, Omdurman, and Khartoum North organized numerous large-scale peaceful protests, which were often met with violence by security forces, including the use of live ammunition.
The state of emergency continued until 29 May 2022, as did the temporary decree that gave expanded arrest authority to the General Intelligence Services, Sudanese Armed Forces, Rapid Support Forces, and police forces. These organizations retained the prerogative to conduct searches and seizures of contraband, to freeze financial assets, and to restrict the movement of individuals. These security forces also received immunity from prosecution for such actions performed during the state of emergency. General Burhan’s lifting of the state of emergency coincided with the release of more than 70 political detainees.
Persons arrested following demonstrations were routinely and severely beaten with pipes, sticks, and batons, and were kicked by security forces, including when already restrained. Severe beatings carried out by security forces at detention centers resulted in broken bones and one miscarriage. There were several reports of security forces committing sexual violence against women across the country, reportedly to discourage their participation in demonstrations.
On 12 September 2022, security forces posted at major intersections in Khartoum stopped vehicles and pedestrians and forcibly shaved young men’s heads and searched vehicles for contraband. There were credible reports that security forces targeted young men with long hair, whom they associated with prodemocracy protesters.
Government authority remained with the Sovereign Council headed by General Burhan and dominated by military members; the civilian members of the Sovereign Council named by Burhan in November 2021 were dismissed on 04 July 2022. Following the military takeover in October 2021, the Sovereign Council did not publicly hold anyone accountable for abuses and disbanded the committee aimed at identifying and reclaiming or confiscating assets that corrupt officials in the Bashir government had stolen.
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