Franco-Prussian War - Path to War
By his abilities or his good fortune Napeleen III had contrived to win for himself and for the French people a position in European diplomacy which must have been inconceivable when the French empire disappeared in the wreck of his uncle's fortunes half a century earlier. His successes were, it is true, greatly inferior in magnitude to those of Napoleon I. But they had in common a grandness of conception.
It had been a watchword of Napoleon I that the French people cared little for liberty and much for honour. Napoleon III might well believe it, for he had reaped the reward of his foreign policy at home. Constitutional liberties had been suppressed but the nation, if not content, had seemed to acquiesce. But latterly, as he himself confessed, "black shadows " had appeared. His diplomacy had met with disaster when confronted by the coolness and assurance of Bismarck. Crippled by the Mexican adventure, he had not felt himself in a position to sustain his demands by the forcible arguments on which their cogency depended.
Bismarck was fully aware of the situation. From the moment that Napoleon began to interfere in the questions between Prussia and Austria, the German minister knew that war between Prussia and France would be the natural outcome. It was because of this danger, that could not be postponed for over-long, that Bismarck worked with all his energy to accomplish not only the consolidation of the North German Confederation, but also, if possible, to draw closer the civil and military relations of the North and South German States ; and he had also to procure the neutrality of the European Powers.
The cause of the rupture was an international " incident " manufactured by the diplomatists, the Press, and heated popular rumours in both countries. For years the people of Spain had been torn by the internecine struggle of the Carlist wars, and misgovernment reigned supreme. At the head of affairs was the Queen Isabella, who was entirely influenced by her confessor, Dom Claret, her paramour, Marfori, and by the clever but injurious influence of a nun, Petrocuno. Affairs of State depended upon the camarilla; whilst the generals of the army were banished not individually but in batches. By September, 1868, Spain could endure no longer. General Prim * raised revolt at Cadiz on the 17th, and Isabella fled to France on the 3Oth. A provisional government was immediately established, with Serrano as president and Prim head of the War Office ; while the electors were called upon to settle the government. The Constituent Cortes finally decided on May 2ist, 1869, in favour of a Constitutional monarchy : a decision which was easy enough ; but the difficult question arose as to whom they were to elect as Constitutional monarch.
There were four candidates. Carlos VII. claimed his rights from Pau, but was regarded as quite impossible. An obvious candidate (see pedigree, p. 41) was the Duc de Montpensier, but to elect him would, as Prim well knew, offend the august Emperor of France. The King of Italy was applied to, but he resolutely refused to accept on behalf of his second son. General Prim therefore proposed Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, brother of the Prince of Roumania, and thus unwittingly started the fire that was to blaze round the French empire. Prince Leopold was related through the families of Murat and Beauharnais to Napoleon himself ; and, though a subject of the King of Prussia, he was not related closely to the royal family. Besides this, he was a Catholic, and would therefore be most acceptable to the Spanish people. At first the prince refused, but finally agreed on condition that the head of his house, King William of Prussia, gave his entire consent.
The news was equally a shock to the pride of the French people and to the diplomacy of the French Court. The inconvenience of having a representative of Prussian interests behind the Pyrenees, the disparagement of French influence, which had been exerted in favour of another candidate, the personal resentment of the Bonapartes at the honour done to a house with whom they had a private quarrel, overcame considerations of policy. On July 4th the Duc de Grammont declared that " France would not tolerate the establishment of a Hohenzollern or any other Prussian prince on the throne of Spain." Bismarck pointed out that the question had nothing to do with Prussia as a nation, but was a purely private affair for the King as head of the House of Hohenzollern. This only increased the intense suspense of the French people, who waited impatiently to hear what the Prussian King would say to their minister, Benedetti. He said much the same as Bismarck had already said. At the same time Lord Granville suggested, both to Bismarck and to Prim, that the withdrawal of Leopold's candidature was an obvious way of preserving the peace.
On July 12th, after ten days of intense excitement, Leopold withdrew his candidature. Ollivier proclaimed that France had gained a brilliant and bloodless victory. But there seemed room for doubt as to the terms of the withdrawal, and the Imperialists thirsted for further triumphs. When it appeared that the Prussian Government refused all responsibility and took the view that the Prince had acted on his own initiative, the Duc de Grammont proposed that the Prussian King should signify his assent and give some guarantee for the future. Benedetti, the French ambassador, was entrusted with the mission. The King expressed his approval of the action of Prince Hohenzollern but would give no promise, and the request for another interview was refused. The news was sent to Bismarck in a long telegram, which he forwarded in an abbreviated form to the Prussian envoys at different courts.
Germany was convulsed with amusement at the rebuke to the French ambassador, and France was roused to a passion of resentment which decided the Cabinet in favour of war. It has been supposed that Bismarck's modified version of the telegram was the deciding factor. It was not, in fact, materially different or more humiliating than the original. His conversation, on the same day, with the British ambassador, in which he compared the French to robbers revealed by a flash of lightning, shows that he was resolute for war. But the French ministers must bear a part of the blame. M. Ollivier, in words which have become historic, said that he accepted the challenge of Prussia " with a light heart." Napoleon, urged by his wife, yielded to the demands of the nation. He probably realized that the die was cast and on this war depended the fate of himself, his Empress, and the future welfare of the Prince Imperial. The Government took immediate steps to " safeguard the interests and honour of France." All ideas of arbitration were swept on one side. The declaration of war reached Berlin on July 19th.
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