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Pashtunistan - 1979-2008

By the late 1970s, Pakistan had settled the insurgencies in Baluchistan and Pashtunistan, but when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan they installed a communist regime that was openly hostile to Pakistan. Pakistan did not fear outright attack from the much weaker Afghan military, but India's support for Afghanistan's claims on Pakistani territory had long created unrest among Pakistani military planners, who dreaded the prospect of a major two-front war.

The Soviet backed Kabul regime raised the question of the Durand Line, that is, the rightful boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Since raising the Pashtunistan issue on the day of the coup, the Daud Government issued a series of public statements and private demarches alleging Pakistani "provocations" which could lead to "serious consequences" and to which Afghanistan "cannot remain indifferent": delivered a strong attack at the Algiers nonaligned conference on Pakistan's treatment of the Pathans; and arrested and detained a body of Pakistan's Frontier Scouts which strayed across Afghanistan's borders.

In response, Pakistan: announced that nomadic Afghan tribesmen, who normally winter in Pakistan, will not be permitted to enter without "travel documents," which have never been issued to them before; reinforced its border with Afghanistan by deploying two fighter squadrons to Quetta, two infantry battalions to the Quetta border, and army units to replace border guards elsewhere; indeed, President Bhutto confirmed to Ambassador Helms that he was abandoning Pakistan's policy of rear deployment for the army; reactivated a dormant army roadbuilding project close to the border.

Wali contributed to tensions by implying publicly that he is moving toward secession and that he would seek outside assistance in a confrontation with Bhutto. Bhutto's reaction has been to arrest about 500 of Wali's NAP supporters.

Kabul's "forward policy" had been implemented with words, but the rhetoric had been inflammatory and provocative. Pakistan's reaction, while short of belligerence, has been reinforced with military moves. Both governments have assured us that they seek a peaceful solution and good relations, but neither has made moves to seek from, or to give to, the other assurances of peaceful intent. At present, Afghanistan and Pakistan are heading toward confrontation, and their domestic compulsions appear sufficiently strong to drive them farther down this road in the coming months.

Wali Khan, son of Abdul Ghafar Khan [the "Frontier Ghandi"] pursued a pragmatic line for a Pashtun homeland, but was mostly ambiguous under the banner of the National Awami Party (NAP). Evenutally, the relative prosperity of the Pashtuns, and their increased integration into the armed forces and among federal administrative elites, led to Pashtunistan dying a natural death.

By the late-1990s, the Taliban eraa in Afghanistan fostered a Pashtun Nationalism, albeit of an Islamic character, and tribal leaders of the NWFP started viewing themselves as Muslims and Pashtuns. They did not want to secede from Pakistan, but wanted autonomy with regard to language, identity, and political aspirations. They provided Kabul with ample opportunity to raise the Pashtunistan issue even more vigorously.

September 11th changed the situation of Pashtunistan. After the Taliban's overthrow in 2001 and India's return to the Afghan scene, Pakistan began to fear that New Delhi's renewed presence would reactivate the Afghan claim to "Greater Pashtunistan."

In July 2003 there were clashes between Pakistan and Afghan security forces, and the Pakistani embassy in Kabul was ransacked on July 8, 2003. About two-thousand Afghans, including some government officials, took to the streets of Kabul to protest alleged border incursions by Pakistani troops. Several dozen protesters broke away from the rally and entered the Pakistani embassy. Afghan officials say the group smashed windows and other furniture, but no staff members were hurt. Local security forces quickly evicted the protesters and sealed off the diplomatic mission.

The November 2008 Global Trends 2025 report by Thomas Fingar, the US Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, suggested that "The future of Pakistan is a wildcard in considering the trajectory of neighboring Afghanistan. Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province and tribal areas probably will continue to be poorly governed and the source or supporter of cross-border instability. If Pakistan is unable to hold together until 2025, a broader coalescence of Pashtun tribes is likely to emerge and act together to erase the Durand Line, maximizing Pashtun space at the expense of Punjabis in Pakistan and Tajiks and others in Afghanistan. Alternatively, the Taliban and other Islamist activists might prove able to overawe at least some tribal politics."